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Abstract 
This dissertation argues that moral error theory is the most plausible metaethical 
theory if we assume the truth of cognitivism about moral judgments and the moral 
statements that express them. According to moral error theory, various moral 
statements carry a non-negotiable commitment to a robust kind of categorical moral 
normativity, which means that this commitment cannot be denied on pains of 
changing the subject. Unfortunately, there is no such robust categorical moral 
normativity, at least not in the actual world. This entails that these moral statements 
are always untrue, or ‘in error’. 
In arguing for moral error theory, the thesis first argues that the standard 
argumentative strategy for establishing moral discourse’s non-negotiable 
commitment—viz., forging a relation of conceptual entailment between moral 
statements and the statement that there exists robust categorical moral normativity—
is highly problematic. It also argues that forging a presupposition relation can work, 
but that error theorists are best advised to pursue a completely new strategy, which 
uses a relation of metaphysical entailment. The dissertation then argues that moral 
discourse metaphysically entails robust moral categorical normativity and proceeds 
to present a new argument against its existence. According to this argument, various 
sorts of hypothetical and categorical normativity exist because these can be 
grounded in a naturalistically respectable metaphysic; unfortunately, categorical 
moral normativity cannot be so grounded.  
Finally, the dissertation explores an often ignored answer to the following 
question: what (prudentially) should we with our error-riddled moral discourse? I 
argue for revolutionary cognitivism. This is the view that we should continue to use 
moral language and fully believe what we say but that what we say should be 
purged of its error. We should revolutionize our moral thought and start to conceive 
of morality’s normativity in a less robust way than we currently do.   
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Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents  .................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Moral Error Theory  ...................................................... 1 
1.1  Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
1.2  The Metaethical Debate and Moral Error Theory ....................................... 1 
1.3  Rival Metaethical Theories  ...................................................................... 10 
1.3.1  Cognitivist Theories ...................................................................... 11 
1.3.2  Non-cognitivist Theories  .............................................................. 16 
1.3.3  Further Theories  ........................................................................... 18 
1.4  Problems for Moral Error Theory  ............................................................ 20 
1.5  Conclusion and Preview  ........................................................................... 22 
Chapter 2 Existing Error Theories  ....................................................................... 23 
2.1  Introduction ............................................................................................... 23 
2.2  J.L. Mackie  ............................................................................................... 23 
2.2.1  Mackie's Early Moral Skepticism  ................................................ 23 
2.2.2  Mackie's Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim  ............................ 27 
2.2.3  Mackie's Substantive Claim  ......................................................... 38 
2.2.4  Mackie's Solution  ......................................................................... 52 
2.3  Richard Joyce  ........................................................................................... 57 
2.3.1  Joyce's Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim  ............................... 57 
2.3.2  Joyce's Substantive Claim  ............................................................ 73 
2.3.3  Joyce's Solution  ............................................................................ 81 
2.4  Other Error Theories  ................................................................................ 84 
2.5  Conclusion and Preview  ........................................................................... 90 
Chapter 3 Options for Error Theorists  ................................................................ 91 
3.1  Introduction ............................................................................................... 91 
3.2  The Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim ................................................. 92 
3.2.1  Entailment  .................................................................................... 93 
3.2.1.1  Logical Entailment  ........................................................... 94 
3.2.1.2  Conceptual Entailment  ..................................................... 95 
3.2.1.3  Metaphysical Entailment  .................................................. 97 
- vii - 
3.2.2  Implicature  ................................................................................... 99 
3.2.2.1  Conversational Implicature  .............................................. 99 
3.2.2.2  Conventional Implicature  ............................................... 100 
3.2.3  Presupposition  ............................................................................ 103 
3.3  The Substantive Thesis ........................................................................... 107 
3.4  Error-riddled Moral Discourse ................................................................ 109 
3.5  After Moral Error Theory ....................................................................... 110 
3.6  Conclusion and Preview  ......................................................................... 112 
Chapter 4 Conceptual Entailment and Presuppostion ...................................... 113 
4.1  Introduction ............................................................................................. 113 
4.2  A New Objection to the Entailment Claim  ............................................ 113 
4.3  Entailment and Pragmatics  ..................................................................... 121 
4.4  Against Conceptual Entailment .............................................................. 123 
4.5  Against Presupposition ........................................................................... 129 
4.6  Conclusion and Preview  ......................................................................... 132 
Chapter 5 Metaphysical Entailment  .................................................................. 133 
5.1  Introduction ............................................................................................. 133 
5.2  Platitudes ................................................................................................. 134 
5.3  The Metaphysical Entailment Claim ....................................................... 140 
5.3.1  Categorical Moral Normativity  .................................................. 140 
5.3.2  Categorical Moral Normativity in the Rationality-Involving 
Sense  ........................................................................................... 146 
5.4  Doing With Less  .................................................................................... 155 
5.5  Conclusion and Preview  ......................................................................... 158 
Chapter 6 Categorical Moral Normativity in the Rationality-Involving 
Sense  ............................................................................................................. 159 
6.1  Introduction ............................................................................................. 159 
6.2  Grounding Procedural+ Normativity  ..................................................... 163 
6.2.1  Functional Norms  ....................................................................... 163 
6.2.2  Problems and Solutions  .............................................................. 168 
6.3  Norms of Prudence and Epistemology  ................................................... 174 
6.3.1  Norms of Prudence ...................................................................... 174 
6.3.2  Norms of Epistemology .............................................................. 182 
6.4  Procedural+ Categorical Moral Normativity?  ........................................ 187 
6.4.1  Do Procedural+ Rational Requirements Entail Categorical 
Moral Requirements?  .................................................................. 187 
- viii - 
6.4.2  Can Categorical Moral Norms be Grounded in the 
Functional Profile of Human Psychologies?  ............................... 195 
6.5  Looking Elsewhere ................................................................................. 198 
6.6  Conclusion and Preview  ......................................................................... 209 
Chapter 7 Further Objections to Moral Error Theory  .................................... 210 
7.1  Introduction  ............................................................................................ 210 
7.2  Quick Objections, Quick Replies  ........................................................... 210 
7.3  Honesty  .................................................................................................. 212 
7.4  Pervasiveness  ......................................................................................... 214 
7.5  The Non-Aribtrariness Constraint and Metaphysical Possibility ........... 217 
7.6  Conclusion and Preview  ......................................................................... 219 
Chapter 8 Revolutionary Cognitivism  ............................................................... 220 
8.1  Introduction  ............................................................................................ 220 
8.2  Psychology, Semantics, Epistemology, Benefits  ................................... 220 
8.3  Objections and Replies  ........................................................................... 232 
8.3.1  A Collapse Into Realism?............................................................ 232 
8.3.2  Feasibility  ................................................................................... 233 
8.3.3  Doxastic Involuntarism  .............................................................. 236 
8.4  Comparing Revolutionary Cognitivism with Other Views  .................... 238 
8.4.1  Abolitionism ................................................................................ 238 
8.4.2  Fictionalism ................................................................................. 239 
8.4.3  Preservatism ................................................................................ 241 
8.5  Conclusion  ............................................................................................. 243 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 244 
 
- 1 - 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: Moral Error Theory 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces moral error theory.1 It explains the general metaethical 
debate and how error theory fits into that debate (§1.2). It also explores rival 
metaethical theories and explains how error theory responds to those theories (§1.3). 
Both of these sections introduce key terms and concepts that are used throughout the 
dissertation. The chapter continues to discuss problems for error theory (§1.4). 
Solving these problems is an important task for the remainder of the dissertation. A 
final section concludes and looks ahead (§1.5).  
1.2 The Metaethical Debate and Moral Error Theory 
The metaethical debate contrasts with but is related to the debate about normative 
ethics. Their relation lies in the fact that they are both elements of the philosophical 
explanation of morality, which is an explanation of which actions are right and 
wrong (normative component) as well as where morality comes from and why we 
should care about it (metaethical component).2  
Which types of actions are included in the explanation? For my purposes in 
this and the next few chapters I will make use of the idea that we can ‘recognize the 
moral when we see it’.3 For instance, we all recognize that causing an innocent child 
to undergo a prolonged and excruciatingly painful death is a morally relevant action 
                                            
1 I will often abbreviate moral error theory to ‘error theory’; unless I compare moral 
error theory with other kinds of error theory, such as error theory about mathematics 
(Field 1989) or colour (Ellis 2006), in which case I will write moral error theory.  
2 Egan (2007: 206). This distinguishes philosophical ethics from such related fields 
as sociological and theological ethics, which study, respectively, which moral rules 
people as a matter of fact accept or have accepted and which moral rules accord with 
a particular religion. 
3 Joyce (2001: 67, 75); Mackie (1977: 29); Brink (1986: 29). Similarly, Shafer-
Landau (2003: 80) writes that we “know [the natural] when we see it” much like we 
can recognize “the pornographic” when we see it. Also see Papineau (2007).  
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(and indeed a moral kind of wrongness, if anything is).4 By contrast, and other 
things being equal, we all recognize that believing that grass is red in the face of 
(known) conclusive evidence that grass is not red is not morally relevant (it is an 
epistemic kind of wrongness, if anything is). If other things aren’t equal, such as 
when the devil has promised me that he will cause an innocent child to undergo a 
prolonged and excruciatingly painful death unless I believe that grass is red in the 
face of (known) conclusive evidence that grass is not red, then the question of 
whether to believe that grass is red becomes morally relevant (and the wrongness of 
not believing that grass is red will be moral and not epistemic).  
I leave the content of morality vague at this part of the dissertation because a 
precise delineation of its boundaries requires careful discussion that is most 
naturally introduced in later chapters.5 Moreover, that discussion would be 
distracting in the present chapter, which aims to explain and introduce error theory. 
As will become clear, this aim can be attained almost solely on the basis of 
reflections on the status of morality, thus without reflections on its content or 
subject-matter.  
I continue with my explanation of the metaethical debate. Both metaethics 
and normative ethics partake in the philosophical explanation of morality. Their 
difference lies in the fact that, roughly speaking, normative ethical theories concern 
the first part of the philosophical explanation of morality (which actions are right 
and wrong?) whereas metaethical theories concern its second part (where does 
morality come from and why should we care about it?).6  
                                            
4 This example is due to Shafer-Landau (2003: 207). Copp (2007: 119) uses it as 
well. I will more often use the example of the wrongness of stealing for ease of 
exposition (and because I find Shafer-Landau’s example distasteful). See Singer 
(1972: 231) for another example of an obvious moral truth; viz., that avoidable, 
undeserved human suffering is morally bad.  
5 One of many issues is that an ‘other-regarding’ conception of the content of moral 
norms is inconsistent with what some regard as our moral obligation not to kill 
ourselves. It is sometimes argued that the moral concerns other-regarding behaviour 
and that the ethical allows for more inclusive evaluations of agents, including their 
self-directed actions. I will however, pace Williams (1985a: 6) and Skorupski (1999: 
1) but with Enoch (2011a: 2), use the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ interchangeably 
6 This is ‘roughly speaking’ because philosophers disagree about what, exactly, is 
included in ethical and metaethical theorizing (Enoch 2011a: 17, 41, 49). Moreover, 
some paradigmatically normative ethical theories like rule consequentialism can 
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Normative ethical theories enumerate which actions are right or wrong and 
explain why they are right or wrong.7 One but by no means the only possible way in 
which philosophers proceed in this regard is by providing a Theory of the Good and 
a Theory of the Right. Hedonistic Utilitarians, for instance, might claim that what is 
good is pleasure and that what is right is to maximize pleasure. Armed with this 
theory, Hedonistic Utilitarians can enumerate which actions are right and wrong 
(because right actions maximize pleasure, wrong ones don’t) and explain why that is 
so (because their theories of the Good and the Right are justified).   
Metaethical theories, by contrast, are theories about the nature or status of 
moral reality itself, not about which action types or tokens are morally right or 
wrong and why. Metaethicists are concerned with the ontological status of moral 
truths, if indeed there are any (moral metaphysics).8 They are also concerned with 
our epistemic access to these moral truths, again if there are any (moral 
epistemology) as well as with the nature of moral judgments (moral psychology) and 
moral statements (moral semantics), which undeniably exist.9  
In an attempt to reach an overall theory of the status of morality, which 
includes an account of the nature of our judgments and statements about it, 
                                                                                                                           
also be understood as metaethical proposals about the nature of moral facts (Copp 
2010: 142; cf. Enoch 2011a: 46-7, 47n60). I use this (simplified) understanding of 
normative ethics unapologetically as I use it solely for the purpose of introducing 
metaethics and through that error theory. What I think of as the correct relation 
between normative ethics and metaethics is one of my topics in the final chapter of 
this dissertation. 
7 Darwall et al. (1992: 181). Note that normative ethics deals with deontic concepts 
like RIGHT and WRONG, evaluative concepts such as GOOD and BAD, and thick 
concepts like BRAVE and COURAGEOUS (henceforth I use SMALL CAPS when I talk 
about concepts).  
8 Darwall et al. (1992: 126). Jackson (1998: 1-5) talks about the location problem 
for ethics.  
9 That is, it is undeniable that there are judgments about morally relevant matters, 
such as judgments about stealing and killing and it is also undeniable that some of 
these judgments become statements by being uttered or inscribed (what is deniable, 
for instance, is whether the moral terms in such statements make a separate 
contribution to their meaning—Ayer 1936). Note that an accidentally uttered string 
of words—e.g., by someone who has no knowledge of the English language—that 
sounds like ‘stealing is morally wrong’ is not a moral statement, nor is a similarly 
accidentally inscribed string of letters ‘stealing is morally wrong’ (Putnam 1992; 
Glassen 1959; Joyce 2001: 12-3). The list of metaethical topics given in the text is 
not meant to be exhaustive. For instance, Gill (2008: 99) adds moral phenomenology 
to this list. Also see Miller (2013: 2).  
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metaethicists take up two jobs. The first job is to present the most accurate account 
of moral discourse as possible.10 Metaethicists must account for our actual moral 
discourse and practice in a way that does justice to its deeply entrenched features 
(perhaps shoring up any wrinkles or inconsistencies in the process). For example, if 
in making moral statements we are expressing pro- and con-attitudes towards 
actions which are not (correspondence) truth-apt, then this feature of moral 
discourse has to be part of our overall metaethical theory.11 However, if instead what 
we are doing in making moral statements is trying to describe a mind-independent 
moral reality so that our statements are correspondence truth-apt then that has to be 
part of our metaethical theory.  
The rationale behind doing this first job is that metaethicists want to make 
sure they are talking about, and ultimately vindicating or debunking, the real thing—
moral discourse. They don’t, and shouldn’t, want to be talking about and ultimately 
vindicating or debunking something that looks a lot like moral discourse but on 
                                            
10 I define moral discourse as including not only ethical talk but also ethical beliefs, 
reactions, a sense of obligation and more besides (Hartcourt 2005: 251; Evans and 
Shah 2012: 85). Even so it is not entirely clear what ‘ordinary moral discourse’ or 
‘folk morality’ is. Is it “unreflective bourgeois morality” (Nagel 1986: 166), an 
ideally cleaned-up version of that (Jackson 1998), different still? I present my own 
account in Chapter 5.  
11 I add ‘correspondence’ to truth aptitude because pro- and con-attitudes might be 
truth-apt in a more minimal way. This may happen for instance when disciplined 
syntacticism is true. According to disciplined syntacticism, so long as a sentence is 
suitably well-behaved—i.e., so long as it can be embedded in propositional attitude-
contexts and plays an appropriate role in conditionals, logical inferences and the 
like—then it is truth-apt (Boghossian 1990: 161-7). Henceforth, for simplicity I’ll 
sometimes talk about moral judgments and sentences being truth-apt although the 
notions of truth and falsity apply in the first instance to moral propositions. 
(Propositions are thought to be (any combination of): (i) the meanings of sentences, 
(ii) the referents of that-clauses, (iii) the (primary) bearers of truth-value, and (iv) 
the objects of beliefs and other ‘propositional attitudes’ such as hopes and fears; 
McGrath (2012: §1); Williamson (2007: 15). There are two main theories of 
propositions: propositions can be conceived of as complexes of senses or abstract 
entities (Fregean propositions) or as complexes of ordinary concrete objects that are 
the referents of our words (Russellian propositions). It will not matter for my 
purposes which view of propositions we shall keep in mind, as both are congenial to 
moral error theory. Russellian moral propositions are flawed if the referents of our 
words (moral facts and properties) don’t exist; Fregean moral propositions are 
flawed when its senses have an empty extension.) 
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closer inspection in fact just isn’t the real thing (call this schmoral discourse).12  
Methodologically, metaethicists conduct quasi-empirical investigations into 
the features of moral discourse but also employ traditional analyses of moral 
concepts. Quasi-realist empirical investigations are investigations of the 
metaethicist’s own experiences with and intuitions about moral discourse.13 Such 
investigations by no means reach the currently accepted standards in the sciences for 
empirical research. But they are useful, and often accepted, so I will make use of 
them as well.  
One way in which the metaethicist could go wrong in this regard is when she 
projects her pre-conceived or professionally invested theoretical commitments unto 
moral discourse. Another difficulty for the metaethicist is that moral discourse 
contains various aspects that are to various extents superficial, inessential, 
contradictory and misleading.14 This is where the question of how inconsistencies in 
moral discourse are to be shored up becomes relevant. For what does the most 
accurate picture of moral discourse look like if moral discourse itself contains 
contradictory elements? I will have a lot to say about this in Chapter 5; here I 
continue with my rough explanation of metaethics and through that error theory.  
The second task for metaethicists is to come up with a theory of morality’s 
nature and status that accounts for these commitments of moral discourse and that is 
philosophically respectable. An important aspect of a theory’s philosophical 
respectability is its ability to meet the constraints of metaphysical naturalism; the 
ontological doctrine according to which, roughly, the only facts and properties that 
exist are natural facts and properties.15 Other constraints include the theory’s 
                                            
12 Joyce (2007b, MS). The first reference to schmoralizing that I know of occurs in 
Blackburn (1984).  
13 See Johnston (1987); Robinson (2009: 321); Dunaway et al. (forthcoming); 
Marks (2013: 9); Finlay (2008b: 136) for a defence of this methodology.   
14 Anscombe (1958); Kirchin (2010). 
15 Or at least this is a common assumption; see, e.g., Timmons (1999); Scanlon 
(2009); Miller (2013). Influential accounts of what makes a property a natural 
property cite their causal efficacy (Parfit 2012 Vol2: 305-6) or the nature of our 
epistemic access to them (Copp 2012: 28-9). A different take on natural properties 
doesn’t specify a feature that they all have in common (what, for example, is the 
causal efficacy of the property of belonging to a certain species, which probably 
counts as a natural property?). This is the disciplinary approach according to which 
the natural is defined in terms of the subject matter of various disciplines (Shafer-
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parsimony and explanatory power.  
Let’s give these projects names. Call the first part of the metaethicist’s job 
the project of internal accommodation (because it is concerned with questions 
internal to our moral practice). And call the second part the project of external 
accommodation (because it is concerned with questions external to our moral 
practice).
16
  
The error theorist’s distinctive metaethical claim can now be understood. It is 
that it is impossible to do full justice to both the internal and external 
accommodation projects within the following constraints. For moral discourse to be 
moral discourse, error theorists argue, we have to acknowledge the existence of a 
moral reality, sufficiently robustly understood, that is the truth-maker of our moral 
beliefs and moral statements.17 To say that moral discourse could still be moral 
discourse if we denied its commitment to a robust moral reality that supplies the 
truth-makers for our moral beliefs would be to fail at the internal accommodation 
project. That would be to cease talking about moral discourse and to start talking 
about schmoral discourse. Unfortunately, error theorists continue, accepting this as 
an essential part of the internal accommodation project makes a successful external 
accommodation project impossible. For a robust moral reality would be inconsistent 
with metaphysical naturalism, or cannot be accounted for in a philosophically 
respectable way more generally.  
I have so far described moral error theory as taking ordinary moral discourse 
as its object. There is a purely explanatory reason for doing that in this introductory 
chapter: moral error theories have traditionally been formulated with ordinary moral 
                                                                                                                           
Landau 2003: 58). I present my own take on metaphysical naturalism in Chapter 6. 
Also, I understand facts to register the instantiation of properties (Shafer-Landau 
2003: 65; Horgan and Timmons 2008b: 270-3); natural facts register the 
instantiation of natural properties and moral facts, if they exist, register the 
instantiation of moral properties.  
16 Taken, with adaptations, from Timmons (1999: 12); also see Southwood (2010: 
8-9); Nichols (2004: 168). Not all metaethical theories have been constructed with 
these desiderata in mind; Timmons mentions McDowell (1985) and Platts (1991).  
17 Exactly how we should understand this notion of robustness is a difficult matter, 
and will be topic of much that is to follow, starting with a discussion of Mackie’s 
and Joyce’s versions of moral error theory in Chapter 2.  
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discourse as the object of their scepticism.18 But there is a justifying reason as well. 
This is that we have to get our account of what moral properties are like from 
somewhere. After all, a metaethical account of morality according to which moral 
goodness is analysed as something that is “pink with yellow trimmings” so that 
moral goodness can be argued to exist because there are pink things with yellow 
trimmings, it will be agreed on all sides, cannot be accepted as a vindication of 
moral goodness.19 The question is though: wherefrom do we get our account of what 
morality would have to look like to count as morality if not from the way we think 
and talk about morality; viz., from moral psychology and moral language?20 The 
difficulty of answering that question explains why error theories take moral 
discourse as the object of their scepticism.  
This reasoning notwithstanding, there are error theories that focus on 
something other than ordinary moral discourse. First, we can formulate an error 
theory about morality itself, either conceived of as a collection of entities including 
ought facts and moral properties, or as a system of rules, or again as a doctrine or 
ideology.21 When error theorists focus on morality itself as opposed to moral 
discourse they have to be careful how they formulate their theory. For there is a 
good sense in which it is undeniable that various such moralities exist, at least when 
                                            
18 See Mackie (1977). One explanatory hypothesis for this fact is that Mackie 
worked in an era in which philosophy of language was considered to be the first 
philosophy (Burge 1992). So although his moral error theory reacts to that idea in a 
way by giving metaphysics more weight than the ordinary language philosophers 
concerned with metaethics before him, he still found it natural to start with a careful 
analysis of moral language couched in moral statements. Also, note that the term 
skepticism has at least two senses in contemporary philosophy. The first is one that 
denotes a mental stance of withholding judgment on an issue because one finds the 
considerations for two mutually inconsistent claims about an issue to be equally 
compelling (Pyrrhonian skepticism). The other sense of ‘skepticism’ is one that 
denotes a mental stance of positively rejecting a certain claim because it lacks 
sufficient justification (Cartesian skepticism). In this thesis ‘skepticism’ will be 
understood in the latter sense of the term. 
19 Stevenson (1937: 14). The implausible idea that words can mean whatever we 
wish for them to mean is known as Humpty Dumpty’s Dictum (Jackson 1998: 118; 
Schroeder 2007: 73-5). Also see Joyce on defining reasons as creatures that live in 
the forest (2001: 87) and Copp on defining heat as a cabbage or a king (2012: 47).   
20 Wedgwood (2001: 1-4).  
21 Clark (2009: 204); Cuneo (2012: 126-30).  
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these are understood as not epistemically endorsed.22 That is, the error theorist 
should not deny that there exist moralities such as Christian Ethics and Moorean 
Intuitionism, as long as is what is meant by that claim is that what is being 
quantified over are people’s false beliefs and patterns of behaviour. What such error 
theorists should (and do) deny is that such beliefs should be endorsed (where the 
‘should’ is a non-moral, epistemic should to avoid self-refutation). This 
complication comes in addition to that which such error theorists face regarding the 
issue of how they are going to delineate their subject matter. They do not get their 
account of what morality looks like from considerations of the workings of moral 
language and moral psychology; but then where do they get this account from?  
A further possibility for an error theory that doesn’t focus on ordinary moral 
discourse is to formulate an error theory about philosophers’ conceptions of 
morality.23 A final possibility is an “amalgam or fusion of [philosophical and folk 
conceptions of morality].”24 In what follows, for ease of exposition and following 
the current trend in the literature, I will take an error theory of folk moral discourse 
as my main example of moral error theory.  
To sum up the discussion so far, moral error theory maintains that moral 
discourse is in error because it carries an essential or non-negotiable commitment to 
a robust kind of moral reality, the denial of which would change the subject from 
moral to schmoral discourse.25 It also maintains that this commitment is flawed, for 
example because it violates metaphysical naturalism.26 Since moral discourse 
consists of various sorts of moral judgments and statements, including, but certainly 
not limited to, ‘stealing is morally wrong’ and ‘keeping promises is morally 
obligatory’, moral judgments and statements too are flawed. This gets us the 
                                            
22 Joyce (2007b: 64).  
23 Mackie (1977: 35). This option was also on Hare’s mind when he wrote that 
although many philosophers “have thought that moral words connoted [a robustly 
understood moral reality]” he didn’t believe that “ordinary people, innocent of any 
philosophy, are the whole time committing the same error” (1981: 78-9).  
24 Blackburn (2005: 327).  
25 The term ‘non-negotiable commitment’ is Joyce’s (2001: 4, 97).  
26 I use the term ‘flawed’ as a catch-all phrase for all the different ways in which 
moral discourse, or the statements that comprise it, can be ‘in error’: so moral 
statements can be false, untrue, neither true nor false, etc. I canvass all the options in 
Chapter 3.  
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following preliminary formulation of moral error theory: 
 
Moral Error Theory 
P1 Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim:  
Moral statements and judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to a 
robustly understood moral reality  
P2  Substantive Claim:  
This commitment is flawed  
P3  Auxiliary Claim: 
If moral discourse carries a false non-negotiable commitment then it is itself 
flawed
27
 
C Conclusion 
Moral discourse is flawed: the statements and judgments comprising it are 
‘in error’ [From P1, P2, P3]
28
  
 
Almost all contemporary moral error theories operate in much like this 
way.
29
 In the remainder of this chapter I discuss the main rivals of error theory 
                                            
27 In contrast with almost everyone else in the field, Evans and Shah (2012: 86n13) 
argue that P3 is required for the argument to go through. I agree. If we think that the 
non-negotiable commitment of moral discourse is to a robustly understood notion of 
a moral reality then perhaps moral statements cannot be correctly asserted relative to 
the ‘correspondence-truth norm’, according to which moral judgments are correctly 
assertible if and only if there exist moral properties that are the truth-makers of these 
judgments. But that doesn’t rule out the possibility that they can be correctly 
asserted relative to the ‘norm of usefulness’, according to which moral judgments 
are correctly assertible if and only if they are useful (for instance, because they 
facilitate human cooperation—see Mackie 1977: Ch.5). For moral judgments can 
still be useful even when they are false (Timmons 1999: 79; Wright 1996: 3; 1922: 
10; also see Miller 2002). Auxiliary Claim saves Conclusion because it rules out this 
possibility.   
28 Error theories are sometimes presented with a fourth step; the so-called 
explanatory step, which aims to explain why we hold the moral beliefs that we do 
and why we have had them for so long even though they are also false. Mackie 
employs his projectivist theory of morality, whereas Joyce appeals to our 
evolutionary history; Mackie (1977: 42); Joyce (2001: Ch.6, 2006). I argue that this 
step is logically superfluous for Mackie’s error theory in §2.2.3. The same holds, by 
implication, for Joyce’s theory and my own.  
29 Different ways of arguing for error theory will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Some moral error theorists I won’t discuss in much detail (but which are worth 
mentioning to get a sense of the presence of the theory in the literature) include 
Hinckfuss (1987), Biehl (2008); Garner (1994, 2010); Burgess (2010); Pigden 
(2010); Williams (1985a); Marks (2013). Historical figures that can be interpreted as 
error theorists avant la lettre include: Ramsey (1990); Hume (1739-40, 1751) 
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(§1.3). I also explain the main objections to error theory (§1.4). The remainder of the 
dissertation aims to show that an error theory that undertakes relevantly different 
commitments from the existing error theories I discuss in the next chapter can avoid 
many of these objections. It will also argue that my formulation of error theory can 
handle objections that apply specifically to it. This amounts to a sustained defence of 
error theory.  
Before doing this, however, there is one terminological issue to resolve. 
Some philosophers regard theories according to which there are moral facts and 
properties and according to which it is just that the folk have false beliefs about 
these properties as “moderate” error theories.30 I regard these as success theories: 
there are moral facts and properties after all, it is just that the folk have false beliefs 
about what those properties are.31 I don’t want to imply that such theories aren’t an 
interesting addition to the metaethical landscape. I just won’t be concerned with 
them in this thesis because I think that the folk’s mistake about morality is stronger 
than this. 
1.3 Rival Metaethical Theories 
Typically, error theorists are cognitivists about moral judgments, believing that 
moral judgments are or express beliefs and that moral statements are truth-apt.
32
 
Error theories are also anti-realists about (the subject-matter of) those moral 
judgments. Hence the main rivals of error theory are cognitivist realists (§1.3.1) and 
non-cognitivist anti-realists (§1.3.2). Recent work in metaethics has also generated 
contenders that don’t fit nicely into either of these camps. An example of such a 
theory will be discussed as well (§1.3.3).  
                                                                                                                           
according to Olson (2011c); Nietzsche (1883-88) according to Pigden (2010: 20); 
Russell (1922); Protagoras according to Hare (1999). Smith (2006) has offered 
arguments for moral error theory without embracing it. Hussain (2010: 342-4) 
formulates a non-cognitivist version of moral error theory. 
30 Olson (MS: 14); also see Kahane (2013: 150); Miller (2009); cf. Shafer-Landau 
(2003: 17); Hussain (2010).  
31 The term ‘success theory’ was first introduced into the debate by Sayre-McCord 
(1986).  
32 See, e.g., Schroeder (2010: 12-5, 33-4); Miller (2013: 104).  
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1.3.1  Cognitivist Theories 
Cognitivist theories hold that a moral judgment like ‘stealing is wrong’ expresses a 
(usually correspondence) truth-apt proposition about the nature of moral reality. 
Moral judgments either get the value ‘true’ or ‘false’ depending on whether or not 
they aptly describe this moral reality. As cognitivists that are not error theorists hold 
that at least some moral judgments are true, the only cognitivist theories that I will 
discuss in this sub-section are cognitivist realist theories.  
Some cognitivist realists believe that moral judgments are correspondence 
truth-apt and that their truth-makers are supplied by a non-naturalists moral 
metaphysic.33 Typically these theories are completely non-revisionary with respect 
to the internal accommodation project, at least by the error theorist’s lights. For non-
naturalist realist theories can claim that the non-negotiable commitment of moral 
discourse is to a robustly understood mind-independent moral reality. After all, their 
outright acceptance of a non-naturalist moral metaphysic allows them to fully 
vindicate this picture of the status of morality in the external accommodation 
project. One reason for thinking that a non-naturalist metaphysic can be accepted is 
that it makes the best overall sense of our moral practice. A theory like error theory 
that insists on metaphysical naturalism and denies that morality exists loses more 
‘plausibility points’ than a theory that requires us to enlarge our ontology with non-
natural moral properties but is able to retain moral reality.34 The error theorist’s 
response to non-naturalist moral realism, though, is to argue that non-naturalists are 
wrong to think that such a project can succeed.  
There are also naturalist cognitivist realists. They too think that moral truth 
requires truth-makers for correspondence truth-apt moral judgments but they differ 
with non-naturalists about the nature of those truth-makers. For they think that moral 
reality doesn’t require a non-naturalist metaphysic. The only things we need are 
natural facts and properties.  
Naturalist cognitivist realists divide themselves on at least three issues. The 
first is the Analytic/Synthetic issue: 
 
                                            
33 Enoch (2011a); Wedgwood (2007); Moore (1903); Shafer-Landau (2003) on 
some interpretations; Heumer (2005); also see Zangwill (2012: 347). 
34 Enoch (2011a: Ch.10); also see Shafer-Landau (2003: 43).  
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Analytic/Synthetic  
Are moral properties identical or else somehow fully constituted by natural 
properties in virtue of a metaphysical or a semantic relation?
35
 
 
Analytic naturalists think that the second scenario obtains.36 They often argue that 
the fact that moral predicates are semantically equivalent to predicates and sentences 
framed in non-moral (natural) terms do carry implications for the metaphysics of 
moral properties and facts. Standard defences of analytic naturalism assume the 
synonymy test for property identity: if two predicates are synonymous then the 
properties they stand for are identical (or, on a weaker formulation, that the two 
properties stand in a relation of constitution or something relevantly like a 
constitution relation).37 Synthetic naturalists believe that moral properties are 
identical to or wholly constituted by natural properties because moral properties 
themselves are found, by a posteriori rather than a priori means, to be identical to or 
wholly constituted by non-moral (and in this case natural) properties.38  
The second issue is about the reducibility of moral facts and properties:  
 
Reductive/Non-Reductive  
Are moral facts reducible to non-moral (natural) facts, or are they not reducible to 
non-moral (natural) facts and do they exist in their own right?
39
 
                                            
35 Brink (1989: 162); Jackson and Pettit (1995: 28); Nuccetelli and Seay (2012: 
131).   
36 Analytic naturalists include Spencer and Westermarck according to Moore (1903: 
section 29, 97-8; 1922: 332); Bentham (1789: Ch.1); Perry (1926); Sharp (1928); 
Jackson (1998). Note that there is substantial disagreement about “what portions of 
sentences [we should] account predicates” (Armstrong 1978: 2): predicate words 
such as ‘wrong’ and ‘circular’, expansions of these to include connective verbs to 
get ‘is wrong’ and ‘is circular’, or sentence-frames like ‘____ is circular’. In this 
thesis I will write in accordance with the first option, but none of my argumentative 
purposes will be affected if one prefers to keep another option in mind. 
37 Brink (1989).  
38 Note that although “moral properties [may be] natural properties” synthetic 
naturalists often claim that we may not have “non-moral vocabulary [for them]” 
(Olson forthcoming-a: 29). This claim is often denied by analytic moral naturalism 
(Jackson 1998), and constitutes another difference between analytic and synthetic 
naturalism.  
39 Another way to put the point is to say that reductive theories are looking for type-
type property identities whereas non-reductive theories are after something less than 
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Generally speaking, reductionist claims can be more or less reductionist in 
substance. For reductionist claims concerning entities of a kind K imply that Ks 
exist, albeit it that, contrary to the appearances, Ks are really Ys, where Ys are less 
ontologically problematic than and different from what we commonsensically 
assume Ks to be. The degree of departure from the commonsensical understanding 
of what Ks are, by the proposed reduction-base that are the Ys, is what determines 
how reductionist ‘in substance’ the reduction is. For an example consider 
psychological behaviourism.40 Behaviourists are wary of beliefs understood as 
mental states (Ks). But they don’t deny that beliefs exist. Instead they reduce beliefs 
to behavioural dispositions (Ys). The reduction succeeds, claims the behaviourist, 
because enough of our commonsensical convictions about beliefs understood as 
mental states are retained by understanding them as behavioural dispositions. This 
includes, but is not limited to, the conviction that beliefs reliably cause us to act in 
certain ways, and behavioural dispositions do exactly that.  
An example of a reductive view in metaethics is Jackson’s moral 
functionalism, according to which moral properties fully reduce to non-moral (or, as 
he prefers, descriptive) properties because of the specific relation of meaning-
equivalence between moral and descriptive predicates.41 An example of a non-
reductive view is Sturgeon’s moral naturalism according to which moral facts and 
properties feature in our best explanations of the world and are therefore 
naturalistically respectable even though they are not reducible to non-moral (natural) 
properties.
42
 
The reductionism/non-reductionism issue is orthogonal to the 
analytic/synthetic issue. A stance on the latter issue implies nothing about whether 
or not one is or should be a reductionist about the nature of moral properties. 
Synthetic naturalists are free to claim that their a posteriori investigations into the 
nature of moral properties reveals either that they do or don’t reduce to non-moral 
(natural) properties. Likewise, analytic naturalists can claim that correctly carried 
                                                                                                                           
that, such as actual world-instantiation, constitution, realization or tokening of moral 
property types by non-moral, natural features (Bedke 2012: 111).  
40 Cuneo (2007a: 29-30).  
41 Jackson (1998).  
42 Sturgeon (1984). 
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out analyses of moral concepts entail either that moral properties reduce to non-
moral (natural) properties or that they don’t. 
The final issue I want to discuss here is: 
 
Revisionist/Non-Revisionist   
Is the naturalist account of moral discourse and the nature of moral reality fully 
consistent with our honest results in the internal accommodation project or do they 
imply benign revisions of our conception of morality?
43
 
  
Non-revisionist naturalist realists claim that all of the deeply embedded features of 
ordinary moral discourse can be accounted for with naturalistically (or more 
generally philosophically) respectable means.44 Revisionists claim that although a 
naturalistically respectable moral metaphysics cannot account for all of the 
important deeply embedded features of ordinary moral discourse, it can account for 
enough of these so that a kind of morality that doesn’t collapse into a schmorality is 
vindicated after all. In that case the revision is said to be ‘benign’. For instance, 
revisionist naturalist realists might claim that almost all of the deeply embedded 
features of moral discourse can be accounted for purely by reference to natural 
properties, such as morality’s content and motivational force, but that one such 
element, such as morality’s normativity, cannot be so accounted for. Often the 
argument for a benign revision is that the overall philosophical picture of morality 
that entails that morality is real albeit slightly different from how we ordinarily think 
about it is more plausible than an overall philosophical picture of morality according 
to which the failure of the instantiation of the folk conception of morality commits 
us to metaethical nihilism. Lewis claims that a choice between these two accounts 
may be merely a “matter of temperament.”45 Railton’s revisionist naturalism is more 
firmly grounded in a comparison of ‘plausibility points’.46  
How do error theorists argue against naturalist realists? Against analytic 
naturalists, regardless of whether or not they also accept the semantic test for 
                                            
43 Of course there are non-benign revisions, but these would give rise to error 
theories, so I won’t discuss them here. 
44 Copp (2007, 2010).  
45 Lewis (1989: 137). Also see Lewis (1996).  
46 Railton (1986).  
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property identity, they argue that a correctly carried out conceptual analysis reveals 
that conceptual non-naturalism rather than conceptual naturalism is true. Moral 
predicates are not identical to natural predicates—it is at least also part of moral 
concepts that they involve non-naturalist, robustly normative aspects (this reply 
assumes that the error theorist has in hand an account what it takes for a predicate to 
be non-natural and robustly normative). Against the synthetic naturalist error 
theorists argue that their account of moral properties that denies that they would 
have to be part of a robustly understood moral reality ends up being an account of 
schmorality and that any attempt to account for that kind of normativity whilst 
remaining faithful to metaphysical naturalism will be impossible. Against 
revisionary naturalist realism the error theory argues that her proposed benign 
revision of morality is in fact an account of schmorality only.
47
 The reducibility vs. 
non-reducibility issue is not of major importance to the error theorist.48    
In addition to non-naturalist and naturalist realist theories, according to 
which moral judgements are true, when they are true, in virtue of correspondence 
with a non-naturalist or naturalist moral reality, there is a third type of cognitivist 
theories; irrealist cognitivism.49 According to it, moral judgments express beliefs, 
are truth-apt, and sometimes true, but not in virtue of correspondence with worldly 
facts, whether natural or non-natural. Instead, moral judgments are true in virtue of 
nominal facts. (This also means that the nomenclature of ‘irrealism’ is a bit 
confusing, as moral facts are ‘real’ in a sense according to the irrealist; they are only 
not real in the same sense in which classical naturalists and non-naturalists think 
moral facts are real).  
This view is a dangerous competitor to error theory as it insists, with error 
theory, on the non-arbitrariness or objectivity of moral facts without taking that to 
require any sort of metaphysical import whatsoever (this is the work that nominal 
facts are doing in this theory). However, error theory insists in turn that this project 
                                            
47 Revised moral concepts are like “Hamlet without the prince” (Joyce 2007a: §5) 
because the “[original moral] concept is the whole point of the discourse … it 
furnishes us with something authoritative that the wimpified [revised] surrogate 
[concept] cannot” (Joyce MS: 14). Also see Jackson (1998: 45).  
48 There are many other objections to naturalist cognitivist realism, such as Fine’s 
(2002: 253) argument that naturalist theories entail the collapse of various kinds of 
necessity that should be kept distinct.  
49 Skorupski (1999, 2010).  
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must fail; that only a moral metaphysic existing at least partially outside of us and 
that we aim to be responsive to when we make moral judgments can account for the 
deeply embedded features of folk moral discourse. My own argument against 
irrealist cognitivism can be found in §6.5.  
A final category of cognitivist theories that error theorists have to respond to 
is that of constructivism. According to constructivism there exist moral facts in 
virtue of ‘constructive’ efforts of moral agents. Moral facts are worldly facts alright, 
but unlike classical naturalist and non-naturalist theories they are also mind-
dependent.50 Examples are contractualist and contractarian theories.51 
Contractarianism is associated with Gauthier’s self-interested theory of agreements 
and contracts.52 Contractualism is associated with Scanlon’s theory of agreements 
and contracts that is rooted in a standing desire to be moral that can come apart from 
whether moral behaviour is (always or usually) in the agent’s self-interest.53 Since 
constructivists believe that moral facts are in an important respect mind-dependent, 
error theorists can respond by insisting that the mind-dependence of moral facts 
strays too far from the picture of morality as we get it from a fairly executed internal 
accommodation project.   
1.3.2  Non-cognitivist Theories 
In addition to cognitivist rivals error theory also has non-cognitivist rivals. These 
will now be discussed.  
A radical non-cognitivist theory is Ayer’s, according to which moral 
judgments take a non-cognitive psychology and according to which a moral 
statement like ‘stealing is morally wrong’ means something like ‘boo! stealing’.54 In 
                                            
50 O’Neill (1988/9: 3); Timmons (1999: 72); James (2007: 302); Heathwood (2012: 
2); Shafer-Landau (2003: 14).   
51 Scanlon (2009, Lecture 4: 16) argues that contractualist theories are examples of 
constructivist theories only if the term ‘constructivism’ is taken in a sufficiently 
broad sense. Shafer-Landau and Cuneo (2007: 81) also puts Harman’s moral 
relativism down as a constructivist metaethical theory, as it holds that moral 
properties are conferred on things by actual moral agents. Harman views morality 
“as a compromise based on implicit bargaining” between agents (1975: 13).   
52 Gauthier (1986).  
53 Scanlon (1998). This distinction between contractualism and contractarianism is 
Darwall’s (2002).  
54 Ayer (1936); also see Stevenson (1937). See Joyce (2001: 201) for discussion.   
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making this claim Ayer makes the following transition from psychology to 
semantics. Because moral judgments aren’t beliefs (psychological claim) and 
because it is this non-cognitive attitude that gets expressed by our public moral 
utterances (positive semantic claim), a further, negative semantic claim follows. 
This is the claim that moral predicates are only syntactically predicates; they don’t 
function to pick out a property and their only semantic function is to indicate that a 
certain desire-state or emotion is present.55 As we will see, not making this transition 
from psychological to particular semantic claims opens up logical space for 
metaethical theories that do not fit in the ‘cognitivist realist’ vs. ‘non-cognitivist 
anti-realist’ dichotomy (§1.3.3). Here however I focus on traditional non-cognitivist 
anti-realist theories. 
The non-cognitivist camp also includes less radical, quasi-realist non-
cognitivist theories such as Blackburn’s.56 Their view is ‘less radical’ because they 
try to ‘earn the right’ to talk about moral truth, moral reality, et cetera, even though 
notions of moral truth, moral reality, et cetera play no fundamental role in the 
explanation of moral judgments. One way in which they try to accomplish this task 
whilst steering clear of attaching metaphysical commitments to ordinary moral talk 
is by taking “what seems like a thought that embodies a particular second-order 
metaphysic of morals … as a kind of thought that expresses a first-order attitude.”57 
For by doing that the claim ‘even if we had approved of it or desired to do it, bear-
baiting would still have been wrong’, although it sounds like a second-order realist 
commitment, can come out as a “perfectly sensible first-order commitment to the 
effect that it is not our enjoyments or approval to which you should look in 
discovering whether bear-baiting is wrong (it is at least mainly the effect on the 
bear).”58 This then gets analysed in the familiar quasi-realist way. In trying to 
account for moral truth such theories can use a minimalist instead of correspondence 
theory of truth which similarly avoids ontological commitments.
59
 
                                            
55 Kalderon (2008: 1). Joyce (2006: 53) talks about non-cognitivism “presented as” 
psychological and semantic theses. Also see Joyce (2001: 8); Miller (2013: 112).  
56 Blackburn (1992: 948, 1993); also see Gibbard (1990, 2003). 
57 Blackburn (1993: 153).  
58 Blackburn (1993: 153).  
59 Minimalists hold that the question ‘is p true?’ can be answered simply by 
replying that p and that this reply incurs no substantial commitments about the 
- 18 - 
In this thesis I assume that non-cognitivism is false.60 My project is to 
carve out the most plausible metaethical theory within a cognitivist framework.  
1.3.3  Further Theories 
There are additional metaethical theories that do not fit into my ‘cognitivist realism 
vs. non-cognitivist anti-realism’ dichotomy. Their grid in logical space can be 
secured by making the following distinctions:  
 
Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism Moral judgments take cognitive/non-
cognitive psychology 
 
Expressivism/Anti-Expressivism The content of moral statements is/is not 
determined by the non-cognitive attitude it 
expresses 
 
Factualism/Non-Factualism The content of moral statements 
represents/fails to represent a distinctive 
domain of moral fact
61
  
 
Classical non-cognitivists like Ayer have reasoned as follows. They accept the Non-
Cognitivist thesis that moral judgments are non-cognitive attitudes and conclude that 
these attitudes get expressed in publicly available moral statements (that is, they 
move from Non-cognitivism to Expressivism). Moreover, because they accept both 
Non-Cognitivism and Expressivism they conclude from the claim that the content of 
moral statements is determined by the non-cognitive attitude it expresses that moral 
statements fail to represent moral reality (that is, they move from Non-cognitivism 
and Expressivism to Non-Factualism).  
                                                                                                                           
nature of truth. Correspondence theorists hold ‘is p true?’ cannot be ‘simply’ 
answered by replying that p and that this reply, when given, incurs the substantial 
commitment that there exists a state of affairs that answers to ‘p’ (Timmons 1999: 
148-9; Wedgwood 2007: 6-7; Schroeder 2010: 26-30).  
60 Olson (MS) makes the same assumption in his forthcoming book-length defence 
of error theory.  
61 Kalderon (2005: vii-viii, 2008: 1).  
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However Kalderon has argued that these three theses can come apart. He 
defends hermeneutic moral fictionalism, which combines Non-Cognitivism with the 
semantic theses Expressivism and Factualism. Thus his theory maintains that moral 
statements are non-cognitive attitudes (they are attitudes of ‘make-believe’) and that 
although the content of moral statements is determined by the non-cognitive attitude 
it expresses, moral statements nonetheless express propositions which attribute 
moral properties to a state of affairs.
62
  
This basic setup allows Kalderon to avoid error theory. He argues that moral 
propositions have both real and fictional content. The former (e.g., ‘this is an act of 
deliberate cruelty against children’) is completely naturalistically respectable and for 
people with the right moral sensibility sets the parameters for the fictional content of 
the moral proposition (e.g., ‘this act of deliberate cruelty against children is morally 
wrong’). Furthermore, the fictional content of a moral proposition solely has norms 
of correctness that are internal to the moral practice. Hence the real content of moral 
propositions requires a traditional inquiry into matters of correspondence with states 
of affairs in an empirical world and is completely naturalistically respectable, and 
the fictional content of the moral propositions does not require a traditional inquiry 
into matters of correspondence with states of affairs in an empirical world at all. 
Hence there isn’t anything objectionable about Kalderon’s theory from the point of 
view of a naturalistic metaphysics. Moreover, since at least some of our moral 
judgments come out as true, error theory is false. To this error theory responds by 
insisting that a non-cognitivist construal of the notion of moral acceptance entails a 
failure on the score of the internal accommodation project.  
This concludes my discussion of the opponents of moral error theory. We 
have seen that there exists a rich variety of metaethical theories and I have had to 
ignore many of them to keep the discussion manageable. So advocates of a moral 
error theory have to be careful with how they formulate their theory. Ignoring 
distinctions and theoretical possibilities might play into the hands of the success 
theorist.  
In fact, this is not the only problem for error theory. The next section surveys 
the main objections to error theory, and the chapter closes with a summary and 
                                            
62 Kalderon (2005: 149). 
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preview.  
1.4  Problems for Moral Error Theory 
Error theory has attractive and unattractive features. Its attractiveness lies in its 
honesty regarding the internal and external accommodation projects—no half-way 
house compromises are made. What is unattractive about error theory is its 
skepticism about morality. But what are the main philosophical problems with error 
theory that go beyond this initial observation?  
One problem is the Formulation Dilemma:  
 
Formulation Dilemma  
Error theorists can either formulate a global error theory via a broad meta-normative 
scepticism, or they can formulate a local moral error theory which leaves intact at 
least some normativity (and only finds, e.g., categorical moral reasons of rationality 
objectionable) 
 
On the first horn, the problem is that the global meta-normative error theory is even 
more radical than the local moral error theory, and to that extent harder to defend. 
For according to the global meta-normative error theory, there are no normative 
epistemic facts, no facts about the correctness of logical inferences, no fact of the 
matter that if one wants to be in London by 5pm one has to take the 2.53pm train 
from Leeds at the latest, et cetera. On the second horn, the main difficulties for the 
local error theory are provided by slippery slope and entailment objections. Slippery 
slope objections are to the effect that if the local error theorist accepts x (where x 
could be hypothetical normativity) there is a good chance that she would have to be 
committed to y as well (where y could be categorical normativity) and where y is 
incompatible with her theory.63 Entailment objections claim more strongly that 
denying p (where p is categorical moral normativity) entails denying q (where q 
could be categorical epistemic normativity), but that q is undeniable, so that a 
reductio ensues.64 
A second problem is that moral discourse can’t be said to carry any clear 
commitment whatsoever. Opponents of error theory have argued this point for a 
                                            
63 Korsgaard (1996); Hampton (1998). Also see Lillehammer (2007).  
64 Rowland (2013); Streumer (forthcoming). Also see Lillehammer (2007).  
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variety of reasons. One reason is that they think that moral discourse is too messy to 
carry a clearly formulated commitment. For every contender commitment we can 
find evidence in moral discourse that neutralizes it.65 A second reason for thinking 
that moral discourse doesn’t carry any essential commitments is that the 
commitments that error theorists single out are exaggerated: 
 
ordinary people when they use [moral] words are not intending to ascribe objective 
prescriptive properties to actions
66
  
 
I just do not think that ordinary moral discourse presupposes that ethics is objective 
in the sense that realism and some versions of constructivism attempt to capture
67 
 
 
it is extremely unlikely that any belief so recherché [as the error theorist’s Non-
Negotiable Commitment Claim] could be part of common sense moral thinking
68
  
 
Both the first and the second problem concern the error theorist’s Non-
Negotiable Commitment Claim. A third problem for error theory concerns its 
Substantive Claim. It is that it is not at all clear that the mode of commitment of 
moral discourse is ‘flawed’. This problem takes different forms depending on how 
error theorists argue the commitment is flawed. For instance, error theorists might 
argue that the commitment is flawed because it is inconsistent with our best theories 
about physics or ontology more broadly. In that case, the problem is at least 
threefold. First, ‘scientism’—the view that the investigative methods of the physical 
sciences are applicable or justifiable in all fields of inquiry—it is agreed on almost 
all sides (and correctly so, I will assume), should be avoided, at least when our 
investigations are concerned with ethics.
69
 But then we open up the possibility that 
there are methods of reasoning applicable or justifiable in the moral domain that 
vindicate moral facts even if we don’t pay much attention to ontology. Second, in 
the absence of scientism, it is not clear what determines whether a given fact or 
                                            
65 Finlay (2008a, 2011); Kirchin (2010); Loeb (2010).  
66 Hare (1981: 86, 1999: 2); also see Lillehammer (2004: 97).  
67 Timmons (1999: 75); also see Nagel (1986; 144); Railton (1989, 2010); Finlay 
(2008a: 348). 
68 Brink (1984: 120).  
69 Nagel (1986: 144).  
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property is or is not an acceptable addition to our ontology. In particular, the 
explanatory value of a property often justifies such an addition. Third, it is not even 
clear that ontological issues play any (major) role in ethical and indeed metaethical 
theorizing at all.   
A fourth problem I discuss is this. Error theories should have a theory about 
what to do with moral talk and thought once it is agreed that these are ‘in error’. 
This is not strictly speaking necessary. It is already an interesting result that current 
moral discourse is in error. But given the importance we generally attach to moral 
thought and talk, it would be a good thing if error theorists could tell us what to do 
with it after accepting their theory. The problem is that it is not clear that error 
theorists have so far succeeded in supplying this kind of additional theory that we 
can accept.   
1.5  Conclusion and Preview 
This chapter has introduced error theory via an introduction of metaethics. It has 
also explored the four main problems for error theory, which, at least in conjunction, 
should make us suspicious of its truth. The remainder of the thesis argues that we 
can carve out a more plausible position in logical space for error theory by adopting 
different theoretical commitments than the error theories that currently exist have so 
far been able to do. In order to show this I start with an exposition of current error 
theories and argue that their attempts to solve the four main problems fail (Chapter 
2). I then introduce different theoretical options for error theorists (Chapter 3) and 
argue that commitments different from those theories discussed in Chapter 2 get us a 
more plausible error theory, at least insofar as the first three problems are concerned 
(Chapters 4-6). I then argue that further problems for error theory other than the four 
main ones I have already mentioned can also be solved (Chapter 7). Finally, I argue 
that a hitherto highly underexplored option for what to do with moral discourse after 
error theory has a lot to be said in favour of it, which shows that the fourth problem 
just mentioned is solvable as well (Chapter 8). These results amount to progress in 
the debate about error theory.  
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Chapter 2 
Existing Error Theories 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores existing error theories, and their ways of solving the four main 
problems for error theorists as discussed in §1.4. It also argues that none of these 
attempts are very successful. This motivates the project of the remainder of the 
thesis; viz., to argue that a different formulation of moral error theory can do better.  
I first explain Mackie’s error theory. I discuss, after a brief critique of 
Mackie’s earliest thoughts on the mater (§2.2.1), how his later work aims to settle 
the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim (§2.2.2), how it argues for the Substantive 
Claim (§2.2.3), and what it recommends we should do with our error-ridden moral 
discourse (§2.2.4). The chapter proceeds with an explanation of Joyce’s error theory 
and its Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim (§2.3.1), its Substantive Claim (§2.3.2) 
and its recommendation for what to do with moral discourse after error theory 
(§2.3.3). The chapter closes with a similar, but briefer, discussion of other error 
theories; namely, Olson’s, Streumer’s, Loeb’s and Schiffer’s (§2.4). A final section 
concludes and looks ahead (§2.5).  
2.2  J.L. Mackie 
2.2.1  Mackie’s Early Scepticism 
Mackie first formulated his error theory in a paper from 1946. In that paper he starts 
by presenting an early version of the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim:  
 
[m]ost of us … judge that actions and states are right and good, just as we judge 
about other matters of fact, that these judgments are either true or false, and that the 
qualities with which they deal exist objectively. This view, which almost everyone 
holds, may be crudely called “believing in morals.”
70 
 
 
                                            
70 Mackie (1946: 77-8; also see 80, 81). 
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In contrast to his later 1977 book Ethics: inventing right and wrong, the paper says 
hardly anything in defence of this claim. I think it is safe to suppose that Mackie 
thought that it is simply obvious and undeniable that we ‘believe in morals’. This is 
of course true in a sense; virtually everyone moralizes. But the question is whether a 
philosophical account of the datum that we al ‘believe in morals’ requires the 
postulation of the robust metaphysical picture of moral properties that Mackie 
proceeds to use for his moral nihilism; viz., that the “qualities with which [moral 
judgments] deal exist objectively.” Roughly, this is the picture on which moral 
properties are both wholly independent from us and yet able to affect our actions, 
normatively and motivationally. The problem is that this philosophical claim is 
neither obviously entailed by the simple observation  that ‘everyone moralizes’, nor 
is it argued for by Mackie in this paper. Instead after making the remark cited above 
Mackie immediately proceeds to discuss four arguments for the claim that there are 
no moral values understood in the metaphysically robust way I just explained. So the 
first point of critique of Mackie’s early error theory is that it fails to establish the 
Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim.  
The second point of critique is that Mackie’s four arguments for the 
Substantive Claim don’t work. The first two arguments resemble the famous 
disagreement and queerness arguments that can also be found in the 1977 book.71 
Argument one is an argument to the best explanation. We are better off explaining 
the persistence of inter- and intra-cultural disagreement about morals on the basis of 
the non-existence of moral facts (both parties to the dispute wrongly believe that 
morality exists) than on the basis of cultures or individuals within cultures differing 
in their epistemic access to objective moral facts (some cultures or individuals get 
morality right and other cultures simply lack those cultures’ or individuals’ moral 
sophistication). Moreover—and this is the second argument—moral facts would be 
very queer entities, which is further reason for not postulating them.  
The third argument is that we have a good explanation of how and why it is 
that moral judgments feel to us as though we are describing an objective moral 
reality even though our “feelings [of approval and disapproval] are all that exists.”72 
The idea is that the availability of this explanation renders unnecessary an 
                                            
71 Mackie (1946: 78).  
72 Mackie (1946: 86, emphasis in original). 
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alternative, ontologically more costly explanation according to which it is the 
occasional latching on to moral properties that explains moral judgments’ distinctive 
phenomenal character. Mackie’s answer to the question how it is that we objectify 
our feelings is that we project our moral sentiments onto external objects and 
actions.73 This is meant to be similar to how we project our feeling of disgust, as we 
get it from seeing a foul mushroom, onto the mushroom itself. And why do we 
objectify? Mackie’s answer is that it is useful.74 We are more inclined to refrain 
from killing—and hence to display behaviour that fosters stable social communities 
the fruits of which are to our own benefit—if we believe that killing really has the 
property of being morally wrong compared to when we think that all we are doing is 
projecting our feelings onto morally neutral actions.  
Note that none of these arguments can show that we have conclusive reason 
to believe that error theory is true. All these arguments can show is that we have 
some good reasons to believe that error theory is true, but this is consistent with the 
existence of moral facts.  
The fourth argument for error theory, which appears towards the end of the 
paper, involves an alleged absurdity that is ingrained in our ordinary use of 
‘obligation’. The absurdity is that obligations require both indeterminism and 
determinism. This argument, when successful, will be able to show that error theory 
is true. For no theory that entails an absurdity can be true, and any moral success 
theory would carry this entailment.
75 
 
Moral obligations require indeterminism because the ‘ought implies can’-
doctrine is true. For it to be true that Jane ought to φ it must be possible for Jane to 
φ.76 But φ-ing is only possible for Jane if indeterminism is true: compatibilist 
accounts of metaphysical freedom of the will (according to which freedom is 
compatible with determinism) are false.77 Unfortunately, obligations require 
determinism as well. For when we assess Jane’s behaviour—and we invariably do, a 
                                            
73 Mackie (1946: 81).  
74 Mackie (1946: 80).  
75 Mackie (1946: 86).  
76 In this and the coming few paragraphs we read, to make sense of Mackie’s 
writings, ‘ought’ as ‘is obligated’.  
77 Mackie (1946: 87). 
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claim anticipating Strawson’s famous 1962 essay Freedom and Resentment—we 
assess Jane’s behaviour, not whatever forces outside of Jane’s control interfered in 
the process leading from Jane’s decision to act to her actual action.78 These forces 
could be brain processes ‘within’ Jane that Jane doesn’t control, or they could 
consist in acts of Divine intervention, or what have you. Either way, for Jane to be 
praiseworthy for her actions, her actions have to “flow from” her character or self 
“inevitably.”79 We now have an absurdity, for his entails that obligations require 
both indeterminism and determinism.   
 This argument has dropped out of Mackie’s book. That was a good idea. The 
argument is not persuasive. First, it doesn’t justify sinking moral discourse even 
when it is sound. The argument isn’t powerful enough for that. As Mackie himself 
recognizes, moral discourse contains much more than ascriptions of obligations—it 
also contains for example evaluative as opposed to deontic appraisals of character 
traits.80 Perhaps, then, moral discourse can survive the blow that its obligation-
ascription judgments are all systematically false as long as its judgments involving 
evaluative concepts aren’t. But Mackie’s paper doesn’t consider this. So his 
argument is underdetermined.  
Second, Mackie’s argument doesn’t even seem sound. The premise that 
compatibilism is false is shaky.81 Moreover, even if we are incompatibilists, it is not 
clear that for true ought statements of the form ‘Jane ought to φ’, we need to be able 
to praise Jane as something over and above the workings of her brain. This is 
precisely the positive proposal of event-causal libertarians about free will.82 The fact 
that event-causal libertarianism is coherent means that it merits positive 
argumentation to rule it out. But Mackie doesn’t supply this argumentation.  
 As Mackie’s book on moral skepticism covers much the same terrain as the 
1946 paper (except the argument just mentioned), and much more besides, I shall in 
what follows just focus on the book.  
                                            
78 Skorupski (2007: 95) notes that “moral obligation and blame are connected: if A 
has a moral obligation to φ then A can be blamed for not φ-ing.”  
79 Mackie (1946: 88).  
80 Also see Kirchin (2010: 172). 
81 For a forceful argument for compatibilism, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 
82 Kane (1996).  
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2.2.2  Mackie on the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim  
The opening statement of Mackie’s Ethics is that “[t]here are no objective values.”
83
 
This sceptical claim should first be distinguished from other claims that might be 
conflated with it. It is different from subjectivism understood as the claim that 
everyone ought to do as he thinks he should.
84
 For subjectivism so understood is a 
first-order moral claim, whereas Mackie’s skepticism is a second-order claim. It 
should also be distinguished from other second-order claims. Some of these involve 
questions of meaning. One example is the question whether a statement such as ‘this 
action is right’ means ‘I approve of this action’, and which second-order 
subjectivists answer in the affirmative. Mackie makes it clear that his skepticism 
differs from all such semantic second-order positions because his is fundamentally 
an ontological second-order view.
85 
 
However, Mackie isn’t just arguing that objective moral values are not “part 
of the fabric of the world.”
86
 He is also making claims about moral language—claims 
about what ordinary speakers of the English language mean when they utter moral 
statements. Mackie makes these further claims because he wants to avoid his 
skepticism being “trivially true.”87 He doesn’t want it to be the case that although 
there are no objective moral values, no one thought there were such values anyway. 
In particular, his concern is that no one ever thought that moral values were 
objective in the technical sense of objectivity he has in mind; namely, the sense in 
which the objectivity of values is given by their existence  
 
prior to and logically independent of all [human] activities [such as] preferring, 
choosing, recommending [and] condemning
88
  
                                            
83 P5 (all references are to the 1977 book unless otherwise indicated). Note that 
Mackie, following the tradition of his time and that he is rejecting against, places 
(intrinsic) goodness at the normative centre stage, as opposed to notions like reasons 
or rationality, as is nowadays more customary (Olson 2009b: 164). Note too that 
Mackie says that much of what he claims about objective moral values also applies 
to objective aesthetic values, but it is not clear that it does (see Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation). For now I bracket the issue of skepticism about aesthetic values. 
84 P17.  
85 P18. 
86 P15. 
87 P15, 30.  
88 P30; also see Joyce (2001: 16, 2011b: 157).  
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Call this kind of moral objectivity Mackie-Objectivity:  
 
Mackie-Objectivity Moral values are prior to and logically independent 
of all human activities
 
  
The claim that moral properties, to count as moral properties, would have to 
be Mackie-Objective is an extremely radical thesis. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 
call this view Ethical Platonism.
89
 Tresan uses the term SuperDuper Objectivism.
90
 
The thesis is radical because for Mackie moral properties are both existentially 
mind-independent and conceptually mind-independent; moral properties would exist 
even if no minds existed and the concept of a moral property can be adequately 
articulated without making reference to any mental entities.
91
 So various kinds of 
constructivist, irrealist cognitivist and naturalist realist theories (insofar as these 
offer a different conception of moral values) are out almost before we even got 
started.  
But moral properties are not the only items that are Mackie-Objective. 
Consider the stars, the sun and the moon, and the oceans, to name just a few. What 
sets out moral properties and facts from other Mackie-Objective properties and facts 
is that the former can ‘bind’ humans to perform certain actions. What this means is 
that moral facts and properties are ‘prescriptive,’ which Mackie understands to 
concern both motivational and normative force:   
 
Moral … values … are a very central structural element in the fabric of the world. 
But it is held also that knowing them or ‘seeing’ them will not merely tell men what 
to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling any contrary inclinations
92
 
                                            
89 Darwall et al. (1992: 141n59).     
90 Tresan (2009: 369).     
91 Joyce (2009).     
92 P31-2. Scanlon (2007: 5) and Pauer-Studer (2009: 186) note that Mackie, under 
the influence of Hume (Mackie would write a whole treatise on Hume’s moral 
theory in 1980, and his 1977 book features many references to Hume), was deeply 
impressed by the requirement that metaethics must answer the ‘problem of moral 
motivation’. One explanation of why Mackie focusses on motivation when he talks 
about ‘prescriptivity’ is that he “seems to have confused the motivational import of 
[an atomic] moral belief with the normativity of a moral fact” (Copp 2010: 146; this 
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The first sentence in this citation reaffirms Mackie’s view that moral values are 
objective in the technical sense that they would literally have to be part of reality 
itself; their mode of existence is wholly unaffected by our dealings with or our 
efforts to modify or interpret that reality. The second sentence explains what the 
prescriptivity of moral values amounts to. Moral values are normative so long as we 
take the relation of ‘telling’ someone to do something to be a normative relation. 
And moral values are also motivationally efficacious because they ensure that 
agents who are aware of them will do what they have to do, perhaps absent lethargy, 
listlessness and the like. So Mackie-Prescriptivity can be defined as follows: 
 
Mackie-Prescriptivity  Moral values provide both normative and 
motivational direction for agents who are aware of 
them 
 
What is not quite clear is whether Mackie thought that the normative or 
motivational force of moral properties and facts would have to be overriding in the 
following sense. Once agents are acquainted with moral facts and properties, they 
are automatically motivated to act in accordance with them, regardless of how 
strong their motivation was to do something else. Moreover, the normative force of 
moral facts and properties also overrides whatever else spoke in favour of the agent 
performing a different action. This notion of overridingness is not represented in my 
description of Mackie-Prescriptivity because its presence doesn’t improve Mackie’s 
argument for error theory.93 If anything, it will make it harder for Mackie’s error 
theory to be true, not easier. For the stronger the non-negotiable commitment of 
ordinary moral discourse is formulated, the harder it becomes to argue that moral 
discourse carries it. And the commitment to Mackie-Objective and Mackie-
Prescriptive values is already, or so it seems, strong enough to get some kind of 
                                                                                                                           
is also Dreier’s 2010 interpretation of Mackie). On Parfit’s interpretation of 
Mackie’s (1977), the argument is all about motivation (2012: 448-52). Garner 
(1994: 144) argues that Mackie did not distinguish clearly enough between 
motivational internalism and reasons internalism. For similar points see Brink 
(1984: 114, 114n8); Shafer-Landau (2003: 55). I address these issues in what 
follows.  
93 For arguments that non-overridability is part of our ordinary concept of morality, 
see McNaughton (1988: 114).  
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queerness argument going. Hence because I think that Mackie’s error theory doesn’t 
work—my own error theory is different from Mackie’s—I want to set up my 
opponent’s view as strongly as possible and therefore leave non-overridability out of 
my account of Mackie on moral values. From now on when I write about objectivity 
and prescriptivity I’ll have Mackie-Objectivity and Mackie-Prescriptivity in mind.  
Mackie thinks that moral facts construed as both objective and prescriptive 
are a non-negotiable commitment of moral discourse: 
 
the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main line of 
western philosophers are concepts of [objective and prescriptive] value
94
  
 
This is evidence that Mackie thinks that the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim can 
be settled by means of the Conceptual Entailment Claim: 
 
Conceptual Entailment Claim The mode of commitment of moral 
discourse to Mackie-Objective and 
Mackie-Prescriptive values is one of 
conceptual entailment95 
 
Roughly, according to Conceptual Entailment Claim, moral statements entail 
statements about objective and prescriptive values because it is necessary to the 
correct applicability of moral concepts, as expressed by moral statements, that there 
exist objective and prescriptive values.96 To see how this works, first consider a non-
                                            
94 P35; emphasis mine.  
95 This interpretation is accepted by almost everyone in the field: Smith (1994: 64); 
Svavarsdóttir (2001: 145); Burgess (2010); Olson (2011a: 79n.3). However, some of 
Mackie’s commentators write as though Mackie favoured a presupposition rather 
than an entailment approach (Burgess 1998: 543; Finlay 2008a; Copp 2010: 144). 
Given that presuppositions are very different from entailments (see Chapters 3-4) 
and given that Mackie explicitly says that it is part of our concepts that moral facts 
about objective and prescriptive, I set this interpretation aside (I suspect that the 
second group of commentators hasn’t thought in much detail about the difference 
between conceptual entailment and presupposition).  
96 For this way of thinking about conceptual entailments see Finlay (2008a: 347); 
other ways of thinking about the Conceptual Entailment Claim are canvassed in 
Chapter 3. This is a rough characterization of the Conceptual Entailment Claim 
because, for instance, ‘correct application conditions’ is ambiguous between 
‘conditions of true application’ and ‘conditions which constrain how competent 
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moral example. The sentence ‘this is a vixen’ entails ‘this is a fox’ in virtue of the 
concept VIXEN expressed by the term ‘vixen’ in the sentence ‘this is a vixen’. For the 
conditions on the correct application of the concept VIXEN are two-fold: in order to 
use VIXEN correctly, you have to apply it to something that is both female and a fox. 
Take either femaleness or foxhood out of VIXEN and the schvixens you end up 
referring to simply don’t deserve the label ‘vixen’. Likewise, ‘stealing is morally 
wrong’ entails ‘there exist objectively prescriptive values’ in virtue of the concept 
MORALLY WRONG expressed by the term ‘morally wrong’ in ‘stealing is morally 
wrong’.97 For the conditions of correct application of the concept MORALLY WRONG 
are two-fold: in order to use MORALLY WRONG correctly you have to apply it to 
something that both instantiates an objectively prescriptive value and that is of 
recognisable moral import.  
How does Mackie aim to settle the claim that we will be using moral 
concepts wrongly if we don’t apply them to things that both instantiate an 
objectively prescriptive value and that is of recognisable moral import? Take 
recognisable moral import first. Mackie thinks that the subject-matter of moral 
judgments concerns social coordination—the real function of moral systems is social 
coordination.98 Let us simply accept that this is true in line with my earlier proposal 
to run with the idea that we can recognise the moral when we see it (see n3 above). 
So let’s simply assume that when social usefulness is at stake our discussion 
becomes morally relevant. The beef in Mackie’s account is in his claim that it is part 
of moral concepts’ correct application conditions that they have to be applied to 
things that are objectively prescriptive. He has two arguments for that claim. One 
argument focuses on how philosophers use moral concepts (capturing, at least to a 
large enough extent, claims Mackie, what the folk are after).99 The other argument 
focuses on how the folk use moral concepts.  
                                                                                                                           
concept-users apply the concepts’ and perhaps other readings as well. These details 
are unimportant in the present context and will be discussed in the next chapter.  
97 We can take, with Parfit (2012 Vol2: 333), ‘stealing is morally wrong’ to be 
equivalent to ‘stealing morally ought not to be done’, which in my experience to 
some ears more clearly licences the claim that moral values are objectively 
prescriptive.  
98 Chapter 5.  
99 “I think that Kant is struggling to bring out something that is latent in ordinary 
moral thought [he is] not merely constructing a philosophical fantasy” (P60).  
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Let’s first look at the argument focusing on how philosophers use moral 
concepts. Mackie tries to show that the best interpretation of their work reveals that 
they think that using moral concepts entails describing things that are objectively 
prescriptive. Mackie looks at Kant, Aristotle, Hutcheson, Price, Plato and Sidgwick. 
For instance, according to Clark there are:  
 
eternal and necessary differences of things that make it fit and reasonable for 
creatures … to act [in a certain way]
100
 
 
Moral values are Mackie-Objective because they are ‘eternal and necessary’ (and 
things that are ‘eternal and necessary’, the assumption goes, are prior to and 
logically independent of all human activities). And moral values are Mackie-
Prescriptive because they make it ‘fit and reasonable’ for agents to act in a certain 
way (and the relation of making it ‘fit and reasonable’ for agents to act in a certain 
way is a normative relation).101  
What to make of this argument? One thing we can wonder about is whether 
the argument’s interpretation of these philosophers’ work is correct.102 The problem 
with Mackie’s remarks is that they are too quick to count as serious exegesis. We 
can also ask why the work of those philosophers who have proposed a less 
ontologically demanding understanding of the nature of moral facts and properties 
can be ignored, as Mackie does. Finally we can ask for a justification of the claim 
that these philosophers are trying to put into words what the folk are committed to 
when they participate in moral discourse. Mackie doesn’t supply this justification. 
Hence this argument of Mackie’s is shaky to say the least. Perhaps then Mackie’s 
                                            
100 P31.  
101 In fact this quote reveals one problem with my interpretation of Mackie-
Prescriptivity. For according to my interpretation Mackie- prescriptivity involves 
both normativity and motivation but this quote only involves normativity. In light of 
numerous other remarks elsewhere in the text that do take prescriptivity to involve 
both normativity and motivation, I put this down to a slip of the pen on Mackie’s 
part.  
102 Take Kant. Davidson (2004: 40) interprets Kant as a realist in Mackie’s sense. 
Rauscher (2002) dissents with an interpretation of Kant according to which he is 
committed to a stark form of moral anti-realism. Similar questions arise for the other 
philosophers.  
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claim that the Conceptual Entailment Claim can be settled by looking at the folk 
directly can bring solace.  
Mackie draws attention to the following pattern of reactions that the folk 
display to a perceived need to abandon their belief in moral values, such as it may 
assail them when they learn that error theory is true. This abandonment causes “at 
least temporarily, a decay of subjective concern and sense of purpose.”
103
 The fact 
that this happens, argues Mackie, is evidence that people objectify their purposes; 
imbuing them with a fictional external authority as captured by their values’ 
objective prescriptivity. After all, if we hadn’t thought that moral facts were ‘real’ in 
the robust sort of way that Mackie argues they would have to be then this decay of 
subjective concern and loss of purpose presumably wouldn’t occur. You presumably 
only feel ‘lost’ when you learn that there are no ‘real, objective values’; not when 
you learn that the values you’ve been making up don’t exist. Mackie wants to infer 
from this that “it is not going too far to say that this assumption [of moral values’ 
objectivity and prescriptivity] has been incorporated in the basic, conventional, 
meanings of moral terms.”
104 
 
This can be doubted in three ways. First, we can ask why we would be 
justified in thinking that this explanation of the folks’ behaviour is better than other 
explanations. Consider the following, rival explanation. The folk merely have a false 
belief about the referents of their moral concepts.
105
 They think, falsely, that morality 
is about objectively prescriptive values whereas in fact morality is about actions for 
which there exists no objective prescriptivity to perform them. We can also explain 
the datum that the folk feel lost when they learn about error theory by reference to 
this false belief rather than by reference to the claim that is part of moral concepts 
that there must be objective prescriptivity. The rival explanation is that the folk’s big 
myth around moral values must be re-written; that they have been wrong about what 
moral values are, which are near and dear to them.
 
Re-writing this myth will be 
difficult and painful, and learning to live with the truth might cause the folk to have 
                                            
103 P34. Also see Hare (1999: 2).  
104 P35, for “[a]ny analysis of the meanings of moral terms which omits this claim 
to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete; and this is true of 
any non-cognitive analysis, any naturalist one, and any combination of the two” 
(P33).  
105 Finlay (2008a); Tresan (2009: 369); also see Gill (1996). 
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the reaction to error theory described earlier. The problem for Mackie is that he 
hasn’t considered this rival explanation.  
Second, supposing that the earlier question can be answered, we can still ask: 
why do we need to translate the ‘robustness’ of moral values—which we (by 
hypothesis) need to postulate to explain the reactions of the folk to learning about 
these values’ non-existence—in terms of Mackie-Objectivity and Mackie-
Prescriptivity? There are other notions of ‘robustness’, captured for instance by 
inter-subjectivity rather than objectivity.
106
 These notions might do the explanatory 
job equally well here. They too might allow us to explain the alleged datum about 
folk reactions. But, again, Mackie doesn’t consider this option.  
Third, is it really true that if we learn that it is not morally right, laudable or 
obligatory to help others who suffer because nothing is morally anything we will 
experience a decay of subjective concern and sense of purpose? Mightn’t we 
continue to care about the suffering of people all the same, without decay of 
subjective concern, simply because it is the suffering we care about rather than 
whatever further objective-cum-prescriptive moral property this suffering is said to 
instantiate? If that is so then again Mackie’s argument will be compromised. For 
then the datum that Mackie argues requires for its explanation the postulation of 
objectively prescriptive moral properties—viz., that people will feel lost after 
hearing about error theory in the way that he says they will—won’t even be a datum.   
The combined force of these objections to Mackie’s argument entails that his 
attempt to establish the Conceptual Entailment Claim by looking at folk behaviour 
fails just like his attempt to establish the Conceptual Entailment Claim by means of 
interpreting philosophical texts about morality.  
To sum up our discussion so far, we have discussed what Mackie means, 
exactly, when he denies that there exist moral values: moral values would have to be 
both Mackie-Objective and Mackie-Prescriptive. We have also explained that 
Mackie couples this claim with a second claim: the folk as well as the moral 
philosophers believe that morality and moral discourse are non-negotiably 
committed to moral values thus understood. Finally we saw that Mackie’s arguments 
                                            
106 Burgess’ (2007) error theory goes in terms of inter-subjectivity rather than 
(Mackie-)objectivity.  
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for the second claim don’t even come close to settling the Non-Negotiable 
Commitment Claim. 
Perhaps, then, we have been looking in the wrong direction. I have so far 
presented the standard interpretation of Mackie.
107
 But there is another interpretation 
according to which what is queer are not moral facts and properties themselves but 
moral beliefs and their alleged motivating power (motivational internalism) or moral 
beliefs and their alleged power to provide reasons for action (reasons internalism).
108
 
Let us therefore look at these interpretations of Mackie to see whether they can help 
his case.  
First consider motivational internalism, and consider the Anti-Humean 
Theory of Motivation: 
   
At least some beliefs, perhaps in addition to desires, are motivationally efficacious 
mental states
109
 
 
                                            
107 Brink (1984: 113); Hampton (1998: 21-6); Joyce (2001: 16-29); Dreier (2010: 
76); Garner (1990).  
108 Copp writes: “Mackie thinks that the normativity of goodness would consist at 
least in part in the fact that, necessarily, the belief that truth-telling is good would 
provide anyone with a motive to be truthful” (2010: 145,emphasis added). Brink 
writes: “In claiming that moral facts would have to be objectively prescriptive, 
Mackie is claiming that moral realism requires the truth of internalism. Internalism 
is the a priori thesis that the recognition of moral facts itself either necessarily 
motivates or necessarily provides reasons for action.” (1984: 113). A third 
interpretation focuses on Mackie’s theory of practical reason rather than moral 
metaphysics (as the standard interpretation has it) or moral beliefs and various kinds 
of internalisms (as Copp and Brink have it). This third interpretation is defended by 
Schroeder (2007: 119 n23); Philips (2010: 87, 95); Joyce (2001: 42, 77, 2005); 
Olson (2009b: 177); Robertson (2010: 435). However, this third interpretation can 
be dismissed on the ground that Mackie writes that talk about imperatives 
expressing categorical reasons makes the issue about the non-existence of moral 
values not existing “clearer” (P27). I take it that the most natural interpretation of 
this is that moral discourse’s commitment to moral properties is more fundamental 
than the commitment to practical reason. I won’t therefore discuss this third option 
in the text. In the text I do argue that Copp’s and Brink’s interpretation doesn’t have 
a lot going for it.  
109 The Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation negates the Humean Theory of 
Motivation according to which beliefs by themselves never motivate and can only 
motivate, when they do, if conjoined with motivationally efficacious desires (Smith 
1994: Ch.4).  
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If the Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation is true then our sense that morality is 
prescriptive can be explained without postulating moral facts outside of the agent 
that have a motivational pull on the agent. For if the Anti-Humean Theory of 
Motivation is true then morality can motivate because our beliefs about morality can 
motivate. In that case Mackie could take it as his Non-Negotiable Commitment 
Claim that morality requires the truth of the Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation and 
he could take it as his Substantive Claim that the Anti-Humean Theory of 
Motivation is false. Perhaps beliefs that are intrinsically motivationally efficacious 
are queer.  
There are various problems with this suggestion. One problem is that 
although Mackie accepts the Humean Theory of Motivation in the Ethics, in his later 
book on Hume’s ethical theory he rejects it in favour of the Anti-Humean Theory of 
Motivation.110 Another problem is that the Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation 
doesn’t seem to be able to do enough work for Mackie. Mackie wasn’t just worried 
about morality’s motivational pull; he was worried about its guaranteed 
motivational pull (which is not to imply that Mackie was worried about morality’s 
overriding motivational pull):  
 
 values [have a] power, when known, automatically to influence the will
111
 
 
But the Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation is consistent with values not 
automatically influencing the will. The Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation only 
implies that beliefs can motivate, not that they are guaranteed to motivate. 
One could try to remedy this by accepting a slightly modified version of the 
Anti-Humean Theory of Motivation: 
 
At least some beliefs, perhaps in addition to desires, are necessarily motivationally 
efficacious mental states 
 
However, this spurs the worry that the natural conclusion of Mackie-style arguments 
against morality would not be that morality is flawed but that moral judgments are 
                                            
110 Mackie (1980: 53, 54, 141-2).  
111 P40; emphasis added. 
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not beliefs, which sits ill with Mackie’s rejection of non-cognitivism. After all, if it 
is essential to moral judgments that they are beliefs and necessarily motivate, but in 
fact cannot motivate, then, as one natural conclusion has it, moral judgments are not 
beliefs.
112
  
But most importantly, this alternative interpretation of Mackie on the Non-
Negotiable Commitment Claim also sits ill with what Mackie does and doesn’t say 
in his Ethics. He nowhere says that beliefs or judgments motivate, but he does say 
that knowledge by acquaintance of moral facts guarantees motivation (see the last 
quote from Ethics above). Thus it seems that for Mackie, with his theoretical 
commitment to the truth of cognitivism, we would have to postulate objectively 
prescriptive properties to account for morality’s objective prescriptivity, as my 
earlier interpretation commits him to. So this alternative account of morality’s 
poisoned commitment according to which what is queer are moral beliefs rather than 
moral properties doesn’t, as presented, get us a working moral error theory either.  
 The problems I just rehearsed for the motivational internalism-interpretation 
of morality’s alleged poisoned thesis also apply, mutatis mutandis, for the reasons-
internalism interpretation of morality’s alleged poisoned thesis. According to this 
proposal, what Mackie thinks moral discourse is non-negotiably committed to are 
beliefs that provide reasons for action and what Mackie finds queer is that such 
beliefs exist. The most important problem with this interpretation, again, is that 
Mackie nowhere says that it is beliefs that supply moral reasons whereas he does say 
that knowledge by acquaintance of moral facts provides morality’s required 
normativity. So the reasons-internalism interpretation too should be ignored.  
Overall then, Mackie’s claim that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable 
commitment is in serious trouble. Internalism interpretations sit ill with Mackie’s 
text. The mind-independent, Mackie-Objective and Mackie-Prescriptive moral 
properties-interpretation sits much better with the text, but Mackie’s arguments for 
the claim that morality couldn’t be morality without the postulation of moral 
properties thus understood are highly inconclusive.  
                                            
112 Shepski (2008: 373); Olson (forthcoming-b).  
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However, from now on let’s assume, arguendo, that Mackie has a case for 
his ‘conceptual’ claim. Let’s turn to his arguments for the Substantive Claim that 
there are no objectively prescriptive moral facts and properties.  
2.2.3  Mackie’s Substantive Claim 
Mackie has three arguments for the Substantive Claim that there is no objective 
prescriptivity. I discuss them in turn.  
The first is the argument from queerness. Moral values would have to be part 
of the universe to count as objective in Mackie’s sense because in that sense of 
objectivity things are objective if and only if they are independent of and logically 
prior to all human activity. They would also have to be prescriptive in the sense of 
supplying both normative and motivational force. Now according to Mackie our 
world contains subjective prescriptivity, such as values for sheepdog trials and the 
rules of etiquette (to be discussed later in this section). Our world also contains 
objective non-prescriptive things, such as the stars and the oceans. But our world 
doesn’t contain objective prescriptivity. Such things would be too ‘queer’ to exist. 
We can formalise the argument as follows: 
 
Queerness Argument  
P1 Morality’s non-negotiable commitment: moral motivation stems from the 
motivational pull of mind-independent moral properties exerted on the 
human psyche and moral normativity is provided by the same mind-
independent moral properties 
P2 Any fact that exerts motivational pull on the human psyche (i.e., any fact 
such that knowledge by acquaintance of that fact guarantees that the knower 
is motivated) is queer and any fact that tells agents what to do that is not 
suitably connected to those agents and their desires, plans and social roles et 
cetera is queer 
C1 Hence, moral facts are queer [From P1, P2] 
P3 We can safely assume that queer things don’t exist 
C2 We can safely assume that moral facts don’t exist [From C1, P3]
113
 
 
It is not clear that this argument works. Most importantly, we need to know 
what the queerness alluded to involves. What, exactly, does it take to be queer, and 
on the basis of what is the inference in P3 from queerness to non-existence justified? 
We can distinguish, with Shepski, between three ways in which properties can be 
                                            
113 Cf. Olson (forthcoming-b); also see Burgess (1998: 543); Skorupski (2007: 92).  
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queer: moral properties can be ontologically proliferate, sui generis and mysterious 
(i.e., ‘incomprehensible’ or ‘unexplainable/ineffable’).114 But as Shepski argues, 
none of these interpretations of queerness gets us a working argument from 
queerness.  
Start with being ontologically proliferate. If postulating an entity or property 
expands our ontology then that by itself doesn’t make that entity or property queer. 
Shepski gives the example of Pegasus; there is nothing ‘queer’ about a horse with 
wings, it is just that such entities do not exist.115 Adding flying horses to our 
ontology does not mean adding ‘queer’ things to our ontology. Moreover, even if we 
assume that an expansion of our ontology is prima facie queer, we often justify it on 
the following ground. The expansion is required for a good philosophical account of 
some phenomenon, such that the overall account that includes the expansion is 
better (explains more, et cetera) than an account that doesn’t make the expansion. It 
is not clear that this phenomenon couldn’t hold for morality.  
The same holds for expansions of our ontology with sui generis and 
mysterious properties. Take mysteriousness first. The fact that a property is 
‘mysterious’ doesn’t make that property queer. The nature of our failure to 
comprehend something is important here. If we model our failure to comprehend 
moral values on our failure to comprehend ‘round squares’ then we don’t have an 
argument from queerness. For in that case we would have an argument from the 
meaningless of the language we are using to try to pick something out in the 
world.116 Another model for ‘failure to understand’ would be taking it as something 
                                            
114 Shepski (2008). Heumer (2005: 200) suggests a fourth way in which properties 
can be queer; viz., by being ‘counter-intuitive’, but from his discussion it becomes 
clear that he has Skepski’s ‘mysteriousness’ in mind. 
115 Shepski (2008: 375).  
116 Suggestions that Mackie employs this argument have been introduced into the 
debate by Williams (1985b: 203-4). Others have picked up. Smith writes that for 
Mackie, “[t]he problem with … [moral properties] isn’t that there aren’t any such 
things as a matter of contingent fact. The problem is that we can literally make no 
sense of them” (2010: 119; also see 1993: 237). Copp writes that according to 
Mackie, “There could not be facts that, as a matter merely of the way they are in 
themselves, necessarily motivate people who are aware of them.” (2010: 145). 
Nolan et al. (2005: 325-6) write: “nothing could even possibly have the sort of 
objective prescriptivity Mackie describes … [so that positive moral claims are false] 
of semantic or logical necessity.” Also see Lillehammer (2004: 96); Kalderon (2005: 
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like ‘beyond human understanding’. However, although inferences from our failure 
to conceive of something to that thing’s non-existence are fairly standard in 
philosophy, inferences from ‘failing to be understood’ to ‘non-existent’ aren’t 
recognized. For an inference from our failure to understand something to that 
thing’s queerness and non-existence is clearly unwarranted. A third model for 
‘incomprehensible’ would be ‘currently unexplained’. But things aren’t queer 
because we currently can’t explain them. The objects and properties that quantum 
science postulates aren’t queer because we currently do not fully understand them. 
For all these cases, moreover, it also holds that if the postulation of ‘mysterious’ 
properties is nonetheless required for a good philosophical account of some 
phenomenon, then we aren’t justified to infer from the alleged queerness of the 
property that it doesn’t exist. On the contrary, adding some queerness to our overall 
account of the phenomenon might be a price worth paying. Again it is not clear that 
this phenomenon couldn’t hold for morality.  
Consider, then, the interpretation of queerness as sui generis. Can being 
different from everything else in the universe make a property queer? Again off the 
cuff it doesn’t seem like it does. In a way, everything is different from everything 
else and some things are very different from all the other things. The property of 
being alive, perhaps, is a case in point.
117 Is the property of being alive therefore 
queer and, because of that, non-existent? It seems that the answers would have to be 
‘no’ and ‘no’. Moreover, again, if the postulation of sui generis properties is 
nonetheless required for a good philosophical account of some phenomenon, then 
we aren’t justified to infer from the alleged queerness of the property that it doesn’t 
exist. And again we seem to have no good reason not to extend this line of reasoning 
to morality.  
Thus far I have mentioned two problems with Mackie’s queerness argument. 
First, it is not clear that at least one of the three specifications of queerness is really a 
specification of queerness (as opposed to something else). Second, it is not clear that 
even if one of them is it follows that the queer property doesn’t exist. For there can 
                                                                                                                           
101); Loeb (2008); Olson (2011c: 34). I explain why I don’t think that Mackie put 
forward this argument for error theory shortly.  
117 Also consider: “The world is a queer place. I find neutrinos, aardvarks, infinite 
sequences of objects, and (most pertinently) impressionist paintings peculiar kinds 
of entities” (Platts 1980: 72); also see Enoch (2011a: 135).    
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be good reasons to postulate queer properties if they are explanatorily useful. 
Mackie, I argue, hasn’t done enough to show that in fact we can get a working 
specification of queerness and that in fact we can show that being queer means not 
existing.  
So how does Mackie attempt to make Queerness Argument sound? Shepski 
argues that Mackie takes the sui generis interpretation of queerness—queerness as 
an objectionable form of uniqueness—and cites Garner:  
 
Moral facts are not just unusual … they are unusual in an unusual way
118  
 
 
The question remains, however, whether being unusual in an unusual way is 
a good reason to be regarded as non-existent. This is not at all clear. Maybe in fact 
being alive is not just unusual but unusually unusual. But most certainly there are 
things that are alive. And at the risk of sounding like a broken record I add that 
expanding our ontologies with unusually unusual properties can be acceptable on 
theoretical grounds and that there is no reason to think that moral properties, even 
though they might prima facie be unusually unusual, couldn’t likewise be accepted 
into our ontology.   
Some of the arguments we just discussed in passing may well be excellent 
arguments for the Substantive Claim, but they aren’t arguments from queerness. If 
moral properties have mutually inconsistent application conditions (recall the 
argument form the meaninglessness of moral language) then there are no moral 
properties because there couldn’t be moral properties. But I don’t think that Mackie 
put forward this argument. His argument isn’t that moral properties are impossible; 
it is that they are possible but queer. After all, had queerness meant ‘impossible’ in 
Mackie’s mouth then the arguments from disagreement and projectivism (which 
Mackie did put forward after the queerness argument and which will be discussed 
shortly) wouldn’t have been necessary. But Mackie nowhere says that they are 
strictly speaking superfluous, so queerness does not mean ‘impossible’ for Mackie. 
It would also be a misuse of the word ‘queerness’ to have it mean ‘impossible’.  
                                            
118 Garner (1990: 143).  
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 Perhaps then we should focus instead on the queerness of our epistemic 
access to moral facts to get an argument from queerness going. Here the argument is 
that if objectively prescriptive moral values existed then our epistemic access to 
them would require “a special sort of intuition.”119 The postulation of this special 
faculty of moral knowledge is required on the following ground: you need a special 
mental faculty for detecting moral properties as moral properties are ontologically 
sui generis.120 However, argues Mackie, the postulation of this faculty is “lame”.121 
This argument faces an analogous worry to the previous argument; viz., that of 
securing a distinctive kind of queerness as the main driving force of the argument. 
Moreover, it seems that explanatory redundancy is the main driving force behind the 
argument, not queerness. For, says Mackie, postulating a special faculty for moral 
perception is meant to be ‘lame’—not ‘queer’. Furthermore, we can once more 
observe that believing in queer facts can be justified on the basis of a well-worked 
out theory that has a lot of explanatory power and other epistemic virtues. Since the 
only difference between the two types of queerness arguments is that one focuses on 
the queerness of moral facts directly whereas the other focuses on our epistemic 
access to these facts, it seems that this argument, too, by parity of reasoning, is 
unlikely to be successful.  
Mackie has a third and final queerness argument. It focusses on the 
supervenience relation that holds between natural (non-moral) facts and properties 
on the one hand and moral facts and properties on the other hand. It will be helpful 
to quote the relevant passage in full: 
 
Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is 
supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural 
features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of 
deliberate cruelty … and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, 
a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur 
together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is 
wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is 
signified by this ‘because’?122 
 
                                            
119 P39.  
120 Also see Brink (1984: 123).  
121 P39.  
122 P35. 
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Shepski finds in this passage evidence for the claim that Mackie’s doesn’t 
find semantic or logical necessitation (supervenience is a necessary relation) queer 
because these relations are explicable and what is queer about moral supervenience 
is that it is not explicable (rather than unusually unusual, as moral facts and 
properties and our ways of gaining epistemic access to these are meant to be).123 He 
then points out that Mackie may well be right that semantic necessitation is 
explicable. Consider a creature’s being an ANIMAL supervening on its being a CAT, 
which we can explain by reference to the definition of CAT which includes, at least, 
that cats are ANIMALS. However, logical necessitation isn’t explicable in that way. 
For in the case of logical necessitation all we can do in trying to ‘explain’ why for 
instance the validity of an argument supervenes on the argument’s logical form is 
multiply examples.124 But that isn’t explaining. Hence, argues Shepksi, it either 
follows from the queerness argument focussed on moral supervenience that logical 
necessitation too would be queer and thus non-existent or else that moral 
supervenience isn’t queer even though it isn’t explicable. After all, for moral 
supervenience too it seems that we can only multiply examples.  
This reading of Shepski’s may have its merits and may well trouble this 
queerness argument. But I think it leaves out the important point that Mackie uses a 
too coarse grained notion of supervenience. It is nowadays customary to conceive of 
some supervenience relations as relations of mere modal covariance (‘necessary 
coextension’) and thus without any reference to ontological dependence or 
something being ‘consequential’ on something else. Often “when someone asserts 
that A supervenes on B, she also wants to say that A-properties ontologically depend 
upon B-properties … However … this goes beyond the minimum required for 
supervenience.”
125
 Relations of necessary co-variance are probably ontologically 
                                            
123 Shepski (2008: 383-4).  
124 Caroll (1895) comes to mind here.  
125 McLaughlin and Bennett (2010: §3.5, also see §3.8). Examples of philosophers 
who accept that ontological dependence is part of moral supervenience include the 
following. Shafer-Landau talks about the non-moral features of a situation fixing its 
moral status and writes that “moral facts necessarily covary with descriptive ones 
because moral properties are always realized exclusively by descriptive ones” (2003: 
77). Brink writes: “Supervenience implies that no change can occur in the 
supervening property without a change occurring in the base property, but it also 
asserts a claim of ontological dependence” (1984: 119). Also see Moore (1942: 
588); Olson (2012: 195).  
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innocent whereas conceptions of the supervenience relation that go beyond this need 
not be.126 The problem with Mackie’s argument is that he simply assumes that the 
moral supervenience relation renders moral properties ontologically or explanatorily 
dependent on the natural (or non-moral) properties. Thus Mackie’s argument is 
underdetermined. He hasn’t done enough to argue that the relation between moral 
and natural features of an action must be of the non-innocent kind. Furthermore, 
even if Mackie gets the non-innocent version of supervenience, we still face the 
questions whether we can make sense of a separate argument from queerness and 
why we would be justified to move from queerness to non-existence in the face of 
known moves in philosophy and science where queer properties are accepted in 
people’s ontologies because of their explanatory value.  
This ends my discussion of Mackie queerness argument, which is one of 
three arguments Mackie offers for the Substantive Claim.127 I conclude that the 
queerness argument wasn’t successful. In what follows I discuss the remaining two 
arguments that Mackie gives for his Substantive Claim. After that I explain what 
follows from the truth of Substantive Claim in terms of the truth-value of moral 
statements. I close by explaining what follows from the truth of Substantive Claim 
for the tenability of value judgments that do not entail objective prescriptivity.  
The second argument for the Substantive Claim that there is no objective 
prescriptivity that Mackie puts forward is the argument from disagreement.
128
 
Mackie makes the empirical observation that there is an enormous amount of 
variation of moral values across different cultures and times but also within cultures 
and that moral disagreement often seems intractable.129 He then argues that the best 
explanation of these data is that there are no moral facts and properties. This 
                                            
126 Kripke (1972: 153-4).  
127 Mackie in fact says that he has five arguments (P49) but I have contracted his 
argument from the queerness of moral facts, the queerness of the supervenience 
relation between moral facts and natural facts, and the queerness of our epistemic 
access to moral facts into one argument, which I call ‘the queerness argument’.  
128 I borrow this label from Brink (1984: 112). Mackie uses the label ‘argument 
from relativity’, but this is misleading. Mackie’s argument isn’t ‘from’ relativity to 
some other conclusion; instead, Mackie’s argument is one ‘from’ disagreement to 
relativity (which is meant to be inconsistent with the objectivity of moral facts and 
properties).  
129 P36-8. 
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explanation is meant to be better than the rival explanation that there are such facts 
and properties but that some cultures or individuals have better epistemic access to 
them than others. Because of this, and other things being equal, we shouldn’t 
postulate moral properties.130  
This argument can be challenged on two fronts. First, there may well be not 
as much relativity in moral opinions held across cultures as Mackie suggests.131 
However, I am prepared to give Mackie the benefit of the doubt here. I focus on my 
second worry, which is that we may be able to come up with a philosophical account 
of moral disagreement that explains why some cultures have better epistemic access 
to moral truth than others. One place to start is with the conceptually mediated 
nature of moral observation. Suppose moral observation is conceptually mediated in 
the sense that it takes taught conceptual sophistication to be able see the instantiation 
of moral properties. Just like I can’t see that Fred told a joke without possessing a 
(probably fairly complicated) conceptual sophistication about social circumstances 
and humour, I won’t be able to perceive that torturing innocent babies just for fun is 
wrong without possessing the required conceptual sophistication for that 
perception.132 Suppose further that such conceptual sophistication is at least in part 
dependent on circumstances largely beyond the agent’s control. Perhaps it depends 
on the education she receives. In that case, given that some cultures differ in their 
education, we have at least the beginnings of an explanation of such cultures’ 
deprived epistemic access to moral truth. The explanation is that these cultures are in 
relevantly different circumstances.
133
 As Mackie doesn’t consider these kinds of 
proposals in any detail his argument fails to convince that the best explanation of 
said data favours moral nihilism.  
Mackie’s third and final argument for moral error theory is that it can explain 
where our false beliefs in the objectivity of moral values come from. This again 
would make the postulation of moral properties as the things that our beliefs latch 
                                            
130 Also see Lillehammer (2004: 97).  
131 Parfit (2012 Vol1: 145).  
132 McGrath (2004: 221); also see Denham (2000). 
133 See Brink (1984: 116-8) for an alternative explanation based on a coherentist 
moral epistemology.   
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onto explanatorily superfluous. Just like in his 1946 paper, Mackie aims to clinch 
the argument by means of defending:   
 
Moral Projectivism Moral sensations, caused by our own mental states 
such as wants and desires are taken to be objective, 
mind-independent features of reality
134
 
 
Belief in the objectivity of moral values can be explained by reference to the 
propensity of our minds to mistake feelings that arise from within ourselves with 
evidence for the external world having some kind of property.  
Having sais this however, exactly how Moral Projectivism and moral error 
theory are related in Mackie’s Ethics is subject to controversy.135 Here are three 
possibilities. (I) By the time Mackie has discussed his arguments from queerness 
and disagreement he needs a tie-breaker because believing in morals is still 
permitted at that point. The tie-breaker would be the argument from moral 
projectivism. Joyce believes that the following quote is evidence for this 
interpretation. Immediately after his discussion of the queerness and disagreement 
arguments Mackie writes: 
 
Considerations such as these suggest that it is in the end less paradoxical to reject 
than to retain the common-sense belief in the objectivity of moral values, provided 
that we can explain how this belief, if it is false, has become established and is so 
resistant to criticism
136
 
 
The word ‘provided’ is important here: we can read this passage as saying that we 
aren’t yet justified in embracing moral scepticism. We first have to explain where 
our moral beliefs come from and why they feel to us the way they do before we can 
become moral sceptics. (II) After the queerness and disagreement arguments the 
error theory is established, and Projectivism solely functions to explain where our 
error comes from for the curious reader. (III) Mackie believes in epistemological 
                                            
134 P42-6. As Garner puts it: “[t]he error pointed to in [Mackie’s error theory] is the 
error we make when we take our projections for independent features of what we are 
evaluating, or see our requirements, or the requirements of others, as lodged in 
reality itself” (1994: 139).  
135 Joyce (2010a: 44-5).  
136 P42.  
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conservatism; the view that, roughly, the beliefs one brings to the table before one 
starts doing any sort of inquiry, including metaethical inquiry, carry a certain level 
of epistemic warrant that is difficult to overturn even in the face of arguments to the 
contrary (such as the queerness and disagreement arguments). Interpretation (III) 
therefore has it that Mackie musters the truth of Moral Projectivism to overcome the 
hurdle of epistemological conservatism.  
Joyce accepts reading (III) and finds evidence for Mackie’s acceptance of 
epistemological conservatism in the following passage:  
 
[moral skepticism] goes against assumptions ingrained in our thought and … 
conflicts with … common sense [therefore] it needs very solid support
137
 
  
On this interpretation, Mackie argues that a genealogical explanation of moral 
beliefs that doesn’t make reference to the objects of those beliefs undermines 
whatever prima facie justification these intuitions might otherwise have had. 
Therefore, even though the principle of epistemological conservatism is true, 
according to Mackie, and threatens error theory, error theory can still be accepted.  
 My own view is that the first and third interpretations make good sense of 
our evaluations of the queerness and disagreement arguments as presented in this 
sub-section. For we saw that neither argument is conclusive, so further evidence for 
error theory is required. However, I also find the third interpretation’s envisaged 
restriction on the role that Moral Projectivism can play in the dialectic unnecessarily 
restrictive. It may very well be that Moral Projectivism can provide direct support 
for moral error theory. So far we haven’t seen any evidence that its only role could 
be to undermine the prima facie justification of our earlier beliefs in morality, and 
hence that its only role could be to counteract epistemological conservatism. 
Joyce however argues that Moral Projectivism alone cannot be used as a 
direct argument for moral nihilism and so can only be used to undermine 
epistemological conservatism and its consequences.
138
 He first distinguishes between 
two kinds of projectivism. A ‘minimal’ projectivism holds just that the experience of 
moral wrongness is immediately caused not by a perception of a moral property but 
                                            
137 P35.  
138 Joyce (2010a: 47).    
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by a moral emotion. Minimal projectivism is metaethically neutral in two senses. 
First, it is silent on the cognitivism/non-cognitivism issue: the thesis that moral 
experience is caused by a moral emotion is consistent with the thesis that moral 
judgments are non-cognitive attitudes but also with the thesis that they are beliefs. 
Second, minimal projectivism leaves it open that there are moral properties.
139
 After 
all, the thesis that our moral experiences are immediately caused by our own 
emotions rather than by moral properties is consistent with the existence of moral 
properties. A more robust version of Moral Projectivism could solve this problem by 
adding to Minimal Projectivism that moral properties are metaphysically queer. If 
the queerness argument would work then the moral realist, untouched by minimal 
projectivism, is sunk (however the non-cognitivist may still be in the game). But this 
also means that queerness is doing all the work and thus that the projection 
mechanism is argumentatively idle. And, anyway, queerness arguments don’t work. 
All of this seems right to me, and so I conclude that arguments for the Substantive 
Claim based on Moral Projectivism won’t work.   
This gets me my conclusion: although Mackie’s arguments for his 
Substantive Claim that there are no Mackie-Objective and Mackie-Prescriptive 
properties are inventive and influential, they also stand in need of further support. 
They do not, not even in conjunction, make the case for moral skepticism 
sufficiently compelling.  
Suppose however that Mackie’s arguments for the truth of Substantive Claim 
are persuasive. We are justified in believing that there are no moral values. What 
does this mean for the status of moral statements understood as attempting to 
describe a moral reality that consists of Mackie-Objective and Mackie-Prescriptivity 
moral values? Mackie believes that his error theory makes all first-order moral 
judgments false (rather than truth-valueless, or neither true nor false, or what have 
you).
 
However, moral judgments are not necessarily false. Mackie didn’t think, 
some of his readers’ interpretations notwithstanding, that the instantiation conditions 
for moral properties are somehow mutually exclusive or jointly incoherent.  
I will now explain why there nonetheless are, according to Mackie, 
subjectively prescriptive values consistently with a denial of objectively prescriptive 
                                            
139 Also see Brink (1984: 111).  
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values. This is important for Mackie because in the absence of an argument for 
subjective prescriptivity his error theory would be stronger than he wants it to be. 
For his error theory of objectively prescriptive values will then entail error theory of 
normativity as such. As it turns out, however, Mackie cannot avoid this collapse of 
his local error theory of morality’s objective prescriptivity to everything that is 
normative. This means that Mackie unwittingly accepts the first horn of the 
Formulation Dilemma of §1.4; viz., that we should be broad, meta-normative 
sceptics. But this horn, we said, is very implausible. This is further evidence for the 
implausibility of Mackie’s version of moral error theory.  
Mackie claims that “‘X is good’-claims are always of the form ‘X satisfies 
the requirements in question’”.
140 
Take sheepdog trials.141 There are various standards 
that determine how well sheepdogs do in such trials. The standards are widely 
agreed upon by experts and they bear a close connection to the work that sheepdogs 
are kept to do. Good or valuable sheepdogs are those that measure up to the 
standards and  
 
[g]iven any sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective matter, a 
matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular specimen measures up to 
those standards
142
 
 
But, importantly, the standards are based on our “choosing or deciding to think in a 
certain way.”143 So they aren’t Mackie-Objective and prescriptive. This saves them 
from being ‘queer’, as only the combination of Mackie-Objectivity and Mackie-
Prescriptivity is queer.  
                                            
140 P55. Ziff concurs: the best analysis of good was that ‘‘‘good’ in English means 
“answering to certain interests,’’ the interests in question being supplied by the 
context in which something is said to be good (1963). In a similar vein Rawls write 
that ‘‘A is a good X if and only if A has the properties (to a higher degree than the 
average or standard F) which it is rational to want in an X, given what X’s are used 
for, or expected to do and the like (whichever is appropriate).’’ (From: Scanlon 
2011: 445). 
141 P26; also see Evans and Shah (2012: 86).  
142 P26.  
143 P16.  
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The same holds for the institution of etiquette.144 Again it is objectively true 
that you have to eat peas with a fork, whether you want to or not. Nevertheless, still, 
these rules aren’t Mackie-Objective because they are again based on our ‘choosing 
or deciding to think in a certain way’. No one thinks that the rules of etiquette are set 
in stone as much as moral rules are. Whether eating peas with a fork or a spoon is 
the thing to do depends on what we (collectively) decide; whether you can kill has 
no such relation to our decisions. This again is what makes the rules of etiquette 
metaphysically respectable; only the combination of Mackie-Prescriptivity (which 
the rules of etiquette possess) and Mackie-Objectivity (which they lack) is 
troublesome.  
Why, exactly, is something that is prescriptive but not Mackie-Objective 
naturalistically respectable? Mackie believes that facts about etiquette can be 
prescriptive and naturalistically respectable because their prescriptivity only requires 
the obtaining of a causal connection between the desired ends and the (best 
available) means for satisfying these ends.145 What it is for something to be 
prescriptive is for it to consist in an appropriate causal relation between means and 
ends. And causal connections aren’t queer.  
An important qualification is that the ‘ends’ in question can be given not 
only by individual desires of agents but also by societies at large. Indeed, Mackie 
thinks that a stranger’s sufferings “constitute some reason”
146
 for us to help her so 
long as we think of this as a reason ‘supplied by’ the societal end not to let people 
suffer. So if we think that a stranger’s suffering constitutes a reason to act then  
 
we are again bringing in the requirements of … an established way of thinking, a 
moral tradition, demands that I show some concern for the well-being of others
147
 
 
                                            
144 The examples I give, here and in other chapters, are examples of what Brink 
(1992: 9; also see Shafer-Landau 2003: 210; Nesbitt 1977: 223) calls ‘mere 
etiquette’, which is to be distinguished from those rules of etiquette that overlap with 
the rules of morality (examples of the latter are rules that oblige one to speak 
decently to other people).  
145 P28.  
146 P78; also see Joyce (2011a: 524); Svavarsdóttir (2001: 149).  
147 P78, 79.  
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Mackie even says that such institution-dependent moral language is “written into 
ordinary moral language.”148 This however begets the question: doesn’t this 
compromise the error theory we started with? After all, we already had institution-
independent moral language that is flawed because objectively prescriptive and 
written into ordinary moral language. But now we also have institution-dependent 
moral language that is not flawed because it is subjectively prescriptive and also 
written into ordinary moral language. The problem is that this opens up the 
possibility that the institution-dependent moral talk is more important than the 
institution-independent talk, in which case moral discourse is not in error (or at least 
its most important part is not in error). Mackie, however, doesn’t notice the threat.  
Be that as it may, Mackie’s account faces another problem as well. Perhaps 
motivational force can be understood in terms of a causal connection between ends 
and means. But given that the reduction is supposed to be one of Mackie-
Prescriptivity, which also involves normativity, a good question is whether a 
reduction of normativity to a causal relation between means and ends can work as 
well or whether we instead have an elimination of normativity. Offhand, it seems 
that we have an elimination. We have a strong intuition that normative relations 
outstrip whatever contingent causal relations can obtain between means and ends, 
even when sheep dog trials and etiquette are concerned.
 
In the language of 
reductions introduced in §1.2.1, Mackie’s reduction is very reductionist in 
substance—so much so that it disallows us to retain one very important 
commonsensical thought about the property of normativity to be reduced; viz., that it 
can outstrip the contingently obtaining causal relations between means and ends. 
The worry is that this should make us seriously doubt the success of Mackie’s 
attempt to show that subjective prescriptivity is metaphysically kosher.  
 To sum up this sub-section, I have argued for three main claims. First, 
Mackie’s arguments from queerness, disagreement, and projectivism are unable to 
justify his Substantive Thesis. Second, if we can and must believe his Substantive 
Thesis then moral statements are all false, albeit not necessarily so. Third, 
subjectively prescriptive values exist, according to Mackie, although we have also 
seen reason to doubt this.  
                                            
148 P79.  
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But again let’s assume that Mackie’s arguments work and that we should 
believe his error theory up until this point—hence that we should believe both its 
Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim and its Substantive Claim and that the theory 
can avoid the Formulation Dilemma. Let’s ask, then, how Mackie recommends we 
should respond to the truth of moral error theory.  
2.2.4  Mackie’s Solution 
According to Mackie, what should we do with our error-ridden moral discourse once 
we realise that his error theory is true? Here the ‘should’ is a prudential, non-moral 
‘should’ to avoid the charge of self-refutation.  
Mackie’s commentators come to very different conclusions about how 
Mackie answers this question. Some think that Mackie was a fictionalist. 
Fictionalists either think that we should make-believe rather than believe moral 
propositions (where to make-believe a proposition is to adopt an attitude akin to 
pretence to moral propositions so that one’s attitude isn’t subject to general norms of 
doxastic attitude adoption, such as the correspondence-truth norm). Or they think 
that we should continue to fully believe propositions as long as we have turned them 
into fictionalist propositions like: ‘in the moral fiction, stealing is wrong’.149 Others 
think that Mackie was a preservatist, thinking that we should simply continue to 
moralize as if we had never discovered the error.150  
I believe that all these interpretations are false and that Mackie was a 
revolutionary cognitivist. Mackie put forward a proposal for a revolutionary reform 
of our error-ridden moral concepts, and because he thought that moral concepts 
contribute to the meaning of moral statements he believed that moral statements and 
their meaning are to be changed as well.151 So Mackie wasn’t a preservatist because 
he thinks that we should alter rather than preserve moral discourse. And he wasn’t a 
fictionalist because the kind of change that’s needed neither involves pre-fixing 
                                            
149 Joyce (2005: 288); Sainsbury (2010: 204); Lillehammer (2004: 105). Further 
specification of moral fictionalism will be provided in Chapter 3.    
150 West (2010: 184-5); Oddie and Demetriou (2010: 200). This reading gains 
support from Mackie’s remark that first-order and second-order ethical questions 
“are not merely distinct, but completely independent” (p16). For if they are then 
even if error theory is true we can still continue to engage in first-order moral 
discourse without falling into error.  
151 Schiffer (1990: 614) comes close to this interpretation.  
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moral propositions with a fictionalist operator nor taking some kind of make-belief 
stance to moral propositions. Instead, we should change moral concepts into 
schmoral concepts to get a schmoral statement like this:  
 
Schwrong Stealing is schmorally wrong 
  
Participants in moral discourse should cease to assent to moral propositions that 
falsely suggest that type or token events exemplify objective prescriptivity and they 
should start to assent to schmoral propositions that truly suggest that type or token 
events exemplify subjective prescriptivity.  
One passage that speaks in favour of my interpretation of Mackie’s solution 
comes from a book that Mackie wrote a year before his Ethics: 
 
[a] similar conceptual reform [to the one about personal identity I am presently 
proposing], rather than mere analysis of our present concepts, is, I believe, needed 
in ethics. I hope to discuss this topic in another book
152
  
 
The ‘conceptual reform’ Mackie talks about is that of altering the contents of 
moral concepts from objective moral prescriptivity to subjective prescriptivity. The 
book he talks about is his Ethics. 
Here is Mackie’s idea presented in more detail. Distinguish between morality 
in the broad sense and morality in the narrow sense.153 Morality in the broad sense is 
a general, all-inclusive theory of conduct which provides rules for behaviour 
reflecting objectively prescriptive moral truths. It also aims to realize moral ideals. 
Call the practice of discovering and communicating rules of morality in the broad 
sense moralizing. Morality in the narrow sense is limited to constraints on the 
extreme pursuit of self-interest. Its rules do not reflect objectively prescriptive moral 
truths and it doesn’t aim to realize moral ideals. Morality in the narrow sense also 
trusts the agents’ moral sense, is man-made (‘invented’ rather than ‘discovered’—
hence the subtitle of Mackie’s Ethics: inventing right and wrong) and depends on 
                                            
152 Mackie (1976: 196n27); cf. Lillehammer (2004: 106); Silverstein (2012: 13). 
Burgess is therefore off the mark when he writes that: “even though [Mackie] talks 
of the need to invent morality, he does not seem to think that this proposal could be 
worked into a revisionary meta-ethic” (1998: 538n8; also see Blackburn 1993: 149). 
He thinks it can, and proceeds to show this in the later chapters of his Ethics.  
153 Mackie (1977: 106-16). 
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individual and collective benefits, which are subject to change over time.154 Call the 
practice of finding and communicating moral rules in the narrow sense 
schmoralizing. Mackie’s proposal is that we should stop moralizing and start 
schmoralizing.  
How can schmorality be implemented—that is, how can we make sure that 
people are no longer in error when they think and talk about morality and start to 
think and talk about schmorality, and thus avoid the error? In the chapters that come 
after his rejection of moral values Mackie seemingly simply continues to talk about 
moral values. This, I suspect, has fuelled preservatist readings of his Ethics. I think 
that what Mackie had in mind though is that we cease to believe that there are moral 
properties when we say ‘stealing is wrong’ and instead start to believe that there are 
schmoral properties when we say ‘stealing is wrong’.155 This entails that it would be 
more accurate to say ‘stealing is schmorally wrong’, but perhaps because Mackie 
thinks that the folk couldn’t be brought to start talking differently he allows them to 
continue to say ‘stealing is wrong’. This is fine, or course, as long as we know that 
what we mean when we say that has changed.   
What is the function of schmorality and of believing in schmoral 
propositions? It is something like securing the benefits of living in a well-run society 
and enjoying the fruits of cooperation.156 We can make this more precise by looking 
at what Copp calls the problem of sociality:  
 
Problem of Sociality Humans are typically not self-sufficient and can 
benefit from social cooperation. But the problem is 
how we can guarantee the benefits of social 
cooperation given that it is often in humans’ 
immediate, short-term self-interest not to 
cooperate
157
 
 
                                            
154 Lillehammer (2004: 96) argues that Mackie’s morality in the narrow sense can 
be interpreted as a form of morality that already exists and that can be shown to be 
in error. This is a mistake. The folk wouldn’t mistake ‘their’ Mackie-Objective and 
Mackie-Prescriptive morality for morality in the narrow sense—the latter is ‘man-
made’ and therefore not “prior to and logically independent of all [human] 
activities” (Mackie 1977: 30).    
155 P106.  
156 Also see, e.g., Gauthier (1986).  
157 Copp (2009a: 27).  
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For Mackie, the function of schmorality is to counteract these limited sympathies 
that stand in the way of solving the Problem of Sociality.158   
This begets the question how Mackie can explain how schmoral constraints 
on selfish behaviour ‘bind’ agents in the absence of Mackie-Objective and Mackie-
Prescriptive moral values.159 After all, if we can simply shrug off schmoral 
constraints whenever we are presented with them because they are only subjectively 
prescriptive (alter your ends, and you will have altered what you ought to do—recall 
that subjective prescriptivity consists in causal relations between means and ends) 
then they aren’t really constraints. For consider the following conversation 
 
Abe: ‘Hey, don’t steal those jeans! That is “schmorally” wrong!’  
Bert:  ‘So what? There isn’t any desire-independent normativity that speaks 
against my stealing these jeans and there also isn’t anything in the world 
that affects my motivation. Moreover, I personally desire to steal, this act of 
stealing won’t disrupt society and no-one’s looking (so the risk of getting 
caught and ending up in jail is low). So why wouldn’t I?’160 
 
As we defined schmoral constraints, this is a perfectly legitimate way for Bert to 
respond. But then it no longer looks as though the constraints are really constraints. 
And so it seems that we can’t solve the Problem of Sociality with schmorality. 
Implementing a ‘schmorality’ with the aim of solving the Problem of Sociality is 
likely to be unsuccessful.  
Mackie thinks he has a reply to this. It isn’t that calculations of long-term 
self-interest as brought out by various game-theoretic considerations can do the 
trick.161 Instead he argues that what we need are “psychological substitutes for 
physical chains.”162 Mackie’s proposal has two components. First we should “trim 
down moral demands to fit present human capacity” and “look for rules … that can 
fit with the relatively permanent tendencies of human motives and thought.”163 This 
                                            
158 P107.  
159 Blackburn (1985).  
160 Adapted from Hare (1999: 4).  
161 P114, 119.  
162 P116.  
163 P133, p134. The talk of ‘physical chains’ further corroborates my interpretation 
of Mackie’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim, according to which for Mackie 
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helps to solve the problem of getting actual constraints without objective 
prescriptivity. For if there are fewer cases where what one schmorally ought to do is 
out of line with what one wants to do, then, on the assumption that a successful 
reduction of non-objective prescriptivity to the obtaining of a causal relation 
between means and ends works, there will be fewer cases where we have to say that 
the schmoral constraint in fact wasn’t doing any constraining. But we still need 
something in addition to this for those cases where people want to do things (such as 
stealing) that inhibit social stability and cooperation. (Moreover, as I argued in the 
previous section, it is not at all clear that the reduction of non-objective 
prescriptivity to causal means-end relations works).  
Here is where the second component of the proposal comes in. If you don’t 
desire to do what is schmorally right (i.e., foster social cooperation) then there is a 
real penalty that awaits you. The penalty is a disintegrated psychology and the 
sacrificing of “inward peace of mind”.
164 
The main problem with this proposal, of 
course, is that for many people a ‘disintegrated’ psychology, it seems safe to fear, 
wouldn’t be enough of a penalty to forego stealing (or worse) when they are sure 
that no one is looking. But if that is true then schmorality won’t solve the problem of 
sociality. Schmorality’s ‘constraints’ on purely selfish behaviour aren’t really 
constraints. Perhaps, then, it is better after all to be a fictionalist or a preservatist—
but these are options that Mackie doesn’t consider.     
To sum up, I have defended the claim that the best interpretation of Mackie’s 
proposal for what to do with moral discourse after error theory is that it is a 
revolutionary cognitivist proposal. According to revolutionary cognitivism, ordinary 
participants in moral discourse should cease believing moral propositions and start 
believing schmoral propositions, where schmoral propositions are propositions like 
‘stealing is schmorally wrong’ and whose truth does not entail objective 
prescriptivity but only the defensible kind of subjective prescriptivity. I have also 
expressed reservations about whether Mackie’s system of schmoral obligations will 
work for the purpose for which it was invented; viz., solving the Problem of 
Sociality with the particular aim of safeguarding social cooperation.  
                                                                                                                           
the fate of morality hinges on moral properties with actual ‘binding’ or ‘motivating’ 
power. 
164 P191. The quote is from Hume (1751: 82.)  
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This means that Mackie doesn’t have a working theory about moral 
discourse that we can use after error theory. Moreover, Mackie doesn’t have 
convincing arguments for this Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim or his 
Substantive Claim. Finally, Mackie’s error theory doesn’t have the resources to 
respond to the Formulation Dilemma. Overall, then, Mackie solves none of the 
problems for moral error theory as discussed in §1.4. Let’s see if the other main 
well-worked error theory currently discussed in the literature—that of Richard 
Joyce—does better than this.  
2.3 Richard Joyce 
2.3.1  Joyce’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim 
According to Lillehammer, Joyce’s error theory contrasts with Mackie’s in that the 
former, but not the latter, is based on a Kantian style focus on categorical reasons.165 
I argued above that this isn’t entirely accurate insofar as Lillehammer’s 
interpretation of Mackie is concerned. Mackie believed that talking about 
categorical reasons, furnished by categorical imperatives, make his case against 
moral values “clearer.”166 What is true is that Mackie’s main focus is on moral 
values whereas Joyce focuses squarely on categorical reasons as the non-negotiable 
commitment of moral discourse.  
 What, exactly, do we mean by categorical? Consider the following from 
Dreier:  
 
First, we might say that an imperative is categorical when our application of it to the 
behaviour (or deliberations) of someone does not depend on any aim, or any desire 
of that person. In this sense, the rule ‘Practice your scales daily’ is not categorical, 
since we should withdraw it upon learning that the addressee had no interest in 
learning to play the piano. There is little question that moral imperatives aren’t 
categorical in this sense. Informing your critic that you aren’t interested in 
according respect to other persons isn’t going to make him withdraw the imperative 
to keep your promises. [There is also] a second sense of categoricity. A rough try at 
                                            
165 Lillehammer (2004: 101).  
166 Miller (2013: 108) uses the locution “furnished by.” The Mackie quote is from 
P27.  
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expressing this sense is to say that each person has reason to follow, no matter what 
her desires are
167
  
 
For Joyce, morality and especially its obligations are categorical in both senses. 
Moral obligations apply to all of us regardless of our desires, wants or goals. You 
can’t escape being under a moral obligation by changing your desires in the way that 
you can escape being under an obligation to practice your scales by changing your 
desire to learn how to play the piano. Say when this is true that morality is 
categorically applicable. Moral obligations also supply all of us with reasons to act, 
again regardless of our desires, wants or goals. You can’t escape having a reason to 
abide by your moral obligation by changing your desires whereas you can escape 
having a reason to practice your scales by changing your desire to learn how to play 
the piano well. Say when this is true that morality is categorically reason-giving. 
Importantly, these ‘reasons’ are standard normative reasons or reasons of 
rationality—they are not ‘merely’ reasons with moral content which it would not be 
irrational to ignore. For ease of exposition, and when context allows me to, I will 
sometimes treat this last qualification as read from now on.     
In this terminology, morality’s categorical reason-giving force entails its 
categorical applicability: if everyone has a reason to abide by morality’s rules then, 
straightforwardly, the rules also apply to everyone. But some philosophers argue 
that the reverse entailment does not hold.168 Joyce disagrees. For Joyce thinks that 
Mackie’s platitude is true:  
 
 
 
                                            
167 Dreier (1997: 84); also see Railton (2010: 268); Brink (1997). Railton (1986: 
165) also defines categoricity in terms of all agents necessarily having reason to 
obey moral imperatives (he reserves the term ‘universality to talk about what Dreier 
defines as the first sense of ‘categorical’). To see the gap between both sense of 
categoricity, consider, with Foot (1972: 308), the case of etiquette, where we use the 
‘should’ of etiquette categorically but “to which no one attributes the special dignity 
and necessity conveyed by the description “categorical imperative.”” For a rule of 
etiquette “does not fail to apply to someone who has his own good reasons for 
ignoring this piece of nonsense, or who simply does not care about what, from the 
point of view of etiquette, he should do.” Also see Shafer-Landau (2003: 199). 
168 Foot (1972); Kavka (1984); Brink (1989: Chapter 3, 1992); Railton (1986); 
Copp (1995). Foot “later officially retracted her heresy” (Finlay 2008a: 349).   
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Mackie’s Platitude 
[I]t is necessary and a priori that, for any agent x, if x ought to φ, then x has a reason 
to φ169 
 
From Mackie’s Platitude it follows that we can move from ‘x morally ought to φ’ to 
‘x has a reason to φ’ on the ground that it is a platitude that oughts entail reasons. 
That is, just like it is a platitude that being red entails being coloured, it is a platitude 
that oughts entail reasons.  
 Shafer-Landau complains that Mackie’s platitude isn’t a platitude.170 No 
one contests the platitude that red objects are coloured whereas lots of philosophers 
(and perhaps other folk) doubt that morality is normative in the strong sense of 
entailing categorical reasons. Shafer-Landau argues that the contestability of 
Mackie’s ‘platitude’ is evidence that it isn’t in fact a platitude, whereas the non-
contestability of the platitude that all red objects are coloured shows that this 
platitude in fact is a platitude.171 It may still be true, of course, that ‘for any agent x, 
if x ought to φ, then x has a reason to φ’, but, argues Shafer-Landau, that won’t be 
because it is platitudinously true. We need a different argument for why oughts 
entail reasons.  
Shafer-Landau is right. Platitudes need not be recognized as platitudes by 
absolutely everyone to count as platitudes. I might be too tired to recognize that 
something is a platitude. But platitudes do need to be recognized by enough people 
in the debate to count as platitudes. Especially people like Brink, Railton and Copp 
who have thought long and hard about the issue of morality’s normativity shouldn’t 
(be able) to deny the alleged platitude that oughts entail reasons. The mere fact that 
they deny this is evidence that Mackie’s Platitude isn’t a platitude. In light of this it 
seems question-begging to insist that Mackie’s platitude is a platitude, so Joyce 
should have further arguments for morality’s commitment to categorical reasons. He 
does, and I will now explain what these are.  
Joyce accepts that it would have to be part of a moral concept that there are 
categorical reasons—Joyce accepts what I have called the Conceptual Entailment 
                                            
169 Joyce (2001: 101). Also see Broome (2007). 
170 Shafer-Landau (2005: 101).  
171 Shafer-Landau (2005: 111).  
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Claim. His commentators widely agree: “Joyce claims it is a conceptual truth that 
moral obligations have “inescapable authority.”172 The reference to ‘inescapable 
authority’ (sometimes Joyce also uses ‘practical clout’ or ‘practical oomph’) is 
important. Joyce thinks that what he can establish is that when the folk are engaged 
in moral discourse they are committed to something we can only rather inchoately 
formulate as the ‘inescapable authority’ of moral considerations. The folk make 
inchoately formulated claims like you ‘have to’ refrain from stealing and killing ‘no 
matter what you want’.173 This is the ‘bare’ conceptual entailment claim: it is part of 
the correct application conditions on moral concepts that you apply them to things 
that there is inescapable authority to do or refrain from doing. Furthermore, Joyce 
thinks that our best philosophical attempts at interpreting this notion of inescapable 
authority commits us to talking about categorical reasons of rationality.174  
Why do we end up with categorical reasons of rationality when we try to get 
clearer on the notion of inescapable authority? The reason is that categorical reasons 
of rationality are authoritative and inescapable in the very same way that moral 
obligations are meant to be authoritative and inescapable. Morality delivers 
obligations (morality is authoritative) in such a way that there is nothing the agent 
can do, not even adopting different desires, that allows him to escape this obligation 
(morality is inescapable). Similarly, practical reasons too are authoritative (they ‘tell 
you’ what to do) and inescapable. For whenever you try to question their authority 
you are ipso facto committed to their authority because to question something is to 
                                            
172 Copp (2010: 155); also see Joyce (MS). In fact moral discourse exhibits two 
conceptual commitments, according to Joyce: “The conceptual commitment of 
moral discourse, upon which the error theory runs, is one concerning actions that we 
“have to” perform, regardless of what our desires and interests are. We can place 
next to this another commitment concerning the content of such imperatives: that the 
things we “have to” refrain from need to include breaking promises for trivial 
reasons, doing violence for self-gain, and the like. … In other words, a theory of 
imperatives that managed to supply strong categorical imperatives ... but for things 
like “Kill anyone who annoys you,” “Steal when you can,” etc., simply would not be 
a morality” (2001: 67). Joyce, as noted, is happy to leave matters imprecise 
regarding the second entailment. I follow suit because the main beef in the argument 
is that it is part of moral concepts’ correct application conditions that they apply to 
things that exhibit inescapable authority.  
173 Joyce (2001: 76). Also see Joyce (2000).  
174 Joyce (2001: 104; 2006: 192). Although Joyce also has his doubts (2009a, 
2000b).   
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ask for a reason.175 This only follows, as Joyce realizes, when reasons are given by 
practical rationality. He writes: “with Smith [1994] I will use “normative reason” in 
a restricted sense, to mean something that is justified according to practical 
rationality.”176 Joyce also believes that whether agents have a reason to do 
something is determined by whether they would want to do that thing if they 
reasoned correctly—that is, if they reasoned without flouting such principles as that 
which obliges agents to take the means to their ends.  
Moreover, it looks as though practical rationality is uniquely inescapable. 
What else has this feature of being authoritative and inescapable? Nothing, it seems. 
Therefore, the only hope for defenders of moral realism would be to show that there 
are categorical practical reasons with recognizable moral subject-matter. (To 
foreshadow what is to come: Joyce’s Substantive Claim is that there are no such 
reasons.) 
Let’s look at this argument, and the considerations Joyce brings to the table 
in support of its premises, in more detail. Joyce’s master-argument looks like this: 
 
Joyce’s Master Argument 
P1  If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless of whether he cares to 
φ, regardless of whether φing satisfies any of his desires or furthers his 
interests—morality has categorical applicability 
P2  If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing—morality has 
categorical reason-giving force 
C1  Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φing regardless 
of whether φing serves his desires or furthers his interests [From P1, P2] 
P3  But there is no sense to be made of such reasons 
C2  Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation [From C1, P3]
177
 
 
In this sub-section I discuss Joyce’s arguments for (P1-P2). The next sub-section 
discusses Joyce’s argument for (P3). The sub-section after that discusses Joyce’s 
moral fictionalism, which is Joyce’s view on what we (prudentially) ought to do 
with moral discourse after error theory.  
                                            
175 Joyce (2001: 49, 68, 102, 104). Also see Shafer-Landau (2005: 110). Copp 
(2007: 271) calls this the closed question proposal of authoritative normativity (or 
inescapable authority).  
176 Joyce (2001: 70 n. 21).   
177 Joyce (2001: 42).  
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Let’s start with three dialectical points about P1. First, P1 can be—and 
usually is—accepted by lots of naturalist theories that Joyce has no beef with other 
than that they fail to recognize morality’s categorical reason-giving force as 
mentioned in P2.
178
 For as we have seen, there is only an entailment from categorical 
reasons to the categorical applicability of moral norms; there isn’t one that runs in 
the other direction. So these naturalists accept P1 but reject P2. They either think 
that an honestly executed internal accommodation project doesn’t commit us to P2 
(non-revisionary naturalism). Or else they think that when it does that a revision of 
our conception of what morality would have to look like to one that doesn’t include 
categorical reasons would be benign and thus vindicates moral discourses 
(revisionary naturalism).  
Second, P1 is very plausible. Joyce brings this out with various examples. 
For instance, we have the intuition that the rules of morality apply to characters like 
Plato’s Gyges, full stop. Gyges has a ring that makes him invisible at will, and he 
uses it to steal and kill as he can always get away with it by making himself 
invisible. We think that it doesn’t matter what Gyges desires to do, or whether he 
can escape punishment, or what have you. Gyges shouldn’t steal and kill, period.179 
Again, the thought that morality forbids Gyges to use his ring in the ways he wants 
is very much ingrained in our ordinary moral thought (and Joyce exploits this well); 
the beef of Joyce’s argument is on the issue of whether the ‘ought’ in ‘Gyges 
‘ought’ not to steal and kill’ must be analysed as a categorical normative reason.180  
Nevertheless, third, P1 has been denied. Consider Harman’s moral 
relativism, according to which the ‘logic’ of at least the deontic moral judgments 
forces us to conclude that they can only sensibly be applied to those agents whom 
we know are capable of being motivated by the reasons we ascribe to them.
181
 If this 
is true then P1 is false: ‘if x morally ought to φ, then it is not the case that x ought to 
φ regardless of whether he cares to φ, regardless of whether φing satisfies any of his 
desires or furthers his interests.’ However, Harman’s view is very much a minority 
view and  
                                            
178 These naturalists include: Brink (1984, 1989); Railton (1986); Foot (1972).  
179 Joyce (2001: 32-3, 2011a: 525). See Plato, Republic, 360b-c.  
180 Also see Joyce (2006: 203).  
181 Harman (1975).  
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[t]he many critical howls that greeted [Harman’s] claim are evidence that [P1] was 
regarded by his audience as a conceptual truth
182
  
 
Moreover, I will have my own arguments against Harman in Chapter 5. So here I 
proceed on the assumption that Joyce has settled P1. We thus accept that “moral 
commands are conditioned on the desires and concerns of those to whom they are 
addressed neither explicitly nor implicitly.”183 
 It is much harder for Joyce to argue that P2 is true. Apart from the failed 
entailment between P1 and P2 based on Mackie’s platitude, Joyce presents the 
translation test argument and reinforces that argument with the function or use 
argument. I discuss both of them in what follows.  
According to the translation test argument, if you have a concept x (such as 
MORAL WRONGNESS) and wonder whether it entails concept y (such as INESCAPABLE 
AUTHORITY), then you should remove y from your discourse about x and see if the 
new discourse would be accepted as an eligible replacement of the original 
discourse.184 If the answer is ‘no’ then x entails y.  
 A big problem with the translation test argument is that it isn’t feasible. For 
the counterfactual judgments that are involved in it are too complex for us to trust 
our intuitions about them.185 Can we get a clear verdict on whether a certain 
contender moral concept counts as a moral concept in the hypothetical situation that 
we are confronted with a choice between it and some other contender moral 
concept? Problems of projecting theoretical commitments onto moral discourse 
loom large, as does the problem that the folk may lack the conceptual sophistication 
to grasp the question at hand. So even though the argument might work in theory, in 
practice it is pretty much useless. Or at least this is what Joyce himself believes, and 
because I want to argue that Joyce’s arguments for error theory are highly 
problematic I’ll follow him in this.  
                                            
182 Shafer-Landau (2005: 118n4).  
183 Joyce (2011a: 523).  
184 Joyce (2001: 3, 2006: 200); also see Copp (2007: Ch. 6); Tresan (2010: 227).  
185 Joyce (2001: 3, 2006: 201).  
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So the translation test needs reinforcement. This is what the use argument 
brings.186 If we ask what determines whether something like INESCAPABLE 
AUTHORITY is part of moral concepts then according to Joyce  
 
[T]he answer turns on how the concept morality is used. If concept A is used in a 
certain manner, but turns out to be problematic for various reasons (i.e., it is 
uninstantiated by the world), and concept B is an instantiated contender for 
replacing A, then B can be an adequate successor only if it too can be used in the 
same manner. For example … when we discovered that there are no diabolical 
supernatural forces in the universe, we had no further use for the concept witch. 
Perhaps we could have carried on applying the word “witch” to women who play a 
certain kind of local cultural role on the margins of formal society … but carrying 
on in this way would not have allowed us to use the word “witch” for the purposes 
to which we had previously put it: to condemn these women for their evil magical 
influence and justify their being killed
187
 
 
Likewise for moral concepts, argues Joyce. If taking inescapable authority out of 
(the correct application conditions of) moral concepts then we won’t be able to use 
moral concepts in the same way that we can use them now; therefore, inescapable 
authority is part of (the correct application conditions of) moral concepts. So on the 
basis of the use argument we can formulate: 
 
Practical Debunking Thesis (PDT) The usefulness of moral statements does 
not survive the debunking of the myth that 
moral concepts have inescapable authority; 
therefore, inescapable authority is an 
essential part of moral concepts
188
 
 
I argue that Joyce uses two types of use arguments: one that focusses on the 
function of moral concepts as used by agents in their own practical deliberation, and 
another that focusses on the ability of agents to criticize the behaviour of other 
agents whilst using those concepts. I call the former the silencing function 
argument.189 I call the latter the argument from enfeebled moral criticism.190 The 
                                            
186 Joyce (2007b, 2006: 206-8); also see Mackie (1977: 108, 203), Cuneo (2012: 
114, 124); Tresan (2010: 235-6); Garner (1994: 139n7). 
187 Joyce (2007b: 65).  
188 Tresan (2010: 227).  
189 Joyce (2001: 181, 215; 2006: 108-18, 168-74, 206); Kirchin (2010: 179); Cuneo 
(2012: 115). 
190 Joyce (2006: 208); Tresan (2010: 232); Vogelstein (forthcoming).  
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literature further distinguishes the redundancy of moral language argument and the 
argument from encouraging wrongdoing.191 I explain after my own interpretation of 
Joyce’s use arguments why both of these arguments merit only a very brief 
discussion.  
Start with the silencing function argument. According to this argument, it is a 
sine qua non for moral concepts that (i) when they feature in moral judgments like 
‘stealing is wrong’ or ‘I ought not to steal’, they have the following effect on the 
agent who makes those judgments. They put out of mind rationalizations that might 
tempt them to steal. According to the silencing function argument, it is also true that 
(ii) moral concepts could only have this effect when the moral facts they can be used 
to describe are facts about categorical moral reasons. In other words, (i) the function 
of moral concepts is to put alternative rationalizations for the performance of 
different actions out of the agent’s mind and (ii) moral concepts could only perform 
this function if the facts they describe are facts about categorical reasons. Aspiring 
moral concepts that cannot be used to describe facts about categorical reasons are 
schmoral concepts at best.  
One question that comes to mind is whether the silencing function argument 
entails that the normativity of categorical reasons must be overriding in the sense 
that once it is recognized it should and does, precisely, put other rationalizations—
such as the excitement that stealing might bring or the gains to one’s personal 
welfare—out of mind. That is, if it is allowed that non-moral (say, prudential) 
considerations can override moral ones, would it then follow that its countervailing 
consideration wasn’t in fact a moral consideration? After all, the ‘moral’ 
considerations didn’t perform its alleged function, which was to ‘silence’ these other 
considerations. If Joyce’s argument assumes the overridingness of moral 
considerations’ normative force then that is a strike against the argument. For it does 
not seem to be the case that the normativity of moral considerations is overriding in 
this way.192 At least we need an argument that morality’s normativity has this 
further property of being overriding. But this has not been supplied by Joyce.193  
                                            
191 Tresan (2010: 234-6) based on Joyce (2006: 206-7).  
192 For such arguments see, e.g., Kagan (1989: 1).  
193 Joyce comes close to accepting that morality has to be overridingly normative in 
his discussion of what we ought to do with moral discourse after recognition of the 
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To the contrary; Joyce seems to think that the overridingness of moral 
considerations plays no role in his silencing argument:   
 
a moral judgment … is no guarantor that the action will be performed, but so long 
as it increases the likelihood of the performance then this may be its evolutionary 
function [because the moral judgment can] … play a dynamic role in deliberation 
…. prompting and strengthening certain desires and blocking certain considerations 
from even arising
194 
 
 
But this passage is unclear. Either moral considerations play a ‘dynamic role’ in 
deliberation in that although they ‘increase’ the likelihood of the agent performing 
the morally right action, they need not necessarily do that and hence may be 
overruled by other considerations. Call this the ‘dynamic role’-interpretation. Or else 
moral considerations play an even more impressive role by actually ‘blocking’ other 
considerations from even arising. Call this the ‘guaranteeing role’-interpretation. 
What is unclear about this passage is that it supports both interpretations. Let’s take 
each in turn.  
The guaranteeing role interpretation of morality’s function is tantamount to 
the interpretation we had in the previous paragraph. Moral considerations only count 
as moral considerations if they override other considerations. But we have already 
seen problems with this suggestion. So let’s take the ‘dynamic role’ interpretation 
instead. The problem with this interpretation is that the weakened account of moral 
considerations’ functional role in an agent’s psychology that it implies makes it a lot 
harder to set them apart from other considerations. That is, if sometimes prudential 
considerations ‘silence’ rationalizations for doing a ‘morally right’ thing then we get 
the following question. How often do moral considerations have to be successful in 
silencing other considerations to count as moral considerations?
195  Without an 
                                                                                                                           
truth of error theory, although I’m not sure that this issue has completely crystallized 
in his thinking (2001: 184).  
194 Joyce (2006: 114).  
195 See Lewis (1989) for a similar question about how many commonly recognized 
aspects of the concept ‘value’ would have to be instantiated by the world for us to be 
able to say that there are values (perhaps benignly reduced to less-than-perfect 
claimants of the term of which it is true that the world satisfies all of its aspects but 
of which it is also true that this claimant doesn’t include all the commonly 
recognized aspects of values as we actually think about them). See Joyce (2012) for 
critique.  
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answer to that question it looks as though their ability to “silence” other 
considerations is insufficient to set them apart from other considerations, for these 
also have this silencing function. Note that responding by insisting that we can pick 
out moral considerations by looking at their content as well as their silencing 
function might well work, but also obfuscates the need for silencing. For if both 
moral and prudential considerations can silence each other and are therefore on a par 
with each other in that respect then constraints on the content of moral 
considerations are doing all the philosophical work.  
Even if we assume that Joyce can solve this problem, there is a further 
problem with his silencing function argument. Certain naturalists can also claim that 
moral thought and discourse plays much this function without postulating 
categorical reasons. These naturalists can accept (i) but reject (ii). Cuneo gives the 
example of pretending that there are categorical moral reasons, which, when we are 
sufficiently engrossed in the moral game, will also tend to set us on the right path.196 
If we pretend that there are categorical reasons when we are doing our practical 
reasoning then, so long as we are sufficiently ‘down’ with the moral game, we will 
also manage to put out of mind rationalizations for different actions, and indeed very 
reliably so, without a need to assume that the moral concepts that feature in those 
considerations must describe facts about categorical moral reasons. So, the objection 
goes, even if moral considerations play a silencing function and even if we can 
somehow unproblematically describe what this function amounts to (recall my 
earlier comments about the overridingness of prudential considerations that suggest 
that this assumption isn’t at all obvious), the data as we have them do not entail the 
claim that moral considerations require categorical reasons.  
The next point of critique I have about the silencing function argument is 
related to the previous one. I just argued that it is not clear why ethical naturalism 
wouldn’t be able to account for the datum that moral considerations play a silencing 
function. But we can also give Joyce the benefit of the doubt and say that ethical 
naturalism cannot give a good enough explanation of this datum. In that case still it 
is not clear that (ii) follows from (i); viz., that it follows from (i) that moral concepts 
would have to describe facts that are categorically reason-giving. Perhaps, that is, 
                                            
196 Cuneo (2012: 123-4). He bases himself on Johnston (2010: 17). Also see Brink 
(1989: 66).  
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moral statements stand in a more general relation of entailment to categorical moral 
reasons, and this relation is ‘more general’ because it doesn’t require connections 
between concepts. I call this relation ‘metaphysical entailment’ and explain it more 
fully in the next chapter. Because Joyce doesn’t consider other possibilities besides 
conceptual entailment he jumps from (i) to (ii) without argument. But in fact 
argumentation is required. So the dialectical value of this particular objection to the 
silencing function argument is that it may well be a good argument for error theory 
(as long as the other problems can be solved with it anyway) but that it is unclear 
whether it would be a good argument for an error theory that uses conceptual 
entailment as opposed to a good argument for error theory that uses metaphysical 
entailment (or some other account of the mode of commitment of moral discourse to 
the moral reality thesis for that matter). On the basis of this and the other problems 
discussed I conclude that the silencing function argument doesn’t make the 
Conceptual Entailment Claim sufficiently plausible.  
Let’s move on to the next version of the use argument and see whether it can 
bring solace. This is the argument from enfeebled moral criticism. The argument 
starts with the observation that it would be odd to say of someone that she did the 
morally wrong thing but had no reason not to do it. The reason why this is odd is 
that we cannot legitimately criticize someone for doing something she had no reason 
not to do. But then holding constant the practice of moral criticism, moral 
considerations must entail reasons; and because moral criticism applies 
categorically we even get categorical reasons.  
Vogelstein argues that the kind of criticizability at least sometimes has to be 
of the subjective and cannot always be of the objective kind.197 It is extremely 
implausible that I’m culpable for the consequences of my behaviour that I’m 
unaware of at least where I’m not culpable for the unawareness (objective 
wrongness).198 It is much more plausible that I’m culpable for the consequences of 
                                            
197 Vogelstein (forthcoming). He also argues that the concept of criticism here has 
to refer to the attitude of being critical rather than to the act of criticism, as actually 
criticising wrongdoers might make things worse. Exactly what kind of worseness is 
at stake here however remains unclear, and if Vogelstein’s suggestion is that 
criticising a wrongdoer will make things morally worse than that suggestion will be 
immediately rejected by the error theorist. So I’ll leave this out.  
198 This further condition is not recognized by Vogelstein but it is clearly required 
for his point to go through.  
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my behaviour that I am aware of (subjective wrongness). Taking this into account, 
the argument from enfeebled moral criticism will go something like this: 
 
Argument from Enfeebled Moral Criticism 
P4  Moral practice is committed to holding transgressors blameworthy 
regardless of the ends they desire 
P5  Holding someone blameworthy regardless of the ends they desire entails 
judging that that person failed to respond to reasons that were authoritative 
for her
199
 
C3  Therefore, moral practice is committed to the judgment that moral reasons 
are authoritative for persons whatever their ends [From P4, P5]
200
 
 
What to make of this argument? P4 seems true. Barring, perhaps, genuine 
moral dilemmas such that both φ-ing and not φ-ing would be morally wrong, it 
seems that doing something morally wrong deserves (moral) criticism. And since 
moral obligations apply to agents categorically, the critique of their behaviour that 
we should be able to direct at them also takes no regard of these agents’ desires or 
ends.  
But it is not clear that P5 is true. Generally speaking, if you are criticisable 
for not φ-ing (refraining from acting is also an action) then there must have been 
some consideration that spoke against φ-ing. The thought is this: it would be very 
weird if we could criticise you for doing something if there wasn’t anything at all 
that counted against you doing that thing. But whence the focus on reasons of 
rationality that do the counting against? Why wouldn’t a weaker conception of the 
normativity of morality (as opposed to the strong, reason involving-conception) be 
enough? One example of a weak conception of morality’s normativity is a rule-
conception of normativity:  
 
                                            
199 Also see Nagel (1970: 83); Shafer-Landau (2003: 193).  
200 Taken, with adaptations, from Finlay (2008a: 358). Vogelstein (forthcoming; 
minor adaptations mine) has: (P4’) Necessarily, for all A, x: if it would be morally 
wrong for A to do x, then A would be criticisable if she were to do x; (P5’) 
Necessarily, for all A, x: if A would be criticisable if she were to do x, then if A 
were to do x, A would not be in compliance with her best (subjective or objective) 
reasons; (C3’) Necessarily, for all A, x: if it would be morally wrong for A to do x, 
then if A were to do x, A would not be in compliance with her best (subjective or 
objective) reasons [From P4’, P5’].  
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Rule-Involving Conception of Morality’s Normativity   
Moral oughts are normative in virtue of being rules, and rules are normative in 
virtue of distinguishing between what is correct and incorrect or what is allowed 
and disallowed
201
  
 
If morality can be normative simply by consisting of rules and thus without 
(necessarily) involving reasons then there can be something that counts against not 
φ-ing—viz., morality’s rule that tells you not to φ—in the absence of rationally 
authoritative reasons. The rules of morality apply categorically, and there is genuine 
normativity around (albeit it of the rule- rather than rationality-involving kind), but 
P5 will be false. Holding someone blameworthy regardless of the ends they desire 
does not entail judging that that person failed to respond to reasons that were 
authoritative for her. It may only entail that the agent ignored categorically 
applicable normativity that falls short of being rationally authoritative; for instance, 
a kind of normativity that can be analysed in terms of rules.  
Joyce disagrees with this last point, and tries to elicit precisely that intuition 
in us with cases like:  
 
Jack the Ripper It would be intolerably odd if it were possible to add to our 
observations of Jack the Ripper’s atrocities that he “had 
every reason to act wickedly … and no real reason to 
refrain”
202
   
  
I accept that it would be intolerably odd if there were nothing we could say to Jack 
the Ripper. But with the rule-involving rather than reason-involving conception of 
morality’s normativity we can say something: we can say that what he did was 
wrong relative to the rules of morality and that since rules are categorically 
normative, Jack’s behaviour is ‘categorically wrong’ and we can criticize him for 
ignoring this rule. Now perhaps this would still be enfeebled moral criticism—if 
                                            
201 Parfit (2012 Vol1: 144). One difference between the rule-involving conception 
of normativity and the reason-involving conception of normativity is that on the 
former conception, new normative truths can be created “merely by introducing, or 
getting some people to accept, some rule. Legislators can create laws, and anyone 
can create the rules that define some new game … In contrast, on the reason-
involving conception, there is normativity only when there are normative reasons … 
We cannot create such reasons merely by getting people to accept some rule” (ibid.).  
202 Based on Joyce (2006: 204); also see Joyce (2001: 43-4). Jack the Ripper was a 
serial killer in London in the late 1880s.  
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inescapable authority isn’t an essential part of moral concepts then we can’t criticise 
Jack for ignoring the normative reason (he knew) he had not to kill and we can only 
point to a rule—but the question is whether this degree of enfeebling moral criticism 
is sufficient for the practical debunking thesis.
203  If the choice is between moral 
concepts with inescapable authority that allow us to criticise agents for ignoring 
reasons (they knew they had) to be moral and moral concepts that don’t allow us to 
criticize immoral behaviour at all, then we might be drawn to the practical 
debunking thesis. But if the choice is between moral concepts with inescapable 
authority that allow us to criticise agents for ignoring reasons (they knew they had) 
to be moral and moral concepts that allow us to criticise agents for wrong behaviour 
relative to the rules of morality, then it is not at all clear that this enfeebling of our 
capacity to criticize wrongdoers vindicates the practical debunking thesis. The 
practical vindication thesis (PVT) might still be on the table: the usefulness of moral 
statements survives the debunking of the myth that moral concepts have inescapable 
authority, so inescapable authority is not an essential part of moral concepts. Joyce 
doesn’t consider this issue, and so, again, his arguments are not conclusive.  
 A further point of critique I want to make regarding the argument from 
enfeebled moral criticism is structurally identical to a remark I made a couple of 
paragraphs up concerning the silencing function argument. The remark I have in 
mind was that the silencing function argument might be a good argument for a kind 
of error theory but that it is not clear that it is a good argument for error theory based 
on conceptual entailment. For a more general entailment relation was still in the 
running, and nothing about the silencing function argument seemed to rule out that 
entailment relation. The same holds for the argument from enfeebled moral 
criticism. Although I just gave reasons to doubt this, let’s assume that Joyce is right 
that moral discourse wouldn’t be moral discourse without the possibility of moral 
criticism and that we need categorical reasons of rationality for moral criticism. But 
why would it follow from this that it is built into the (correct application conditions 
of) moral concepts that the things they can be used to describe are categorical 
reasons? Again, a general entailment relation, which I call ‘metaphysical entailment’ 
and which will be further elucidated in the next chapter, would seem to do just as 
well. Joyce doesn’t consider this option; probably, as I surmised earlier as well, 
                                            
203 Again cf. Lewis (1989); Joyce (2012).  
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because Joyce is working with only one conception of entailment: conceptual 
entailment. My critique is that Joyce hasn’t done enough to argue that the argument 
from enfeebled moral criticism supports the conceptual entailment. There are too 
many problems with this version of the use argument for us to accept it.  
 To sum up what we have so far, Joyce accepts, and so have we with him, that 
moral discourse is non-negotiably committed to the categorical applicability of 
moral obligations. Joyce wants to move from this to the claim that it is also a non-
negotiable commitment of moral discourse that moral obligations are or entail 
categorical reasons of rationality. We have discussed Joyce’s three arguments for 
that conclusion—the argument from Mackie’s Platitude, the translation test 
argument and the use argument—in their various forms but we have found them 
wanting. So far we are not obliged to accept Joyce’s claim that moral discourse 
wouldn’t be moral discourse without categorical normative reasons.  
Discussions of Joyce’s attempt to settle the non-negotiable entailment claim 
in the literature occasionally attribute further arguments to him. One is the argument 
from encouraging wrongdoing.204 According to it, when agents are aware of error 
theory and thus of their moral concepts not being imbued with practical clout, they 
can jiggle their desires round, thereby escape legitimate criticism of their behaviour, 
and thus feel free to perform wrongful actions. And because this is to be avoided 
(we don’t want wrongs to be committed even more often than they already are) we 
should accept that moral reasoning comes with inescapable authority. However, this 
argument is clearly irrelevant on a reading according to which it is the moral 
wrongness that is doing the philosophical work in the argument. For that reading 
contradicts error theory by asserting that moral wrongness matters. But we interpret 
the ought as a prudential ought then the argument collapses into wishful thinking 
rather than an argument for the claim that practical clout is part of moral concepts.  
Finally the literature also mentions the redundancy of moral language 
argument.205 According to this argument, an alleged moral system without 
inescapable authority would make moral language redundant, but moral language 
isn’t redundant, so it must contain some form of inescapable authority. This 
argument however clearly begs the questions against the naturalist who claims that, 
                                            
204 Tresan (2010: 234) based on Joyce (2006: 206).  
205 Tresan (2010: 235-6) based on Joyce (2006: 207).  
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strictly speaking, moral language is redundant. We need an argument that we can’t 
have moral discourse without inescapable authority, not an assertion of that claim.  
 I will now leave Joyce’s unsuccessful attempts to settle the non-negotiable 
commitment behind, assume for the sake of argument that he is right, and continue 
with his argument for the Substantive Claim that there are no categorical moral 
reasons of rationality.  
2.3.2  Joyce’s Substantive Claim 
The claim that Joyce now has to argue against is the view he calls moral rationalism; 
viz., the view that moral reasons are reasons of rationality. As we know from the 
previous sub-section, according to Joyce, moral rationalism is the only way to make 
sense of the deeply embedded commitment in moral thought and talk to inescapable 
authority. For reasons of rationality are inescapably authoritative in the very same 
way that moral considerations are meant to be inescapably authoritative, and nothing 
else is. Unfortunately, argues Joyce, moral rationalism is false. Moral reasons are 
not a subset of normative reasons such that moral failing is, necessarily, rational 
failing.206 This Substantive Claim, in combination with the conceptual claim that it 
is a non-negotiable commitment of morality that there are categorical moral reasons 
of rationality comprises Joyce’s error theory. 
 Joyce’s argument for the claim that there are no categorical normative moral 
reasons is that we can’t “make sense” of such reasons.207 We can make sense of 
reasons that “have some degree of dependence on [our] actual desires” but we 
cannot make sense of reasons that have no such dependence on our actual desires.208 
Practical reasoning “is in general a desire-sensitive affair, and … thus so too are the 
practical reasons that come along with it”.209 Now we do have genuine practical 
reasoning as some desires can be shown to be misguided or inappropriate. This 
includes the desire to catch the 4pm train to Leeds if we know that we also desire to 
be at work in Leeds that day by 9am. For this is desire-sensitive practical reasoning: 
we can show that the desire to catch the 4pm train doesn’t jibe with one’s other 
desire to be at work on time. Of course this can’t be the whole story—we’ll also 
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207 Joyce (2001: 42; 2006: 190-9).  
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209 Joyce (2006: 198).  
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need some account of why the desire to be at work on time is the ‘more important’ 
one, and lots more besides—but the thought that Joyce is having is that we can at 
least get a grip on how practical reasoning with desires as input works. The problem 
for moral realism—whose fate, recall, is tied up with the fate of moral rationalism—
is that turning practical reasoning into a desire-sensitive affair entails that not all 
desires can be shown to be misguided or inappropriate. This implies that “different 
people in the same circumstances may have very different reasons.”210 So when the 
circumstances are ‘morally relevant’—i.e., if there is a question of killing or 
stealing—then one agent might have a reason to refrain from performing these 
actions, whereas another agent might have a reason to perform these actions, 
depending on what desires they have. But that means that not all reasons with 
recognisable moral content are categorical reasons—some will be desire-dependent 
or hypothetical. And that means that moral rationalism, and thus moral realism, is 
false.  
 I’ve just provided a very quick sketch of the intelligibility of practical 
reasoning as a desire-sensitive affair and I’ve asserted that according to Joyce, 
practical reasoning without desires as input won’t work. I will now expand on this 
second point. Joyce argues that practical reasoning without desires as input won’t 
work because we can’t allow agents to be ‘alienated’ from their reasons.211 Joyce 
accepts that the presentation of a normative reason claim to an agent needn’t 
necessarily immediately motivate the agent. For Joyce accepts a non-Humean 
instrumentalist theory of reasons according to which some desires fall within the 
scope of rational influence.212 Agents may need to generate desires that correspond 
with their reasons, and this process might not yet have affected the agent. But what 
Joyce doesn’t accept is that the agent, after having corrected his desires in light of 
full information about means-end relations in the instrumentalist way, can 
                                            
210 Joyce (2006: 198).  
211 Joyce (2001: 80).  
212 Joyce (2001: 69). The theory is non-Humean because Joyce accepts the 
interpretation of Hume’s theory of practical reasoning according to which no desires 
whatsoever fall within the scope of rational critique. The theory is still a version of 
instrumentalism “because it understands reasons only as means to an agent’s ends. 
An agent’s desires may be available for rational appraisal in a way with which 
Hume would have disagreed, and an agent may have X for an end (and thus a reason 
to pursue X) even though she does not desire X, but none of this distracts from the 
instrumentality of those reasons” (Joyce 2001: 77-8). 
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legitimately ask ‘but so what?’213 For that would mean that if someone presents an 
agent with a contender reason claim then all that is going on is that this person is 
barking a command in the direction of the agent—a command, moreover, that 
doesn’t resonate with the agent. Such ‘barked commands’ are like commands to do 
a thousand push-ups even if there’s nothing about what you want to do that would 
make that command appropriate, legitimate or intelligible. Such demands aren’t 
reasons, thinks Joyce. Reasons ‘engage’ the agent in the right sort of way, for 
instance by being means to their ends. They certainly don’t alienate agents. And 
how do we avoid alienation? By “tying an agent’s normative reasons directly to the 
things that the agent is interested in”—that is, to his desires.214  
Joyce thinks that the non-alienation constraint on reasons means that we get 
a dilemma for moral rationalism. Either we make sure that reasons count as reasons 
by tying them to agents’ desires because we thereby avoid alienation. But then we 
have to agree that reasons are relative in the sense that not all people might have a 
reason not to steal.215 Or else we make sure that all people do have reasons not to 
steal, perhaps by prioritizing first-order moral reasoning and dropping the 
requirement that agents can’t be alienated from their reasons. But then we won’t 
have reasons because these ‘reasons’ aren’t tied in the right kind of way to our 
desires—they don’t count as reasons and are mere ‘barked commands’.   
 Even if we assume the non-alienation constraint, for the dilemma to work we 
still need to know, exactly, why rational deliberation without input from desires 
can’t generate categorical moral reasons of rationality. So far we have only seen a 
constraint on a successful attempt to argue that rational deliberation without input 
from desires can generate categorical moral reasons—the non-alienation constraint. 
But in fact this is all Joyce has. Joyce argues that there is no reason to assume that 
rational agents will converge in their judgments about which desires they ought and 
ought not to keep and thus places the onus of proof on the moral rationalist to show 
that when these agents think clearly and calmly about the matter, they will all desire 
not to steal.216  
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215 Joyce (2001: 39, 41, 44).  
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But how about idealization strategies? These are strategies that claim, 
roughly, that once agents reason in idealized circumstances, they will desire to do 
the morally right thing. In response to this claim in support of moral rationalism, 
Joyce insists that it matters what the idealization involves. Joyce argues that adding 
to the equation just that agents have all and only true beliefs makes no difference:  
 
The differences that hold among actual agents that are based on doxastic 
disagreement will, of course, evaporate in their idealized counterparts, but there are 
no grounds for holding that all the other differences – those derived from different 
desires … will likewise be lost in the idealization. So there will be no convergence 
and a fortiori no convergence regarding stealing … etc.
217
 
 
However, Joyce needs to do more than this, as various philosophers take up 
the challenge of showing why rationality demands moral behaviour. Joyce considers 
Smith’s Kantianism.218 Smith’s argument that practical rationality is substantively 
non-relative (i.e., delivers reasons that aren’t relative to people’s idiosyncratic 
desires or wants) goes as follows. He asks us to consider “the empirical fact that 
moral argument tends to elicit the agreement of our fellows.”219 If that is true then it 
seems safe to say that if we think sufficiently long and hard about moral matters, we 
will agree on the same rules—that is, that we will all recognize the same reasons.  
How about the rejoinder that this alleged ‘empirical fact’ is simply false? 
Smith replies by drawing attention to the following three alleged facts: 
 
1  There are moral disagreements but there are also moral agreements  
2  Of the moral agreements, many are due to rational deliberation 
3  All of the disagreements are due to the failure of rational deliberation220 
 
Joyce complains that 1-3 do not show that moral rationalism is true. 1 and 2 can be 
granted. Actually, 2 would be more interesting if it were formulated as 2*: 
  
2* All moral agreements are due to rational deliberation 
                                            
217 Joyce (2001: 76-7).  
218 Smith (1994); Joyce (2001: 88-91).  
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But Smith, wisely, doesn’t profess on this issue. This is a wise decision because 2* 
is more difficult to defend than 2, and because all the most important philosophical 
work in 1-3 is done by 3 anyway. After all, if 3 is true then someone holding the 
view that killing is permissible will be practically irrational. And since practical 
rationality generates reasons, if 3 is true then we all have a reason not to kill, even 
the person currently holding that killing is permissible. So if 3 is true then we get 
categorical moral reasons of rationality. But how do we argue for 3? 
 Smith employs the Kantian Leap to argue that the person wanting to kill—
call him the criminal—holds an irrational desire. The Kantian Leap is the idea that 
when one deliberates about what one should do, one is in effect legislating for 
everyone. Everyone in the same circumstances as you would have the same reason 
that you decided you had. If the Kantian Leap is true then the idea is that if the 
criminal is rational, he wouldn’t desire to kill—for by the Kantian Leap that would 
mean that we are all allowed to kill, and thus allowed to kill the criminal.221 And no 
rational agent can allow for desires that potentially annihilate his own agency or 
capacity for rational deliberation.  
But the Kantian leap is false, argues Joyce.222 The problem lies with what we 
understand by ‘same circumstances’. Either we understand ‘same circumstances’ to 
include the agents’ idiosyncratic desires or we don’t. If we do then it won’t be true 
that we all have the same reasons. The criminal desires to kill and is willing to 
universalize that desire and take the risk of being killed—perhaps the criminal feels 
sufficiently safe with his guns and the support of his fellow thugs. I however don’t 
to desire to kill—I don’t want to take the risk of being killed myself—and so I want 
to universalize that desire. The problem for Smith, argues Joyce, is that neither is 
contradicting the other and that we’d need something in addition to universalization 
to settle the matter about who is irrational here—the criminal or myself. But the 
whole point about the universalization proposal was that it could settle this matter. 
Alternatively, if we exclude desires from ‘same circumstances’ then the Kantian 
Leap doesn’t get us the claim that we all have reasons not to kill. This is because 
although we have a good conception of what it is for agents to universalize their 
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actions based on their desires (the criminal vs. me-case), we can’t make sense of the 
irrationality of desires that is wholly unconnected with what we presently desire.  
Smith though offers the following thought to make sense of critique of an 
agent’s desire in a way that doesn’t involve pointing out a connection to other 
desires. The criminal 
 
sticks with his opinion [that stealing is rationally acceptable] despite the fact that 
virtually everyone disagrees with him
223
 
 
But of course, accepting arguments that most people accept is no virtue of rationality 
that we should aspire. Either way, therefore, the Kantian leap doesn’t work.  
Joyce’s argument, it seems to me, works against Smith. The problem with 
Joyce’s argument, though, is that it only works against Smith. Other Kantian 
strategies are still available. For instance, there are arguments to the extent that 
reasons can be Williams-internal (i.e., that something can be a reason if and only if  
it is suitably related to agents’ antecedently held desires—accepted by Joyce) and 
yet categorical.224 It would strengthen Joyce’s case if we could do better than this.  
Before closing I want to raise some further worries for Joyce’s argument for 
the Substantive Claim that there are no categorical moral reasons of rationality. The 
first is that it is not at all clear that the non-alienation constraint on reasons is true. 
Do we really think that reasons can’t be reasons once they fail to engage agents and 
what they care about, broadly construed? Indeed, don’t we rather think that, as 
precisely our practice of moralizing shows, an agent can have a reason to do 
something (to give to famine relief for instance) regardless of whether he desires to 
kill? Furthermore, think about aesthetics and our general belief-forming processes. 
Don’t we think that agents can have a reason (of rationality) to appreciate the 
aesthetic qualities of Rembrandt’s De Nachtwacht even though they don’t care about 
the great works of art? And don’t we think that agents can have a reason (of 
rationality) to believe that the half-life of carbon-10 is 19.29 seconds when 
presented with the evidence even though they don’t desire to engage with modern 
chemistry? Since all of these practices—the moral, the aesthetic and the 
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epistemological—deal with categorical reasons and since this much, or so it seems 
anyway, is deeply ingrained in our ordinary thinking, Joyce’s move to wield in the 
non-alienation constraint to place into doubt especially moral reasons starts to look 
question-begging.  
Second, if Joyce’s entire argument for moral error theory via the non-
alienation constraint and his dilemma works, then it seems that Joyce is committed 
to the view that there are no categorical aesthetic and no categorical epistemic 
reasons of rationality either. That is an even tougher bullet to bite than just the bullet 
that there are no categorical moral reasons of rationality. Joyce however doesn’t 
consider this objection. In the terms of §1.4, Joyce accepts the (very implausible) 
first horn of the Formulation Dilemma, and this is a further strike against it.  
The third worry is that Joyce accepts what he calls the ‘practical reasoning 
theory’ of reasons; the theory according to which our reasons are given by what 
agents would end up deciding to desire and do after flawless practical reasoning.225 
Copp professes that he finds it  
 
counter-intuitive to suppose that the wrongness of torture depends on whether it is a 
necessary truth that anyone who believed that torture is wrong would be irrational to 
fail to take this into account in deciding whether to torture
226
  
 
The fact that an account of moral wrongness strikes people who have thought hard 
and long about it as counter-intuitive is a further strike against it.  
Fourthly, why can’t we argue that normative reasons are, to use one 
metaphor, part of the fabric of the universe, perhaps because reasons are facts and 
where ‘facts’ are understood here very broadly to cover how things are?227 Perhaps 
the existence of such intrinsically normative facts suffices for the truth of the claim 
that we should all care about morality. This kind of view is what Korsgaard would 
count as a version of “normative realism” and provided the backbone for Mackie’s 
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metaethics.228 When defensible, the view would vindicate moral realism and a 
success theory of moral discourse.  
Joyce doesn’t consider this view. He would presumably reject it because it 
alienates agents from their reasons. Agents can ask ‘so what?—what are these facts 
to me?’ when they are presented with their existence. But at least offhand it seems 
that if there are reasons understood as intrinsically normative constituents of the 
world then, precisely, ‘so what?’ responses are not legitimate. If such facts 
‘emanate’ categorical normative force, then, it seems, there is no question as to 
whether that forced can be ignored.229 The force is simply there, whether you want 
to recognize it or not. It might be difficult to believe that such (irreducibly) 
normative entities exist, but we’d need something like a queerness argument to show 
that they don’t exist. And at least the queerness argument as we got it from Mackie 
was far from successful; moreover, Joyce doesn’t have a queerness argument. In not 
considering this view Joyce is begging the question against it. Overall, then, Joyce’s 
attempt to settle the Substantive Claim is problematic.  
To sum up this sub-section, Joyce formulates a dilemma for the moral 
rationalist, whose theory he argues is the only hope for moral realism. Either reasons 
are reasons because they don’t alienate people as they are sufficiently closely tied to 
agents’ desires. But then we have to admit that different people might have different 
reasons in different circumstances, which is inconsistent with moral reasons’ 
categoricity. Or else reasons are guaranteed to be the same for everyone because we 
deny that they require some kind of connection with our desires. But then these 
‘reasons’ aren’t in fact reasons as agents can then legitimately ignore them. I argued 
that the second horn of the dilemma is far from damaging for the moral rationalist 
and indeed the moral realist. For all that Joyce has, I explained, is some critique of 
existing Kantian strategies coupled with the remark that the burden of proof is on 
them to clinch an argument without violating the non-alienation constraint. And this 
leaves one escape route wide open for the success theorist: find a Kantian that can 
clinch the argument. I also argued that the non-alienation-constraint on reasons 
coupled with the practical reasoning theory of reasons can be seen as question-
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- 81 - 
begging in the context of arguing for error theory, and some further objections beset 
his theory in addition to this. Moreover, Joyce does not have an acceptable answer to 
the Formulation Dilemma. So our conclusion has to be that Joyce hasn’t made error 
theory sufficiently plausible.  
However, again let’s give Joyce the benefit of the doubt. Suppose his error 
theory can be established. Then what (prudentially) ought we to do with our error-
ridden moral discourse?   
2.3.3   Joyce’s Solution 
For Joyce the main consideration relevant to deciding what to do with moral 
discourse after error theory is what “is supported by some kind of cost-benefit 
analysis.”230 This includes having no replacement discourse at all, continuing as if 
we never discovered the truth of error theory, and everything in between. Joyce 
thinks that a fictionalist treatment of moral thought and talk does best on the cost-
benefit analysis because it preserves important functions of our original tendency to 
moralize. In particular, fictionalizing bolsters self-control and combats weakness of 
will when it comes to performing those actions that we were used to call morally 
right and obligatory.231 And, importantly, fictionalism procures these benefits 
without the great costs of having no replacement discourse at all (abolitionism) or 
violating the truth-norm that governs most of our utterances most of the time 
(preservatism). 
Fictionalist theories of moral discourse either hold that we should believe 
fictionalist propositions like ‘in the moral fiction, stealing is wrong’ (content-
fictionalism) or that we should make-believe or pretend that stealing is wrong 
(attitude-fictionalism).232 Joyce is an attitude-fictionalist, and believes that if we 
make-believe moral propositions then, in every-day cases in which we aren’t 
reminded of the heightened epistemic standards as exhibited in the philosophy 
seminar room, we will be more likely to refrain from stealing compared to when we 
just think about the prudential considerations that speak against stealing (such as 
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232 Attitude-fictionalism is also sometimes called force-fictionalism (Enoch 2011a: 
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increased possibility of ending up in jail).233 Joyce believes that this is the case 
because ‘pretending’ that stealing is morally wrong isn’t some kind of ‘activity’ in 
the sense that in morally relevant situations we actively decide to pretend that there 
is a morality. Instead we bear an attitude of precommitment to morality.234 Before 
we get ourselves into practically relevant circumstances we decide that we want to 
immerse ourselves in the moral fiction so that when it matters we simply and 
automatically assent to the proposition that stealing is wrong, and, especially when 
this is done vividly, we will have yielded motivationally efficacious emotions that 
make us refrain from stealing.235 Only when we are in critical contexts in which we 
are most “undistracted, reflective, and critical” such as the philosophy seminar room 
do we forget about the fiction and agree that, really, nothing is morally right or 
wrong.236 The reason why this works better than just thinking about the prudential 
benefits of not stealing is that humans have a tendency to rationalize changes in 
desires—‘I don’t really want to be a moral saint anyway, and no one’s looking, so 
stealing this sandwich is actually fine’.  
Why can’t we simply go on believing in morality? That too would have by 
and large the same effect as make-believing in morality. Perhaps we can (largely) 
compartmentalize our (false) moral thoughts and our metaethical convictions.237 
Roughly, we should simply not think of error theory when it matters in daily life. 
Joyce objects that in doing this we will sacrifice the value of truth. Although truth 
isn’t intrinsically valuable, believing in falsehoods is a practical error because doing 
so is likely to have negative repercussions.238 It is true that the norms of truth and 
truthfulness, which allow agents to retain their grip on reality, can be abandoned or 
overruled by norms of social usefulness. But they should not be overruled too 
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religion, then he should want to remedy this” (2011: 95) 
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often.239 The bad consequences of this are “doxastic schizophrenia … which can … 
be expected to lead to various kinds of pragmatic handicap.”240 Another bad 
consequence is that a seemingly useful false belief will require all manner of 
compensatory false beliefs to make one’s entire package of beliefs coherent or 
internally consistent.241 This is not feasible.  
So perhaps Joyce is right about the benefits of fictionalism over having no 
replacement discourse and preserving our error-riddled discourse, if it works. But 
can fictionalism be made to work on its own terms? That is, is it true that we can 
reap the benefits of social cooperation with a fictionalist system that is supposed to 
regulate our practical deliberations, where this system is not undergirded by real 
normativity?  
One point of critique comes from Lillehammer, who asks how we can decide 
which values we are to further with the fictionalist discourse without thereby letting 
moral reasoning in through the back door again.242 Joyce argues that we have to 
look at what is “instrumentally useful”.243 And what is instrumentally useful is in 
part determined by the kinds of creatures we are.244 For us, cooperation is generally 
useful, and so it would be useful to adopt the policy of immersing ourselves in the 
moral fiction.245 The question though is what happens when lots of people disagree 
about what is instrumentally useful. What do we do with people who’d rather see 
very little cooperation because that benefits their business? How do we decide what 
becomes part of the moral fiction, given that, as agreed, there are no moral rules 
constraining that content? Just looking at the kinds of creatures we are might not 
work. Some people are very different from others.  
                                            
239 Lillehammer (2004: 105) calls this a “sane commitment” to truth, contrasting it 
with dogmatically believing that the norms of truth and truthfulness are to be upheld 
all of the times.  
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 A further worry is whether Joyce can “dispel [the worry] that making fictive 
judgments need involve self-deception or irrationality”.246 Joyce argues that self-
deception is avoided because it is always open to the make-believer to opt out of the 
fiction and agree, in the philosophy seminar room perhaps, that in reality morality is 
a sham.247 But this creates a tension with the practical benefits of fictionalizing. 
Once we are very much engrossed in the moral game, it seems, we will be in a state 
of mind that excludes thinking about error theory and this may indeed get us to 
refrain from stealing. But if this happens it also seems as though we are deluding 
ourselves: by hypothesis, the thought that error theory is true isn’t accessible if we 
are very much engrossed in the moral game. For if it were then the practical benefit 
of setting the agent on a course to not stealing wouldn’t occur. However, once we 
try to avoid this from happening by allowing ourselves to become conscious of the 
thought that error theory is true when we consider to steal something, then, 
especially when we know that no one is looking, the practical benefits of 
fictionalism will be compromised. So it is not clear that Joyce can avoid the worry 
of self-deception whilst retaining the benefits of some form of moral thinking. 
Indeed, it seems that we have a dilemma. Either accept self-deception but that 
sounds just as bad as compromising on truth. Or avoid self-deception, but then the 
practical benefits of fictionalizing will be compromised. Fictionalism is in trouble.  
 This was a short sketch of fictionalism because I will return to it specifically 
in Chapter 8. Nonetheless we can already conclude that it is not free of problems. 
Overall, we should conclude that Joyce’s error theory is not plausible. The theory 
solves none of the four major problems for error theory as discussed in §1.4.  
2.4  Other Error Theories 
In this section I provide a briefer discussion of the commitments of other existing 
error theories. Again my aim is to show that the four problems from §1.4 have not 
been adequately dealt with by error theorists.   
 I start with Olson’s error theory. Olson stays fairly close to the error theories 
of Mackie and Joyce. He accepts what he calls the standard formulation of error 
theory: 
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Standard Formulation  Error theory concerns ordinary folk moral 
discourse, the mode of commitment of moral 
discourse to the poisoned thesis is one of 
conceptual entailment, the content of the poisoned 
thesis is that there exist categorical moral reasons 
of rationality, and moral statements are false
248
 
 
Moral facts entail facts about categorical reasons, but there are no categorical 
reasons (these are too queer to exist) and hence, by entailment, there are no moral 
facts.  
Like Mackie, Olson thinks that the normativity that attaches to hypothetical 
reasons can be reduced to naturalistically respectable elements:  
 
The fact that there is (conclusive) non-categorical reason for chess players not to 
move the rook diagonally just is the fact that moving the rook diagonally is 
incorrect according to the rules of chess [there is nothing queer about this and 
likewise] there is nothing metaphysically queer about the fact that there is non-
categorical reason for a soldier to comply with the orders of a general, since this is 
just the fact that complying with the orders of those superior in military rank is part 
of the role of being a solider
249 
 
 
The reason why there is no queerness here is—focussing on the chess example for 
simplicity—that these norms are constitutive norms, determining simply what it is to 
play the game.250 Had we been talking about the substantive norms of playing chess, 
such as one obliging us to play, then this move would not have been possible. Moral 
norms are substantive and don’t exist; the norms of chess aren’t substantive and 
exist.  
Regarding the question of what to do with moral discourse, Olson is a 
preservatist, thinking that we can continue to indulge in our error-ridden moral 
                                            
248 Olson (2011a: 62). Recently however Olson had changed his mind about the 
‘content of the poisoned thesis’: “In previous work, I maintained that moral facts are 
queer because they are or entail categorical reasons (Olson 2010, 2011). I now 
believe that the best articulation is that moral facts are queer in that they are or entail 
facts that count in favour of certain courses of behaviour, where the favouring-
relation is irreducibly normative” (forthcoming-b: 13). 
249 Olson (2011a: 65); also see (2011b). Bedke similarly writes “what it is for F to 
be a reason for A to φ is for A to have a goal with content F and for φing to further 
that goal” (2010: 50).  
250 Also see Evans and Shah (2012: 83n7).  
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discourse as long as we compartmentalize our moral and metaethical thoughts.251 
The thesis that we screen off metaethical considerations from moral considerations 
when we are (a) error theorists and (b) can stand a lot to win by displaying selfish 
behaviour is extremely implausible, at least phenomenologically, but also 
philosophically as I will demonstrate in Chapter 8.  
The fact that Olson’s error theory is so similar to that of Mackie and Joyce 
suggests that it suffers from the same kinds of problems as theirs. And indeed it 
does. First, for Olson just as much as for Mackie we seem to have not a reduction 
but an elimination of normativity. Using our conceptualization of reduction relations 
and the way in which they can be more or less reductionist ‘in substance’ from the 
previous section, it could be argued that Olson’s alleged reduction violates too many 
of our commonsensical claims about normativity and therefore counts as an 
elimination of normativity. Furthermore—and this is the second point—this would 
open up Olson to the further objection that his local error theory or moral discourse 
collapses, implausibly, into an error theory of normativity as such. Finally, as just 
indicated, Olson doesn’t seem to have an adequate answer to the question of what 
we ought to do with moral discourse after error theory.  
The next error theory I discuss is Schiffer’s. Contrary to Olson, Schiffer 
argues for a very different error theory from the error theories discussed so far. 
According to Schiffer, moral properties do exist albeit only in the sense of being 
mere shadows of predicates.252 The idea is that every meaningful predicate F has a 
nominalization, ‘the property of being F’, which cannot fail to refer. The property of 
being F is a pleonastic gift of the predicate F, but this does not entail that moral 
properties are also instantiated in a particular world. For being a property 
understood as a pleonastic shadow of a predicate is one thing and pleonastically easy 
to come by; being a property that is actually present in a given possible world is 
quite another thing. Unfortunately, argues Schiffer, moral properties cannot possibly 
be instantiated because they don’t have instantiation conditions at all.253 That moral 
properties don’t have instantiation conditions falls out of Schiffer’s anti-Platonist, 
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‘use’ theory of sameness of meaning. Platonists in the relevant sense hold that two 
predicates have the same meaning if and only if the property that gives the meaning 
to the predicates can be identified and if and only if both predicates are relevantly 
semantically related to that property. Schiffer’s use theorist holds that sameness of 
meaning can be established by showing relevant sameness of use, where this issue is 
specifiable without mention of an expression’s being related to a property. 
Unfortunately, given the persistence and omnipresence of ‘faultless’ moral 
disagreement—disagreement that obtains in the absence of false non-moral beliefs 
and the like—we can’t establish relevant sameness of use. There is no moral 
proposition that is relevantly determinately true. People’s varying uses of moral 
terms can’t supply (determinate) instantiation conditions for moral properties. All 
we can say is that two parties have different (ultimate) moral principles and hence 
different criteria of application for their moral terms.  
Schiffer does think that moral reasoning and language has an instrumental 
role to play in our lives even though we should accept his error theory. For we can 
best fulfil our desire to live in what “one would have called the morally best world” 
by using moral talk without assenting to any of its propositions (though Schiffer 
leaves it open what the nature of this ‘use’ is).254 This comes close to Mackie’s 
revolutionary cognitivism.  
Schiffer’s version of error theory faces problems. First, it requires error 
theorists to accept controversial theories about the nature of moral properties and 
moral semantics. This is not a knock-down argument against this way of formulating 
error theory, but it would be preferable if error theorists could formulate a theory 
that doesn’t suffer from these problems. Second, Schiffer’s solution to the problem 
of what we ought to do with moral discourse once we become convinced of error 
theory is not worked out to a degree of sufficient detail. This is also not a knock-
down argument against his error theory, but it would be better if we had more to say 
(I will try to say more about this kind of position in the final chapter of this thesis). 
In general, although Schiffer’s error theory is very interesting, it is too far removed 
from the kind of Mackie-Joyce-style error theory I want to resuscitate in this thesis. I 
will therefore put it aside from now on.  
                                            
254 Schiffer (1990: 614).  
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I close with Streumer’s version of error theory, which is currently defended 
in various complementary papers. One paper deals with the question ‘do normative 
judgments aim to represent the world?’255 Streumer answers this question in the 
affirmative. He also argues that this entails that normative judgments are beliefs that 
ascribe normative properties. Here the term ‘property’ is used in a non-minimalist 
sense—i.e., not in Schiffer’s sense in which properties are simply the ‘shadows’ of 
predicates. Hence Streumer argues for a global error theory about all normative 
judgments, including moral and epistemic ones. Streumer also argues that there are 
no normative properties.256 Suppose normative properties are identical to descriptive 
properties. This entails, argues Streumer, that we should be able to say which 
descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. But we aren’t able to say 
that. Streumer attempts to show this with several arguments, one of which resembles 
Schiffer’s argument from faultless disagreement, although Streumer doesn’t mention 
Schiffer. So normative properties aren’t identical to descriptive properties. 
Moreover, there are no irreducibly normative properties either.257 This entails that 
there are no normative properties at all. Importantly, we reach this argument without 
having said anything about the thorny issue of whether normative properties can be 
descriptive properties.258  
Streumer’s other paper that is directly relevant to error theory argues that we 
cannot believe error theory and that this is good news for error theory.259 We cannot 
believe error theory because error theory entails that there is no reason to believe 
error theory. For reasons require normative properties and there are no normative 
properties. But, argues Streumer, we cannot fail to believe what we fully believe to 
be entailed by our beliefs. This means that when we believe error theory we cannot 
but believe that there is a reason to believe the error theory. Unfortunately, it is true 
of beliefs that we cannot have them without believing that there is a reason for that 
belief. This entails that we cannot believe the error theory. Moreover, given that 
there cannot be a reason for someone to believe anything (including error theory) if 
                                            
255 Streumer (2008).  
256 Streumer (2011).  
257 This is because, according to Streumer, Jackson’s (1998) argument for that 
claim works; Streumer (2008, 2011: 338-9).  
258 Streumer (2011: 346).  
259 Streumer (forthcoming).  
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this person cannot believe that thing, there is no reason to believe error theory 
either.260  
Why is this good news? First of all, it is not a problem that we cannot believe 
the error theory. It is clearly not a problem for any theory if we do not believe it, so 
it seems that it also shouldn’t be a problem for a theory if we cannot believe it. 
Second, we can reject: 
 
Objection from Toothlessness 
If there is no reason to believe error theory then error theory is polemically 
toothless. For if there is no reason to believe error theory then it is not a rational 
mistake to reject error theory
261
 
 
We can reject Objection from Toothlessness because we can believe the various 
parts of error theory at different times and that these parts seem to show that error 
theory is true, in which case—on the assumption that we rationally should believe 
what we have most evidence to believe—it is a rational mistake not to assent to 
these seemings.  
 The second benefit of the fact that we cannot believe error theory, on 
Streumer’s view, is that we no longer need an answer to the question what we ought 
to do with moral discourse once we become convinced that we should fully believe 
error theory. For we cannot fully believe error theory.  
 However, there are problems with Streumer’s error theory. The first of these 
is that Streumer explicitly accepts a global error theory of all normative judgments, 
including moral and epistemic ones. True, Streumer does argue that this generates 
benefits for his view, but in fact this can be questioned. For it is really hard to 
believe that there are no reasons for beliefs. Another problem comes from the fact 
that we can’t believe error theory in its entirety but that we can believe its various 
parts, for this entails a schizophrenic attitude towards morality. We can’t fully 
believe error theory but we know that its various parts are true (and together they 
entail error theory). This also in fact, and contrary to what Streumer claims, does 
make the question of what we ought to do with our error-riddled moral discourse 
                                            
260 Also see Hampton (1998); Shafer-Landau (2003: 205-6); Olson (2009a).  
261 Cuneo (2007a: 117-8).  
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relevant. For in practical situations it is all too easy to believe that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with morality even if we cannot fully believe error theory, in 
which case the natural bulwark that morality provides—in the form of a believe-led 
inhibition against stealing—may disappear. But then we need a theory about 
whether we can have a surrogate bulwark that isn’t morality (which is in error), or 
else we need an argument why we can still use morality as a bulwark even though it 
is in error, or that we can do without morality or something like it. The problem is 
that Streumer doesn’t consider these issues.  
Overall we reach the following conclusion. There are error theories that are 
relevant similar to that of Mackie and Joyce and there are also error theories that are 
different. From the latter category I discussed Schiffer’s theory. Although this error 
theory is interesting, I argued, it is also not obvious that it will work, and, in any 
case, my aim here is to revive the Mackie-Joyce-style error theory, so I put it aside 
in what follows. Error theories that are relevantly similar to that of Mackie and 
Joyce (Olson’s and Streumer’s) suffer from similar problems and have room for 
improvement, which I will aim to provide in the remainder of this thesis.  
2.5 Conclusion and Preview 
In this chapter I have discussed the main error theories currently on offer; I 
discussed the theories of Mackie and Joyce in significant detail and the theories of 
Olson, Schiffer and Streumer more quickly. I argued that none of these theories can 
solve the four main problems for error theory as identified in §1.4. The remainder of 
the thesis aims to do better. To this end it starts, in Chapter 3, with an investigation 
of the options for error theorists when it comes to formulating their theory.  
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Chapter 3 
Options for Error Theorists 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I formulate a direct and maximally non-committal formulation of 
error theory that acts as a template for specific, committal formulations of error 
theory (§3.1). The idea is to canvass what the options for error theorists are so that a 
possibly more plausible formulation of error theory can be defended than has so far 
seemed possible. The generic formulation of error theory that I will formulate has 
three places where theoretical commitments are required to get the argument to 
work, and the chapter subsequently discusses what the possibilities are (§3.2-4). The 
chapter also discusses the different answers to the following question: what (non-
morally) ought we to do with our error-riddled moral discourse (§3.5)? It closes with 
a conclusion and preview (§3.6).  
In addition to using a direct argument for moral error theory based on the 
template that I am about to present it is also possible to formulate indirect arguments 
for error theory. Before presenting my template I will explain why these alternative 
ways of defending error theory are not very useful. One possibility is to formulate an 
argument from an inference to the best explanation.
262
 According to that argument, 
an inquiry into the past 2000 years of metaethical endeavours justifies claiming that 
the best explanation for our failed attempts to vindicate moral realism is that moral 
error theory is true. A second possibility is to formulate an argument from 
elimination, which relies on direct arguments against every rival of the moral error 
theory, and concludes, by elimination, that moral error theory must be true.
263
 Both 
arguments leave open the possibility that, in fact, moral error theory is false. A 
better, because more direct, argument for error theory goes as follows (cf. §1.1 of 
this dissertation): 
                                            
262 Joyce (2007b: 52); Burgess (2010: 13).  
263 Joyce (2001: 101).  
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Moral Error Theory 
P1 Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim:  
Moral statements and judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to a 
robustly understood moral reality; the moral reality thesis 
P2  Substantive Claim:  
This commitment is flawed  
P3  Auxiliary Claim: 
If moral discourse carries a false non-negotiable commitment then it is itself 
flawed 
C Conclusion 
Moral discourse is flawed: the statements and judgments comprising it are 
‘in error’ [From P1, P2, P3] 
 
The three choice points that this template provides are the phrase ‘is non-
negotiably committed’, which concerns the nature of moral discourse’s mode of 
commitment to T, the content of ‘the moral reality thesis’, and ‘flawed’. I will now 
consider the contender interpretations for these placeholders (§3.2-4).  
3.2 The Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim 
This section discusses the various options for understanding the nature of moral 
discourse’s mode of commitment to the moral reality thesis. Because moral 
discourse is comprised of moral statements of various kinds we can use the familiar 
options from the philosophy of language for understanding how such linguistic 
utterances can carry semantic or pragmatic commitments, which are, in the relevant 
sense and to varying degrees, non-negotiable.  
In previous chapters I have already introduced two of the relevant options; 
viz., conceptual and metaphysical entailment. In that context, which was concerned 
with understanding conceptual and metaphysical entailment well enough to be able 
to appreciate some problems with Mackie’s and Joyce’s theories, it wasn’t necessary 
to consider these options in much detail. Here I will provide more detail, starting 
with a fuller investigation of the nature of the various moral statements that 
comprise moral discourse.  
Consider:   
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Wrong   Stealing is morally wrong 
 
Wrong is an atomic moral statement; ‘atomic’ because it has the logical form ‘x is 
F’, and ‘moral’ because the predicate F is a moral predicate. It is possible to embed 
Wrong under various linguistic operators, such as negation, modal and question 
operators. Doing that gives us the following non-atomic moral statements:   
 
Negation   Stealing is not morally wrong
264
 
Modal  Stealing might be morally wrong 
Question Is stealing morally wrong? 
 
It is natural to assume that only atomic moral statements are committed to 
the moral reality thesis, as only they are, at least prima facie, in the business of 
ascribing moral properties to action types and tokens (and character traits, states of 
affairs, et cetera). But in fact some of the other moral statements can also somewhat 
naturally be interpreted to commit its utterer to the moral reality thesis. For instance, 
a denial of the wrongness of stealing is not plausibly heard as committing its utterer 
to the wrongness of stealing (to the contrary). However, this leaves it open that 
Negation carries a commitment to the existence of a moral reality in a different way. 
Perhaps if stealing is not wrong it is positively morally permissible; i.e., permissible 
according to morality. I discuss this and other complexities in the next chapter. For 
ease of exposition I will here only have atomic moral statements in mind when I 
speak of ‘moral statements’ and their mode of commitment to the moral reality 
thesis.  
3.2.1 Entailment 
One option is that ‘is non-negotiably committed to’ is best understood as ‘entails’. I 
make three explanatory remarks about entailment relations in general before 
discussing the different kinds of entailment relations that are options for error 
theorists. First, entailment relations primarily have propositions as their relata and 
                                            
264 To avoid unnecessarily longwinded formulations I take Negation to be 
equivalent to ‘it is not the case that stealing is morally wrong’. I also use the 
negation in Negation in its ordinary truth-functional rather than metalinguistic way.  
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are most fruitfully understood in terms of truth-conditions.
265
 If a proposition p 
entails proposition q then p can’t be true without q being true.  
 A second explanatory remark is that entailment relations hold regardless of 
whether anyone recognizes them.
266
 For instance, a certain answer could be entailed 
by the way in which a particular mathematical question is phrased even if no human 
being (or rational agent for that matter) has so far realized this. This means that 
entailment relations can hold between moral statements even whilst the folk, or the 
philosophers for that matter, are not aware of this.  
A third and final remark is about what it is in virtue of which the entailment 
relation obtains. This can be either in virtue of logic, concepts, or metaphysics. 
Hence there are three distinct kinds of entailment relations; viz., logical, conceptual 
and metaphysical entailments. I discuss each of them below. I explain how the 
entailment works in standard cases and what must be true for the kind of entailment 
under discussion to work in the moral case. 
3.2.1.1  Logical entailment 
If proposition p logically entails proposition q then q is true whenever p is true and 
in virtue of a logical connection between p and q. A standard case is provided by the 
(conjunctive) proposition ‘all Fs are Gs and this is an F’ (‘p’), and ‘this F is a G’ 
(‘q’).267 The latter is logically entailed by the former because it is logically 
impossible for it to be true that all Fs are Gs and for this F not to be a G.  
Logical entailment is a very unlikely candidate for the kind of non-negotiable 
commitment relation that obtains between moral discourse and the moral reality 
thesis (if indeed there is such a relation). This is because a further feature of logical 
entailments is that they are content-independent, whereas what we have in the case 
                                            
265 Streumer (2007: 355) and Copp (2007: 130-1) respectively. On a stretch of 
terminology, entailment relations can also be thought to hold between facts. I won’t 
take this option into consideration here. Also see Soames (2006).  
266 Street (2010: 367).  
267 For ease of exposition I use a conjunctive proposition (because that allows me 
to talk about just two propositions). If you don’t think that it is useful to talk about 
conjunctive propositions (because you might think that they are not really 
propositions but just two separate propositions), then you can read me as saying that 
logical entailments hold between sets of propositions, e.g., between p (‘All whales 
are mammals’), q (‘This is a whale’), and r (‘This whale is a mammal’). See 
Anscombe (1959: 32).  
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of moral discourse and the moral reality thesis is a content-dependent entailment, if 
indeed an entailment relation is relevant for understanding its commitments. 
Therefore, I set logical entailment aside in what follows.  
3.2.1.2 Conceptual entailment  
Conceptual entailments are similar to logical entailments in that they are best 
understood in terms of propositions and truth-conditions: if a proposition p entails 
proposition q then p can’t be true without q being true. However, truth is here 
preserved not as a matter of content-independent logical necessity but in virtue of 
content-dependent connections between concepts (they may disclose analytic 
truths).
268
 As I explained in my discussion of the error theories of Mackie and Joyce, 
this is currently the most popular option, and amounts to: 
  
Conceptual Entailment Claim Moral discourse’s mode of commitment to 
the moral reality thesis is one of conceptual 
entailment  
 
The Conceptual Entailment Claim has thus far been the dominant theory for 
thinking about the mode of commitment of moral discourse to the moral reality 
thesis.
269
 It can be made more precise in at least the following two ways. 
One way of explicating the notion of conceptual is to formulate an epistemic 
notion of conceptual entailment, according to which a proposition is a conceptual 
truth just in case any person who meets the minimal conditions required for grasping 
it would thereby be in a position to know that it is true merely by considering 
carefully whether it is true while thinking clearly.
270
 For instance, ‘all vixens are 
female foxes’ is a conceptual truth because anyone can come to know that it is true 
merely by reflecting carefully on what it says (so long as they are minimally 
competent at grasping it). Likewise for propositions with moral content, says this 
                                            
268 A proposition is analytically true, if it is, solely in virtue of its meaning (Juhl 
and Loomis 2010: ix-x; Williamson 2007: 60).  
269 The Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim is often simply called the Conceptual 
Claim (Smith 1994: 65; Joyce 2007b: §4; Robertson 2008: 111; Joyce 2001: 5; 
Shafer-Landau 2005: 108; Brink 1984; Copp 2010; Tresan 2010).  
270 Copp (2007: 121). Williamson similarly writes about the epistemological 
conception of analytic truths such as ‘Every vixen is a female fox’ that “failure to 
assent [to such truths] is not merely good evidence of failure to understand; it is 
constitutive of such failure” (2007: 73).  
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proposal. ‘If stealing is morally wrong then there exist Mackie-Objective and 
Mackie-Prescriptive moral properties’ would be a conceptual truth, and would tell us 
what has to be true for ‘stealing is morally wrong’ to be true, solely in virtue of it 
being the case that agents who meet the minimal conditions required for grasping 
this proposition would be in a position to know that it is true in the way suggested.  
This way of explicating the idea of conceptual entailment faces the following 
difficulty. It requires us to specify in a non-question begging way what it takes for 
an agent to be minimally conceptually competent, but we better not argue that 
minimally conceptually competent agents are those that regard the proposition ‘all 
vixens are female foxes’ as conceptually true. That would be question-begging.  
Another way of spelling out the notion of conceptual entailment is to focus 
directly on the applicability conditions of the concepts involved. Take moral 
concepts and the atomic moral statements that record their instantiation. Moral 
statements entail statements about categorical moral reasons (say) because it is 
necessary to the correct applicability of moral concepts, as expressed by moral 
statements, that there exists categorical moral normativity.271  
This is the explication of conceptual entailment that I used to formalize 
Mackie’s and Joyce’s account of the conceptual entailment claim earlier in the 
thesis. The sentence ‘this is a vixen’ entails ‘this is a fox’ in virtue of the concept 
VIXEN expressed by the term ‘vixen’ in the sentence ‘this is a vixen’. For the 
applicability conditions of vixen are two-fold: in order to use vixen correctly, you 
have to apply it to something that is both female and a fox. Take either femaleness 
or foxhood out of vixen and the schvixens you end up referring to simply don’t 
deserve the label ‘vixen’. Likewise, ‘stealing is morally wrong’ entails ‘there exist 
objective and prescriptive values’ in virtue of the concept MORALLY WRONG 
expressed by the term ‘morally wrong’ in ‘stealing is morally wrong’. For the 
applicability conditions of morally wrong are two-fold: in order to use morally 
wrong correctly you have to apply it to something that both instantiates an 
objectively prescriptive value and that is of recognisable moral import. Take 
                                            
271 Also see Finlay (2008a: 365).  
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categorical reason-giving force out of moral concepts, and the schmoral concepts 
you end up with are too “wimpified” to be mistaken for the real thing.272  
One issue that arises with regard to this is how, exactly, we are to understand 
the nature of the correctness of the application conditions. For ‘correct application 
conditions’ is ambiguous between ‘conditions of true application’ and ‘conditions 
which constrain how competent concept-users apply the concepts’ and perhaps other 
readings as well. This makes it difficult to specify what these conditions are in a 
non-question-begging way. Moreover, we have already seen problems with 
Mackie’s and Joyce’s attempts to make the Conceptual Entailment Claim work. 
Nevertheless, contrary to logical entailment, conceptual entailment isn’t obviously 
useless for error theory, so we should keep it as an option for error theorists.  
3.2.1.3  Metaphysical entailment  
Metaphysical entailments are similar to logical and conceptual entailments in that 
they are best understood in terms of propositions and truth-conditions: if a 
proposition p entails proposition q then p can’t be true without q being true. 
However, truth is preserved not as a matter of logical or conceptual necessity but in 
virtue of a metaphysical or substantive necessity “of the same modality as the 
connection between being gold and having atomic number 79”.273 For another 
example: the proposition ‘this is water’ is metaphysically entailed by the proposition 
‘this is H2O’ because it is a metaphysical necessity that water is H2O—there is no 
possible world in which something is water but not H2O.
274
  
Importantly, conceptual and metaphysical entailment relations differ only 
about what it is in virtue of which the entailment holds (this yields concomitant 
differences in the epistemology of both entailment relations). But since both are 
entailment relations this difference doesn’t compromise the ‘stringency’ of either 
relation. They are equally necessary relations; the point is just that their necessity 
can be explained by reference to different things. So both can be used as models for 
the error theorist’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim. You can’t have morality 
without objective prescriptivity either because denying that we need objective 
                                            
272 Joyce (MS).  
273 Railton (1997: 70).  
274 Putnam (1975); Kripke (1972). Cf. Farrell (1981). Also see Shafer-Landau 
(2003: 84); Fine (2005); Vaidya (2010).  
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prescriptivity for morality exhibits a conceptual mistake or because it displays a 
more general mistake about the nature of morality without that mistake implying 
anything about one’s mastery of the concepts involved.275  
Just as with conceptual entailments, there are various ways of establishing 
metaphysical entailment relations. I mention two of them here.  
The first strategy is an indirect strategy. Error theorists can critically assess 
the proposals of such synthetic naturalists as Brink, Boyd and Railton and argue that 
their proposals about the nature of moral rightness and wrongness (goodness, 
badness, obligatoriness, et cetera) are fundamentally lacking in those respects that 
make error theory plausible. Synthetic naturalists typically claim that the nature of 
moral goodness consists in some complex natural property, and that the fact that this 
property is intimately connected to a person’s (distinctively) human capacities, 
including that person’s well-being, explains and grounds that natural property’s 
normative role.
276
  
By critically assessing this kind of moral naturalism error theorist can reach a 
metaphysical entailment claim. So error theorists may argue that the normative role 
that the natural properties play in the synthetic naturalists’ theory in fact aren’t 
sufficiently ‘tight’ or ‘internal’ to account for what we generally or even 
platitudinously consider moral properties’ normative role to be. This gives rise to a 
metaphysical entailment claim because the considerations that are brought to bear by 
the error theorist in providing an account of the nature of moral goodness and 
wrongness et cetera can be a posteriori, non-conceptual considerations which 
nevertheless specify what it takes for moral goodness to be moral goodness.  
The second strategy available to error theorists for arriving at a metaphysical 
entailment claim is more direct. On this strategy, error theorists muster intuitions, 
thought-experiments and platitudes about the nature of moral wrongness—derivable 
from reflections on the workings of moral discourse, and therefore a posteriori—and 
argue that the best explanation of these platitudes et cetera is that there is an 
entailment relation between the proposition that X is morally wrong and that of X 
being authoritatively or categorically required by practical rationality (or some 
                                            
275 For similar points see Fine (2002: 255).  
276 Brink (1984, 1989); Boyd (1988); Railton (1986, 1989, 2003).  
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such).
277
 Again, there is an entailment relation but not one in virtue of connections 
between concepts but instead in virtue of a posteriori considerations about the 
nature of moral wrongness itself.   
3.2.2  Implicature 
A second possibility is to understand the locution ‘is non-negotiably committed to’ 
as a placeholder for ‘implicates’. Implicature relations hold just in case a statement q 
(as opposed to proposition q) is linked to another statement p without q being part of 
the truth-conditions of p.
278
 Implicatures come in two kinds: conversational and 
conventional.
279
 For both kinds, I explain how the proposal works in standard cases, 
and then I explain what must be true for it to work in the moral case. 
3.2.2.1  Conversational Implicature  
Normally conversational implicatures hold between statements as they are uttered by 
speakers in particular contexts, not between statements per se, independently of the 
context of utterance.280 Conversational implicatures are standardly understood along 
Gricean lines. Grice explains implicatures and how they arise with the aid of two 
phenomena: the cooperative principle and conversational maxims.  
The cooperative principle says:  
 
[m]ake your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purposes or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged281 
 
The maxims tell you what to do to meet the principle; e.g., the maxim of quantity 
tells you to make your contribution neither less nor more informative than is 
required by your talk exchange, and the maxim of relation tells you to make your 
contribution relevant. According to Grice, we are justified in assuming that people 
conform to the cooperative principle and hence to the maxims (absent special 
                                            
277 Further theoretical considerations could be added to these intuitions, platitudes 
and thought-experiments; e.g., Enoch’s deliberative indispensability argument 
(2011a: Chapter 3). Also see Scanlon (2009, Lecture 2: 12).  
278 Finlay (2005: 1); Wayne (2008).  
279 Finlay (2005: 1-2).  
280 ‘Normally’, because I will discuss an exception shortly.  
281 Grice (1989: 6).  
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circumstances such as when people are acting). So for example, if you ask me ‘Will 
Pete be at the meeting tomorrow?’ and I answer ‘his car broke down’ then my 
utterance implicates that he won’t be at the meeting. For the implicature is 
calculable: you make the justified inference that my original statement has this 
implicature because that is the best way you have of making sense of my obligation 
to abide by the maxim of quantity as a means of abiding by the cooperative 
principle. After all, if my statement didn’t carry this implicature then I would be 
saying something less informative than was required to answer your question 
whether Pete will be at the meeting.282  
Note that the implicature is also cancellable: it is a felicitous addition to my 
statement ‘his car broke down’, and ultimately to our conversation, if I continue to 
say ‘but mind you, Pete will be at the meeting tomorrow—he’ll go by bike.’283 I 
myself might go through your calculation of the implicature, realise that you 
justifiably make the inference that my statement implicates that Pete won’t be at the 
meeting, and hence make this implicature-cancelling addition to save the 
conversation.  
The fact that conversational implicatures are cancellable means that they 
cannot be used in a defence of moral error theory. For moral error theory requires a 
non-negotiable commitment and cancellable commitments clearly do not count as 
non-negotiable in the relevant sense. So we can safely put this option aside.  
3.2.2.2  Conventional Implicature  
Conventional implicatures also hold between statements rather than propositions, 
but they do so in virtue of the (linguistic) meaning of one or more words that feature 
in the relevant (target) statements. This sets them apart from conversational 
implicatures, which hold in virtue of the cooperative principle and the maxims.
284
   
Here is an example:  
                                            
282 This is an example of a particularized conversational implicature, as the 
utterance in the text does not standardly carry said implication and is dependent on 
features of the context to arise (if utterances standardly carry implications and are 
not dependent on conversational context we speak of generalized conversational 
implicatures; Strandberg 2012: 93). The latter are nonetheless implicatures because 
they also depend on the cooperative principle and conversational maxims to arise.  
283 Copp (2007: 172).  
284 Grice (1975); also see Davis (2010).  
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Target statement:   ‘Thora is a baby but she is quiet’ 
Descriptive meaning:   ‘Thora is a baby and she is quiet’ 
Conventional implicature:  ‘Babies are not usually quiet’
285
 
 
This is an instance of conventional implicature and not entailment because the 
sentence ‘Thora is a baby, but she is quiet’ does not logically, conceptually or 
metaphysically entail that babies are not usually quiet. There is no relation between 
the concepts in ‘Thora is a baby but she is quiet’ and ‘Babies are not usually quiet’, 
nor is it a metaphysical necessity that links these two statements. Furthermore, 
Target statement does not logically entail ‘Babies are not usually quiet’ because the 
logical roles of ‘but’ and ‘and’ are identical. Yet Target statement stands in an 
interesting relation to Conventional implicature whereas Descriptive meaning 
doesn’t. The hypothesis is that the interesting relation between the two statements is 
carried by the linguistic meaning of the word ‘but’. This would mean that we have a 
conventional implicature; as such implicatures arise in virtue of the meanings of 
such connectives as ‘but’ and other words.  
Conventional implicatures are not cancellable and this sets them apart from 
conversational implicatures. You can’t say something like ‘Thora is a baby but she 
is quiet—yet, I do not mean to say that babies aren’t usually quiet’. The meaning of 
the word ‘but’ forbids you to do that. Conventional implicatures also aren’t 
dependent on the cooperative principle and the maxims as they are more direct, 
grasped more or less immediately by competent speakers of the English language.  
For an example of an evaluative term, consider racial slurs. These can, when 
embedded in a sentence, conventionally implicate other sentences: 
 
Target sentence:   ‘Mario is a wop’ 
Descriptive meaning:  ‘Mario is Italian 
Conventional implicature:  ‘Italians are contemptible’286 
                                            
285 Potts (2007: 666). An alternative way of presenting the conventional implicature 
is: ‘There is a contrast between being a baby and being quiet’. I take this difference 
between the two descriptions of conventional implicatures to be immaterial for what 
follows.  
286 Copp (2009b: 175, 184); Strandberg (2012: 95).  
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Likewise, perhaps: 
 
Target sentence:   ‘He is brave’ 
Descriptive meaning:   ‘He doesn’t falter in the face of danger’ 
Conventional implicature:  ‘He is morally good’ 
 
However, true as this may be, it falls short of the all-important step needed 
by error theorists. For at present we don’t have an explication of the non-negotiable 
commitment of goodness (or wrongness, or what have you) to the moral reality 
thesis. This is precisely what is not supplied by the above. After all, all we have 
there is a relation between a thick and a thin moral concept; not a relation between a 
moral concept, whether thick or thin, and the moral reality thesis. But, 
problematically, we can’t seem to have the following kind of conventional 
implicature from the thin moral concept to the moral reality thesis:  
 
Target sentence:   ‘He is morally good’ 
Descriptive meaning:  ‘He is morally good’ (?) 
Conventional implicature:  (??) 
 
Furthermore, when sentences containing pejoratives get embedded in larger 
linguistic structures they typically continue to convey the speaker’s contempt for 
whatever it is that she focusses on: ‘If Mario is a real wop, he’ll have pasta for 
dinner’ continues to convey the speaker’s disrespect for Mario and Italians. This 
contrasts with embedding sentences containing thin moral terms into lager linguistic 
structures: ‘if stealing is wrong, then it’s wrong to get your little brother to steal’ 
does not necessarily convey that the speaker believes that stealing is wrong.287 This 
is further reason for thinking that conventional implicatures are a poor model for 
understanding the error theorist’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim. So both 
kinds of implicature relations are poor models to advise the error theorist to base her 
account of the mode of commitment of moral discourse on (although, as I will argue 
in Chapter 4, both play an important role elsewhere in the defence of error theory). 
                                            
287 Strandberg (2012: 94-98). 
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3.2.3  Presupposition 
The third idea is that the phrase ‘is non-negotiably committed’ is best understood as 
a placeholder for ‘presupposes’. This option has been tried and tested for moral error 
theory, albeit only rather briefly.
288
 It is fairly customary to distinguish between two 
broad kinds of presupposition relations; pragmatic and semantic ones.
289
 I discuss 
them, and their relation to the error theory, in the below. However, for ease of 
exposition, I start with a rough characterization of presuppositions that ignores this 
distinction.  
In characterizing the notion of presupposition as neutrally as possible it is 
instructive to think about presupposition relations as holding between statements. 
Consider: 
  
 Bald   The present king of France is bald 
 Not-bald The present king of France is not bald 
 King  France presently has a king 
 
Intuitively, Bald and Not-bald contradict each other in a sense because they ascribe 
mutually incompatible properties about his hirsuteness to the present king of France. 
But they both agree that France presently has a king. That is, again intuitively, Bald 
and Not-bald both presuppose King.  
                                            
288 Joyce (2001: 6-9) toys with this idea but doesn’t work it out in much detail. 
Olson (MS: 13) writes that Sobel (MS: Chapter 13) defends a presupposition failure 
moral error theory. Railton (1989: 159) mentions the fact that the likely outcome of 
a secular account of value is “bound either to assert that our value judgments are 
systematically false – because they are based upon false or meaningless 
presuppositions – or to be revisionist in some way about the meaning of value 
judgments”, which, especially because he mentions this in the context of a 
discussion of F.P. Ramsey (an error theorist avant la lettre), I take to be referring to 
an error theory. Yet Railton goes on to investigate the revisionist option, not the 
false presupposition option. Shafer-Landau and Cuneo (2007) have a three page 
introductory piece on the moral error theory in which they only mention the 
presupposition approach. Lastly, although Finlay (2008a: 374; 2011: 535) calls the 
step in the error theorist’s argument where the non-negotiable commitment gets 
established Presupposition, he only engages with the arguments of Mackie and 
Joyce, which fall squarely in the conceptual entailment camp (Shafer-Landau (2005) 
is in the same predicament). Also see Timmons (1999: 78); Silverstein (2012: 1).  
289 Juhl and Loomis (2010: 9); Saeed (2003: 102). 
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 We can make the notion of presupposition more precise with the projection 
test.290 This test is used in linguistics and the philosophy of language to determine 
whether or not a piece of information as carried by an utterance belongs to its 
meaning. It is widely used as a diagnostic for presupposition (although not all such 
projected content is presuppositional). The term ‘projection’ refers to a phenomenon 
in natural languages where an implication survives as an utterance implication when 
the target statement (Bald) is embedded under an entailment-cancelling operator 
(Not-Bald). The implication King as carried by Bald ‘projects’ because it survives as 
an implication of Not-bald: regardless of whether we deny that the present king of 
France is bald, that there is a king is a piece of information that is carried by both 
sentences. The currently most inclusive and empirically adequate explanation of 
why the information as captured by King survives as an implication of Bald and 
Not-Bald is that this information is not at issue.291 This hypothesis fits our case: in 
debating the hirsuteness of the present king of France, his existence is not at issue 
and hence projects.  
 In the case of Bald and Not-bald it is fairly easy to determine what 
information projects. Indeed we may go so far as to say that we can simply ‘read 
off’ the utterance implication from Bald and Not-Bald. Often however figuring out 
whether a piece of information projects requires priming an appropriate context. 
Consider: 
 
Hammock If she didn’t sleep in the hammock, then I don’t know where she 
slept
292 
 
 
Hammock is felicitous as a contribution to pretty much any conversation only if a 
unique woman is salient in the common ground. We achieve the felicity of 
Hammock by priming as our conversational context that this woman is in the 
common ground, thus satisfying the presupposition of the pronoun ‘she’ as it occurs 
under the entailment-cancelling embedding of this ‘if-then’ construction.  
                                            
290 Simons et al. (2010: 309); Simons (2006: 359-60); Karttunen (1973). 
291 Simons et al. (2010: 315-8). 
292 Simons et al. (2010: 312). 
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 So presuppositions can be triggered by various things. They can be triggered 
by particular words without help of a previously primed context (the Bald, Not-Bald 
and King case) or by the interplay of words and context (the Hammock case).293 
Although it is tempting to straightforwardly associate the class of semantic 
presuppositions with the former and more pragmatic ones with the latter, recent 
studies suggest that the relation between whether a presupposition is semantic or 
pragmatic on the one hand and what triggers it on the other is more complex.294 
Thus a presupposition can depend on context and still count as a semantic 
presupposition. This is good news for error theorists. Pragmatic presuppositions may 
be cancellable, just like conversational implicatures, because they arise via 
pragmatic mechanisms. They would therefore be negotiable and so a poor model for 
understanding Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim.295  
How does this apply to the moral case? The first thing to note is that if 
Wrong presupposes the moral reality thesis we can’t simply ‘read off’ this 
information from that statement. Contrary to Bald and Not-Bald, where King is 
pretty much contained within these statements, the information as captured by the 
moral reality thesis isn’t likewise ‘contained within’ Wrong. For the moral reality 
thesis mentions something like ‘objective prescriptivity’ and that specific 
information is not ‘contained within’ Wrong. The information that is contained is 
that there exist moral properties, but that isn’t specific enough. Does wrongness 
come with objective prescriptivity or does it not?   
So in attempting to uncover the presupposition of moral statements we 
would have to prime an appropriate conversational context. As in other, non-moral 
cases, this usually happens by stipulation.
296
 Therefore, let’s prime a conversational 
context by stipulation.  
Assume that a conversation takes place between two moralists; i.e., ordinary 
people debating the wrongness or otherwise of stealing. Conversations between two 
moralists have two very general purposes; viz., the communication of beliefs about 
the instantiation of moral properties and the influencing of behaviour in light of 
                                            
293 On priming contexts see Kartunnen (1973: 182); Saeed (2003: 107).  
294 Beaver and Geurts (2011: §1). 
295 Stalnaker (1999); also see Williamson (2007: 88); Lycan (1999: 199).  
296 Strawson (1956); also see Saeed (2003: 101, 108).  
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those beliefs.297 In this context, suppose one of them utters Wrong and his 
interlocutor utters Modal. Given that ordinary morality seems to so many to be 
invested in objective prescriptivity, what seems not to be at issue is the claim that 
there is such a thing as moral wrongness understood in terms of objective 
prescriptivity. What is at issue is whether moral wrongness (understood in terms of 
objective prescriptivity) applies to stealing. This means that the information that 
stealing is wrong, as entailed by Wrong (every statement entails itself) doesn’t 
project, but that the claim that there is such a thing as wrongness understood in 
terms of objective prescriptivity does project. So we may perhaps say that the claim 
that there is wrongness understood in terms of objective prescriptivity is 
presupposed by Wrong and Modal.  
There are some assumptions left unargued for in this sketch. I return to them 
in the next chapter in the context of critique of the presupposition option. Here I 
proceed by noting that although both semantically triggered presuppositions and 
conventional implicatures obtain in virtue of the words used in the target sentence 
(in the examples we used above, the target sentences were ‘Thora is a baby, but she 
is quiet’ and ‘stealing is wrong’), there is a clear difference between the two. The 
difference is that in the case of conventional implicature, it being false that there is 
no opposition between being a baby and being quiet doesn’t make it the case that the 
target sentence ‘Thora is a baby, but she is quiet’ is no longer apt for assessment in 
terms of truth and falsity. For the truth-value of ‘Thora is a baby, but she is quiet’ is 
the same as that of ‘Thora is a baby, and she is quiet’. This is not true of a 
semantically triggered presupposition. If the presupposition is false, the target 
sentence is no longer capable of being true or false. Compare Bald and Not-Bald: if 
France doesn’t have a king then both sentences are no longer apt for assessment in 
terms of truth and falsity.  
It must also be noted that semantic presuppositions are in one respect similar 
to entailments and conventional implicatures: they are non-cancellable. Or at least 
this holds for atomic statements and their presuppositions. Consider entailments: 
adding ‘mind you, this is not a fox’ to my original statement ‘this is a vixen’ is not a 
felicitous contribution to our conversation. Likewise, denying King after having 
uttered Bald is not felicitous either (I can’t felicitously say ‘The present king of 
                                            
297 Strandberg (2012: 102-3).  
- 107 - 
France is bald, but mind you, France doesn’t have a king’). However, 
presuppositions are cancellable when embedded.298 If I say ‘The present king of 
France is not bald—there is no present King of France!’ then I have felicitously 
contributed to our conversation about the hirsuteness of the present King of France 
even though I’ve cancelled the presupposition of Not-Bald. Likewise, ‘stealing is 
not wrong—nothing is wrong!’ is a felicitous contribution to a conversation about 
the wrongness or otherwise of stealing even though we have a cancellation of the 
presupposition of Negation. Importantly though, presuppositions’ limited 
cancellability need not be a problem for the presupposition option. Indeed, it is 
exactly the sort of thing that an error theorist might want to say: their limited 
cancellability may help to explain how various non-atomic moral statements might 
carry a commitment to Objective Prescriptivity without this commitment being non-
negotiable in the way entailments of atomic sentences are.  
As this sub-section shows, using presupposition failure as a way of 
understanding the error theorist’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim yields an 
error theory very different from the standard error theory according to which the 
nature of the Non-Negotiable Commitment is defined by conceptual entailment. 
Furthermore, although various implicature options are quite clearly no good 
candidates for the error theorist’s non-negotiable commitment, a second sort of 
entailment relation—metaphysical entailment—looks promising but has so far not 
even been recognized as an option for error theorists in the literature. The next 
chapter exploits this result to present a more nuanced picture of the prospects of both 
entailment options on the one hand and the presupposition option on the other. Here 
I continue with my list of options for error theorists; namely, her options regarding 
the substantive thesis.  
3.3  The Substantive Thesis 
This section discusses the various theses that moral discourse can be non-negotiably 
committed to. I start with the most common option, which is to argue that the moral 
reality thesis is the thesis that there exists a robustly understood notion of categorical 
moral normativity. Error theorists are free to argue that a less robust conception of 
normativity is morality’s culprit. But this may not be a good strategy. After all, the 
                                            
298 Beaver and Geurts (2011: §3).  
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existence of a weak conception of morality’s normativity is comparatively easy to 
defend. So usually error theorists go for a more robust notion of normativity. We 
saw Mackie’s notion of prescriptivity that was meant to be ‘Mackie-Objective’. We 
have also seen Joyce’s categorical reasons of rationality. Copp has argued that there 
is something that makes the normativity of the moral stand apart from that of other 
realms, namely that each of its demands are experienced by the agent as ‘welcome’ 
or as something that is ‘a rightful part of her’.299 This too could feature in error 
theorists’ arguments.300  
Another option is an argument via motivational internalism or the 
requirement that morality would have to be able to motivate more generally. In 
connection with Mackie’s version of error theory I argued that this option would, 
however, most plausibly entail an error theory of moral beliefs rather than morality 
itself.  
A third option is the thesis that human beings have metaphysical free will. 
On this proposal, judgments about moral obligations are of central importance to 
moral discourse and carry a non-negotiable commitment to the claim that agents 
possess a metaphysically robust sort of free will. But, this version of error theory 
continues, there are strong arguments that this kind of metaphysical free will does 
not exist (cf. my discussion of Mackie’s early error theory form §2.2.1).301 In this 
thesis I set this option aside.  
  Fourthly, error theorists can try out different philosophical notions of 
morality’s objectivity.302 Burgess claims that moral discourse “carries [the] 
implication” that there exists “at least [an] intersubjectively valid and impersonal … 
‘backing’ for each person’s moral standards”.303 According to Burgess, it is this 
‘backing’ in virtue of which (true) first-order moral judgments are true. Similarly, 
                                            
299 Copp (2007: 260-3). 
300 Related to this is the more general option of a metaphysical framework allowing 
for supernatural forces, which could in turn explain the existence of categorical, 
robust normativity: see Hägerström (1953); Hussain (2010: 335).  
301 Pereboom (2001); Libet (2004); Doris (2002); Roskies (2003); Haji (1998, 
2003); Newman (1981). According to Railton (2010: 305), Nietzsche, too, believed 
that the non-existence of metaphysical free will yields something we would 
nowadays call a moral error theory.   
302 Sayre-McCord (1986: 13-4).  
303 Burgess (2010: 12).  
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Lillehammer favours “convergence-based error theories”, where the claim in favour 
of this way of thinking about moral error theory is that “the issue of convergence 
matters in substantial moral thought.”304 These are conceptions of morality’s 
objectivity that do not refer to mind-external entities but to the convergence of 
rational minds.  
3.4  Error-riddled Moral Discourse 
My task here is to explain the different commitments moral error theorists can 
undertake when it comes to interpreting the locution ‘flawed’ in error theory. There 
are two broad categories of answers: both the moral reality thesis and our moral 
judgments could be untrue (in various ways), and both the moral reality thesis and 
moral judgments could be theoretically unjustifiable (in which case we withhold 
judgment about their truth-value rather than positively reject them). One way of 
being untrue is being false, and either necessarily so (by being nonsensical or 
conceptually incoherent
305
) or contingently so. But moral judgments could also lack 
truth-value.
306
 This option is most naturally combined with some versions of the 
Presupposition Claim.
307
 However, Burgess endorses the ‘lacking in truth-value’-
view without relying on presupposition failure:  
 
I … maintain that moral judgements are without truth-value … My reason is this: It 
is part of the normal understanding of moral judgments that what truth-value they 
have is supposed to be independent of the person by whom, and the circumstances 
in which, they are uttered. Yet though each speaker may have quite definite (albeit 
unconscious) criteria for applying the term “moral,” there is not enough common to 
all speakers’ criteria to provide “Abortion is immoral” with a speaker-independent 
truth-value
308 
 
 
In addition to being untrue, moral judgments could also be unjustifiable.
309
 On 
                                            
304 Lillehammer (2004: 98). Lillehammer mentions Smith (1994) as a convergence 
success theorist.  
305 Recall that this is Mackie’s position according to Smith (2010: 121) and others; 
also see Wittgenstein (1965), Hussain (2010: 338); Shafer-Landau (2003: 82).  
306 Joyce (2001: 28); Burgess (2010: 8); Loeb (2008). 
307 Strawson (1956), also see Joyce (2001: 6).  
308 Burgess (2010: 8).  
309 Kalderon (2005: 106), Kirchin (2010: 168), Hussain (2010: 337). Garner writes 
that “error theory … is not necessarily a falsity theory” (1994: 139n7).  
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this view, the error theorist doesn’t need to argue for anything as strong as the moral 
reality thesis or moral judgments being determinately nonsensical, false, or lacking 
in truth-value. All she needs is the truth of the claim that we cannot prove that the 
moral reality thesis is true. The moral reality thesis could be unjustifiable.  
3.5  After Moral Error Theory 
There are various families of stances moral error theorists can adopt in response to 
their theory. I list and explain them in this subsection. 
  First there is the abolitionist stance.
310
 According to it we should abolish 
moral talk completely. One reason for doing this is that the world “would be on 
balance a more salubrious place if we gave up the whole business of morality.”311 
We should strive for ‘sensible’ solutions to for instance the abortion and euthanasia 
problems without getting into the muddy waters of moral arguments and the quest 
for a correct solution to moral problems. These quests only lead to continuing 
human suffering, not to quick policies that diminish suffering.  
  A second option is conservatism. According to it we should continue to 
participate in moral discourse as usual even though it carries a flawed commitment. 
Conservatist stances towards our flawed moral discourse subdivide into two kinds. 
First there is propagandist conservatism, according to which the folk should not be 
told the truth about error theory. The hope is that this avoids the dreadful 
consequences of relinquishing moral discourse—viz., predicted increases in stealing, 
killing, et cetera.
312
 Second, there is non-propagandist conservatism.
313
 We can have 
“business as usual”—we can fully believe in morality and expect to reap its benefits, 
such as fewer occurrences of stealing etc. compared to a state without morality—
even when the folk learn about error theory.
314
 One way to do this without sinking 
into inconsistency is to formulate a metaethical argument to the extent that first-
                                            
310 Hinckfuss (1987), Garner (1994, 2010); Nietzsche (according to Joyce 2006: 
107); for further arguments in favour of abolitionism, see Mackie (1980: 154). 
311 West (2010: 185n3). 
312 Discussed but not endorsed in Joyce (2001: 214; 2005). This stance is very 
similar to Government House Utilitarianism (Lillehammer 2004: 104).  
313 Mackie (1977: 16); also see West (2010: 137); Farber (1998: 161-2); Joyce 
(2005).  
314 I borrow this term from West (2010).  
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order and second-order moral questions are “not merely distinct, but completely 
independent”.315 The folk can believe error theory as long as they also understand 
the true relation between metaethics and normative ethics.  
  Thirdly, we have fictionalism, which comes in two main varieties, as 
explained in connection with Joyce in the previous chapter. First we have content-
fictionalism.
316
 To avoid making errors, agents are not to assert and believe the 
proposition ‘x morally ought to φ’, but the closely related proposition ‘in the moral 
fiction, x morally ought to φ’. There is also attitude-fictionalism, which is what 
Joyce accepts. To avoid making errors, agents are not to assert and believe the 
proposition ‘x morally ought to φ’. Indeed, they are not to assert and believe any 
proposition at all. Instead agents are to make-believe (or adopt another attitude 
relatively similar to make-believe to) the proposition ‘x morally ought to φ’. 
Fourthly, there is revolutionary expressivism. This is the view that we should 
start to express pro- and con-attitudes when we are engaged in moral discourse.317 
This has one benefit in common with fictionalism; viz., that it typically guarantees 
moral motivation (we are generally motivated if we are in desire-like states). It is 
unclear however whether recent quasi-realist efforts to save the appearances of 
moral discourse on an expressivist model don’t let moral truth in again through the 
back-door, in which case revolutionary expressivism would collapse into a form of 
moral realism, which is incompatible with error theory. Given also my aim to carve 
out the most plausible error theory within a cognitivist framework I will not take this 
option into consideration in this thesis.  
 Fifthly, there is a view that has no clear label in the literature and which I 
propose to call obsoletism. According to it, we should render the need for morality 
and moral discourse obsolete. This could be done by increasing "to a sufficient 
degree the benevolence of men or the bounty of nature."318 This option is clearly not 
feasible and will it set it aside in what follows.  
Finally we have revolutionary cognitivism; accepted, as I argued in the 
                                            
315 Mackie (1977: 16). 
316 Endorsed by Lewis (1978). Discussed but not endorsed by Oddie and 
Demetriou (2010: 200); Juhl and Loomis (2010: 274).  
317 Ridge and Köhler (forthcoming).  
318 Hume as quoted in Lukes (1985, p. 108). Also see Lillehammer (2004: 100).  
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previous chapter, by Mackie. On this view, philosophers are to change something 
about the moral propositions we express in our moral judgments—not by prefixing it 
with an ‘in the moral fiction’-operator but by changing our conception of what it is 
in virtue of which something is wrong (or schwrong). The kind of change we need is 
one that results in moral propositions no longer containing its flawed-making 
properties, whilst making sure that the sentences containing them retain as much of 
their usefulness as possible. This can be done by turning moral propositions into 
schmoral propositions.  
3.6  Conclusion and Preview 
This chapter has explored different options for formulating error theory. Doing this 
was important because, as the previous chapter showed, existing error theories with 
their idiosyncratic commitments are rife with difficulties. But it is possible to argue 
for error theory by means of different commitments, and the remainder of the thesis 
shows that one such alternative formulation of moral error theory is plausible. To 
that end I will now consider in depth the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim 
(Chapters 4-5) and the Substantive Claim (Chapter 6) in light of the options listed 
here.  
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Chapter 4 
Conceptual Entailment and Presupposition  
 
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that error theorists are ill-advised to take conceptual 
entailment as their interpretation of the mode of commitment of moral discourse to 
the poisoned thesis of morality (the moral reality thesis). I also argue that although 
the presupposition option can work, error theorists are best advised to explore the 
metaphysical entailment option instead. It is the task of the next chapter to argue that 
with metaphysical entailment, error theorists can get a working account of the non-
negotiable commitment of moral discourse to the moral reality thesis.  
I first argue that there is an objection to both the Conceptual Entailment 
Claim and the Metaphysical Entailment Claim, previously unrecognized in the 
literature, which, if successful, gets the Presupposition Claim a dialectical advantage 
over the entailment views. This is because the objection doesn’t affect the 
Presupposition Claim (§4.2).
319
 I then argue that in fact both the Conceptual 
Entailment Claim and the Metaphysical Entailment Claim can respond to my 
objection, so that the Presupposition Claim’s dialectical advantage vanishes (§4.3). 
With the playing field level again, I argue that the Conceptual Entailment Claim is 
unacceptable on different grounds (§4.4). I then argue that the Presupposition Claim 
can work for error theorists, but that the general commitments of presupposition 
relations favour exploring the Metaphysical Entailment Claim (§4.5). A final section 
concludes and looks ahead (§4.6). 
4.2  A New Objection to the Entailment Claim 
In this section I formulate a new objection to the view that the non-negotiable 
commitment of moral discourse is to be spelled out in terms of entailment without 
specifying what kind of entailment it is. For as will become clear shortly, that issue 
                                            
319 Previously unrecognized because I formulate it in Kalf (2013).  
- 114 - 
is a moot point in this context. Before I can formulate my objection we need to be 
more precise about the various moral statements that comprise moral discourse.  
Consider:   
   
Wrong   Stealing is morally wrong 
Permissible Stealing is morally permissible 
 
Wrong and Permissible are atomic moral statements. Recall from §3.2 that this 
means that they have the logical form ‘x is F’ and that they are ‘moral’ because the 
predicate F is a moral predicate. It is possible to have the following sense of 
permissibility in mind when saying that something is permissible: ‘stealing is 
positively morally permissible; i.e., stealing has the property of being permitted by 
morality’. But sometimes when people say that something is permissible they mean: 
‘stealing, like everything else, is permissible because there is no morality’. In that 
case we have: 
 
Permissible*  Stealing is permissible, but not morally permissible or 
permissible according to morality, because there is no 
morality 
 
Permissible* might be a statement that we use after the truth of moral error theory, 
since it doesn’t attribute moral properties to things, and is therefore not a moral 
statement. The predicate ‘F’ that is ‘permissible’ doesn’t read as ‘morally 
permissible’ but as ‘non-morally permissible’. In what follows I’ll have Permissible, 
not Permissible* in mind.  
It is possible to embed Wrong and Permissible under various linguistic 
operators, such as negation, modal and question operators. If we do this for Wrong 
we get three further, non-atomic moral statements:   
 
Negation   Stealing is not morally wrong
320
 
Modal  Stealing might be morally wrong 
Question Is stealing morally wrong?
321
 
 
                                            
320 Recall my earlier simplifying assumption that Negation is equivalent to ‘it is not 
the case that stealing is morally wrong’ and that its negation is used in its ordinary 
truth-functional rather than metalinguistic way.  
321 Although thus far I have understood ‘moral statements’ as linguistic utterances 
that express moral judgements understood as beliefs, from this point onwards, and 
for ease of exposition, I broaden my understanding of ‘moral statement’ to allow it 
to include non-atomic contributions to moral discourse, such as questions, that do 
not straightforwardly express beliefs.  
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A hitherto ignored question about all these different kinds of moral 
statements is: how well do the entailment and presupposition views fare with respect 
to all of them? Normally error theorists only focus on atomic moral statements and 
their negations; not on questions, modalized moral statements, etc.
322
 But each of the 
five moral statements commits its utterer to the moral reality thesis to varying 
degrees (this will be argued presently) and so if it turns out that the entailment view 
or the Presupposition Claim accounts for this better than the other then that speaks in 
favour of adopting that view as our account of the Non-Negotiable Commitment 
Claim. It is this feature of moral discourse—the fact that it consists of many more 
kinds of moral statements than just atomic ones and their negations—that I will now 
use to argue against both entailment options and in favour of the Presupposition 
Claim.  
Here is an intuitively plausible account of the relation between these five 
moral statements and the moral reality thesis. Wrong, given its atomic logical form, 
straightforwardly commits its utterer to the moral reality thesis. Negation 
straightforwardly does not commit its utterer to the moral reality thesis.323 How 
about Modal, Question and Permissible? Consider moral nihilists, ordinary 
participants in moral discourse deeply sceptical about moral truth.
324
 Nihilists are 
not willing to utter Modal and Question. Modal suggests that some things can be 
morally wrong: there is only a point in suggesting that things might be wrong if 
you’ve not already ruled out that things can be wrong. But nihilists believe that 
nothing is morally anything. Question leaves it open that some things are morally 
something: there is only a point in asking whether ‘p’ if you’ve not antecedently 
ruled out ‘p’. But nihilists think that ‘p’ has already been ruled out, so they see no 
point in uttering Question. This behaviour of nihilists—their reluctance to utter 
                                            
322 Joyce (2007a).  
323 Further examples of sentences that contain moral terms but that are obviously 
not infected with the poisoned thesis that error theorists balk at include those 
reporting propositional attitude ascriptions (‘John believes that stealing is wrong’) 
and those containing conceptual truths (‘murder is wrongful intentional killing’; 
Copp (2007: 116-21). I won’t consider them here because they obviously can’t be 
used as data in an argument that aims to decide which of the Conceptual Entailment 
Claim, the Metaphysical Entailment Claim or the Presupposition Claim is the error 
theorist’s best bet to formulate the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim with.  
324 Dreier (2006: 242). I use the locution ‘nihilist’ to talk about ordinary moralists 
and reserve ‘error theorist’ to talk about metaethicists subscribing to error theory.  
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Modal and Question—suggests that Modal and Question carry some kind of 
commitment to the moral reality thesis. The eventual account of the mode of 
commitment of moral discourse to the moral reality thesis should explain this.  
Finally, consider Permissible. Nihilists will be willing to utter Permissible* 
for obvious reasons. But they won’t be willing to utter Permissible. This is because: 
 
“facts about moral permissibility ... [are] not … objectively prescriptive but rather, 
as we might say, objectively permissive”325 
 
To understand why nihilists are unwilling to utter Permissible, recall that error 
theorists are impressed by morality’s apparent inescapable authority: its ability to 
bind us to perform certain actions (authority) such that there is nothing we can do, 
not even altering our desires, to escape this authority (inescapability). It is built into 
this notion of inescapability that moral facts would have to be objective in the sense 
of being independent of human desires or attitudes more broadly. Otherwise we 
could change what is morally wrong by altering our attitudes and thus ‘escape’ 
morality’s authority. But this means that the prescriptive force of moral 
considerations would have to be “simply there, in the nature of things.”326 And this 
is intolerably queer—nothing can be objective and prescriptive at the same time. But 
if it is mysterious how things can, just by themselves, demand the performance of 
actions, then it is equally mysterious how things can out of themselves permit the 
performance of actions. The nihilists’ reluctance to utter Permissible tells us that 
Permissible carries a commitment to: 
 
 The moral reality thesis (permissible):   
There exists objective permissibility 
 
 Nihilists’ unwillingness to utter Permissible has a further implication as well: 
they will also be unwilling to utter Negation, for Negation entails Permissible, by 
deontic logic. This means that although it remains true that Negation carries no 
commitment to the moral reality thesis understood as the moral reality thesis (which 
mentions reasons to refrain from stealing), we do find that Negation carries a 
commitment to the moral reality thesis understood as the moral reality thesis 
                                            
325 Olson (2011a: 79n.4).  
326 Mackie (1977: 59).  
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(permissible). For Negation entails Permissible and Permissible carries a 
commitment to the moral reality thesis (permissible). 
The fact that people sometimes have Permissible* in mind when they say 
that something is permissible does not threaten my claim that the error theorist’s 
eventual account of the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim needs to explain in 
virtue of what Permissible is committed to the moral reality thesis (permissible). 
And it doesn’t seem plausible that people always have Permissible* in mind when 
they say that something is permissible. The same holds for Modal. It too can be 
given an alternative interpretation according to which nihilists will be willing to 
utter it. This alternative interpretation is one according to which the ‘might’ in 
Modal gets an epistemic rather than a metaphysical reading. The nihilist can say: ‘I 
acknowledge that I am a fallible epistemic agent and thus, for all I know, stealing 
might be wrong’. She will be willing to utter this because worries about epistemic 
access to (moral) reality don’t imply a commitment to there being a (moral) reality. 
But again this would threaten my conclusion that Modal is committed to the moral 
reality thesis only if Modal is never used in its non-epistemic sense. But this too is a 
currently unsettled empirical claim (and one that is probably false). 
So we need an explanation of the fact that each of the five moral statements 
carries a commitment to the moral reality thesis or the moral reality thesis 
(permissible), at least to the extent that it does. That is, the commitments of the non-
atomic moral statements and Permissible may or may not be non-negotiable; I 
haven’t argued this point either way. But even without this specific information we 
can already formulate the following challenge: neither the Conceptual Entailment 
Claim nor the Metaphysical Entailment Claim, in virtue of both being entailment 
relations, seems to be able to account for this. After all, it is a perfectly general 
feature of entailments that embedding atomic sentences carrying them under 
negation operators causes the embedded sentence to lose that entailment. Stalnaker 
writes:  
 
A entails B if and only if B is necessitated by A but not by its denial
327
 
 
Thus ‘this is a vixen’ entails ‘this is a fox’ but ‘this is not a vixen’ does not entail 
‘this is a fox’. Likewise, Negation doesn’t entail the moral reality thesis. This is 
                                            
327 Stalnaker (1999: 54). Also see Saeed (2003: 103); Simons (2006: 357).  
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problematic because Negation is committed to the existence of a moral reality: it 
entails Permissible, which carries a commitment to the moral reality thesis 
(permissible). But it has not yet been argued that the latter commitment is an 
instance of an entailment. So here is an explanatory task for the entailment view: 
explain how Permissible entails the moral reality thesis (permissible) and hence how 
Negation entails the moral reality thesis (permissible).   
In addition to Negation and Permissible, consider Modal and Question. 
Modal and question operators are also entailment-cancelling operators; e.g., 
‘stealing might be morally wrong’ does not entail that it is wrong, and hence does 
not entail there is a categorical reason not to steal. This is also problematic, for as 
we saw Modal and Question do carry a commitment to the moral reality thesis. 
Conclusion: the entailment view is extensionally inadequate, and indeed very much 
so.  
My reasoning here is open to two objections. First, advocates of the 
entailment view can “treat [moral discourse] as a term of art … meaning a 
widespread linguistic practice of uttering atomic [statements]”.328 If error theorists 
treat moral discourse in this way then my explanatory challenge no longer applies to 
them. For then moral discourse, by hypothesis, no longer contains non-atomic moral 
statements. But to make this move is to abandon the aim of providing an error theory 
about ordinary moral discourse, which consists of lots of other kinds of moral 
statements besides atomic ones. Yet that was the nature of the game. This objection 
doesn’t stick.  
The second objection can be understood as an attempt to explain away the 
difficulties that Modal, Question et cetera present. The friend of either entailment 
option can  
 
agree that people are not always the best judges of what they are talking about” and 
insist that the telling evidence is how nihilists respond to cases where the 
commitment to [the moral reality thesis] is explicitly denied, not how they respond 
to [complicated statements like Modal]
329
  
 
In reply, I agree that the folk may be mistaken about their own discourse, thinking 
that a certain non-atomic statement like Modal carries a commitment to the moral 
reality thesis even though, by hypothesis, it doesn’t. But I insist that in that case we 
                                            
328 Joyce (2007a: §4); also see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006: 34-6).  
329 Joyce (2011a: 527).  
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need an explanation of why the folk are mistaken in the systematic way that they are. 
We have a large number of statements that seem to carry a commitment to the moral 
reality thesis —Modal, Question, Permissible, Negation via Permissible, and 
probably many more—and if none of them in fact carries that commitment then the 
fact that they appear to requires explanation. Either way, advocates of the 
entailment view have explanatory work to do. This objection doesn’t stick either.  
To sum up what we have so far, the entailment view is unable to account for 
the fact that various moral statements embedded under entailment-cancelling 
operators seem to carry commitments to the moral reality thesis. It also has yet to 
explain how, exactly, Permissible (and hence Negation as it logically entails 
Permissible) is committed to the moral reality thesis (permissible. I will now argue 
that the error theorist’s back-up plan, the Presupposition Claim, does a much better 
explanatory job here.  
Recall that for presuppositions between moral statements and a statement 
specifying the moral reality thesis, a suitable conversational context needs to be 
primed. This is because if Wrong, Negation, Modal, Question and Permissible 
presuppose the moral reality thesis or the moral reality thesis (permissible), we may 
not be able to (or perhaps can’t) simply ‘read off’ this information from these 
statements. For the moral reality thesis mentions objective prescriptivity and the 
moral reality thesis (permissible) mentions objective permissibility and that specific 
information is not contained within our five moral statements.  
So let’s prime an appropriate conversational context by stipulating that our 
conversation takes place between two moralists; ordinary people debating the 
wrongness or otherwise of stealing. One of them utters Wrong and his interlocutor 
utters Modal. On this assumption, given that ordinary morality seems to so many to 
be invested in objective prescriptivity, what is not at issue is the claim that there is 
such a thing as moral wrongness understood in terms of objective prescriptivity. 
What is at issue instead is whether moral wrongness understood in terms of 
objective prescriptivity applies to stealing. This means that the information that 
stealing is wrong, as entailed by Wrong (every statement entails itself) doesn’t 
project, but that the claim that there is such a thing as wrongness understood in 
terms of objective prescriptivity does project. This is exactly what we intuitively find 
(or at least error theorists and non-naturalist realists argue) and so we may perhaps 
say that the claim that there is wrongness understood in terms of objective 
- 120 - 
prescriptivity is presupposed by Wrong and Modal. Applying this to Question, we 
find that, at least when the intonation is on stealing (as in ‘is stealing wrong?’) the 
information that there is wrongness understood in terms of objective prescriptivity 
projects.330  For that information is not at issue if you wonder about the wrongness of 
stealing. And something similar holds for Permissible. If I utter Wrong and you utter 
Permissible then that there are things that have moral properties is not at issue and 
hence this information projects; for the only thing that is at issue is whether stealing 
has the property of being permissible or of being wrong.  
However, in fact whether the information that projects must be understood in 
connection with categorical reasons, objective permissibility, or a mixture of these is 
not clear. That is, it seems that saying that the information that projects mentions not 
objective permissibility but categorical reasons instead would work equally well. Or 
indeed we can imagine less robust accounts of morality’s normativity or even claim 
claims about free will or rational convergence (cf. §3.3) to accompany the projected 
information ‘that there exist moral properties’. So although the Presupposition 
Claim seems to work in principle when what we have in mind is extensional 
adequacy—viz., an explanation of why a whole raft of different kinds of moral 
statements seems to be committed to the moral reality thesis to various degrees—we 
also need to tighten our explanation. For, again, what we have at present is a view 
on which the mode of commitment of moral discourse to the moral reality thesis 
leaves it open what the precise content of the moral reality thesis is: objective 
permissibility, categorical reasons, or what have you. I assume that an eventual, 
more fully developed account of the Presupposition Claim can work this out. The 
important point though is that it doesn’t seem impossible for the friend of the 
presupposition claim to argue that Modal et cetera presuppose the moral reality 
thesis. This contrasts with the Conceptual Entailment Claim and the Metaphysical 
Entailment Claim. For the Conceptual Entailment Claim and the Metaphysical 
Entailment Claim, given that various sentential operators such as modal operators 
provide entailment-cancelling embeddings for the atomic statements they are based 
upon, it is impossible to explain why statements like Modal et cetera are committed 
to the moral reality thesis. So, to conclude, the Presupposition Claim has an 
important dialectical advantage over the Conceptual Entailment Claim and the 
                                            
330 When the intonation is on wrong then Question could be heard as asking the 
question whether anything is wrong at all.  
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Metaphysical Entailment Claim. The Presupposition Claim can whereas the 
Conceptual Entailment Claim and the Metaphysical Entailment Claim cannot 
provide, at least in principle, an extensionally adequate account of the mode of 
commitment of the various moral statements that comprise moral discourse to the 
moral reality thesis.  
4.3  Entailment and Pragmatics 
Or does the Presupposition Claim have this advantage? I will now argue that in fact 
it doesn’t. Our discussion of the entailment view in the previous section shows that 
it consists of the following theses:  
 
Positive Thesis  Atomic moral statements (except those about 
permissibility) entail the moral reality thesis 
(Permissible entails the moral reality thesis 
(permissible)) 
Negative Thesis Non-atomic statements do not entail the moral 
reality thesis 
 
Negative Thesis bears its name because it says that the entailment view is only 
committed to the, precisely, negative thesis that non-atomic statements do not entail 
the moral reality thesis. But this leaves it open that another relation apart from 
entailment can be used to close the gap.  
Here is a proposal. Modal, Question and Permissible keep the existence of a 
moral reality open as a live option because they conversationally implicate:  
 
Reasons  There exists objective permissibility as well as objective 
prescriptivity and hence, in virtue of the latter fact, categorical 
moral reasons
331
 
 
Recall from the previous chapter that conversational implicatures are 
standardly understood along Gricean lines. Grice explains implicatures, or how 
statements convey information without that information being part of their meaning, 
with the aid of two phenomena: the cooperative principle and conversational 
maxims. The cooperative principle says:  
 
[m]ake your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purposes or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged
332
  
                                            
331 For a similar proposal see (Olson 2011a: 69-70).  
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The maxims tell you what to do to meet the principle; e.g., the maxim of quantity 
tells you to make your contribution neither less nor more informative than is 
required, and the maxim of relation tells you to make your contribution relevant. 
According to Grice, we are justified in assuming that people conform to the 
cooperative principle and hence to the maxims (absent special circumstances such as 
when people are acting).  
In our case, the implicature between Modal, Question and Permissible on the 
one hand and Reasons on the other holds because, looking at Permissible for 
example, we have in our society a moral standard according to which morally 
relevant actions are either permissible or forbidden (but not both) and because to 
state that information explicitly would be to violate the Gricean maxim of quantity, 
which forbids us to be overly informative when we speak. Here is the calculation of 
the implicature. You utter Permissible. I am justified in thinking that you abide by 
the maxim of quantity as your means of abiding by the cooperative principle, and 
since I know that it is part of our conversational context that we have a moral 
standard in place according to which various morally relevant actions are either 
morally prescriptive or morally permissive, I know that your utterance of 
Permissible carries the implicature that there are other actions that carry categorical 
moral reason-giving force.  
This explains why nihilists are not willing to utter Permissible. By uttering 
Permissible they commit themselves, via its implicature to Reasons, to the existence 
of categorical reasons. But nihilists can also reveal their hands and clarify that they 
mean to say that stealing isn’t wrong because nothing is morally anything. Although 
Wrong still entails the moral reality thesis in that case, the implicature of 
Permissible to Reasons gets cancelled, and so nihilists will be happy to say that 
something is permissible. For then it has become clear that what nihilists intend to 
convey is Permissible*. Note that Negation, since it (logically) entails Permissible, 
gets a similar treatment. Nihilists are initially unwilling to utter it because it 
expresses allegiance to the moral game: Negation entails Permissible which 
conversationally implicates Reasons. But when that conversational implicature gets 
cancelled, nihilists are willing to utter Negation. They might say: ‘yes, stealing is not 
wrong, and hence (non-morally) permissible, because nothing is morally anything’.   
                                                                                                                           
332 Grice (1989: 6).  
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 Something similar again holds for Modal and Question; these are also 
statements that nihilists are initially unwilling to utter as they are suggestive of 
things having moral status, and thereby trigger recognition of Reasons. And nihilists 
will be happy to utter Modal and Question once they have cancelled these 
implicatures. For then Modal may take up its epistemic reading and Question could 
be used as a means of testing the allegiance of others to either moral realism or 
moral skepticism. ‘Is stealing wrong?’ will elicit a positive response from a moralist 
and the following, implicature cancelling response from the nihilist: ‘No, stealing is 
not wrong—nothing is wrong!’  
By incorporating implicatures into their theory, friends of either the 
Conceptual Entailment Claim or the Metaphysical Entailment Claim have the 
resources to explain the commitments of the various kinds of moral statements to the 
moral reality thesis, just like the Presupposition Claim can. So the playing field is 
level again, but, importantly, we are not back to square one. We have gained 
important insights into the kinds of moral statements that carry a commitment to the 
moral reality thesis, and how, exactly, entailment and presupposition options explain 
this. But which one shall we choose? Entailment or presupposition? I will start by 
arguing that the conceptual entailment option is not the error theorist’s best bet.  
4.4  Against Conceptual Entailment  
In this section I argue that error theorists shouldn’t model their account of the mode 
of commitment of moral discourse to the moral reality thesis on conceptual 
entailment, given that metaphysical entailment is also available. The reason for this 
is that, compared to the metaphysical entailment claim, a conceptual entailment 
claim is relatively difficult to defend, and for two reasons, as I will now explain.  
In §3.2.2.3 I explained that the main difference between both conceptual and 
metaphysical entailment relations concerns what it is in virtue of which the 
entailment holds (concepts vs. a posteriori considerations). This difference yields a 
concomitant difference in our epistemic access to both entailment relations. 
Conceptual entailments can be discovered by looking for connections between 
concepts whereas for metaphysical entailment a posteriori investigation is required.  
We can add to this a further difference. Every conceptual entailment is also a 
metaphysical entailment, but not vice versa. If it is part of the applicability 
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conditions of the concepts VIXEN and FEMALE FOX that they both refer to the same 
object (female foxes) then the propositions ‘this is a vixen’ and ‘this is a female fox’ 
not only conceptually but also metaphysically entail each other. This is because the 
re-written propositions ‘this is a female fox’ and ‘this is a female fox’ obviously 
metaphysically entail each other. However, the relation of metaphysical entailment 
that obtains between ‘this is water’ and ‘this is H2O’ does not bring forth a relation 
of conceptual entailment between those two propositions. For it is not part of the 
meaning of ‘this is water’ that that thing is H2O.  
This suggests that conceptual entailment relations relevant to moral error 
theory are more difficult to defend, and for two reasons. First, since not all 
metaphysical entailments are conceptual entailments and since all conceptual 
entailments are metaphysical entailments as well, aiming for a metaphysical 
entailment simply enlarges the error theorist’s chance for success.  
A second reason why conceptual entailments are more difficult to defend 
than metaphysical entailments has to do with the first difference, which concerned 
our epistemic access to both entailment relations.  
In the context of a discussion about the Conceptual Entailment Claim, Finlay 
asks: 
 
[t]he difficult question … how is the [… conceptual] content of our language and 
thought determined? [One idea] turns on considerations of people’s reflective 
understanding of their moral thought and speech, and of what they may be 
conscious of when they engage in this thought and speech. This evinces an 
assumption of the truth of a local form of content-internalism: what we mean 
morally is fixed by something internal to our mental states, particularly our 
intentions … While moral content-internalism doesn’t entail that our reflective 
understanding of our practices is infallible (we can be mistaken about our own 
intentions and can thereby misunderstand our own concepts and language), it is 
what supports the view that reflective evidence can be decisive in establishing 
which theory of moral judgment is correct333 
 
Error theorists tend to like content-internalism.334 Recall Joyce’s translation test-
argument. Take a contender moral concept that doesn’t carry a commitment to some 
kind of inescapable authority and see if (competent) users of moral language would 
                                            
333 Finlay (2008a: 362). Also see Nichols (2004: 192-3). 
334 Also see Shafer-Landau (2003: 67).  
- 125 - 
be happy to accept that concept as a moral rather than a schmoral concept. If they 
are happy to accept it as a moral concept then a concept like MORALLY WRONG 
doesn’t entail INESCAPABLE AUTHORITY and the contender moral concept is indeed a 
moral concept. If however they aren’t happy to accept this then MORALLY WRONG 
does entail INESCAPABLE AUTHORITY. The translation test argument relates to content 
internalism in the following way: if we think that INESCAPABLE AUTHORITY is part of 
the concept MORALLY WRONG because we decide and intend to use MORALLY WRONG 
only when there is inescapable authority afoot, then (ignoring for ease of exposition 
of the relevant point I want to make here the complexities introduced by our 
fallibility) INESCAPABLE AUTHORITY is part of MORALLY WRONG.  
Here then is a problem for the Conceptual Entailment Claim. It ignores 
content-externalist accounts of the conceptual content of our language and thought, 
according to which the meaning and reference of some of the words we use are not 
solely determined by the ideas we (collectively or individually) associate with 
them.
335
 But this is a gratuitous assumption in the context of arguing for error 
theory. For if content-externalism is true then it might be that INESCAPABLE 
AUTHORITY can be safely removed from MORALLY WRONG even if the folk are 
reluctant to accept that. That is, if content-externalism is true then moral concepts 
may well be truly applicable to aspects of the world that do not exhibit categorical 
normativity, and this may be so even when the folk think that this shouldn’t be 
possible.  
This gets us an Alternative Explanation Objection to the Conceptual 
Entailment Claim: even if moral discourse evinces a clear commitment to categorical 
reasons, it still doesn’t follow that this commitment “contaminates” moral 
concepts.
336
 For there is an alternative explanation of the fact that moral discourse 
evinces a commitment to categorical reasons. This is that the folk have false beliefs 
about the referents of the moral terms which stand for moral concepts. The folk 
think that these referents have to have categorical reason-giving force. So (i) they 
don’t accept contender moral concepts that do not have categorical reason-giving 
                                            
335 Lau and Deutsch (2002: §2).  
336 The word ‘contaminates’ comes from Finlay (2008a: 347). Also see Field 
(1973); Brink (1989: Ch. 6); Gampel (1996); Copp (2007: 203-8, 232-6); Cuneo 
(2012: 123n25). Sainsbury’s (1998: 141-2) and Baillie’s (2000: 15) interpretations 
of Hume’s ethics follows much this pattern too.  
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force built into them as moral concepts and (ii) they feel enfeebled in their criticism 
of other people’s behaviour when they can’t use concepts that have categorical 
reason-giving force built into them, et cetera (here I am referring again to parts of 
my discussion of Joyce’s attempts to settle the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim 
from §2.3.1). But according to the alternative explanation, moral terms are free from 
error and successfully refer to moral properties that do not have categorical reason-
giving force. The folk just have false beliefs about, or have wrong referential 
intentions for, moral terms that stand for moral concepts.  
How could this happen? The explanation that opponents of error theory tend 
to give is that the referents of terms, including moral terms, can be opaque to their 
users despite their users’ competence with them.337 For: 
 
It is not … plausible to claim that any competent user of the predicate ‘moves’ 
knows that it expresses the concept of a relation rather than the concept of a 
monadic property … Some perfectly competent possessors of the concept of motion 
were unaware that the only truths there are about motion are relational ones
338
 
 
After all, had it not been possible for competent users of terms to fail to know what 
concept it expresses, exactly, and thus had it not been possible for them to fail to 
know what the constitutive elements of those concepts are, then entire discourses 
would have to be relinquished to systematic falsehood. Error theories of such 
discourses would become our only choice. This holds for the terms ‘moves’, ‘water’ 
and ‘mass’. Harman writes:  
 
Before Einstein, judgments about mass were not intended as relative judgments. But 
it would be mean-spirited to invoke an “error theory” and conclude that these pre-
Einsteinian judgments were all false! Better to suppose that such a judgment was 
true to the extent that an object has the relevant mass in relation to a spatio-temporal 
framework that was conspicuous to the person making the judgment, for example, a 
framework in which that person was at rest339 
  
Which way do moral terms and concepts go? Can they be said to be free of 
error like ‘mass’, ‘water’ and ‘moves’ or do they contain errors like ‘phlogiston’ and 
‘witch’, for which error theories are obviously appropriate? The objection that I am 
developing is that error theorists haven’t done enough to argue that moral concepts 
                                            
337 Jackson (2012: 79-82). 
338 Boghossian (2006: 15).   
339 Harman and Thompson (1994: 4). Also see Horgan and Timmons (2002: 74, 
79-80); Putnam (1988: 9-10). 
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are like the concepts WITCH and PHLOGISTON. True, we have seen Mackie’s and 
especially Joyce’s attempts to argue that moral concepts go that way. Mackie has 
tried to conclude from our patterns of reactions to a perceived need to abandon 
belief in moral values that objective prescriptivity is part of moral concepts. Joyce 
employed Mackie’s Platitude, the translation test argument and various versions of 
the use argument. But we have already seen that these attempts have failed (cf. 
Chapter 2). Moreover, they assume the truth of content-internalism without making 
this explicit and without defending this assumption. This is a gratuitous assumption 
in the context of arguing for error theory. And, furthermore, content-internalism is 
difficult to defend. For recall that even moral error theorists have to assume that for 
many terms, including ‘moves’, ‘mass’ and ‘water’, a successful content-externalist 
story is available. Otherwise we end up with the undesirable consequence that we 
also have to be error theorists about motion-, mass- and water-discourse. But what 
justifies accepting content-internalism other than that it can give error theorists what 
they want? Indeed, one might think that since accepting content-internalism about 
moral discourse leads to an error theory of that discourse, we have reason to reject 
it.  
Importantly, the Metaphysical Entailment Claim survives this critique 
because it doesn’t apply to it. After all, according to the Metaphysical Entailment 
Claim, ‘stealing is wrong’ metaphysically entails ‘there is robust categorical moral 
normativity’ even though that information need not be built into the concept MORAL 
WRONGNESS. This means that what we mean morally can be fixed by something 
external to our referential intentions. So, with the Metaphysical Entailment Claim, 
error theory is no longer open to this particular objection because the advocate of the 
Metaphysical Entailment Claim agrees with that objection that there are aspects of 
the world that obtain external to agents’ minds that can affect which statements 
stand in entailment relations with other statements. It is just that this kind of error 
theorist who accepts the Metaphysical Entailment Claim argues that when we move 
away from the thought that “what we mean morally is fixed by something internal to 
our mental states, particularly our intentions,” and broaden our horizon, we find that 
moral discourse can’t be moral discourse without a robust kind of categorical moral 
normativity.  
Friends of the Conceptual Entailment Claim could respond to my objection 
by saying, with Joyce, that although:  
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there are empirical disclosures to be made about water [for example that water is 
H2O], it could not be discovered that “water” is a mass term for the time between 
lunch and dinner. It is our intentions (considered collectively) to use the term in a 
certain way that preclude this possibility
340
  
 
Joyce’s idea is that any entailment relation needs some (collective) referential 
intentions to ensure extensional adequacy of the relation on offer. But the need for 
some referential intentions is consistent with content-externalism (just like an 
externalist causal theory or reference is consistent with an initial baptizing of a 
term).341 Moreover, since, as Joyce himself says, the referential intentions may be 
collective rather than individual referential intentions, it is not even true that the 
necessity of incorporating referential intentions in figuring out which entailment 
relations there are requires us to move away from content-externalism. Finally, there 
is also no guarantee that the (collective) referential intentions which constrain 
reference assignment for moral terms will have to carry a commitment to categorical 
reasons (or anything else that is useful for a moral error theory for that matter).   
To sum up, I have discussed two considerations that put the Conceptual 
Entailment Claim in bad light. First, if error theorists use the Conceptual Entailment 
Claim rather than the Metaphysical Entailment Claim then they needlessly limit 
their chances for success, as every conceptual entailment is also a metaphysical 
entailment but not vice versa. Second, using the Conceptual Entailment Claim 
requires settling the debate about content-internalism about what fixes what we 
mean morally, or if that is not possible then it requires assuming content-internalism. 
But both of these options are bad news for error theory. The first option is hard to 
defend, given that we know that many terms in our natural languages can 
successfully refer even if the folk have false beliefs about the constituent parts of the 
concepts that these terms express. The second option is intellectually dishonest. 
With the Metaphysical Entailment Claim however error theorists can by-pass these 
issues as the Metaphysical Entailment Claim is consistent with content-externalism 
about what fixes what we mean morally. Better then to relax the requirement on 
entailment relations that they involve connections between concepts to something 
more akin to the Metaphysical Entailment Claim. Indeed, I will argue in the next 
chapter that the Metaphysical Entailment Claim can give error theorists a working 
                                            
340 Joyce (2001: 97). Also see Parfit (2012 Vol2: 301-2).  
341 Kripke (1972).  
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argument for their Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim. But first let me argue that 
the Presupposition Claim is not a good option for error theorists either.  
4.5  Against Presupposition  
In §4.2 and §3.2.3 we saw that the Presupposition Claim makes at least three 
assumptions that stand in need of defence. One was that we can specify a 
conversational context in which the presupposition that there is a moral reality 
(understood in a sufficiently robust and explicit way congenial to error theory) arises 
even when that context is described sufficiently minimally in order to avoid the 
charge that we are building into the context what we want to get out of it. This is not 
evidently possible. Recall that as opposed to the case of Bald, Not-Bald and King, 
where the presupposition that there is a king (King) can be read off both Bald and 
Not-Bald pretty straightforwardly, the presuppositions of moral statements, if any, 
cannot likewise be straightforwardly read off them. In line with standard solutions to 
this problem I then suggested that what’s needed is the priming of an appropriate 
conversational context: we need to get more information about the context of the 
conversation to be able to say what, if any, the presuppositions of the statements 
involved are. I primed one conversational context—one in which we have two 
moralists debating the wrongness or otherwise of stealing—and asked what the 
presuppositions of these statements would be. I suggested that one bit of information 
that may not be at issue in that conversation (recall the projection test for 
presuppositions according to which a piece of information projects so long as it is 
‘not at issue’ in that conversation, and according to which what is thus projected my 
count as a presupposition of that discourse) may be that there is categorical moral 
normativity. The problem is: lots of other bits of information are consistent with this 
story as well. Take: there is hypothetical moral normativity. That information too 
can be said to be not at issue when one person utters Wrong and the other utters 
Negation in response. Which of these is the presupposition of Wrong and Negation? 
Because we primed the conversational context sufficiently minimally to avoid the 
objection that we are building into the context what we want go get out of it, this is 
not clear.  
So let’s put more information into the context. Say, for instance, that both 
interlocutors are very religious and believe that moral rules are God-given, set in 
stone, strongly normative, that they entail categorical reasons, et cetera. With that 
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information specified as the conversational context the suggestion that the 
information that projects is hypothetical moral normativity, not categorical moral 
normativity, seems out. However, our victory is very much a Pyrrhic victory: we 
only got the projected information that there must be categorical moral normativity 
out of the exercise, or so it very much seems, because we put that information into 
the conversational context to begin with.  
This dilemma between beefing up the conversational context in order to get a 
clear presupposition but risking assuming what we set out to prove versus describing 
the conversational context sufficiently minimally to avoid that risk but then landing 
ourselves with an indeterminate presupposition is a big problem for the 
presupposition approach. Note too that the friend of the Metaphysical Entailment 
Claim doesn’t need to prime conversational contexts in this way. She is therefore 
better off than the friend of the Presupposition Claim.  
The second assumption, leading on from the first, was that in a conversation 
in which Wrong and Permissible get uttered, it is not clear which of the moral reality 
thesis or the moral reality thesis (permissible) gets presupposed, and this too would 
need to be settled. Again, this problem has everything to do with the problem of 
priming an appropriate conversational context, and again, this task is one that a 
friend of the Metaphysical Entailment Claim doesn’t have to perform.  
The friend of the presupposition approach can respond to these problems as 
follows. She can say that I’ve exaggerated the need to prime a conversational 
context. I talked about priming a context for talk exchanges between individual 
agents. But it is also possible to look at the shape and function of moral discourse as 
a whole, and to take the natural prediction that what is taken for granted in normal 
contexts of sincere moral discourse to be moral discourse’s presupposition. This 
allows the friend of presupposition to avoid priming conversational contexts 
altogether. All we need, on this picture, for teasing out the ‘poisoned presupposition’ 
of moral discourse are general reflections on platitudes about moral discourse, 
thought-experiments, intuitions and the like.
342
 The benefit of this suggestion is that 
we can get a presupposition relation favourable to error theory on the table without 
priming any conversational contexts, and thus without running head-on into the 
trouble of reading into moral conversations what we want to get out of them.  
                                            
342 See Finlay (2011: 535) on the terminology ‘poisoned presupposition’.  
- 131 - 
However, still, the friend of metaphysical entailment has the upper hand. For 
notice that this way of looking at and arguing for ‘presupposition’ relations is 
virtually identical to looking at and arguing for ‘metaphysical entailment’ relations. 
After all, in arguing for metaphysical entailment relations, I suggested in §3.2.2.3, 
error theorists should also invoke ‘general reflections on platitudes about moral 
discourse, thought-experiments, intuitions and the like’. But then talk of a 
presupposition rather than an entailment relation is potentially distracting. For it 
looks as though it is much easier to make sense of a relation of entailment between 
an atomic moral proposition and the proposition about objective prescriptivity than 
it is to make sense of a relation of presupposition between these two propositions. 
The reader might recall from §3.2.3 the complexities involved in presupposition 
relations, including the issue of semantic versus pragmatic presuppositions and our 
epistemic access to them, to name just two. Error theorists hoping to settle their 
Non-Negotiable Commitment to something like objective prescriptivity by means of 
mustering a posteriori reflections on the nature of moral wrongness would be well-
advised to avoid these complexities by interpreting the relation that they find 
between a moral proposition and a proposition about objective prescriptivity in 
terms of entailment. This is not a knock-down argument against the presupposition 
option. To the contrary; it might still be the case that for all this thesis shows, in fact 
researching the presupposition option gives error theorists the best account of moral 
discourse’s Non-Negotiable Commitment. But I do think that given the 
aforementioned complexities with presupposition and the relative 
straightforwardness of entailment, error theorists should try to work on metaphysical 
entailment first.  
The final assumption that we had to make to make the Presupposition Claim 
work was that the Presupposition Claim would have to be able to explain in virtue of 
what the presuppositions of Modal and Question are cancellable with felicity, as it 
looks like they are. For remember that it makes good sense to say ‘no, it is not the 
case that stealing might be wrong—nothing is wrong!’ Here however the advocate 
of the Metaphysical Entailment Claim faces a similar problem. She has to explain 
how the implicatures of Modal and Question are cancellable with felicity. The 
advantage of metaphysical entailment over presupposition here, however, is that 
again its pragmatic account of cancellability with felicity seems to be better 
understood than that of the various theories of presupposition. Again though this is 
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not a knock-down argument against presupposition. For all this thesis shows friends 
of the Presupposition Claim can tell a perfectly convincing story about this. But it 
does indicate that error theorists should seriously consider looking at metaphysical 
entailment before considering presupposition.  
4.6  Conclusion and Preview 
In this chapter I have argued that there is a currently unaddressed objection to using 
entailment relations between moral statements and the moral reality thesis to make 
sense of the error theorist’s Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim. The objection is 
that although many of the kinds of moral sentences that comprise moral discourse 
are correctly, from an intuitive point of view, either debunked or vindicated by an 
entailment claim, there is also a class of moral sentences that the entailment options 
do not debunk even though these sentences intuitively ought to be debunked. I 
argued that there is reason to believe that this objection favours the Presupposition 
Claim over either the Conceptual Entailment Claim or the Metaphysical Entailment 
Claim. I also argued that this objection in fact fails because the friend of the 
entailment claim can use pragmatic mechanisms to account for the relevant data. But 
this didn’t get us back to square one. Engaging with the hitherto unrecognized 
objection showed us which kinds of moral statements (atomic statements, non-
atomic modalized statements, non-atomic negated statements, etc.) probably carry 
the commitment to the moral reality thesis and to what degree. This then allowed me 
to object to the Presupposition Claim on the grounds that the assumptions it must 
make to account for these data are at least prima facie more difficult to defend than 
the assumptions of the friend of the Metaphysical Entailment Claim. I concluded 
from this that it would make sense for the error theorist to study the Metaphysical 
Entailment Claim rather than the Presupposition Claim. I also argued that there are 
difficulties internal to the practice of proposing relations of conceptual entailment 
that the friend of the Metaphysical Entailment Claim doesn’t have to deal with. This 
gives us prima facie reason to study the Metaphysical Entailment Claim rather than 
the Conceptual Entailment Claim. The next chapter does precisely that, and argues 
that using the Metaphysical Entailment Claim gets us a working argument for the 
claim that ordinary moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment; namely, 
to a robust kind of categorical moral normativity.  
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Chapter 5 
Metaphysical Entailment 
 
5.1 Introduction  
His own efforts to argue for moral error theory notwithstanding, Joyce believes that 
 
no error theorist has yet succeeded in making [the case for the Non-Negotiable 
Commitment Claim] persuasively
343
 
 
In previous chapters I argued that thus far error theorists have tried to establish their 
Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim either by arguing for the Conceptual 
Entailment Claim or by arguing for the Presupposition Claim. I argued that the 
Conceptual Entailment Claim is rife with difficulties and that the Presupposition 
Claim is heavily underexplored and, compared to the Metaphysical Entailment 
Claim, probably unnecessarily complicated. This explains and corroborates Joyce’s 
remark. In this chapter I aim to settle the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim via 
the Metaphysical Entailment Claim. the Metaphysical Entailment Claim allows error 
theorists to argue that objective prescriptivity (or what have you) is part of the truth-
conditions of moral discourse without making this analytic of moral discourse.  
As far as I know the Metaphysical Entailment Claim has so far not been 
explored at all. Lillehammer comes close when he writes that: 
 
the [non-negotiable commitment] claim is fundamental to some moral thought 
(although I don’t claim that [the] commitment … is … [an] analytic … condition for 
basic competence with moral terms)
344 
 
 
This looks like the kind of metaphysical entailment that I’m after: a commitment to 
something like objective prescriptivity is fundamental or essential to moral discourse 
although it is not analytic of moral discourse (or our competence with it). However, 
having made this claim, Lillehammer doesn’t explore this option in much detail. 
                                            
343 Joyce (MS: 10); also see Cuneo (2012: 114-5). 
344 Lillehammer (2004: 99).  
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Instead he makes this comment to motivate error theory to a sufficient degree to 
justify a discussion of what we should do with moral discourse after error theory.  
 How might one go about establishing a metaphysical entailment claim? One 
direct strategy is to look at various platitudes about the nature and status of morality 
as we get them from a carefully executed internal accommodation project of moral 
discourse. With those platitudes in place we can then formulate a hypothesis about 
the nature and status of morality that provides the best possible fit with those 
platitudes. There are complexities involved that I will discuss in due course, but the 
guiding idea is that this hypothesis embodies the non-negotiable commitment of 
moral discourse. After all, the hypothesis is what undergirds and explains 
platitudinously true claims about moral discourse in the best possible way.  
 Let’s be clear about the relationship between (1) what is analytic of moral 
discourse, (2) what is platitudinously true of moral discourse and (3) what best 
explains the platitudes. What I deny is that the non-negotiable commitment of moral 
discourse is analytic of it. That is, I deny that it is part of moral concepts that they 
can only be successfully applied to (say) objectively prescriptive moral facts and 
properties (Mackie), categorical reasons (Joyce), inter-subjective agreement 
(Burgess, Streumer, Schiffer), or what have you. What I accept is that the platitudes 
themselves can be analytic of moral discourse. For this is consistent with (3) what 
best explains these platitudes is some thesis about morality that we discover via a 
posteriori means rather than conceptual analysis.  
 I start by enumerating platitudes about the nature and status of moral 
discourse (§5.2). I then argue that the hypothesis that there exists categorical 
normativity understood in a particular way to be explored provides the best fit with 
these platitudes, and that a Metaphysical Entailment Claim conducive to error theory 
is therefore in the offing (§5.3). The chapter further discusses one important 
objection to my argument, but rejects it (§5.4). It closes with a conclusion and 
preview (§5.5).  
5.2 Platitudes  
In this section I discuss platitudes about the status and content of morality. The 
claims I am about to present count as platitudes on account of the fact that they are 
very much ingrained in folk moral thought. Recall from §1.1 my method of quasi-
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empirical research where metaethicists make claims about what is platitudinously 
true about moral discourse on the basis of their own intuitions and experiences. 
Although it is always possible to overthrow platitudes on theoretical grounds, doing 
so comes with the cost of accepting a theory that cannot handle certain 
platitudinously true claims. I will rely on fairly minimal platitudes—platitudes that 
are formulated in such a way that they allow for exceptions and are consistent with 
various different theoretically more loaded explanations. The argument of this 
chapter is that one theoretical interpretation provides the best fit with these 
platitudes (and the argument of the next chapter is that this commitment isn’t made 
true by the world).  
 One further comment applies. The platitudes that I formulate involve moral 
oughts or the deontic aspects of moral discourse only. Whether my argument 
generalizes to evaluative aspects of moral discourse (and whether it is a big problem 
if it doesn’t) will be discussed in §7.4.  
  Here, then, is the first platitude:  
 
Desire-Independence 
If an agent morally ought to φ, then that agent morally ought to φ regardless of 
whether she feels like φ-ing (at the time) and regardless of whether φ-ing would 
further any of her goals even if she thought about φ-ing for a long time
345
   
 
The idea behind Desire-Independence is that whether it is true of agents that they 
morally ought to φ neither depends on whether they want to φ at the time of 
assessment nor on whether φ-ing furthers any of the agent’s goals. Various infamous 
characters in history and the history of philosophy morally ought not to have done 
what they did, and the folk believe that this is true regardless of what these rogues 
wanted or what their goals were. These thugs include, but are not limited to, 
Genghis Kahn, Caligula, Nero, Hume’s sensible knave, Gyges, and 
Thrasymachus.
346
  
This initial characterization requires various qualifications. First, Desire-
Independence only concerns moral oughts. That is, it only says that if Jack morally 
ought to refrain from killing then he morally ought to do that regardless of what he 
                                            
345 “Common opinion agrees with Kant in insisting that a moral man must accept a 
rule of duty whatever his interests or desires” Foot (1972: 306).  
346 The reference to Hume is to his (1739-40: 3.2.1.9). Gyges and Thrasymachus 
feature in Plato’s Republic.  
- 136 - 
feels like doing at the time and regardless of whether he still desires to kill after 
careful deliberation. Desire-Independence leaves it completely open whether or not 
ignoring this moral ought entails making a rational mistake. Killing could be wrong 
relative to the rules of morality whether or not one feels like killing. But all the same 
it could be a further question whether it is always irrational to kill.
347
 If one thinks 
that being practically irrational consists in ignoring a reason that one has, then the 
question is whether the categorical wrongness of stealing translates into all agents 
also having a reason not to steal. (But one could also hold that being practically 
irrational consists in ignoring rational requirements instead, in which case the 
question becomes whether the categorical wrongness of stealing translates into all 
agents being under rational requirements not to steal).  
The second qualification about Desire-Independence is that if we think that 
moral oughts are not rational oughts then we must make further distinctions. For if it 
is not true that moral oughts are always rational oughts then we must ask: how 
should we then understand the way in which morality is normative? For this kind of 
moral ought is, by hypothesis, not normative because it is a rational ought. But then 
then in what sense or in what way is it normative?348  
Rational oughts are in good sense straightforwardly normative. If I’m 
irrational when I’m doing something morally wrong then I’m not living up to the 
standards of rationality. But what are the other options? Restricting ourselves to 
moral normativity we can note the following possibilities:  
 
Rule-Involving Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of being 
rules, and rules are normative in virtue of 
distinguishing between what is correct and 
incorrect or what is allowed and disallowed349  
 
Motivational Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of entailing 
actual or possible motivation, such that when a 
putative ought, known by an agent, doesn’t actually 
or possibly motivate, it fails to be an ought350  
 
Attitudinal Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of involving 
attitudes of approval or disapproval to our own or 
other people’s actions. Attitudes of approval or 
                                            
347 Foot (1972); Railton (1986); Brink (1984, 1989).  
348 Copp (2012: 25).  
349 Parfit (2012 Vol1: 144).   
350 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 268); Copp (2007: 258-60).   
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disapproval are often motivationally efficacious, 
but this feature isn’t what guarantees the relevant 
oughts’ normativity (that would cause the 
attitudinal account to collapse into the motivational 
account). Instead, oughts are normative if they 
involve attitudes because the attitudes are attitudes 
of approval and disapproval, which are themselves 
normative notions351  
 
Imperatival Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of being 
commands, and commands are normative because 
they are stated in the imperatival mood
352
 
 
These are all conceptions of oughts without normative practical reasons of 
rationality: 
 
Oughts without Normative Practical Reasons or Rationality   
Oughts that are normative without being or entailing normative practical reasons of 
rationality or rational requirements
353
  
 
I will consider these options in more detail shortly. Here I just want to make the 
point that the moral oughts that Desire-Independence mentions are consistent with 
many different metaethical theories of oughts. Therefore, we know that Desire-
Independence is sufficiently inchoately formulated to count as a platitude. We also 
know that Desire-Independence all by itself cannot settle the case for moral error 
theory or indeed any other metaethical theory. So, for instance, moral rationalists 
who believe that moral reasons are reasons of rationality will emphasize the 
rationality-involving conception of morality’s normativity that is consistent with but 
not entailed by Desire-Independence. But other metaethicists who aren’t rationalists 
in this sense won’t insist on this, and this is also consistent with Desire-
Independence.  
 A third comment about Desire-Independence is that it is consistent with 
moral oughts being dependent on various aspects of the agent and her situation. For 
instance, it might be true of all of us that we morally ought to give to famine relief if 
we have a salary in excess of the minimum required to live a decent life in a certain 
                                            
351 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 268); Russell (2011: 209).  
352 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 268); Copp (2007: 257-8).  
353 Kiesewetter (2012: 466). I add specifically ‘normative practical reasons’ 
because Oughts Without Normative Practical Reasons or Rationality is consistent 
with oughts being analysable in terms of moral or legal ‘reasons’ understood as 
considerations that count in favour of X-ing without that implying truths about 
rationality.  
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country, regardless of whether we desire to give to famine relief and regardless of 
what we come to believe after having reflected on the matter long enough, et cetera. 
Nevertheless, the truth of this moral ought claim does not entail that we all morally 
have to give to famine relief. That depends on whether one earns enough.  
 This ends my discussion of Desire-Independence. I will now consider some 
other platitudes about the nature and status of morality.  
 A second platitude about the status of morality is:  
   
Overriding  
Sometimes if an agent morally ought to φ then that is simply what she ought to do
354
   
 
According to Overriding, sometimes what agents morally ought to do completely 
determines what they ought to do all things considered. Try reading Overriding with 
‘refrain from causing an innocent child to undergo a prolonged and excruciatingly 
painful death’ for ‘φ’ (cf. §1.1). In this case, most of us think, doing what we 
morally ought to do is simply what we ought to do full stop. Overriding is consistent 
with many morally relevant actions, such as not scoffing at beggars, for which it is 
not true that we simply ought not to do that full stop. Perhaps scoffing at a beggar is 
the only way to preserve an important work of art (the assumption here is that the 
badness of scoffing at beggars is outweighed by the (non-moral, aesthetic) goodness 
of preserving an important work of art). For all that Overriding says is that some 
moral oughts are all-things-considered oughts. Before moving on, let me note that 
Overriding is also consistent with different theoretical accounts of the way in which 
moral oughts are normative.  
 The third platitude concerns the way in which we moralize:  
 
 Moral Discussion 
When we moralize we exhibit a “disposition to persist in arguing, to continue giving 
reasons, to refuse to accept that convergence is unavailable, to be disappointed when 
argument runs out.”
355
  
                                            
354 McNaughton (1988: 114); Parfit (2012 Vol1: 146).  
355 Lillehammer (2004: 100); also see Kalderon (2005: Chapter 1); Brink (1986: 
23). Lillehammer infers from this that we have “prima facie evidence for a 
conception of moral thought on which satisfaction of the convergence claim 
constitutes part of what it is for moral judgments to be true”, where is ‘converge 
claim’ is his version of the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim and states that 
moral discourse couldn’t be moral discourse if we don’t connect it to the 
convergence of all rational beings on the matters (cf. the inter-subjectivity option 
from §3.3).   
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Consider Abe and Bert. They are arguing over the wrongness or otherwise of 
stealing. It is platitudinously true that—unless they get tired, unless some other 
(important) things interfere with their exchange of ideas, and unless a stalemate or 
impasse becomes obvious, et cetera—they will tend to continue to argue their 
position. It is also true that, under the same conditions, they will tend to hold their 
ground if no good reason to change their view is forthcoming.356 They also refuse to 
accept that there isn’t a right answer that they will converge on if they talk about the 
issue long enough (assuming, perhaps, sufficient capacity for rational deliberation, 
open-mindedness, and the like).357 Moreover, if it is explained to them that beauty 
may be in the eye of the beholder and that morality might be like that, both will 
protest at this idea.358 Finally, the folk will be disappointed when argument runs out, 
such as when Abe announces that his fundamental moral principle is simply that he 
can do whatever he likes. This third platitude is also consistent with various 
theoretical interpretations of the way in which moral oughts are normative.  
 Fourthly, we can note as a platitude: 
 
 Phenomenology Morality feels objective to us—morality seems to have an 
external, inescapable authority
359
 
 
It is widely known, and has been widely noted, that morality has a distinctive, 
objectivist feel. Moral demands feel to us as if we cannot escape from them—as if 
they are simply laid down on us for us to respond to. Whether there is something 
that corresponds to this feeling remains to be seen, of course. It also remains to be 
seen whether taking this platitude on board requires postulating an account of moral 
oughts according to which they equate to rational oughts, or whether perhaps a rule 
or imperatival conception of moral oughts suffices. But that this feeling exists is 
beyond question.  
                                            
356 Enoch (2011a: 9).  
357 Smith (1994).  
358 Bloomfield (2007: vii).  
359 Kirchin (2003); Horgan and Timmons (2005, 2008a, 2008b); Mandelbaum 
(1955); Mackie (1977); Joyce (2009).   
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5.3 The Moral Metaphysical Entailment Claim  
I will now argue that with these four platitudes about the status of morality we get an 
entailment to a particular kind of moral normativity that is stable under various 
mutations of this list of platitudes (that is, the entailment remains in place even when 
we add further—at least contender—platitudes to the list). I first argue, against 
relativists like Harman, that morality’s purported normativity is categorical rather 
than hypothetical (§5.3.1). Recall the following distinction (cf. §2.3.1). (1) morality 
has categorical normative force without this entailing anything about the rationality 
of the agents who recognize this (morality is categorically applicable). (2) morality 
has categorical normative force and this does entail something about the rationality 
of the agents who recognize this—viz., this entails that agents are irrational when 
they ignore morality’s categorical normativity (morality is categorically reason-
giving). Harman’s position is that morality is categorical in neither sense. His 
position is coherent and is inconsistent with my own, and so although he is not my 
most formidable opponent (most metaethicists believe that (1) is true), I should 
argue against him.  
 Next I argue against my most important opponents (§5.3.2). These include 
those naturalist cognitivist realists who agree with me (and disagree with Harman) 
that morality is categorically applicable but disagree with me that morality is 
categorically reason-giving. It is also in this section that I explain why the combined 
results of §5.3.1-2 justifies a Metaphysical Entailment Claim.  
5.3.1  Categorical Moral Normativity   
In my attempt to argue that morality is categorically applicable (rather than merely 
hypothetically applicable, in which case the ascription of moral obligations would be 
sensitive to addressees’ desires and social roles), I start by discussing how Desire-
Independence and then Overriding, Moral Discussion and Phenomenology favour 
the categorical applicability view. I then add various other (at least contender) 
platitudes of and thought-experiments about moral discourse to the picture and show 
that the commitment to the categorical applicability of morality’s normativity 
remains in place.
360
  
                                            
360 I say (at least) ‘contender’ platitudes as it is not entirely clear whether these 
claims are in fact platitudes, as will be explained shortly.   
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 The thesis that morality is categorically applicable provides a clear fit with 
Desire-Independence:  
 
Desire-Independence 
If an agent morally ought to φ, then that agent morally ought to φ regardless of 
whether she feels like φ-ing (at the time) and regardless of whether φ-ing would 
further any of her goals even if she thought about φ-ing for a long time   
 
Suppose Desire-Independence is true. Suppose, that is, that if an agent morally 
ought to φ, then that agent morally ought to φ regardless of whether she feels like φ-
ing (at the time) and regardless of whether φ-ing would further any of her goals even 
if she thought about φ-ing for a long time. We might conjecture that this is so 
because moral oughts are categorically applicable. After all, what it means for an 
ought to be categorically applicable is for that ought to constrain or suggest an 
action independently of whether the agent that may perform the action desires to 
perform it or can be gotten to desire to perform it by being shown that the action 
accords with her ends or desires.
361
 So saying that morality’s normativity is 
categorically applicable explains Desire-Independence very nicely.  
 Next consider:  
 
Overriding  
Sometimes if an agent morally ought to φ then that is simply what she ought to do   
 
I surmise that saying that morality’s oughts are categorically applicable and very 
robust explains this datum. For if morality’s normativity isn’t categorically 
applicable then agents can wiggle around their desires and in so doing escape their 
moral obligation. But if agents can escape their moral obligation in this way then 
Overriding can’t be true. Now of course, if morality’s normativity doesn’t also at 
least sometimes override other kinds of normativity by being the most robust kind of 
normativity then Overriding will be false. So in accounting for this platitude we 
have to make this further assumption as well. However, this doesn’t mean that it 
isn’t necessary in accounting for Overriding that morality’s normativity is 
categorically applicable. It is just not necessary and sufficient.  
  Now consider Moral Discussion:  
 
                                            
361 Wallace (MS: 5).  
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 Moral Discussion 
When we moralize we exhibit a “disposition to persist in arguing, to continue giving 
reasons, to refuse to accept that convergence is unavailable, to be disappointed when 
argument runs out”  
 
Suppose it is not true that moral oughts are categorically applicable (i.e., suppose 
that it is not true that moral oughts apply to everyone regardless of their desires), and 
suppose we all know that. Had this scenario been actual then we would expect to 
have observed that people stopped arguing for their moral beliefs a long time ago. 
After all, if you can escape a moral judgment from applying to you by changing 
your desires then a disposition to persist in arguing and to refuse to accept that 
convergence on the issue is unavailable is futile and wastes energy. In that case, all 
one’s interlocutor has to do to legitimately convince you that what he does isn’t 
wrong is show that he desires to perform that action (and perhaps that he cannot be 
gotten to desire otherwise). Continuing to browbeat him with moral reasoning is a 
waste of energy. But, we in fact do have this disposition to continue to argue, and 
we certainly think that it isn’t legitimate in moral discussions to cite outlandish and 
idiosyncratic desires. So it seems that moral oughts apply categorically. 
 Finally consider:   
 
 Phenomenology Morality feels objective to us—morality seems to have an 
external, inescapable authority 
 
The thesis that morality’s normativity is categorically applicable also explains why 
Phenomenology is platitudinously true. Often what we ought to do depends on our 
desires. If I desire a chocolate ice cream on a hot summer’s day then what I ought to 
do is go to the shop and buy a chocolate ice cream. The authority of this practical 
ought is neither external nor inescapable. But with morality what we ought to do 
bears no such connection to our desires. The authority of moral oughts is external, 
or, precisely, they are categorically applicable. Now in order to explain 
Phenomenology we also have to assume that morality is robustly normative—
perhaps by being rationally authoritative—but that doesn’t mean that morality’s 
categorical applicability isn’t necessary. It is—it just not necessary and sufficient.  
Overall then, the idea that morality is categorically applicable provides an 
extremely nice fit with each of the four platitudes that I mentioned. I will now argue 
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that this remains the case even if we wield in (alleged) data from ordinary moral 
thought and talk that deny these platitudes.  
Consider this from Harman:  
 
My moral relativism is a soberly logical thesis—a thesis about logical form … We 
make inner judgments about a person only if we suppose that he is capable of being 
motivated by the relevant moral considerations362 
 
Harman denies Desire-Independence on account of the ‘logic’ inherent to moral 
discourse: ascriptions of wrongness, obligations and the like (‘inner judgments’) 
only make sense against the backdrop of knowledge that the person one is ascribing 
thin moral notions to can be moved by these ascriptions. Just as it makes no sense to 
say that a boat morally ought not to steal (because boats cannot be moved by the 
relevant considerations), it makes no sense to say that a psychopath or another 
character we know cannot be moved by moral considerations morally ought not to 
steal. Whether one morally ought to do something depends on what one desires or 
perhaps on what one can be gotten to desire under ideal circumstances of reflection. 
This would get us: 
 
Desire-Dependence 
It is not the case that if an agent morally ought to φ, then that agent morally ought to 
φ regardless of whether she feels like φ-ing (at the time) and regardless of whether 
φ-ing would further any of her goals even if she thought about φ-ing for a long time   
 
The question is, does this threaten our conclusion from before that morality’s 
normativity is categorically applicable? It doesn’t. First, there is the general 
countervailing consideration that 
 
The many critical howls that greeted [Harman’s] claim are evidence that [Desire-
Independence] was regarded by his audience as a conceptual truth
363
  
 
Given this consideration it seems safe to assume that Harman is simply wrong to 
deny morality’s normativity categorical applicability.  
                                            
362 Harman (1975: 3-4), where “inner judgments include judgments in which we 
say that someone should or ought to have done something or that someone was right 
or wrong to have done something” (p5); also see Shafer-Landau (2005: 118n4).  
363 Shafer-Landau (2005: 118n4).  
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 I won’t however exclusively rely on this. What I will rely on is a version of 
Joyce’s Jack the Ripper thought-experiment as discussed in §2.3.1 (suitably altered 
to avoid the problems with Joyce’s original case discussed there).  
 But let me first explain the dialectic. I have just argued that there is a fair 
number of platitudes that support the view that morality’s oughts are categorically 
applicable. But there is also countervailing evidence (Harman’s Desire-
Dependence). My argument that this doesn’t jeopardize my claim that morality’s 
normativity is categorically applicable has two prongs. First, there is evidence that 
Harman’s view isn’t true, let alone platitudinously true (see the quote above). From 
this it would follow that we cannot use Desire-Dependence as a platitude, and 
therefore that we cannot add it to my original list of platitudes to see whether this 
results in the view that morality’s normativity isn’t categorically applicable. But I 
also said that I won’t rely exclusively on this idea. So here is a second, additional 
response. There are various thought-experiments that also entail that Desire-
Dependence isn’t (platitudinously) true. But that’s not because the Jack the Ripper 
cases that I will mention are themselves platitudes. They aren’t; they are thought-
experiments with which philosophers can argue that certain theses, including a thesis 
like Desire-Dependence, are false. With Desire-Dependence down as false, it can no 
longer be used as a platitude that problematizes my argument so far, and I can 
conclude that the remaining platitudes about morality entail that its purported 
normativity is categorically applicable.  
 Consider, then, the following as a thought-experiment:   
 
Jack the Ripper-Deliberation Jack the Ripper can ‘realize’ that killing is 
wrong (i.e., fully believe that killing is 
wrong, have epistemic access to that belief, 
know that there are no epistemic defeaters 
around, etc.) and yet be without error if he 
ignores the wrongness of stealing
364
   
 
What is our intuition about Jack the Ripper-Deliberation? Our intuition is that Jack 
the Ripper has made a mistake. My claim is that this intuition is best explained on 
the basis of the claim that morality is categorically applicable. After all, had 
morality been hypothetically applicable then Jack may be without error if he ignores 
                                            
364 Jack the Ripper is one of the world’s most famous serial killers. I what follows I 
assume that Jack desires to kill for pleasure, and that he doesn’t desire not to kill.  
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the wrongness of stealing. For then the normativity of the wrongness of stealing 
would be tied to some of Jack’s desires, and we know that his desires favour killing 
over not-killing (or at least so we can assume for the sake of argument). Therefore, 
Harman is wrong when he says that inner moral judgments (involving deontic moral 
terms) can only be sensibly applied to agents with whom we have some kind of 
agreement in desires. Jack the Ripper-Deliberation shows that we do make inner 
judgments about him. Indeed, even when we learn that he is a psychopath—even 
when we learn that he was so deprived that he couldn’t possibly be gotten to be 
motivated by the ‘relevant moral considerations’.
365
 Of course, the question of the 
nature of the mistake is still wide open. We haven’t yet decided whether Jack 
ignored a rule or whether he was also irrational. No matter. For all we intended to do 
here is establish that morality’s normativity is categorically applicable.   
 We can describe a similar case that goes not in terms of making a mistake 
but in terms of feeling guilt:  
 
Jack the Ripper-Guilt Jack the Ripper can ‘realize’ that killing is wrong 
(i.e., ‘really’ believe it, have epistemic access to 
that belief, know that there are no epistemic 
defeaters around etc.) and yet proceed to kill (or 
decide or settle on killing) without feeling or 
indeed having to feel guilt  
 
My reasoning here is analogous to my reasoning in the Jack the Ripper-Deliberation 
case. First, our intuition is that Jack the Ripper should feel guilt. Second, we explain 
this on the basis of the view that morality is categorically applicable. After all, had it 
been part of the ‘logic’ of inner moral judgments that they only apply to agents who 
share a similar motivational structure with us, then it wouldn’t be the case that Jack 
ought to feel (moral) guilt for what he did (recall our assumption that he has 
fundamentally different desires from us). He could just cite his different desires and 
that’d be that. But we do believe that Jack ought to feel guilt. So morality’s 
normativity must be categorically applicable.  
In addition to Jack the Ripper-Deliberation and Jack the Ripper-Guilt we can 
consider: 
 
                                            
365 Wallace (MS: 5) writes that “it is natural to put the point in the language of 
discretion, saying that [Jack doesn’t] have the … liberty to reject the claims of 
[morality].”  
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Jack the Ripper-Critique Jack the Ripper can be rightly criticized for 
killing
366
  
 
Some philosophers believe that any contender moral system that fails to make sense 
of any kind of criticizability whatsoever fails to be a moral system.367 I argue that 
they are right. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we should start with our 
intuition, which is that our critique of Jack the Ripper is justified. Second, we 
explain this on the basis of the view that morality is categorically applicable. After 
all, had it been part of the ‘logic’ of moral judgments that they only apply to agents 
who share a similar motivational structure with us, then it would not be the case that 
we can legitimately critique Jack for what he did. For recall our assumption that he 
has fundamentally different desires from us; Jack can cite those desires, and 
therewith escape our moral criticism. But we believe that we can legitimately 
critique him. So morality’s normativity must be categorically applicable. 
 Each of the Jack the Ripper cases that I have just discussed supports the view 
that Desire-Dependence can’t be true. Indeed, it is only categorically applicable 
moral normativity and the desire-independence of moral oughts that can explain 
these thought-experiments. This suggests that Desire-Dependence is false, and 
therefore that the four platitudes we discussed earlier support the view that 
morality’s normativity is categorically applicable.368  
5.3.2  Categorical Moral Normativity in the Rationality-Involving Sense 
So morality’s normativity is categorically rather than hypothetically applicable. But 
recall that this is consistent with various interpretations of the nature of morality’s 
normativity. Moral oughts can either be normative in virtue of being or entailing 
oughts of rationality or else in virtue of being or entailing motivation, rules, 
attitudes, or by being expressible by imperatives. What I will now argue is that 
morality’s purported normativity must be understood in terms of rational oughts—
moral oughts equate to reasons that are normative reasons in the standard sense of 
                                            
366 Cf. Jackson and Pettit (1995: 29).  
367  Copp (2007: 2-6); Sinnott-Armstrong (2008: 92). 
368 One explanatory hypothesis for why Harman nevertheless undermines Desire-
Independence in favour of Desire-Dependence is that he believed that the only 
reasons we have are desire-based reasons (Harman 1975: 9), and he might have 
realized, before Mackie’s (1977) and Joyce’s (2001), that without a rejection of 
Desire-Independence this would entail an error theory of ordinary moral discourse.  
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reasons of practical rationality, or they equate to rational requirements (or perhaps a 
combination of these). 
  I will present an argument for this that takes the form of a dilemma for 
different interpretations of my Jack the Ripper cases. The Jack the Ripper cases, 
recall, are not platitudes. They are philosophical thought-experiments designed to 
check the soundness of my argument that the best interpretation of the actual 
platitudes—which admit of exceptions, various interpretations and can be denied on 
theoretical grounds—is that they entail that morality’s purported normativity is 
categorically applicable as well as normative in the rationality-involving way. 
Earlier I argued that the Jack the Ripper cases show that the various platitudes about 
the normativity of morality unequivocally support the view that morality’s purported 
normativity is categorically applicable. Now I will argue that the same thought 
experiments also show that morality cannot be normative without being normative 
in virtue of being related to rationality. This methodology is in line with the idea that 
a metaphysical entailment claim depends on what interpretation of morality’s 
purported normativity provides the best fit with the data that we have—including 
both platitudes and thought-experiments.  
Here, then, is the dilemma: 
 
Dilemma  
We think that what Jack the Ripper did was wrong and that he made a 
mistake/should feel guilt/can rightly be criticized for his behaviour. This is so either 
because he culpably ignored whatever it is that morally speaks against killing 
without this entailing that his mistake is a rational mistake or because in making a 
moral mistake he also necessarily made a rational mistake.  
 
On the first horn of Dilemma, the opponent of error theory must argue that moral 
normativity without rationality can explain our intuitions about the Jack the Ripper 
cases (these will be intuitions that come in addition to the ones we’ve already 
considered). I argue that this impossible, so that the second horn must be embraced. 
But on the second horn of the dilemma, the opponent of error theory must accept my 
claim that moral oughts are rational oughts.  
 Let’s consider the case that can be made for the first horn of the dilemma. 
Recall our four options for conceiving of morality’s normativity without rationality: 
 
Rule-Involving Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of being 
rules, and rules are normative in virtue of 
distinguishing between what is correct and 
incorrect or what is allowed and disallowed  
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Motivational Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of entailing 
actual or possible motivation, such that when a 
putative ought, known by an agent, doesn’t actually 
or possibly motivate, it fails to be an ought  
 
Attitudinal Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of involving 
attitudes of approval or disapproval to our own or 
other people’s actions. Attitudes of approval or 
disapproval are often motivationally efficacious, 
but this feature isn’t what guarantees the relevant 
oughts’ normativity (that would cause the 
attitudinal account to collapse into the motivational 
account). Instead, oughts are normative if they 
involve attitudes because the attitudes are attitudes 
of approval and disapproval, which are themselves 
normative notions  
 
Imperatival Oughts Moral oughts are normative in virtue of being 
commands, and commands are normative because 
they are stated in the imperatival mood 
 
 
Rule-Involving Oughts. Can we explain what we want to explain about the 
Jack the Ripper cases when we conceive of morality’s normativity as consisting of 
rules? Let’s consider the case for this claim.  
Start by taking a close look at the rules of chess. In chess it is a rule that you 
can only castle if you haven’t yet moved your king. So, if you want to play chess, 
you shouldn’t ‘castle’ after you’ve moved your king. But, of course, you could 
decide to play schmess and ‘schcastle’ whenever you want, and thus perform the 
move that is characteristic of castling after having moved your king.369 So we have 
at least the following choice: playing chess and playing schmess. Surely each game 
is normative in the sense that each games contains rules that tell potential players 
which moves are and are not allowed in the game. However, the truth of the claim 
that it is chess rather than schmesss that one should play to begin with depends on 
your choice or desire. You should play chess if you want to play chess and you 
should play schmess if you want to play schmess. What therefore explains the 
normativity of following the rules of chess is a desire to play chess rather than 
schmess. It is a rule in chess that you can castle only when you haven’t moved your 
king yet, but this rule has normative force over you because and only because you 
desire to play chess.  
                                            
369 Enoch (2011b).  
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I am willing, at least arguendo, to accept that the normativity of the ‘castle’-
rule can be fully reduced to the relation that obtains between my desire to play chess 
and the truth of the claim that you can only play chess when you adhere to the rule 
that you can’t castle after you’ve moved your king.370 This probably also gets us a 
naturalistically respectable account of the truth of the claim that you ought not to 
castle when you’ve already moved your king. So we have a naturalistically 
respectable explanation of the ought claim that you should not castle if you’ve 
already moved your king (if you want to play chess). So far so good.  
The question that concerns us here though is whether we can transpose this 
account of normativity as it pertains to the rules of chess to the normativity of 
morality. For what we want to have explained is our intuition that Jack the Ripper 
made a mistake when he decides to kill his victims and proceeds to do it (and that he 
should feel guilt and that we can rightfully criticize his behaviour). But here we find 
the problem for the opponent of error theory wishing to argue that it is not essential 
to moral discourse that moral oughts are rational oughts; and that, in particular, 
moral oughts can be understood as involving rules only. For let’s transpose the rule-
conception of the oughts of chess to the oughts of morality. So let’s assume that we 
can have a naturalistically respectable explanation of the ought claim that Jack ought 
not to kill (if he wants to play the ‘moral game’—i.e., if he desires to heed to 
morality’s demands). This is all well as far as it goes, but we should note that the 
addition of the phrase ‘if he wants to play the moral game’ entails a rejection of our 
earlier established claim that morality’s normativity is categorically applicable. 
After all, on this conception of the oughts of morality, if Jack doesn’t want to play 
the moral game then he is free to kill, just like someone not wishing to play the 
chess game could play schmess instead and castle after having moved his king. But 
we think that morality’s normativity is categorically applicable, and hence that this 
kind of weaselling with one’s desires to escape moral obligations isn’t allowed. The 
problem is that the rule conception of oughts, as I argued earlier, depends on the 
obtaining of certain desires but that for morality’s oughts, this can’t be true. So we 
can’t use the rule-conception if we want to make sense of our intuition about the 
kind of mistake that Jack the Ripper makes.  
                                            
370 Olson (2009a, 2009b, MS); cf. Fitzpatrick (2008: 179-83).  
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The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for our intuitions that Jack should feel 
guilt and that our critique of him is legitimate. For if we accept the rule-conception 
interpretation of the normativity of morality, thus including the fact that it is desire-
based then we get the result that Jack doesn’t have to feel guilt for stealing when he 
forms a desire not to play the moral game. Perhaps Jack want to play the schmoral 
game, according to which killing is at least sometimes perfectly permissible if one 
wants to get pleasure from it, as is the case for Jack. But our intuitions are that Jack 
does have to feel guilt, and that it is not up to him to choose the moral over the 
schmoral game. So the rule-conception account, although it might work for the 
oughts of chess, cannot be used for the oughts of morality.  
And the same again holds for Jack the Ripper-Critique. If we accept the rule-
conception interpretation of morality’s normativity then we get the result that we 
cannot rightfully criticize Jack’s behaviour. For Jack, we assume, simply desires to 
kill for pleasure, in which case he can decide to play the schmoral rather than the 
moral game. And the rule-conception account of morality’s normativity, relying as it 
does on the obtaining of our addressee’s desires to heed to morality’s demands, 
doesn’t allow us to critique Jack. After all, he plays the schmoral game because he 
desires to do that, and we play the moral game because we desire to do that. But we 
most adamantly think that Jack cannot so decide. So the rule-conception account of 
morality’s normativity is inadequate. It can only work if we assume that morality’s 
normativity isn’t categorically applicable—but we cannot assume that.  
My opponents could object to this as follows. They could argue that Jack’s 
mistake is a contingent matter. It is not simply and straightforwardly in virtue of 
being irrational that Jack wrongly kills. Instead it is in virtue of very reliable, but 
contingent, connections with Jack’s concerns and that of this society and the content 
of the moral code that he makes a mistake in killing.371 This objection will take 
some time to explain, and although I take it very seriously, I will answer it only in 
§5.4 below. So with this objection temporarily out of sight, I conclude that the rule-
conception of morality’s normativity fails to capture what is distinctive about the 
way in which morality is normative.  
Motivational Oughts. Motivational oughts fare no better. According to the 
motivational conception of the normativity of a moral ought, moral oughts are 
                                            
371 Brink (1986); Copp (1995, 2007).  
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normative in virtue of entailing actual or possible motivation, such that when a 
putative ought, known by an agent, doesn’t actually or possibly motivate it fails to 
be an ought. The problem with the motivational conception of normativity too lies 
with its ability to account for the categorical applicability of morality’s normativity. 
For on the motivational conception of normativity, something can be normative if 
and only if it can motivate. But that precisely goes against the view that the 
normativity of morality applies to all of use regardless of what we desire (assuming, 
as is standard in current metaethical literature, that desires are motivationally 
efficacious mental states). Therefore, Motivational Oughts should be put aside.   
Attitudinal Oughts. Attitudinal oughts do seem to be consistent with 
categoricity. For according to the attitudinal conception of normativity, an action is 
normative in virtue of being the object of an attitude of approval or disapproval. 
This attitude can be the attitude of one person directed at another person and her 
(possible) actions. I can express disapproval of you not giving to famine relief, and 
then for the true ought claim that you should give to famine relief to be normative it 
doesn’t matter what you desire.  
I will now argue that in fact this doesn’t hold. Consider, once more, Jack the 
Ripper-Deliberation:  
 
Jack the Ripper-Deliberation Jack the Ripper can ‘realize’ that killing is 
wrong (i.e., ‘really’ believe it, have 
epistemic access to that belief, know that 
there are no epistemic defeaters around, 
etc.) and yet be without error if he ignores 
the wrongness of stealing  
 
The question we must ask is this: is Attitudinal Oughts consistent with Jack the 
Ripper-Deliberation and our result from the previous sub-section that morality’s 
normativity is categorically applicable? The answer is ‘no’. For if all it takes for 
moral oughts to be normative is to consist of possible actions that are the object of 
attitudes of approval and disapproval then it will be legitimate for Jack to ask why 
he should play the moral rather than the schmoral game. Most people, let us assume, 
think that killing is not permissible, whereas Jack thinks that it is. Why is it that Jack 
has to take the fact that most people have a different opinion from him into account 
in deciding what to do and think? Why isn’t it rather the case that the other people 
need to take the fact that Jack thinks that killing is permissible into account in 
deciding what to do and think? Given the symmetry here and the lack of further 
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resources on the part of the friend of attitudinal oughts, we have no reason to go 
either way on this matter. But then we can’t explain our intuition that it is Jack who 
has to heed to our attitudes rather than the other way around. Again this account of 
the way in which moral oughts are normative can’t respect morality’s categorical 
applicability.  
Advocates of the attitudinal account of normativity could object to this that 
we should idealize on information and reasoning in defining the relevant attitudes. 
They could argue that is not just the case that the attitudes that people as a matter of 
contingent fact happen to hold determine what is morally right and wrong. Instead, it 
is the rationality of these attitudes that determines which actions are right and 
wrong; viz., those actions that are the object of attitudes that it is rational to hold. 
But if we insist on rationality to this extent then what is doing the philosophical 
work in the attitudinal account is rationality, not the attitudes. Focussing on 
rationality to this extent vindicates the thesis of this chapter; viz., that you can’t have 
moral normativity in the absence of (categorically applicable) rational constraints. 
So this objection, if anything, plays into my hands.  
Imperatival Oughts. Imperatival oughts also seem to be consistent with the 
categorical applicability of morality’s oughts. If oughts can be normative solely in 
virtue of being expressible by linguistic utterances in the imperatival mood, then, on 
the obviously true assumption that we can express claims in the imperatival mood 
without regard for desires, attitudinal oughts are categorically applicable.  
But I want to challenge the idea that we can explain our intuition that Jack 
ought to play the moral rather than the schmoral game merely on the basis of the 
story that moral oughts are normative in virtue of being expressible in sentences in 
the imperatival mood. If consisting of rules or being the object of attitudes is not 
enough, then being expressible as commands won’t be enough either. For it is 
possible to place next to the demand against killing a demand to kill, or an 
expression of the permissibility of killing. But then, given morality’s categorical 
applicability, how shall we explain Jack’s mistake when he accepts that killing is 
permissible if we can’t appeal to rationality? All we have again is a stalemate 
between on the one hand an imperative to steal and on the other hand an imperative 
to refrain from stealing. But if that is all we have then we can’t explain why Jack 
made the mistake, and not us, when he decides to kill whereas we decide not to kill. 
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But if we can’t explain this intuition then the imperatival conception of morality’s 
normativity won’t work either.  
Now consider the rationality-involving sense of normativity. Why does this 
conception of the normativity of morality fare better? The answer is that the rules of 
rationality are inescapable in a way that merely moral rules (or imperatives, objects 
of attitudes et cetera) aren’t. So suppose that we say that morality is normative in 
virtue of consisting of the rules of rationality. Clearly, the rules of rationality apply 
to all agents regardless of what they desire—the rules of rationality are the rules of 
rationality proper, not of particular loci of rationality such as Jack the Ripper, 
president Obama, or whomever. The key question is whether Jack the Ripper can 
intelligibly ask why he should follow the rules of rationality in the same way as he 
could intelligibly ask whether he should follow the moral rules, whether he should 
care about the attitudes of other people, whether he should care about some 
imperatives but not others, et cetera. This is the key question because if we can say 
that this question cannot be intelligibly asked then conceiving of morality’s 
normativity in the rationality-involving way allows us to explain our intuitions about 
the Jack the Ripper cases.    
The answer is that, indeed, the rules of rationality cannot be intelligibly 
ignored. Consider Joyce’s example of an unwilling captive in Roman times who is 
thrown into the arena and forced to choose between fighting for his life or getting 
killed.372 He is told that he can fight in whatever way he pleases, but that he is not 
allowed to throw sand in his opponent’s eyes. Within no time the unwilling captive 
finds himself in a very bad position and the only way to stay alive is to throw sand in 
his opponent’s eyes. The unwilling captive can legitimately question the rule not to 
throw sand in his opponent’s eyes. He can say ‘so what?’ throw the sand, and save 
his life. In this story, because the alleged rules of gladiatorial combat have almost 
nothing to do with the captive (the only relation between the rules and him is that 
they are forced upon him), the rule not to throw sand can be legitimately ignored.  
This contrasts with cases in which the rules of an activity are much more 
closely tied to the agent. Take, indeed, the rules of rationality as they govern desire 
and belief-formation. In a sense these rules aren’t ‘the agent’s’ either. The agent was 
never consulted about which rules are to be accepted just like the unwilling gladiator 
                                            
372 Joyce (2001: 34-6).  
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was never consulted about which rules of combat are to be accepted. But in another 
good sense of ‘the agent’s’ the rules of rationality are clearly ‘the agent’s’. For 
agents like us necessarily have desires and beliefs, and the requirements that govern 
them cannot be shrugged off in the very same way that the rules of gladiatorial 
combat can be shrugged off (or attitudes, or the rules of a ‘moral’ or ‘schmoral’ 
system, or the fact that a rule can be communicated with a sentence in the 
imperatival mood, et cetera). Agents don’t have to be gladiators—certainly not 
against their will—but agents have no choice but to have beliefs and desires. The 
rules of rationality cannot be legitimately ignored. But we know from our platitudes 
and thought-experiments that moral rules too are such that they can’t be legitimately 
ignored. Therefore, tying moral rules to rational rules allows us to vindicate 
morality’s stringent normativity, at least in principle. And therefore, we should 
understand the way in which moral oughts are normative as involving rational 
oughts. (Unfortunately for realist theories of morality, my argument in the next 
chapter is that there are no rational rules with recognisably moral content).  
 Let’s take stock. The discussion in the previous section has allowed us to 
claim that moral oughts are categorically applicable. The discussion in the present 
section has allowed us to claim that the categorical oughts of morality are normative 
in virtue of a connection with rationality. Taken together, this allows us to formulate 
the Metaphysical Entailment Argument:  
 
 Metaphysical Entailment Argument 
Premise One:  There are various claims that are contenders for 
platitudinous truth, including Desire-Independence, 
Overriding, Moral Discussion, Moral Motivation and 
perhaps Desire-Dependence.  
Premise Two: The best interpretation of the state of affairs described in 
Premise One is that morality has to be categorically 
normative in the rationality involving way. 
Premise Three:  If Premise Two, then propositions about morality 
metaphysically entail propositions about categorical moral 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense even though 
this is not built into the (application conditions of) moral 
concepts that we use to express these propositions.  
Conclusion: Therefore, propositions about morality metaphysically 
entail propositions about categorical moral normativity in 
the rationality-involving sense even though this is not built 
into the (application conditions of) moral concepts that we 
use to express these propositions. [From Premise One, 
Premise Two, Premise Three] 
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The argument is clearly valid. Premise One was our subject in §5.2 and Premise 
Two was our subject in §5.3. So for this argument’s soundness all we need is the 
truth of Premise Three. I include Premise Three and indeed the Metaphysical 
Entailment Argument because I initially, in Chapter 3, explained that metaphysical 
entailment relations are in the first instance relations between propositions. But all 
that Premise Three really is is another way of expressing Premise Two. So if the 
move from Premise One and Premise Two to Conclusion works then adding Premise 
Three to it to accommodate earlier terms of discussion will work as well.  
 Hence my conclusion. It is essential to moral discourse as we presently have 
it that there exists categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense. 
Unless, that is, the objections to the extent that we can in fact do with a less 
demanding, non-rationality-involving account of morality’s normativity I bracketed 
earlier and will now discuss work. But, as I will now argue, they don’t work.  
5.4  Doing With Less 
My conclusion so far is that it is essential to moral discourse that there exists 
categorical normativity in the rationality-involving sense, as this is the only way to 
explain our intuitions about the Jack the Ripper cases and other platitudinously true 
claims about moral discourse. I’ve argued for this conclusion without taking into 
account the content of morality—I only talked about platitudes and thought-
experiments about the status and function of morality. This, it could be argued, 
amounts to begging the question against those naturalists who believe that by taking 
morality’s content into account they can explain these aspects of moral discourse 
without thereby making claims about a necessary relation between rationality and 
morality. It is this objection that I will now engage with.  
Consider: 
 
Content  
[Human maintenance] and flourishing probably consist in necessary conditions for 
survival, other needs associated with basic well-being, wants of various sorts, and 
distinctively human capacities. People, actions, policies, states of affairs, etc. will 
bear good-making moral properties just insofar as they contribute to the satisfaction 
of these needs, wants and capacities … [and] there is reason to think that moral facts 
will at least typically provide agents with reasons for action. Everyone has reason to 
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promote his own well-being, and everyone has reason to promote the well-being of 
others at least to the extent that his own well-being is tied up with theirs
373
 
 
The argumentative strategy of my opponent here is to underplay on the hand the 
practical role that moral facts can reasonably be expected to play and to emphasize 
on the other hand the practical role that these facts can play.
374
 In particular, she 
insists that telling a convincing story about how moral demands are closely tied to 
things that are very important to all of us can get her a convincing explanation of the 
Jack the Ripper intuitions. And this holds, she argues, even though Jack the Ripper 
is constitutionally incapable of changing in ways that bring his desires more in line 
with the important things in life. What is important in a human life? Content gives 
the example of human flourishing. Given that we know that human beings are such 
that they flourish only if they give due consideration to their own and other people’s 
well-being, form friendships (and perhaps participate in politics, engage in life-long 
learning, have satisfactory jobs, et cetera), it makes sense to say that there is reason 
of rationality for everyone like us to engage in these activities—at least in the vast 
majority of cases and in most circumstances. In particular, it is not necessary, claims 
this kind of naturalist, to suppose that someone like Jack the Ripper can be shown to 
be irrational every time he acts immorally. What is important is that we can explain 
the reliable, but contingent, connection between the content of morality and its 
normativity (and motivational force). 
The fact that the content-naturalist is happy with a reliable but contingent 
connection between morality and its normative force is highly problematic. Take the 
case of Jack the Ripper considering causing an innocent child to undergo a 
prolonged and excruciatingly painful death. Again, the kind of naturalist I’m 
discussing would argue that Jack always makes a mistake when he kills, namely a 
moral one, but that there are cases, perhaps this one, where such a mistake lacks 
rational authority. The question is whether this gets the naturalist an account of our 
intuitions about the nature of Jack’s mistake that is at least roughly equally good as 
that of the error theorist. This is the relevant question because if it does then my 
error theory becomes rationally arbitrary.  
                                            
373 Brink (1984: 122); also see Brink (1986); Railton (1986, 1989: 154); Copp 
(1995, 2007); Finlay (2011: 546-7). 
374 Sturgeon (2006: 110). The ‘practical role’ of moral facts concerns both their 
normativity and their motivational force.  
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The  answer, though, is that it doesn’t. For our intuitions about the Jack the 
Ripper cases are that, most emphatically, Jack makes an important mistake when he 
sets out to kill innocent children. Admittedly, content naturalism can capture a lot, 
and can explain a lot, about this intuition. It is probably safe to assume that many 
agents, even those relevantly similar to Jack, will be swayed by the arguments of the 
content-naturalist. Moreover, the content naturalism-story provides a lot of depth to 
the explanation of what’s wrong with Jack’s behaviour—indeed, the kind of 
explanatory depth that we expect a successful explanation of what’s wrong with 
Jack’s behaviour to provide. The explanatory depth I’m referring to includes 
reflections on the content of the moral rules, the working of society and the nature of 
human flourishing. Finally, the content naturalist does this in an intuitively plausible 
way and with fairly minimal assumptions.  
The problem for the content-naturalist is that the folk will never accept the 
thought that Jack can be acting fully rationally and yet immorally. This was the 
message of §5.3 (and especially §5.3.2), and looking at the content of morality as 
opposed to the way in which it is normative (e.g., by involving rules or by being 
expressible in sentences in the imperatival mood, et cetera) isn’t going to change 
this verdict. The folk won’t accept the thought that Jack can be fully rational when 
he kills and that ‘all’ that is wrong with him is that he is immoral. The folk want 
morality to be more oomphy. They want morality to be much more closely tied to 
what affects Jack’s practical deliberation. The folk will never accept the thought that 
although there are various considerations that affect Jack’s practical deliberation—
such as means-end considerations and considerations pertaining to prudence more 
generally—morality is something that agents can completely ignore, at least on 
certain occasions and in certain circumstances, without being irrational.
375
 True, 
these are quasi-empirical data that stand in need of further empirical corroboration, 
but on the assumption that these data are correct (and it is my quasi-empirical 
proposal that they are), it follows that the content-naturalist cannot explain our 
intuitions about Jack’s behaviour as well as the moral rationalist who thinks that 
immoral behaviour entails irrational behaviour. The objection from Content doesn’t 
work.  
                                            
375 On this point also see Copp (2012: 31-2).  
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Or does it? There is one further objection that we should deal with. Consider 
the thought that the folk will think that Jack the Ripper is not a full-fledged moral 
agent when he behaves in the way he does (killing and stealing at will). And so, the 
thought continues, the folk won’t attach any importance to the kind of 
considerations I have been mustering in this chapter. After all, on this proposal, they 
think that Jack the Ripper falls outside of the scope of moral assessment. Or else 
Jack the Ripper is a sufficiently far out case that the folk are, perhaps on reflection, 
prepared to acknowledge that their intuitions about him might not be reliable.  
Again my argument stands in need of further empirical corroboration. In line 
with my methodology of quasi-empirical metaethical research, I can honestly report 
that in my well-confirmed experience, even the big baddies in history, according to 
the folk, are subject to a robust sort of blame and have made a robust sort of mistake 
that outstrips the kind of blame and mistake that we can associate with a rule- or 
attitude-conception of morality’s normativity (or any of the other, non-rationality 
involving ones). Indeed cases like that of Jack the Ripper come to mind. I will heed 
to the outcomes of proper empirical research and invite my readers to consider 
whether they include these kinds of characters in their moral assessment and what 
they think of them. But it is my own clear intuition that Jack the Ripper falls within 
the sphere of moral assessment. As far as the objection from Content goes, therefore, 
error theory and its commitment to moral rationalism is safe.  
5.5  Conclusion and Preview 
I have argued that error theorists can get a working account of the Non-Negotiable 
Commitment Claim if they take this to be an instance of metaphysical entailment 
between moral propositions and propositions about categorical moral normativity 
understood in the rationality-involving sense. The remainder of the thesis argues that 
there is no categorical moral normativity thus understood, at least not in the actual 
world (Chapter 6). It also argues that objections thus far ignored don’t hurt my error 
theory all that much (Chapter 7) and that a version of revolutionary cognitivism is 
the best response to this version of error theory (Chapter 8).   
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Chapter 6  
Categorical Moral Normativity in the 
Rationality-Involving Sense 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that folk moral discourse carries a non-negotiable 
commitment to categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense. 
Categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense is the kind of 
normativity that moral facts would have to possess to count as moral facts.  
One way to make this idea more precise is to consider the nature of practical 
rationality. Facts that exhibit categorical normativity in the rationality-involving 
sense must be taken appropriately into account in an agent’s practical deliberation, 
irrespective of what the agent already desires to do or what his social roles happen to 
be. For practical reasoning is the type of activity that is sensitive to facts that are 
normative in the rationality-involving sense.
376
 Agents who let the specific 
normative weight of facts with categorical normativity in the rationality-involving 
sense affect their practical deliberation to the required degree are taking those facts 
appropriately into account in deciding what to do. If fact F counts in favour of φ-ing 
to degree d then agents who factor the fact that fact F counts in favour of φ-ing to 
degree d into their deliberations about what to do are deliberating correctly. 
Contrastingly, agents who don’t do this are not deliberating correctly.377 The non-
                                            
376 See Copp (2007: 270); Gibbard (1990: 61-80); Shafer-Landau (2003: 165); 
Jackson and Pettit (1995: 29).  
377 This is a somewhat simplified picture. For instance, deliberation isn’t always 
necessary for successfully taking the normative weights of various facts into 
account. People might automatically be truthful without giving truthfulness any 
thought and this action might nevertheless be fully appropriate and morally laudable, 
especially when the relevant norms have been internalized by the agent (Copp 2010: 
152). What is essential to morality is that agents take the normativity of moral 
considerations appropriately into consideration in thinking about what to do, think, 
and feel; whether they manage to do that by conscious deliberation or through 
earlier internalization of norms is a bit of a moot point.  
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negotiable commitment of moral discourse is to the truth of the thesis that there exist 
facts that are normative in this way and have recognizable moral content.  
In arguing for this version of the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim I am in 
broad agreement with existing moral error theories such as Joyce’s and Olson’s. As 
Copp puts it:  
 
if morality has … authoritative normativity, its having this property consists in the 
obtaining of the relevant specified relation between it and the norms of rationality
378
  
 
But where I parted from Joyce and Olson is that I left it completely open whether or 
not normativity in the rationality-involving sense can be analysed without 
remainder, on the level of concepts or properties, in terms of reasons—a proposal 
which Joyce and Olson accept.
379
 But normativity in the rationality-involving sense 
can involve more than reasons or perhaps doesn’t involve reasons at all.380 Indeed I 
will use the idea that the normativity of morality may also consist in rational 
requirements, which are also normative in the rationality-involving sense:  
 
Rational Requirements Requirements that govern the holding of various 
combinations of mental states, such as desires and 
beliefs, in abstraction from the question of whether 
we have reasons to have those attitudes in the first 
place
381
  
 
It is one of my main goals in this chapter to argue that denying that normativity in 
the rationality-involving sense must be analysed without remainder, on the level of 
concepts or properties, in terms of reasons allows the error theorist to defend a more 
plausible version of error theory than has thus far believed to be possible.  
                                            
378Copp (2007: 271).   
379 Or to be more precise, Joyce thinks that the normativity of morality must be 
analysed in terms of reasons (see §2.3.1 of this thesis) and Olson’s currently 
published work commits him to it (although in his MS he writes that he now favours 
the view that the culprit of morality is to do with irreducible favouring-relations—
see §2.4 of this thesis). For the view that normative claims are or involve claims 
about reasons see Scanlon (1998); Raz (1999).  
380 In what follows I will sometimes, when context allows me to, omit the 
qualification ‘in the rationality-involving sense’ to avoid endless repetition. 
381 Broome (1999). Also see Kolodny (2005); Parfit (2012: Vol. I,  p36); 
Southwood (2008: 20); Brunero (2010: 31-2).   
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. I start by arguing that rational 
requirements exist because they are naturalistically respectable (§6.2). I then argue 
that rational requirements govern all sorts of (combinations) of desires and beliefs. 
For example, suppose Abe has an intrinsic desire to smoke, the belief that the only 
way to smoke is to buy a new pack of cigarettes in this very shop, but that Abe 
doesn’t have the instrumental desire to buy a new pack of cigarettes in that shop. In 
that case Abe is flouting the following rational requirement (where RR is to be read 
as ‘rationality requires that’)382: 
 
Instrumental Principle (IP)* RR (you take the means to your ends)
383
 
 
Indeed, I argue that the rational requirements that exist vindicate our platitudinously 
true beliefs about what is prudentially and epistemically rational or irrational (§6.3). 
This means that my account of normativity in the rationality-involving sense is 
independently plausible. Many things for which we want to have a vindicatory 
explanation—including our belief that the normative claim that Abe ought to buy a 
new pack of cigarettes is true—can be vindicated without violating a plausible 
metaphysical naturalism. For the vindicatory explanation invokes rational 
requirements like IP* and these can be grounded in a naturalistic metaphysic, as 
argued in §6.2.  
This also means that I accept that there exists categorical normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense. For instance, the Instrumental Principle is categorically 
normative in the rationality-involving sense as it is inescapably authoritative for 
agents with the capacity for rational agency regardless of whether or not they desire 
                                            
382 Smith (e.g., 2007) prefers ‘reason requires that’. Kolodny (2008: 439) claims 
that there is a difference between the locutions ‘reason requires that’ and ‘rationality 
requires that’. Southwood (2008: 20) only talks about requirements: the 
requirements of practical reason tell us how we ought to act, the requirements of 
theoretical reason tell us how we ought to believe, and the requirements of practical 
rationality tell us how we ought to reason. I will not take sides on the issue of which 
of these philosophers has latched on a better nomenclature and simply note that 
‘rationality requires that’ I intend to refer to the kind of normativity that the rational 
requirements exhibit.   
383 I call this IP* because this is a rough formulation of the principle; it will be 
made more precise later in the chapter.  
- 162 - 
to abide by it.
384
 My account is committed to the truth of the claim that there are 
desires that agents rationally ought to have and where the ‘ought’ has categorical 
force. However, these oughts are also relative or sensitive to which other desires and 
beliefs the agent already has. Agents ought to desire to buy a new pack of cigarettes 
if they believe that buying a new pack of cigarettes is the only, or the best, way to 
satisfy their non-instrumental desire to smoke and if they have a non-instrumental 
desire to smoke.  
In fact my picture of normativity in the rationality-involving sense is a bit 
more complicated than this. I will argue that in addition to true categorical ought 
claims that tell agents to adopt certain instrumental desires or beliefs in light of other 
desires and beliefs they already have (the Abe case), there are also some intrinsic 
desires and beliefs that agents ought to have where the ‘ought’ has categorical force 
and where this claim isn’t made true by reference to other attitudes. This includes 
the intrinsic desire to believe what one has sufficient evidence to believe. 
Unfortunately for the moral success theorist, there are no rational requirements that 
oblige us to adopt intrinsic or instrumental desires with recognizable moral content 
(§6.4). And looking at moral reasons rather than rational requirements won’t bring 
solace either (§6.5). Therefore, we should be local moral error theorists, believing 
that although whole rafts of normative claims in the rationality-involving sense are 
true, a subset of those claims—those that involve morality—are never true. This 
allows error theorists to avoid the Formulation Dilemma from §1.4: we can have a 
local moral error theory.  
I call the view that there are lots of rational requirements, including 
requirements to adopt intrinsic desires with non-moral content, Proceduralism+: 
 
Proceduralism+ Agents with the capacity for rational choice and action are 
bound by rational requirements to have certain desires and 
beliefs, not to have certain other desires and beliefs, and not 
to have certain combinations of desires and beliefs. But it is 
never the case that such agents are bound by rational 
requirements to have or not to have desires with 
recognisably morally relevant content, such as a desire not 
to steal.
385
 
                                            
384 Hampton (1998); Dreier (1997: 96).  
385 To save space I also sometimes write ‘recognisable moral content’ instead of 
‘recognisably morally relevant content’ (even though this is not entirely accurate as 
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The ‘+’ in Proceduralism+ usually indicates that Proceduralism+ accepts that there 
are other, purely procedural norms in addition to the procedural norm which is 
expressed by the Instrumental Principle.
386
 Procedural norms tell agents to adopt 
desires or beliefs by reference to the other desires and beliefs the agent already has. 
Substantive norms tell agents to adopt certain intrinsic desires without reference to 
the other desires and beliefs the agents already have. However, I will use the term 
Proceduralism+ to refer to a view that accepts both procedural norms other than the 
Instrumental Principle and substantive non-moral norms but never substantive moral 
norms. I do not intend to use this name in a proprietary way, however, and 
something like Substantivism- would work equally well (where the ‘-’ would 
indicate that there exist substantive norms albeit not with recognisable moral 
content).  
Such is going to be my argument against categorical moral normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense. I close by summarizing my main findings and 
previewing what is to come (§6.6).  
6.2  Grounding Procedural+ Normativity 
In this section I argue that rational requirements are naturalistically respectable. For 
my own metaethical theorizing and that of the vast majority of my interlocutors, the 
issue of the naturalistic respectability of metaethical theories’ postulations is very 
important.387 It is for this reason that I assume, at least for the purposes of this thesis, 
the importance of naturalistic respectability.  
6.2.1 Functional Norms  
Consider the following examples of rational requirements: 
 
Instrumental Principle (IP) RR (if you have an intrinsic desire that p 
and a belief that you can bring about p by 
bringing about q, then you have an 
                                                                                                                           
‘stealing’ is not a moral term, so that a desire not to steal is not as such a desire with 
moral content).   
386 Smith (2012a).  
387 Also see, e.g., Timmons (1999); Scanlon (2009); Miller (2013).   
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instrumental desire that you bring about 
q)
388 
 
 
Belief Consistency  RR (you don’t have logically inconsistent 
beliefs)
389
 
 
Copp assures us that “realism about rational requirements … is compatible with 
metaphysical naturalism.”390 But how does this naturalisation of rational 
requirements work?  
Some philosophers adopt the view that there is a limit to normative 
explanation; viz., the explanation of what it is in virtue of which certain facts are 
normative. For instance, Shafer-Landau argues that a defence of the kind of view 
that I am defending “always consists in offering replies to criticisms, and evidence 
far short of demonstrable proof as positive support.”391 I however will offer positive 
                                            
388 Smith (2007: 282, 2009: 101, 104); Railton (1986); Joyce (2001: 54); Brink 
(1989: 63); Skorupski (2007: 76); Hubin (1999: 32; 2001: 459); Way (2012: 487-8); 
Setiya (2007: 649); Bratman (2009: 13); Darwall (1983: 9, 2001: 141-2); Railton 
(2006: 265); Joyce (2001: 54). Note three things about IP. I. IP can take entities 
other than just desires as its object of assessment, including ‘the will’, and can admit 
of slightly different formulations in both cases (Zangwill 2012: 354). II. The 
instrumental principle plausibly extends beyond productive to constitutive means 
(Korsgaard 1997: 215-6: 652n7; Nagel 1970: 51-2; Wedgwood 2011). III. ME is 
formulated as a wide-scope (WS) rather than a narrow-scope (NS) requirement 
because its normative force governs the entire conditional rather than just the 
consequent; schematically (where ‘O’ stands for ‘ought’): if you have end E  O 
take the means to M (NS), O (if you have end E, then take the means to E) (WS). 
WS is more plausible than NS because NS allows for detaching of the consequent; 
simply by adopting whatever end it is that I fancy I can make it the case that I ought 
to take the means to that end (these would include the end of killing myself and that 
of killing others, which are implausible on prudential and other grounds). WS avoids 
this by leaving it open how one resolves the irrationality of holding end E and not 
the means to E; i.e., by leaving it open whether one drops the end or takes the means 
(so that in the killing case one can simply drop that end).   
389 Kolodny (2005: 510, 2008: 437); Southwood (2008: 10n4). We can add to 
these: Desire Coherence (RR: you don’t have non-instrumental desires that fail to 
cohere with each other) (Smith (2004: 108); Intention Coherence (RR: you don’t 
have intentions that fail to cohere with each other, such as an intention to X and an 
intention not to X) (Parfit (2012: Vol. I, p36); Southwood (2008: 10n4); Enkrasia 
(RR: you intend to do what you believe you ought to do) (See, e.g., Broome 2008: 
98;  Copp 2007: 272), to name just a few.  
390 Copp (2007: 314).  
391 Shafer-Landau (2003: 210).  
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support for Proceduralism+. I will argue for the proper functioning account of 
rational requirements and that this account entails their naturalistic respectability.  
Consider functional kinds such as knives.
392
 The metaphysically mundane 
fact that knife is a functional kind grounds the true normative claim ‘it ought to be 
the case that knives cut well’ (where the ought is not necessarily an all-things-
considered ought—I will leave out this specification for reasons of space). For what 
a knife is is something whose function it is to cut well. This allows us to say that ‘it 
ought to be the case that knives cut well’ is an efficient way of saying that the 
evaluative claims such as ‘knives that cut serve their function better than knives that 
don’t’ and ‘knives that cut more efficiently function better than knives that cut less 
efficiently’ are true. And these evaluative claims themselves are not queer because 
they are short-hand for the descriptive claim that a given knife is higher up a list that 
reports to what extent, compared to others, it exhibits properties that abide by a 
given standard for knives.393 Again, “no Moorean non-natural qualities are … 
required to underwrite the truth of [these claims].”394 
The proper functioning account shares relevant similarities with Copp’s 
pluralist teleological theory of normativity. That theory “accounts for normativity by 
reference to the idea that a normative system can have the “function” of 
ameliorating a problem of normative governance.”395 Recall Mackie’s schmoral 
normativity from §2.2.4. This was a kind of normativity that doesn’t involve 
objective prescriptivity. With it Mackie tried to solve the problem of sociality, which 
was the following problem of normative governance. How can we best govern a 
complex system of interacting individuals that makes up our current society, the 
                                            
392 Thomson (2008); Smith (2010: 124-5). Nagel (1970: 18) anticipates arguments 
such as these when he writes that his “method is one of metaphysical ethics: moral 
and other practical requirements are grounded in a metaphysics of action, and finally 
in a metaphysics of the person. The more central and unavoidable is the conception 
of oneself on which the possibility of moral motivation can be shown to depend, the 
closer we will have come to demonstrating that the demands of ethics are 
inescapable.” 
393 Bloomfield (2001: 19, Chapters 3-4).  
394 Smith (2010: 124, also see his 2012b: 203, 2012a: 241-2, 2010: 125). 
395 Copp (2009a: 33; also see 2012: 38). The proper functioning account also has 
affinities with Aristotle (see his Nichomacean Ethics; Joyce 2006: 169; Casebeer 
2003). 
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function of which, according to Mackie, is to guarantee that humans can live 
harmoniously and reap the benefits of social cooperation?  
In this chapter we have a different, albeit similar, problem of normative 
governance. Here we look at our individual psychologies, not societies, and the 
problem concerns the complex system of interacting attitudes that makes up the 
human psychology and how it can perform its function. Call this not the problem of 
sociality but the problem of psychology. What the function of our psychologies is 
will be explained shortly. It is a moot point in the present context in which I only 
aim to explain that the proper functioning account of rational requirements is an 
instance of what Copp calls a teleological theory of normativity.  
The proper functioning account should be distinguished from the 
intrinsically valuable status account, according to which what grounds the truth of 
normative claims such as the Instrumental Principle is that failing to obey a rational 
requirement involves somehow undermining or failing to respect that status.
396
 For 
the proper functioning account doesn’t mention the intrinsic value of obeying 
rational requirements. It only uses the idea that obeying rational requirements is the 
only way to perform one’s function as a being with a psychology like ours. 
Consider the claim that the psychology of an agent is a functional kind. For 
the psychology of an agent is something whose function it is to produce knowledge 
(or true/reliable belief) and action.
397
 This means that psychologies, like knives, can 
be ordered according to how well they serve their function. This also means that we 
can ground the existence of rational norms in this description of the function of 
psychologies, just as we did with the norms governing the working of knives. 
Psychologies that work by adhering to IP and Belief Consistency are better placed to 
perform their function of producing true beliefs and actions than psychologies that 
don’t. For instance, if you don’t form the non-instrumental desire to transfer money 
to Oxfam’s bank account when you intrinsically desire to ‘give money’ to Oxfam 
and know that transferring money to its bank account is a good (enough) way of 
‘giving money’, then your psychology is failing as a functional kind. You won’t be 
acting well or perhaps not acting at all. You are merely letting things happen to your 
                                            
396 Kolodny (2005: 544-7); Southwood (2008: 15). 
397 Smith (MS); Railton (1997: 64). For the point about producing knowledge also 
see Velleman (2000); for the point about producing action also see Bratman (1986).  
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body (or in this case, letting nothing happen to your body at all, because you are not 
transferring money). Again, saying that IP is true is just to say that this evaluative, 
but metaphysically mundane fact, is true.  
We can tell a similar story that grounds rational requirements not in the 
functional profile of a human psychology as a whole but in the specific attitudes that 
are part of that psychology.
398
 Zoom in on two essential elements in our 
psychologies: desires and beliefs. Take desires. It is a commonplace that desires are 
the states they are in virtue of their characteristic aims. They aim at their own 
satisfaction (compare: knives are what they are in virtue of their characteristic ‘aim’: 
they aim to cut). We can give this commonplace a functional interpretation: a desire 
is a disposition to realize its own content. Now desires manifest themselves in 
agents, and as such they need some background conditions to obtain for them to be 
able to perform their characteristic functions. On the one hand, desires need the 
agent to be able to move her body. On the other hand, since desires can be for 
anything at all, for a desire to realize its content it would have to combine with some 
representation of how the world is or needs to be changed by the agent. This means 
that, for a desire to be everything that it is supposed to be (i.e., for a desire to be able 
to display its functional behaviour), the desire would have to be such that 
 
when an agent who has this desire in addition believes that its content can be 
realized by his performing some bodily movements, it combines with that belief in 
such a way that the agent is disposed to perform, and performs, that bodily 
movement. This is tantamount to saying that a desire functions optimally only if it 
conforms to the principle of instrumental rationality
399
 
 
A similar story to that about IP and how it can be grounded in our 
psychologies can be told about Belief Consistency. Having a psychology that abides 
by this rational requirement will be helpful from the point of view of acquiring true 
                                            
398 Smith (2012b: 203-5); Kolodny (2008: 438). I assume that the folk 
psychological concepts of BELIEF and DESIRE that we us to pick out these mental 
states are not in error, and hence that, for instance, the besire theory of our mental 
states is false (Altham 1986). In the present context of a defence of moral error 
theory this is unproblematic, as many of my strongest opponents in the metaethical 
debate make the same assumption. Hence the assumption is something we all share 
and that I can argue from; it is not something I have to argue for.   
399 Smith (2012b: 205). “[It] is in the nature of … desires to be subject to rational 
requirements” (Smith MS: 2).  
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beliefs and producing actions. If you have logically inconsistent beliefs then you can 
be sure that at least one of them is false. This contradicts our aim of having only true 
beliefs. This explains why we should abide by Belief Consistency. 
Why is the function of our psychologies to believe true things and to produce 
actions that satisfy its desires? Because—and this much simply appears to be rock-
bottom—that is what our psychology do and are there for. Our psychologies enable 
us to do things; our psychologies are not mere loci of events. A table is an example 
of a mere locus of events. There are external forces impeding on it, such as gravity, 
rain and sunlight (if the table is stood outside), and it can be moved by intelligent 
beings like ourselves (we can take the table inside to prevent it from getting wet or 
discoloured). But we are not mere loci of events in that sense. It is not as though 
there are only forces from outside of us, or forces from inside of us that we cannot 
control, that makes it the case that there are merely things happening to us. We can 
move about ourselves. An instance of the problem of normative governance 
therefore applies to us. Here we have a complex system of interacting attitudes that 
is the human psychology, including motivationally efficacious states; what are the 
rules that, when the agent accepts them, would best allow her to have a psychology 
that can optimally perform its function of getting the agent to move about in the 
world?
400
   
There are problems with this account of the function of our psychologies, as 
there are problems with other aspects of my proper functioning account of rational 
requirements. I formulate and respond to them in the next sub-section.  
6.2.2 Problems and Solutions  
First, there is the objection that the error theorist can’t simply assume that the 
function of our psychologies is to produce action and true beliefs and just that. 
What, for instance, about the suggestion that our psychologies exist, at least in part, 
to allow us to get along with other humans? If that were part of the functional profile 
of our psychologies then presumably we can ground rational requirements with 
categorical force and recognizable moral content on it. And from this a moral 
success theory would follow. I take this objection seriously, but postpone answering 
it until §6.4.2.  
                                            
400 Copp (2012: 39).  
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A second objection is that agents are seemingly able to simply shrug off the 
alleged normativity of rational requirements. For why would the fact that agents 
wouldn’t have a ‘properly functioning psychology’ if they don’t abide by IP and all 
the other rational requirements matter to them? Indeed, what’s wrong with saying, 
‘fine, I won’t have a properly functioning psychology if I don’t take the means to 
my ends; but so what?’  
Copp makes a similar objection to Thomson’s functionalist view of human 
beings.
401
 According to Thomson, being morally virtuous is the function of human 
beings. Copp complains that he can imagine Nietzscheans who, precisely, don’t 
want to be morally virtuous and are still able to live their lives and indeed seemingly 
coherently so. This would be evidence against the claim that humans wouldn’t be 
functioning as humans if they aren’t being morally virtuous. Scanlon use a different 
example to make the point:  
 
It may be true in a functionalist sense that we ‘ought’ to have the capacity to 
reproduce—that we are functionally defective if we lack this capacity. But these 
norms, and ‘oughts’, need have no normative force for an agent who recognizes 
them
402
 
 
Likewise, it might be objected to my account that the rational requirements that it 
postulates have no guaranteed normative force for the agent who recognizes them.  
However, we should draw an important distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate ‘so what?’-responses. Legitimate ‘so what?’-responses are ‘so what?’-
responses that make sense. Recall Joyce’s example of an unwilling captive in 
Roman times who is thrown into the arena and forced to choose between fighting for 
his life or getting killed.403 He is told that he can fight in whatever way he pleases, 
but that he is not allowed to throw sand in his opponent’s eyes. Within no time the 
unwilling captive finds himself in a very bad position and the only way to save his 
live is to throw sand in his opponent’s eyes. The unwilling captive can legitimately 
question the rule not to throw sand in his opponent’s eyes. He can say ‘so what?’, 
throw the sand, and save his life. In this story, because the alleged rules of 
gladiatorial combat have almost nothing to do with the captive (the only relation 
                                            
401 Copp (2011: 182); Thomson (2008).  
402 Scanlon (2007: 86-7).  
403 Joyce (2001: 34-6).  
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between the rules and him is that they are forced upon him), the ‘so what?’-response 
makes sense.  
This contrasts with cases in which the rules of an activity are much more 
closely tied to the agent. Take, indeed, the rules of desire and belief-formation. In a 
way these rules aren’t ‘the agent’s’ either. The agent was never consulted about 
which rules are to be accepted; just like the unwilling gladiator was never consulted 
about which rules of combat are to be accepted. But in another good sense of ‘the 
agent’s’ the rational requirements that I’ve been exploring are clearly ‘the agent’s’. 
For agents like us necessarily have desires and beliefs, and the requirements that 
govern them cannot be shrugged off in the very same way that the rules of 
gladiatorial combat can be shrugged off. Agents don’t have to be gladiators—
certainly not against their will—but agents have no choice but to have beliefs and 
desires. It doesn’t make sense to respond to the rational requirements by saying ‘so 
what?’ even though it does make sense to have that response when presented, 
unwillingly, with the rules of gladiatorial combat. So the objection that rational 
requirements, on the proper functioning theory of their normativity, can fail to be 
normative for agents who do not desire to abide by them doesn’t work.   
A third objection to my view is that rational requirements are, in fact, not 
normative at all but only appear to be normative from the agent’s point of view. 
Some philosophers hold this view because they think that the only way to vindicate 
the robust sense in which rational requirements are normative is by showing that we 
can have a (substantive) reason to be rational, but that we have no such reason, and 
that we should therefore conclude that in fact rational requirements at most appear to 
be normative. Of course rational requirements could be normative in a more 
minimal way—they could be normative only in the imperative- or rule-involving 
sense. But, the objection goes, that wouldn’t be a vindication of the robustness of 
the normativity of rational requirements—that wouldn’t be a vindication of their 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense.  
This is Kolodny’s ‘transparency account of the rational requirements’.404 If 
Kolodny is right then I’m wrong in thinking that rational requirements are normative 
in the robust, rationality-involving sense. But Kolodny isn’t right. Kolodny claims 
that vindicating the normativity of rationality requires showing that we have a 
                                            
404 Kolodny (2005: 545-6); Southwood (2008: 13).  
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(substantive) reason to be rational, but he does this without considering the proper 
functioning account. So this claim begs the question against that account. For 
according to my account, vindicating the robust sense in which rational requirements 
are normative does not necessitate giving reasons to be rational. The only thing that 
is required is the kind of story about the function of our psychologies as I have told 
it so far. To simply assume that I’m wrong and that we need to be able to supply 
reasons for being rational is to beg the question against my account.  
In addition to the transparency account of rational requirements there is the 
epistemic account of the normativity of rational requirements, as for instance 
defended by Setiya.
405
 According to this view, and to take IP as our example, the 
ought that we invoke when we say that Abe ought to intend M (the means to his 
ends) is epistemic, not practical. The reason we should believe this account, 
according to Setiya, is that it is our last resort. The other views on the market don’t 
even make sense.
406
 But of course I claim that my own functionalist account of the 
norms of practical rationality does make sense and is plausible. And again this view 
is not even considered. In the absence of a focussed objection to my account, 
therefore, Setiya’s critique too is question-begging.  
The final problem is that I haven’t been sufficiently clear about why my 
account is naturalistically respectable. What does it mean for an account of 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense to be naturalistically respectable? 
There is no shortage of suggestions. Parfit has two proposals. First, properties that 
are studied by the natural sciences count as natural properties. Second, properties 
that satisfy the Causal Criterion, according to which properties are real and natural 
only if they are causally efficacious, are natural properties.
407
 G.E. Moore has used 
the following criteria: (i) natural but not non-natural properties can exist 
independently of any object instantiating them; (ii) natural but not non-natural 
properties exist in space and time; (iii) natural but not non-natural properties can be 
taken up in our hands or be separated from their bearers by scientific instruments.
408
 
Copp claims that a property is natural if and only if any synthetic proposition about 
                                            
405 Setiya (2007).  
406 Also see Schroeder (2009: 224).  
407 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 305-6); also see Enoch (2011a: 7, 159, 162, 177).  
408 Moore (1903: 41, 110, 124).  
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the instantiation of the property that can be known can be known only empirically, 
or by means of empirical observation and standard modes of inductive inference.
409
 
There are many more options, some evidently more plausible than others.  
But which one should we accept? The problem is that without an adequate 
understanding of natural properties we can’t really ‘test’ whether my account is 
naturalistically respectable. Moreover, in trying to settle on a criterion for 
naturalness we have to be wary of presupposing what we are trying to prove. If, 
prior to any investigation into whether normative properties can be natural we define 
all natural properties such that normative properties couldn’t possibly meet these 
definitions then we are begging the question against the latter’s existence.410  
Enoch appeals in this context to the ‘just too different intuition’: normative 
properties are ‘just too different’ from all the natural properties in order to even 
qualify as a contender natural property.
411
 To defend Enoch’s suggestion: it is 
possible that for some fundamental debates, such as the debate about normativity 
and naturalness, intuitions carry a lot of argumentative weight and that we must 
ultimately rely on them in our philosophical accounts of the nature of reality. But at 
the same time it is also true that it would be better if we had more than just our 
intuitions to work with. So can we be more specific than Enoch’s proposal and still 
somehow avoid having to settle the debate about the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of natural properties? 
I propose a position about metaphysical naturalism that holds the middle 
between Enoch’s suggestion that we can rely on intuitions and the very specific 
proposals of Parfit, Moore and Copp that specify necessary and sufficient conditions 
for what it takes for a property to be a natural property. We can work with examples 
of natural properties that are clearly recognizable as such, including the property of 
being an electron, being positively charged, being an Australian twenty-dollar bill or 
                                            
409 Copp (2007: 254).  
410 Miller (2003: 181).  
411 Enoch (2011a: 4, 107). Similarly, Shafer-Landau (2003: 80) writes that we 
“know [the natural] when we see it”, much like we can recognize “the 
pornographic” when we see it. Cf. Joyce (2013). Enoch also accepts the more 
focussed proposal that “[f]acts and properties are natural if and only if they are of 
the kind the usual sciences invoke” (2011a: 103), but the just-too-different intuition 
seems to be doing most of the philosophical work in his thinking about the relation 
between normativity and naturalness.  
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the property a tree can have of being deciduous, and assess whether normative 
properties stray too much from these examples.
412
 This stays rather close to Enoch’s 
proposal, but also gives us a little bit more space to argue for our convictions. We 
can show that some normative properties, like that of being a rational requirement, 
should be included into our ontology because we can show that they are sufficiently 
similar to archetype natural properties. And we can show that some other normative 
properties, such as, perhaps, that of being a categorical reason, should not be 
included into our ontology because we can show that they stray too much from the 
archetype natural properties. This is not an ideal way to proceed—ideally we would 
have a full-blown account of natural properties that specifies their necessary and 
sufficient instantiation conditions—but the discussion of what makes natural 
properties natural would make my discussion unmanageable. So my argument is at 
least at this point subject to further corroboration.  
Why don’t rational requirements stray too far from archetype natural 
properties? Take, for instance, this piece of paper that has the property of being a 
£20 note. It has this property in virtue of complex facts about human agreements and 
economical facts and in virtue of its function. For a £20 note is the kind of thing you 
aren’t allowed to use just by itself to pay for something that is more expensive than 
£20. It functions as a means to exchange goods and services with people in a more 
efficient way than trading those goods and services directly without the intervention 
of money, et cetera. So this piece of paper that is my £20 note is subject to various 
norms in virtue of its function. Likewise, this action of forming a desire to φ has the 
property of being required by IP in virtue of complex facts about human 
psychologies and their functions. For this action is the kind of thing that you aren’t 
allowed to perform if the right kinds of background conditions fail to obtain, such as 
the having of certain beliefs and intrinsic desires. The action is subject to norms in 
virtue of the function of the psychology that it is part of. There are important 
relevant similarities between being a £20 note and being a rational requirement. It is 
safe to assume that if the former is naturalistically respectable then so is the latter. 
I will have more to say about the relation between naturalness and non-
naturalness in due course. For now I close the topic and proceed to show that with 
                                            
412 Copp (2007: 254).  
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Proceduralism+ we can vindicate the truth of many normative claims in the 
rationality-involving sense, including some with categorical applicability.  
6.3  Norms of Prudence and Epistemology    
In this section I list a number of platitudes about prudence and epistemology and I 
argue that they really are platitudes. I also argue that Proceduralism+ can vindicate 
these platitudes. If the project of this section is successful then Proceduralism+ is a 
plausible theory. This is important in the dialectic about error theory. Error theories 
are radical theories, and radical theories are often implausible. An error theory of all 
normativity would be more implausible than my local moral error theory which is 
compatible with a success theory about prudential and epistemic normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense. So this section blocks allegations of extreme 
implausibility as they beset other, more radical, error theories. The next two sections 
argue that a success theory of prudential and epistemic normativity in the rationality-
involving sense is consistent with an error theory of moral normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense.  
6.3.1  Norms of Prudence 
Consider the following statements that I claim can be platitudes about prudence 
when we supply (at least some of) them with sufficiently determinate content (I 
present these statements here without content so that I can make some general 
remarks about them):  
 
(1) It doesn’t make sense to have or fail to have certain intrinsic desires, unless 
one is in some such condition as exhaustion or lethargy or if one is under 
time-constraints. 
(2)  The having or not having of certain instrumental or intrinsic desires doesn’t 
make sense given certain background conditions that one is aware of, unless 
one is in some such condition as exhaustion or lethargy or if one is under 
time-constraints. 
(3)  It doesn’t make sense to fail to take into account all the important facts that 
one knows bear on one’s decision as to what to instrumentally or 
intrinsically desire, unless one is in some such condition as exhaustion or 
lethargy or if one is under time-constraints. 
(4) It doesn’t make sense to continuously hop between sets of intrinsic desires 
without being able to satisfy any of them, unless one is in some such 
condition as exhaustion or lethargy or if one is under time-constraints.
413
 
 
                                            
413 Henceforth I omit the qualification ‘pace exhaustion, lethargy, and time-
constraints’ in all formulations of platitudes and norms; instead I’ll take it as read.  
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Various comments about these platitudes are in order. First, I understand the 
location ‘it doesn’t make sense to’ as generically as possible.414 That is, I use this 
locution as a means of reporting an intuitive sense in which things aren’t going as 
they should with the agents that have the (combinations of) mental states mentioned. 
What I want to avoid is stacking the deck in favour of a particular view about 
whether the kind of irrationality displayed is best understood in terms of 
irresponsiveness to reasons or in terms of something else.  
Second, prudential considerations admit of vague boundaries in that it is 
often not entirely clear whether a consideration counts as a prudential one. Nagel 
equates prudence with practical foresight but also notes that it is more often equated 
with self-interest and that this latter understanding of prudence has a foundation in 
ordinary usage.
415
 This latter understanding of prudence is what I shall have in mind 
throughout.  
Third, the platitudes as I have them above seem to exhaust all the platitudes 
about prudence insofar as their form is concerned. It doesn’t make sense to have a 
desire, intrinsic or instrumental, with certain contents (platitudes 1 and 2). It also 
doesn’t make sense to fail to take into account all the important facts that one knows 
bear on one’s decision as to what to instrumentally or intrinsically desire (platitude 
3). And once one has a set of desires it doesn’t make sense to change everything 
round all the time so that one cannot satisfy any of them (platitude 4). It doesn’t 
seem as though there are other kinds of considerations that I should take into account 
if I want to be prudent.  
However, and this is the fourth point, we can’t be similarly exhaustive about 
the contents of these platitudes. There are many things that we could slot in as the 
objects of our desires in platitudes (1) and (2). And there are also many things that 
we might think are important considerations concerning the process of figuring out 
what our desires should be (platitude 3). Platitude (4) does not seem subject to this 
worry as it is purely formal (it doesn’t matter what kind of specific content for the 
desires we plug into it). I will argue later on that the fact that we can’t be completely 
exhaustive regarding the content of these platitudes is not a big problem for my 
claim that Proceduralism+ can account for all of the platitudes about prudence. The 
                                            
414 For this usage of ‘it doesn’t make sense’, see Railton (1997: 61). 
415 Nagel (1970: 36).  
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reason for this is that we have good reason to believe that my account of the 
platitudes that I do consider will extend to many other platitudes with different 
contents.  
I will now list a number of platitudes with content that can be found in the 
literature. I put stars in front of them to distinguish them from their more general 
formulations (1)-(4):   
 
(*1a) It doesn’t make sense to intrinsically desire to have pain.416 
(*1b) It doesn’t make sense not to intrinsically desire to take medicine that will 
save one from lingering death, and restore one to perfect health.
417
 
(*2a) It doesn’t make sense to intrinsically desire to smoke, to believe that the 
only means to do that is to buy a new pack of cigarettes, but not to 
instrumentally desire to buy a new pack.
418
 
(*2b) It doesn’t make sense to believe that one should jump but fail to desire to 
jump.
419
 
(*3) It doesn’t make sense not to learn about what it involves to be a 
professional philosopher when considering going to graduate school.
420
 
(*4) It doesn’t make sense to desire to be a professional footballer one day, a 
professional philosopher the next day, a medic the third day, and so forth.
421
 
   
One type of evidence that these platitudes really are platitudes is their 
ubiquitous recognition in the literature as such. A related type of evidence is that 
they wear their status as platitudes on their sleeves, so to speak. We find it difficult 
                                            
416 Parfit (1984: 212). Parfit’s datum is actually formulated in a way that includes 
information about when the agony occurs (future Tuesdays) and has other 
specifications as well. But I think that all of these additional pieces of information 
about (*1a) are inessential. After all, it doesn’t seem to matter whether one desires 
pain on Tuesdays or on other days of the week—desiring pain per se doesn’t make 
sense. Also see Heathwood (2011: 95-6); Finlay (2009b: 6); Street (2009: 273). 
Other examples to slot in (*1a) include Hume’s agent who prefers the destruction of 
the world to the scratching of his finger (1739-40: bk.2, pt.3, sec.3), Rawls’s blades-
of-grass counter (1971:432) and Gibbard’s ideally coherent anorexic (1990: 171).  
417 Gert (2004: 41).  
418 Kolodny (2005: 509-10); Darwall (2006: 294); Finlay (2009a); Smith (2010, 
MS); Schroeder (2009); Brunero (2005); Rippon (2011); Dreier (1997: 89); 
Korsgaard (1997: 215, 2009: 1); Lillehammer (1999: 203).  
419 Smith (2009: 112, 2004b: 108); Kolodny (2005: 527); Parfit (2012: Vol. I, p36); 
Finlay (2009b: 4); Smith (1995: 118); Velleman (1996: 696-7); Parfit (1997: 101).   
420 Enoch (2011a: 88).   
421 Fehige (2001: 63).  
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to deny their truth, at least off the cuff. For instance, about something like (*2a), 
R.E. Barnes writes that 
 
a person could not coherently argue that she has no concern for taking the most 
efficient means to her ends. This kind of rationality is so foundational that rejecting 
it risks rejecting a necessary element of all practical reasoning
422
  
 
However, a caveat applies. Consider for instance platitudes (*1a) and (*1b). 
It is sometimes claimed that pain and suffering are good.
423
 This means that, 
although claims (*1a) and (*1b) clearly have a platitudinous standing of a sort, they 
are not the kinds of platitudes that are impossible to deny, such as the platitude that 
everything that is red is coloured, which is impossible to deny.
424
  
I will now argue that that Proceduralism+ can provide a vindicatory 
explanation of these platitudes. Start with platitude (2):  
 
(2) The having or not having of certain instrumental or intrinsic desires doesn’t 
make sense given certain background conditions that one is aware of, unless 
one is in some such condition as exhaustion or lethargy or if one is under 
time-constraints.  
The Instrumental Principle (IP) can make good on this platitude. For according to 
IP, RR (if you have an intrinsic desire that p and a belief that you can bring about p 
by bringing about q, then you have an instrumental desire that you bring about q). 
On the plausible assumption that having a certain intrinsic background desire counts 
as a suitable background condition, IP says that if you believe you ought to pursue 
end E and if means M is the best or a good enough means to attain E then you ought 
to be motivated to pursue M, unless one is in some such condition as exhaustion or 
lethargy or if one is under time-constraints. That is, IP just is the second platitude 
couched in philosophical parlance.  
 How does this relate to (*2a)-(*2b)? 
 
                                            
422 Barnes (2012: 817). Also see Brink (1992: 11), who claims that “the link 
between an agent’s own interests and desires and his reasons for action seems 
intuitive.”  
423 Nietzsche often makes these claims; Parfit (2012 Vol2: 570).  
424 Shafer-Landau (2005); also see Jackson and Pettit (1995).  
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(*2a) It doesn’t make sense to intrinsically desire to smoke, to believe that the 
only means to do that is to buy a new pack of cigarettes, but not to 
instrumentally desire to buy a new pack 
(*2b) It doesn’t make sense to believe that one should φ but fail to desire to φ 
 
(*2a) is just an example of (2), and so because (2) can be accounted for my IP, so 
can (*2a).  
(*2b) can be accounted for by: 
 
Enkrasia RR (you intend to do what you believe you ought to do)
425
   
 
Enkrasia is another rational requirement like Belief Consistency and the 
Instrumental Principle. We have no reason to assume that it won’t be naturalistically 
respectable, given that for it too we can tell a story about why psychologies that 
adhere to it are better able to perform their function than psychologies that don’t. 
That explanation is that without Enkrasia, it will be harder, if not impossible, for 
agents to have their desires fulfilled, which is part of the function of their 
psychologies. And Enkrasia is simply (*2b) in different words.  
 Let us now look at platitudes (1) and (3)-(4). First consider platitude (1); the 
platitude that the mere having of certain intrinsic desires, such as a desire for pain, 
doesn’t make sense. Parfit argues that the Proceduralist+ cannot make good on this 
platitude. He thinks that she would have to accept state-given (i.e., mind-
independent), objective reasons for attitudes. According to Parfit, what explains why 
it doesn’t make sense for us to desire pain is that we have a reason not to desire 
pain—a reason, moreover, that is given by how things are rather than by what would 
satisfy our desires (hence the name state-given reasons).  
I argue that in fact one of the suggestions that Parfit makes for the 
Proceduralist works.
426
 The suggestion Parfit makes is that defenders of 
Proceduralism+ could explain platitude (1) by reference to the fact that pain stands 
in the way of achieving whatever you want to achieve. Given that desires are states 
                                            
425 See, e.g., Broome (2008: 98). Smith uses the slightly different formulation ‘if 
you believe that you would want to ψ if you had a desire that conforms to all of the 
rational requirements, then you desire to ψ’ (2007: 281; 1994). Also see Copp 
(2007: 272).  
426 Parfit (2012, VolI: 85-9).  
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that aim at their own satisfaction, for desires to be able to perform and continue to 
perform that function it can’t be the case that you desire pain. For that desire makes 
it impossible for you to continue to satisfy your other desires. After all, agents that 
are in pain are known to have difficulty satisfying their desires, whatever they may 
be. This gives us the following rational requirement:  
 
No Pain RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to act, then you desire not 
to be in pain) 
 
And just as with Enkrasia we have no reason to think that No Pain isn’t 
naturalistically respectable, given our background story about the function of our 
psychologies.   
 One problem for this suggestion is that there are (possible) agents who only 
desire pain and nothing else. Why should No Pain be a rational requirement for 
them? Off the cuff it doesn’t seem like it should. So these possible agents are 
counterexamples to my account. Indeed, the existence of these counterexamples 
suggests that the rational requirements that I have just considered—Enkrasia, No 
Pain, et cetera—aren’t categorically normative. Enkrasia and No Pain are normative 
for those agents who possess the right kinds of desires and beliefs. But for some 
other (possible) agents who do not have these desires and beliefs, Enkrasia and No 
Pain do not apply.  
  I don’t think that this is much of a problem for my account. Platitudes are by 
their very nature amenable to rejection (in light of theoretical considerations) and 
come in various strengths. Above I gave the examples of the platitude that all red 
objects are coloured, which looks pretty unshakable, and Mackie’s platitude, which 
can be doubted. Also recall that Nietzscheans can seemingly coherently deny 
platitudes (*1a) and (*1b). So the fact that I cannot completely deal with this 
platitude—i.e., that there are extreme cases which I cannot explain—is not a 
problem. Indeed, it may simply adequately reflect the (limited) contestability of this 
platitude. And indeed this platitude seems limited in scope. Almost everyone ought 
to abide by No Pain, except those probably only hypothetical characters who only 
desire pain. But that just seems to be the right result, not an objection to the view.      
I have just explained how Proceduralism+ can provide a (sufficiently robust) 
vindicatory explanation of platitude (*1a). This leaves me to explain:  
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(*1b) It doesn’t make sense not to intrinsically desire to take medicine that will 
save one from lingering death, and restore one to perfect health
427
 
 
Here the reasoning is going to be the same as with (*1a). Proceduralism+ explains 
platitude (*1b) by reference to the fact that disease and death stand in the way of 
achieving whatever you want to achieve. Given that desires are states that aim at 
their own satisfaction, for desires to be able to perform and continue to perform that 
function it can’t be the case that you fail to desire to be cured from a disease. For 
that desire makes it possible for you to continue to satisfy your other desires. After 
all, agents that are lethally ill are known to have difficulty satisfying their desires, 
whatever they may be. This gives us the following rational requirement: 
 
No Death RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to act, then you desire not 
to die) 
 
Of course, there will also be (possible) agents who only desire to be lethally ill and 
(almost) nothing else. But a story similar that which I just told in connection with 
agents who only desire pain and (almost) nothing else will apply here as well.  
Platitudes (3) and (4) are still left. Start with platitude (4); the 
commonsensical observation that it doesn’t make sense for agents to continue to hop 
back and forth between different life plans. Doing that makes it very hard, if not 
impossible, for you to satisfy any desire whatever. For if I am constantly occupied 
by changing my life plans and adjusting my beliefs and desires accordingly then I 
shall lack time and energy to actually do some desire-satisfaction. Moreover, desires 
that require more time to be satisfied—a desire to get a PhD in philosophy, for 
instance—are completely out of the picture if I change my life upside down all the 
time. This gives us the following rational requirement:  
 
Few Changes RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to act, then you 
desire not to change your life upside down too often) 
 
                                            
427 Gert (2004: 41).  
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And again we have no reason not to assume that Few Changes is naturalistically 
respectable, given the availability of a story about the function of human 
psychologies.   
Finally consider (3):  
 
(3)  It doesn’t make sense to fail to take into account all the important facts that 
one knows bear on one’s decision as to what to instrumentally or 
intrinsically desire, unless one is in some such condition as exhaustion or 
lethargy or if one is under time-constraints. 
 
If you don’t acquire a reasonable amount of information about your circumstances, 
then it will be hard for you, if not impossible, to allow your desires to perform their 
function, which is to procure action with the aim of satisfying themselves. If I 
believe, falsely, that throwing my body in a fire gets me a holiday to Spain then after 
that I will neither have a holiday nor the means to satisfy any further desires at all. 
So we have: 
 
Information RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to act, then you 
desire to get a reasonable amount of information about the 
circumstances in which you act) 
 
And at the risk of sounding like a broken record, again we have no reason not to 
assume that Information is naturalistically respectable, given the availability of a 
story about the function of our psychologies.   
We can extend this line of reasoning to different platitudes that share their 
form with (1)-(4) but have different content. This is because it is plausible to believe 
that the move I’ve already used several times so far is versatile. The move was to 
point to rational requirements for which we have no reason to doubt that they can be 
grounded in the functional profile of human psychologies and that command agents 
not to frustrate their aims of realising their desires and attaining true beliefs. So for 
instance, recall:  
 
(*2b) It doesn’t make sense to believe that one should jump but fail to desire to 
jump.  
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I argued above that Enkrasia can deal with this platitudinously true statement. But 
we could also imagine a different way of giving content to (*2b) such that Enkrasia 
can still provide a vindicatory explanation of that platitude. So consider: 
 
(*2b’) It doesn’t make sense to believe that one should duck but fail to desire to 
duck. 
 
If Enkrasia vindicates (*2b) it also vindicates (*2b’).  
So to sum up, Proceduralism+ can account for the platitudes about prudence. 
I continue with the epistemological platitudes and will argue that Proceduralism+ 
can also provide a vindicatory explanation for these platitudes. Moreover, I will 
argue that this consequence of my account pre-empts an important objection that 
many philosophers believe is devastating to error theory.  
6.3.2 Norms of Epistemology 
Consider the following claims that I argue have a platitudinously true standing 
(again, at least when we specify their content, which I again refrain from doing in 
the first instance because I first want to make some general points about them): 
  
(5)  The having or not having of certain beliefs doesn’t make sense given certain 
background conditions of evidence, unless one is in some such condition as 
exhaustion, lethargy, or unless one is under time-constraints. 
(6)  It doesn’t make sense to fail to take into account all the important 
considerations one knows bear on one’s decision as to what to believe into 
consideration, unless one is in some such condition as exhaustion or 
lethargy or if one is under time-constraints. 
 
 Four comments apply. First, (5) and (6) are structurally similar to (2) and (4), 
respectively. It doesn’t make sense to desire or not desire X given background 
conditions Y (i.e., platitude 2) is similar in structure to it doesn’t make sense to 
believe or not believe X given background conditions Y (i.e., platitude 5). And ‘it 
doesn’t make sense not to take into account all the important considerations one 
knows to bear on one’s decision as to what to believe or desire’ simply integrates the 
contents of platitudes (3) and (6) into one.  
Second, the first and fourth platitudes as we had them for prudential norms 
are absent. Consider platitude (1). Although it is platitudinously true that it doesn’t 
make sense to have certain desires per se it isn’t similarly true that it doesn’t make 
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sense to believe something per se. For beliefs are always responsive to the facts 
whereas desires aren’t (or at least need not be). And consider platitude (4). Although 
it is platitudinously true that it doesn’t make sense to swap one’s intrinsic desires 
round at such a speed that one cannot satisfy any of them, it is not similarly the case 
that it doesn’t make sense to swap ones beliefs round at an identical speed. For one’s 
beliefs are responsive to the facts, and if the facts change at a large speed (and if one 
is aware of that) then one simply has to adjust one’s beliefs accordingly. 
Third, evidence that these claims really are platitudes is simply their 
obviousness and again the fact that it is so often noted that they are platitudes (see 
the references I mention in the examples of (5)-(6) below).  
Fourth, none of these platitudes is seemingly as easy to deny as the platitude 
that pain is bad, which, as we saw above, is denied by the Nietzschean.  
 Let’s give platitudes (5)-(6) some content:  
 
(*5a) It doesn’t make sense to believe that the half-life of californium-253 is 
17.82 days if all the facts point towards its half-life being 17.81 days and if 
one knows about these facts. 
(*5b) It doesn’t make sense to fail to believe that the half-life of californium-253 
is 17.81 days if all the facts point towards the truth of that proposition and if 
one knows about these facts.
428
 
(*6) It doesn’t make sense to fail to take the (known) fact that it took 
californium-253’s radioactivity to decay by 50% in 17.81 days into account 
in considering whether to believe that the half-life of californium-253 is 
17.81 days. 
  
I will now argue that Proceduralism+ can provide a vindicatory explanation 
of these platitudes. Given that it is part of our proper functioning to believe only true 
propositions, the following rational requirement applies, for which we have no 
reason to assume that it isn’t naturalistically respectable given the availability of the 
functional story of our psychologies: 
 
True RR (if you have the capacity for rational agency, then you desire 
only to believe those propositions for which you have sufficient 
evidence to believe that they are true).
429
 
                                            
428 Platitudes like (*5a) and (*5b), and the rational requirements corresponding to 
them, are discussed by Kolodny (2005: 521); Brunero (2010: 29); Railton (2003: 
293); Stratton-Lake (2002: xxv-xxvi).  
429 Kolodny (2005); Brunero (2010).  
- 184 - 
  
 True vindicates (5) and thus (*5a) and (*5b). For True forbids agents to form 
their beliefs on any other principle than that of sufficient evidence.   
Regarding (6) and (*6), the following RR applies: 
 
Information RR (if you have the capacity for rational agency, then you 
desire to get a reasonable amount of information about 
what you can and should believe) 
 
Information provides a vindicatory explanation of these platitudes as it says that 
agents would be violating genuine normativity when they don’t take in sufficient 
information when they are considering what to believe. And again we have no 
reason not to assume that these rational requirements are naturalistically respectable.  
Both True and Information are substantive rational requirements, and we are 
under categorical normative pressure to abide by them when it comes to our belief-
forming processes. Hence my account of procedural normativity pre-empts a 
prominent objection to moral error theory, which is that its attempt to be a local 
error theory confined to moral discourse must collapse, implausibly, into a global 
error theory of epistemic and other kinds of categorical norms (this is objection is 
sometimes called the Companions in Guilt Objection).430 As I have just formulated 
this objection, it rests on the assumption that an error theory of categorical epistemic 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense is impossible or at least extremely 
implausible. But my formulation of error theory, because it accepts Proceduralism+, 
has no trouble dealing with this objection. For Proceduralism+ explains why there is 
categorical epistemic normativity in the rationality-involving sense and why there 
isn’t categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense (this will be 
argued in what follows).  
This means that my error theory has a convincing reply to the formulation 
dilemma from §1.4:  
 
Formulation Dilemma  
                                            
430 This objection is at the forefront of Cuneo’s (2007a) book-length defence of 
moral realism. Also see Rowland (2013); Street (2009: 175-6); Lillehammer (2007); 
Streumer (forthcoming).  
- 185 - 
Error theorists can either formulate a global error theory via a broad meta-normative 
scepticism, or they can formulate a local moral error theory which leaves intact at 
least some normativity (and only finds, e.g., categorical moral reasons of rationality 
objectionable) 
 
If error theorists embrace the first horn of this dilemma then the problem is that this 
renders their theory very implausible, as it is extremely hard to believe that there are 
no reasons for belief (or, to be more precise, that there is no categorical normativity 
in the rationality-involving sense that governs our belief-forming processes). But 
error theorists accepting the second horn of this dilemma must convince us that there 
is an important difference between categorical moral normativity in the rationality-
involving sense and categorical epistemic normativity in the rationality-involving, 
and the problem with the second horn is that it is very hard to see what argument 
could deliver this result. The objection against error theory is that neither horn can 
be embraced and hence that error theory should be rejected. However, what I have 
argued in this sub-section is that, in fact, error theorists can provide a naturalistically 
respectable, vindicatory explanation of epistemic normativity in the rationality-
involving sense, and that the remainder of the thesis argues that this is still 
consistent with a rejection of categorical moral normativity in the rationality-
involving sense. This allows error theorist to embrace the second horn of this 
dilemma and to avoid the objection that can be made on its basis.  
 The fact that Proceduralism+’ vindicates categorical epistemic normativity in 
the rationality-implying sense has further good-making features as well. One is that 
it can avoid the following, additional objection to error theory: 
 
1. The Objection from Self-Defeat or Toothlessness  
Moral error theorists must either say that there are reasons to believe the error 
theory or that there aren’t. If they say that there are such reasons, then moral error 
theory is self-defeating, for the property of being a (categorical) reason to believe 
shares all its essential characteristics with the property of being a (categorical) 
reason to act so that if the latter don’t exist the former won’t exist either. If they say 
that there are no reasons to believe the error theory then their theory is polemically 
toothless, for then it is not a rational mistake to reject moral error theory.
431
  
 
                                            
431 Cuneo (2007a: 117-8); Streumer (forthcoming: 13).   
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Proceduralism+ adopts the first horn of the dilemma, in a way, because it provides a 
vindicatory explanation of how there can be genuine categorical normative pressure 
in the rationality-implying sense on agents to believe what they take themselves to 
have sufficient evidence to believe. Proceduralism+ adopts the first horn of the 
dilemma ‘in a way’ because it refuses to analyse epistemic normativity in terms of 
reasons, but that is a moot point in this context as nothing of importance hangs on 
this. Hence moral error theory is not polemically toothless.  
 A final objection that my error theory can deal with because it accepts 
Proceduralism+ is: 
 
2. The Objection from the Normativity of Belief  
Beliefs are normative in the sense that a mental state M counts as a belief if and 
only if there is a reason for us to have M when there is (sufficient) evidence that the 
content of M is true. But if error theory about normativity as such is true then there 
are no mental states of which the foregoing is true. This means that there are no 
beliefs, which is a bad result for two reasons. First, it is hard to deny that there are 
beliefs. Second, this renders error theory self-contradictory: there are no beliefs and 
yet moral judgments express (false) beliefs.
432
  
 
But my error theory, because it embraces Proceduralism+, denies that we should 
accept scepticism about normativity as such. It therefore avoids both the conclusion 
that there no beliefs and that error theory is self-contradictory. For the truth of 
Proceduralism+ entails that there is normativity in the rationality-involving sense to 
have a mental state M when there is (sufficient) evidence that the content of M is 
true. 
So Proceduralism+ is plausible and saves my error theory from many 
implausible consequences and thus far it hasn’t vindicated distinctively moral 
norms. However, some philosophers have argued that Proceduralism+ actually 
entails that there are rational requirements to generate intrinsic or instrumental 
desires with recognizable moral content. The various ways of arguing for this 
entailment will be discussed in the next section, alongside my responses to these 
arguments.  
                                            
432 Shah (2010: 363-5); Streumer (forthcoming: 15); Cuneo (2007a: 121-2).  
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6.4  Procedural+ Categorical Moral Normativity?  
In this section I argue that there are no substantive rational requirements with 
recognizable moral content, such as a requirement to muster a desire to refrain from 
stealing. In essence the argument for that claim is simple. The only naturalistically 
respectable rational requirements are those that can be grounded in the functional 
profile of human psychologies, which consists of the aims of acquiring true beliefs 
and producing action. This functional profile does not mention the aim of caring for 
or respecting other people or agents, and so any putative rational requirement that 
furthers that goal would have to come from somewhere else and is therefore 
metaphysically queer.  
 Various aspects of this argument can be questioned though. I first engage 
with the objection that there is an entailment from procedural+ norms to substantive 
norms that have moral content, which would allow categorical moral normativity in 
the rationality-involving sense to piggyback on the naturalistically respectable 
credentials of Proceduralism+. I argue that this entailment doesn’t hold (§6.4.1). I 
also argue against the objection that the function of human psychologies should be 
described more broadly so as to include the aims of enabling agents to get along 
with other agents (§6.4.2). In §6.5 I argue against the suggestion that the normativity 
of morality should be understood in terms of reasons and can be vindicated in that 
way. This establishes moral error theory.  
6.4.1 Do Procedural+ Rational Requirements entail Categorical Moral  
Rational Requirements? 
In his most recent defence of a kind of moral realism of the rationalist variety, 
Michael Smith argues that procedural+ norms entail substantive norms with 
recognizable moral content.433 To appreciate how this argument works first consider 
the belief formation processes that regularly occur in agents like us who possess the 
capacity to believe propositions on the basis of sufficient evidence. Suppose you are 
in the process of inferring that q from two premises: the premise that p and the 
premise that p implies q. You have arrived at the following point: you have settled 
that p, you are in the process of settling that p implies q and you are only 
                                            
433 Smith (2007: 285, 2009: 103, 2011: 354-60, 2012a, MS: 14-24); also see 
Markovits (2011: 277). I present Smith’s argument with my own additions, 
clarifications, and interpretations.  
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anticipating performing the inference and forming the belief that q. A good question 
to ask is: what qualities do you have to have to believe that q on the basis of 
sufficient evidence at that very moment?  
 The answer is that you have to have various qualities. First, and perhaps 
trivially, you would have to have and exercise the capacity to believe propositions 
on the basis of sufficient evidence. But you also need to be able to rely on your past 
self who settled that p, to be vigilant at the moment in which you are settling that p 
implies q, and to be able to rely on your future self to draw the inference that q. In 
other words, the attitudes of reliance and vigilance are also required in addition to 
having a standing disposition to believe propositions on the basis of sufficient 
evidence.   
 Smith argues that what is required for vigilance in this sense is a desire not to 
allow other desires, such as those to believe things on the basis of wishful thinking, 
to interfere in one’s reasoning. Hence what a rational agent should do is muster a 
desire with a particular content; namely, not to believe things on the basis of wishful 
thinking. And this is true in virtue of the fact that their psychologies are the kinds of 
things that work best if they believe things on the basis of sufficient evidence rather 
than on the basis of wishful thinking. So the following is a rational requirement, and 
indeed a substantive one:  
 
Vigilance RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to believe for reasons, 
then you desire not to allow wishful thinking to interfere in your 
deliberation) 
 
 What is required for reliance? Smith answers: a standing desire not to 
interfere with your future self’s rational deliberation. After all, not having such a 
desire gets in the way of having a psychology that can perform its function of 
acquiring true beliefs. This gets us the following, again substantive rational 
requirement:  
 
Reliance RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to believe for reasons, 
then you desire not to interfere with your future self’s deliberation) 
 
So far we have a kind of reasoning that is perfectly at home with the general 
tenets of Proceduralism+. Although we have categorical epistemic normativity in the 
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rationality-involving sense, we don’t have recognizably moral norms. The kind of 
error theory that I defend can therefore accept everything that Smith has said so far.  
The problem for my error theory though is that this reasoning has been 
argued to entail that there exist substantive moral rational requirements. For if what 
Reliance is meant to protect is rational deliberation, or its possibility, then it would 
be rationally arbitrary to apply Reliance only to the instantiation of the possibility 
for rational reflection in oneself but not to instantiations of the possibility for 
rational reflection in other people. And rational agents don’t make such arbitrary 
decisions.
434
 Therefore, rational agents should not only accept Reliance and 
Vigilance but also (just focussing on Reliance from now on to keep the discussion 
manageable):  
 
Reliance-Others RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to believe for 
reasons, then you desire not to interfere with your future 
self’s or anyone else’s deliberation) 
  
And Reliance-Others looks an awful lot like a moral principle; don’t do to others 
what one wouldn’t want to be done unto oneself. Or quite simply: don’t hurt others. 
Reliance and Reliance-Others are ‘negative’ principles in the sense that they 
only tell the agent what not to do. But they have ‘positive’ equivalents as well, such 
that the latter is derivable from the former in a way similar to that in which 
Reliance-Others was derivable from Reliance: 
 
Reliance-Positive RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to believe for 
reasons, then you desire to positively aid your future self’s 
deliberation) 
 
Reliance-Others-Positive RR (if you have and exercise the capacity to 
believe for reasons, then you desire to positively 
aid your future self’s or anyone else’s deliberation) 
 
And Reliance-Others-Positive is also easily identifiable as a rational requirement 
with recognisable moral content, much in line with principles of beneficence that 
                                            
434 Smith (MS: 18). Nagel (1970: 114) speaks of ‘practical solipsism’ in this 
regard. Also see Copp (2007: Chapter 8); Joyce (2006: 197).  
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require or recommend agents to help others.
435
 Call this version of the argument 
from entailment Smith’s Argument from Entailment.  
 In response to Smith’s Argument from Entailment, note a distinction that is 
not currently made in the literature. Distinguish between desires one should have on 
pain of irrationality that derive from the Instrumental Principle, Belief Consistency, 
Vigilance and Reliance on the one hand and desires one should have on pain of 
irrationality that derive from Reliance-Others and Reliance-Others-Positive on the 
other hand. The difference is that the first group of rational requirements can be 
grounded in individual psychologies (or the attitudes that constitute them, in the way 
explained in §6.2.1) whereas the second group rational requirements cannot be 
grounded in the functional characterization of individual psychologies (or the 
attitudes that constitute them, in the way explained in §6.2.1). After all, a 
requirement not to interfere with other agents’ capacity for rational deliberation or 
theoretical reasoning, or indeed a requirement to positively help other agents with 
that capacity, outstrips what is required for having a working individual psychology, 
whose function is to produce true beliefs and action. But if rational requirements like 
Reliance-Others and Reliance-Others-Positive cannot grounded in the functional 
characterization of individual desires then they aren’t naturalistically respectable. 
But then it is not rationally ‘arbitrary’ to make a distinction between the two groups 
of rational requirements. For rational agents don’t accept the existence of rational 
requirements that cannot be grounded in a naturalistically respectable metaphysic.
436
   
                                            
435 Defending the stronger positive theses isn’t strictly speaking necessary—the 
weaker theses, which seem easier to defend will, all by itself, significantly 
compromise my error theory. I include a discussion of the stronger theses to show 
the versatility of this kind of objection to error theory. 
436 One way out for the success theorist, in addition to those that I will discuss (and 
reject) shortly, is to argue that such other naturalistically respectable phenomena as 
collective decision-making processes and groups can ground naturalistically 
respectable rational requirements or reasons that have recognisable moral content. In 
response, error theorists could attack the naturalistic respectability of group- or we-
intentions, but even if error theorists leave this part of the objection intact two big 
questions remain. First, can the mere naturalistic respectability of a phenomenon 
ground true normative claims? It seems like it can’t—we cannot make true 
normative claims about the property of being green as such. I argued that one way to 
bridge the gap is to invoke function-talk. But—and this is the second question—
what would the function of group-intentions be? These questions need to be 
answered before the success theorist can make her case. Moreover, error theorists 
can rely on eliminative views about group-intentions according to which everything 
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 My opponents have various rejoinders available to them. Parfit, for instance, 
starts by claiming that it would be irrational for individual agents to favour their own 
current selves over their later selves (or the other way round).
437
 It would be 
irrational to take a drug that makes one feel great in the present time but that one 
knows will lethally damage one’s liver in the long run. But if that’s true, argues 
Parfit, then it would be inconsistent for rational agents to favour their own selves 
over other agents. After all, argues Parfit, there is no relevant difference between 
later selves and other agents. So we get rational requirements like Reliance (to help 
our later selves) and Reliance-Others (to help others) again. Call this Parfit’s 
Argument from Entailment.   
 This version of the Argument from Entailment, apart from making some 
interesting additions to the earlier observation that it would be rationally arbitrary or 
ad hoc to accept Reliance but not Reliance-Others, adds nothing of importance to 
Smith’s Argument from Entailment. In particular, it does nothing to assuage my 
worry that rational requirements like Reliance-Others are not naturalistically 
respectable. So again it is not rationally arbitrary to reject Reliance-Others and to 
accept Reliance because the former isn’t naturalistically respectable.438  
                                                                                                                           
that needs to be explained about group-intentions can be explained just by using 
intentions of individual agents. But if that is so then what we are left with are 
individual psychologies and the rational requirements that can be grounded in those. 
But these don’t leave room for requirements with recognisable moral content. 
Overall then, although this kind of objection to error theory first needs to be worked 
out before we can assess its viability fairly, it does already seem to be the case that 
error theorists don’t have a lot to fear from it.  
437 Parfit (1984: §55).  
438 This debate mirrors to an extent the debate between the Nagel of his 1970 The 
Possibility of Altruism and his critics. Nagel writes “Just as there are rational 
requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action, and altruism is 
one of them” (1970: 3). Also, “Nagel sees a parallel between intertemporal and 
interpersonal distribution of benefits and harms. He argues for agent-neutrality or 
altruism by analogy with prudence. Just as the interests of an agent’s future self 
provide him with reasons for action now, so too ... others’ interests provide him with 
reasons for action.” (Brink 1992: 12). But the critique is that “Rational egoism 
assumes that sacrifice requires compensation, that is, that an agent has reason to 
make a sacrifice, say to benefit another, if and only if the agent receives some 
sufficient benefit in return ... [b]ut if sacrifice requires compensation, prudence and 
altruism must be importantly disanalogous. For, in the prudential case, I am 
compensated for a sacrifice of my present interests in favour of my greater future 
interests; these future interests are mine ... [b]ut  interpersonal compensation is not 
automatic; benefactor and beneficiary are distinct. If the independence assumption is 
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 We can also imagine someone arguing as follows. Call this the Entailment 
Argument from Mistakes. At least by hypothesis, she may start her argument, it is 
part of the function of our psychologies to produce true beliefs. But we know that 
individual agents who have the capacity for rational reflection often make mistakes. 
We also know that if agents with the capacity for rational reflection work together 
they are much less likely to make mistakes. So it would be rational for agents with 
the capacity for rational deliberation to work together, for the benefit of each 
individual agent. And to achieve such cooperation, adherence to such rational 
requirements as Reliance-Others is required. Therefore, such requirements as 
Reliance-Others are requirements for agents like us. Importantly, Reliance-Others 
has now been given grounding in individual psychologies of agents. For respecting 
this rational requirement better enables agents to achieve a psychology that can 
perform its function; viz., that of producing true beliefs. So it seems that the other-
regarding (and therefore recognizable moral) rational requirements are in fact 
naturalistically respectable.  
  In response, error theorists can put pressure on at least one element of this 
argument. For there is the possibility of arguing that when individual agents do 
abide by all the rational requirements like True and Information they simply won’t 
believe what there isn’t sufficient evidence to believe. And in that case they will no 
longer need to respect rationality as it is instantiated in other agents. Take some of 
the well-known mistakes that people make when they are engaged in theoretical or 
practical reasoning. Depending on how certain problems are framed people are 
likely to affirm the consequent, to ignore relevant information, et cetera. Working 
together with other agents with the capacity for rational deliberation will decrease 
the possibility of making these mistakes. But so will taking the time to internalise 
                                                                                                                           
correct, the interest of other selves, however great, are not ipso facto interests of 
mine. Unless there is some connection between my interests and those of others ... I 
am not compensated when I sacrifice my interests ... for those of others. But then 
justified concern for my own future does not itself establish [or entail] justified 
concern for others” (Brink 1992: 12). The difference between my account of this 
kind of debate as presented in the text and the account Brink presents is the 
reference to the ‘sacrifice requires compensation-thesis’ has dropped out of my 
account in favour of what we may call the ‘norms are all internal to the agent’s own 
head (and have to be helpful to what’s going on in there)’-thesis, although both 
Brink and I put emphasis on individuals in a sense. Also see Shafer-Landau 
(2003:199).  
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the rational requirements, grounded in one’s psychology in the usual way, not to 
affirm the consequent and not to ignore relevant information. If this is right then as 
far as the goal of acquiring true beliefs is concerned, individual agents do not strictly 
speaking need other agents. True, agents may desire to be able to converse with 
other agents, and this would make it the case that they are, under pressure of the 
Instrumentalist Principle, rationally required to muster a desire not to kill other 
agents. But agents who do not have this desire and simply aim to ensure that their 
psychologies are in line with the rational requirements that there are won’t be 
rationally required to refrain from killing other agents—they can perform their 
function all by themselves. But then a rational requirement like Reliance-Others 
can’t get a grounding in the functional profile of individual psychologies as such—
the rational authority of such requirement is desire-dependent and unable to 
vindicate the categorical applicability of recognisably moral rational requirements. 
Again, we don’t have a vindication of normativity in the rationality-involving sense 
that is recognisably moral. Error theory is still on the cards.  
  Unfortunately, error theory is still not off the hook. For there is one final 
variation on Smith’s Entailment Argument. Call it the Entailment Argument from the 
Goodness of Rational Requirements.  
 Why follow rational requirements rather than just voices in one’s head? The 
answer seems to be: because there is something good about them. If there wasn’t 
anything good at all about following rational requirements rather than voices in 
one’s head then the argument which I make in this chapter (viz., that agents with the 
capacity for rational deliberation should follow the rational requirements like IP and 
Reliance and not voices in their heads) breaks down. For then it would be just as 
permissible to follow voices in one’s head rather than rational requirements. But I 
can’t accept that this argument breaks down, so I should argue that there is 
something good about rational requirements. With that accepted a further claim to 
be made is that the goodness of rational requirements cannot be relative to times or 
agents. For it would result in a very strange view if we admitted that it would only 
be good-for-Abe to abide by IP but that it need not be good-for-Bert to do that, 
given that Abe and Bert have relevantly similar psychologies.
439
  
                                            
439 Markovits (2011: 264n23).  
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 So far no problem for error theory. But now look at Abe considering whether 
he should kill Bert. It would be inconsistent for him to continue to take the means to 
his ends out of recognition of the fact that it is good to follow the Instrumental 
Principle full stop and nevertheless to perform the action of killing Bert that results 
in a state of affairs in which something that is goodness-producing—Bert and his 
ability to follow IP—gets annihilated. Either following IP is objectively or non-
relatively good, in which case agents that can follow IP should be respected, 
regardless of whether these agents are identical to oneself or not. Or it is not 
universally good, but that leads to the weird view that it might be good-for-Abe to 
follow IP but that it need not also be good-for-Bert to follow IP.  
 Both horns of the dilemma are unacceptable for my error theory. The second 
horn, I argued two paragraphs up, sits ill with my defence of Proceduralism+, which 
requires that there is something objectively good about the rational requirements that 
it postulates. But that leaves us with the first horn, which, unfortunately for error 
theory, entails that agents should respect other agents as a means to respecting the 
objective goodness of simple rational requirements like IP. And this ‘should’ is 
clearly recognisable as a moral should.  
To this way of making the argument the error theorist can respond as 
follows. She can insist that talk of the goodness of following rational requirements is 
in fact too much out of line with the proper functioning account of rational 
requirements. Recall from §6.2.1 the distinction between the proper functioning 
account of rational requirements and the intrinsically valuable status account of 
rational requirements. According to the latter, what grounds the truth of for instance 
the Instrumental Principle is that failing to obey a rational requirement involves 
somehow undermining or failing to respect the valuable status of being rational; 
i.e., this would involve failing to respect something that is good. But the proper 
functioning account doesn’t mention the intrinsic value or goodness of obeying 
rational requirements. It only uses the idea that obeying rational requirements is the 
only way to perform one’s function as a being with a psychology like ours. So the 
error theorist relying on Proceduralism+ can question the legitimacy of this talk of 
the goodness as it is employed in the current objection. This means that the 
objection just discussed that relies on it can be rejected as well.  
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 To sum up, there are no rational requirements with recognisable moral 
content that are entailed by the rational requirements that Proceduralism+ vindicates. 
6.4.2  Can Categorical Moral Norms be Grounded in the functional  
Profile of Human Psychologies? 
In this sub-section I look at the objection that my description of the functional 
profile of our psychologies, and the attitudes of desiring and believing that comprise 
it, is somehow mistaken. In essence the objection is that a different account of the 
functional profile of human psychologies provides the building blocks for a 
vindicatory explanation of moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense.  
 Above I argued that desires are the kinds of mental states that ‘aim at their 
own satisfaction’ or ‘are dispositions to realize their own content’. I also argued that 
this interpretation of what desires are gets us an argument for error theory, as the 
only rational requirements that can be grounded in that description are those that do 
not have recognisable moral content.  
 But there are different descriptions of what desires are. Perhaps desires are 
the kinds of things that operate in a law-like way and are in virtue of that subject to 
universalization constraints.
440
 There are various ways of spelling out this idea, 
travelling from Kant through Hare to contemporary philosophers like Korsgaard and 
Velleman. The main idea is that agents who have a desire to kill or steal will have 
desires that they cannot consistently will to have in virtue of the following rational 
requirement: 
 
 Universal RR (if you have and exercise the capacity for practical rationality, 
then the only desires you have are such that they can be fulfilled in 
a way consistent with the fulfilment of all other desires—including 
desires of other agents—or that are such that their content is 
suitably universal) 
 
Universal has two elements. I discuss them in turn. Agents are not allowed to hold a 
desire if it turns out that this desire frustrates the satisfaction of other desires, 
regardless of whether these are instantiated in them or in other agents. So for 
instance, Celine cannot kill Derek because although Celine’s killing Derek would 
satisfy one of her deep desires, that deep desire is also inconsistent with the idea that 
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the fulfilment of no desire may frustrate that of other desires, wherever instantiated. 
And the satisfaction of Celine’s desire to have Derek killed frustrates those desires 
that are instantiated in Derek—indeed, all of them. That was the first aspect of 
Universal. The other aspect of Universal is that desires can also be said to be 
suitably universal when their content is universal. That is, agents can desire equal 
income for all rational agents alike; but they can’t desire, for instance, income 
discrepancies based on non-rational features of agents such as eye-colour.  
 Various philosophers add different emphases to this picture. Korsgaard for 
instance thinks that in performing the action of Killing Derek, Celine would not be 
able to recognize herself as an agent. The reason why desires operate in law-like 
ways and are subject to universalization constraints is that only that allows agents to 
recognize themselves as agents. Velleman adds to Universal the idea that it is 
constitutive of actions that they are intelligible, and that the only way in which this 
aim can be realized is when Universal is respected.
441
  
The problem with the Universalization strategy however is that the thicker 
account of the functional profile of psychologies that it necessitates can’t be 
accepted. The rational requirements that Proceduralism+ postulates are inescapable 
because they are tied to what beliefs and desires are, and these are mental states that 
we cannot help to have. But the rational requirements like Universal that Korsgaard 
and Velleman postulate are only meant to be inescapable because we need to be able 
to recognize ourselves as agents, or because our actions must be intelligible. 
However, in fact they are escapable. Although I simply cannot get rid of all my 
desires and beliefs, I can get rid of the idea that I need to understand myself or that 
my actions have to be able be intelligible. So recall from §5.3.2 my distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate ‘so what?’-responses. Legitimate ‘so what?’-
responses are ‘so what?’-responses that make sense (cf. Joyce’s example of the 
unwilling gladiator). Illegitimate ‘so what?’-responses don’t make sense, and I 
argued that examples of such ‘so what?’-responses are given by rational 
requirements like the Instrumental Principle and Belief Consistency. After all, it 
doesn’t make sense to shrug off requirements on the formation of mental states that 
one cannot help but have whereas it does make sense to shrug off requirements on 
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actions, such as refraining to throw sand, that are entirely arbitrarily and unwillingly 
imposed on oneself. The question is which way Universal goes, and my claim is that 
Universal is like the rule of gladiatorial combat, not like Instrumental Principle and 
Belief Consistency. After all, it makes sense to shrug off the demand for 
understanding oneself—it is not the case that one cannot but want to understand 
oneself—whereas it doesn’t make sense to shrug off the demands of IP et cetera 
because it is the case that one cannot but have desires and beliefs. So a thicker 
notion of the proper function of the human psychologies isn’t defensible. And so 
rational requirements like Universal, which have recognisable moral content, can’t 
be grounded in it.
442
  
 This is a versatile reply. Exactly the same answer applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to suggestions other than that of Velleman and Korsgaard. Take my suggestion from 
§6.2.2 that it might be part of the functional profile of our psychologies that our 
psychologies are the kinds of things whose function it is to allow us to get along 
with each other. Again, the question is whether this is an ‘aim’ or ‘function’ that it 
makes sense to shrug off. And the answer is that it is. We all have desires and beliefs 
and it doesn’t make sense to shrug off the requirements that govern them. But some 
of us are at least some of the times powerful enough, or stealthly enough, to perform 
actions that undermine (mutual) trust in society. For those people, I surmise, it 
makes sense to shrug off the alleged requirement on our psychologies that it must 
produce actions that are such that they, precisely, do not have the effect of 
undermining trust in society. They can get more of what they want without this 
having any negative effects on them.  
One possible reply to this line of reasoning is that I have so far focussed 
exclusively on different understandings of notions of agency, not on the different 
accounts of the function of individual desires per se. According to the 
Universalization account, desires only count as desires when they are subject to a 
universalization constraint. The advocate of a success theory might insist that that 
idea has so far not been undermined. All we have undermined are Korsgaard’s and 
Velleman’s additions to the bare idea of Universal guiding the formation of desires; 
viz., the ideas about recognizing ourselves as agents and the intelligibility of action. 
The reply is that this doesn’t disprove that desires simply are the kinds of things that 
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are subject to rational requirements like Universal.  
This is correct as far as it goes, but it foregoes two important points that 
speak in favour of the error theorist. First, we need an explanation of why desires 
are such that they must operate in a law-like way. Compare this to my own claim 
that desires are the kinds of things that aim at their own satisfaction. My claim is 
very minimal and looks platitudinously true. It sounds very strange to assert that one 
can have a desire for something in such a way that the satisfaction of that desire isn’t 
part of one’s state of mind. But the ‘desires must operate in a law-like way’-idea 
goes further than that—it goes beyond this platitudinously true claim—and we can 
rightfully ask for an explanation of this further claim. That is the first point. The 
second point is that Korsgaard and Velleman provide the required explanations: 
desires are subject to rational requirements like Universal because if they weren’t we 
wouldn’t be able to understand ourselves as agents or else our actions wouldn’t be 
intelligible. But these explanations were unsuccessful. And we have also already 
seen that my objection to Korsgaard’s and Velleman’s explanations is very versatile, 
and so it is plausible to believe that other explanations of why it must be part of 
desires that they operate in a law-like way will also fail. Therefore, merely looking 
at desires themselves in an attempt to argue that they are the kinds of things that are 
subject to universalization constraints won’t work.   
 To conclude, therefore, the friend of a success theory of morality won’t find 
solace in looking at a different, and richer, account of either our psychologies or the 
various mental states that comprise them.  
6.5  Looking Elsewhere  
How about grounding categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving 
sense not in the functional profile of mental states and psychologies, but in 
something else entirely? Perhaps we can say that what supplies morality’s 
categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense are reasons that are 
‘part of the fabric of the world’ in much the way in which Mackie believed that 
morality’s ‘objective prescriptivity’ would have to be ‘part of the fabric of the 
world’. However, in this section I argue that such attempts fail.  
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 Start by distinguishing between robust and quietist non-naturalism.
443
 Robust 
non-naturalists argue that there exist irreducibly normative and non-natural 
properties in the same way that natural properties like being a £20 note exist.
444
 
Quietist non-naturalist realists also argue that there exist irreducibly normative 
properties, but they deny that they exist in the same way that natural properties like 
being a £20 note exist. Moral properties are not real but irreal. This is meant to 
guarantee moral properties’ metaphysical innocence.445 I will first argue that robust 
non-naturalism fails. After that I argue that irrealist theories face the same 
conclusion.  
 In arguing against non-naturalism I will consider Enoch’s recent views, and 
then extrapolate from this discussion.  
Enoch offers the following argument for robust ethical non-naturalism. 
Whether we can accept robust ethical realism “ultimately depends on … [whether] 
its plausibility score is on the whole higher than that of any competing view.”446 
What this means is that if robust ethical realism can make the best sense of our 
platitudinously true claims about ethics and if it has various arguments supporting it 
without taking too many blows in the process—being metaphysically extravagant, 
being in fact unable to explain our epistemic and semantic access to moral 
properties, et cetera—then it will, overall, be preferable to competing theories about 
ethics, including the error theory and various naturalist and expressivist theories. 
And, the argument continues, the antecedent of this conditional is true, so robust 
ethical realism should be accepted.  
 As Enoch also suggests, authors of philosophical treatises can, and should, 
be forgiven for not going through the actual exercise of comparing plausibility 
points (and, in any case, this would require a fairly settled method for tallying 
plausibility points that we currently don’t have).447 So what I am going to do instead, 
in the spirit of Enoch’s own method of argumentation, is to supply some 
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considerations that count in favour of accepting error theory rather than robust 
ethical realism. This discussion is meant to show that robust ethical realism suffers 
from more problems than one might think. I also explain what the plausibility points 
are that error theory has, and the combined result of this is that we should conclude 
that error theory is more plausible than non-naturalism.  
 The first thing I want to mention is that both robust realism and my error 
theory save the appearances, at least to a very large extent. True, robust realism 
saves more appearances than error theory—it saves moral appearances—but other 
than that, I have argued, error theory saves all the other appearances, including 
epistemic and prudential ones. So the fact that error theory only doesn’t save the 
moral appearances is, albeit something that counts against it, not something that 
counts too heavily against it. Indeed, I surmise that this loss in plausibility points 
may be roughly on par with the loss in plausibility points that robust realists face 
with their explicit acceptance of a non-naturalist metaphysics. With Enoch, then, I 
believe that error theory and robust realism are each other’s most formidable 
opponents.
448
 
 Second, on what I think of as a crucial issue—the explanation of the 
normativity of various facts, be they moral, prudential, epistemic or what have 
you—my account is to be preferred over Enoch’s. Enoch agrees with me that moral 
normativity would have to be of the rationality-involving kind and would have to 
have categorical force to count as moral normativity.
449
 He also agrees with me that 
a purely naturalist metaphysics can’t underwrite or ground this kind of 
normativity.
450
 Moreover, Enoch, like me, has a vindicatory explanation of the 
normativity of those facts he believes are normative and exist. I have presented my 
own proper functioning account of rational requirements; Enoch presents his 
argument from deliberative indispensability to ‘Robust Metanormative Realism’ in 
Chapter 3 of his Taking Morality Seriously. But as I will now argue, although I 
believe that my own account is successful, Enoch’s is not. 
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 I can accept Enoch’s “Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of 
Irreducibly Normative Truths” to an extent.451 That is, I can accept that we need to 
postulate irreducibly normative truths in order to make sense of our practical 
deliberation. This, indeed, is similar to the kind of argument I gave in the previous 
chapter for why we have to conceive of the normativity of morality in the 
rationality-involving sense (and to have categorical force). And given that robust 
realism and my error theory save a large number of the appearances, a lot is going to 
turn on the metaphysical respectability of Enoch’s view.  
 Here is where we encounter problems. In his chapter on metaphysics Enoch 
rejects what he calls the Sheer Queerness worry; viz., the worry that we can infer 
from the (alleged) sheer queerness of moral properties that they don’t exist.452 Enoch 
rebuts this worry by insisting that the world is a queer place—Enoch asks us to 
consider, with Platts, neutrinos, aardvarks, infinite sequences of objects and 
impressionist paintings—and concludes that since we don’t put nuclear physics, 
zoology, formal semantics and art history into disrespect in light of the queerness of 
the things that these disciplines talk about, we shouldn’t do that with morality and its 
queer properties either.
453
 I don’t think that this inference holds. The question we 
should ask, in line with my proposal for thinking about naturalness in §6.2.2, is 
whether the properties of being an aardvark, an expressionist painting et cetera stray 
too much from archetype natural properties. And the answer is that none of these 
properties do. But the normative magnetism of moral properties, given the absence 
of a story about the function of a psychology that they can be grounded in (recall the 
result form §6.4.1-2), does.
454
 That is, although we can understand what it is for 
something to be normative when we have at our disposal a story about the function 
of a psychology that grounds the truth of the normative claims involved and 
although we can see that this story is sufficiently similar to a story about other 
properties with functions (such as being a £20 note) that are clearly naturalistically 
respectable, it is very hard to understand how a property that is normative in and out 
of itself can be naturalistically respectable.  
                                            
451 Enoch (2011a: 50). See Enoch (2011a: 116) for a statement of the claim that 
error theorists can accept this argument.   
452 Enoch (2011a: 134-6).   
453 Enoch (2011a: 135); Platts (1980: 72).  
454 Also see Scanlon (2009 Lecture 2: 30); Gibbard (2003: 32).  
- 202 - 
This is queerness understood as ‘mysteriousness’ (see §2.2.3). In that section 
I argued that Mackie uses a different understanding of queerness (being unusually 
unusual) and that a quick glance at understanding being queer as being mysterious 
doesn’t seem to get us a working argument of queerness either. But in fact queerness 
can be understood as mysteriousness, as follows. What is important in the context of 
many theories, both scientific and philosophical, is that we can provide a vindicatory 
explanation of the existence of a theory’s postulates, and, as I argue in this chapter, 
although we can provide a vindicatory explanation of the existence of the norms of 
Proceduralism+ (because these can be grounded in a functional story of human 
psychologies and its constituent parts), we can’t provide a similarly successful 
vindicatory explanation of the existence of mind-independent moral properties that 
are nonetheless normative and indeed able to affect agents’ (practical) rational 
deliberation. Now, postulating such properties anyway would get us a success theory 
of morality, but only at the cost of, precisely, a mysterious (because explanatorily 
vacuous) account of the nature of those properties. For in the same spirit we could 
explain the existence of witches by postulating the existence of the property of being 
able to curse innocent children so that they develop diseases because one has cursed 
them. But in the absence of an explanation of what it is in virtue of which things can 
have that property, this ‘explanation’ of the existence of witches clearly doesn’t 
licences a success theory of witch discourse. In essence, my objection to moral 
realism of the robust, non-naturalist variant goes like this.  
How does this relate to Shepski’s complaints that we can’t infer from our 
failure to understand something that it doesn’t exist (cf. §2.2.3)? Shepski’s 
complaint doesn’t carry a lot of weight as he merely asserts that this inference is 
unwarranted (and that an inference from a failure to be able to conceive of 
something might work, but that this isn’t a queerness worry).455 I disagree. 
Properties for which we cannot provide a vindicatory explanation but which we 
postulate anyway to vindicate the existence of some other phenomenon (witchcraft, 
morality) are clearly and in a good sense ‘queer’. 
So this response of Enoch’s to the queerness of moral properties doesn’t 
work. And again given the plausibility of my error theory when it comes to 
providing vindicatory explanations of normativity elsewhere, it seems to me that 
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robust ethical realism should be rejected in favour of my error theory. A view that 
isn’t queer and only fails to vindicate a small portion of our normative talk—viz., 
our moral talk—is to be preferred over a view that vindicates that extra small portion 
of our normative talk, but is queer.   
 Enoch has a reply to this, however. He claims that his arguments for the 
existence of normative (ethical) truths “were not … intended merely as attempts at 
fleshing out the commitments of moral and normative discourse. They were meant 
as attempts to establish Robust Realism.”456 Since (deliberative) indispensability 
arguments can have ontological implications, the Argument from Deliberative 
Indispensability simply shows that irreducibly normative truths (facts or properties) 
exist. In response, the error theorist should insist that indispensability arguments 
work so long as their ontological implications do not flout a general Metaphysical 
Naturalism, but that, unfortunately, as I’ve just argued, Enoch’s Argument from 
Deliberative Indispensability flouts that very thesis.    
 To this move Enoch has a further reply. Enoch puts forward the Moorean 
Objection against error theory, according to which the fact that one is comparatively 
more certain of a certain existential claim compared to a sceptical claim justifies one 
in retaining the existential claim.
457
 The objection is inspired by Moore’s tactic to 
argue against the skeptic about the existence of an external world:  
 
I cannot help answering [sceptical doubts about the existence of an external world 
as follows]: It seems to me more certain that I do know that this is a pencil and that 
you are conscious, than that any single one of these [sceptical] assumptions is true, 
let alone all [of those assumptions]
458
 
 
In the moral case we would have that it is more certain that one knows that killing is 
wrong than that it isn’t because the sceptical ‘assumption’ that is error theory is true.  
The Moorean objection faces the following dilemma.
459
 Either Moore’s 
claim is a psychological claim or it is a normative claim. If it is a psychological 
claim—as a matter of fact, people continue to believe in moral realism even when 
presented with arguments for error theory—then it seems to have no probative force. 
Philosophical and intellectual inquiries are concerned with what we ought to believe 
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and given that aim it doesn’t matter what some or even all people believe or what 
they are able or unable to believe. If on the other hand the Moorean objection 
presents a normative claim then we need reasons to accept it. Suppose, then, that 
common sense claims are “more certainly true than any evidence that is brought 
against them.”460 However, the problem here is that even if this is true then this 
presumably isn’t a brute fact but that the Moorean Objection fails to provide the 
required explanation. So Moore’s argument fails.   
 Enoch though embraces the second horn of this dilemma. He therefore 
accepts that Moore’s claim is normative. But Enoch insists that Moore’s argument 
isn’t explanatorily vacuous or question-begging, for Enoch argues that there must be 
easy knowledge; i.e., knowledge of the form: 
 
This tomato appears red to me (by introspection); This tomato is red (by 
perception); So my color-perception got it right this time; (Similarly for other 
things); Therefore, my color perception is reliable
461
 
 
Otherwise, argues Enoch, skepticism about the external world can’t be avoided. But, 
to me it seems that this requires further argumentation. There are many responses to 
external world skepticism out there that do not rely on easy knowledge.
462
 I think we 
are therefore back to a consequence of easy knowledge that Enoch himself 
recognizes: Bootstrapping. Appeals to easy knowledge are unjustified, and so this 
final attempt to undermine error theory fails.  
 As far as the debate stands at this point it seems to me that error theory 
emerges victorious: it is better to have a fully naturalistically respectable view that 
condemns a small part of our normative talk—moral talk—to systematic error than 
to have a view that is metaphysically queer but saves moral talk. It would be better if 
I had a knock-down argument against non-naturalism as such though, but I don’t. It 
would also be better if I had the space to compare my error theory with all the other 
version of non-naturalism on offer, but I don’t have that either. Finally it would be 
better if we had a better sense of how to tally plausibility points. Nevertheless, 
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similar kinds of considerations will apply to other non-naturalist theories. Hence I 
conclude, at least provisionally, that error theory fares better than non-naturalism.  
  I turn to irrealist theories. I discuss, in turn, the theories of Scanlon and 
Parfit. After this I generalize my findings to other theories.  
 Scanlon. Scanlon accepts that what is normative in the practical realm always 
involves reasons. He distinguishes, as is customary, between the concept and the 
property of a reason and his view does not reductively analyse reasons on either 
level. So Scanlon’s non-reductionist view does not say that what we really mean 
when we say ‘X has a reason to φ’ is that X stands in a purely non-normative 
relation to purely non-normative facts. It also doesn’t say that the property of a 
reason can be so analysed, for instance by saying that reasons are (the ‘are’ of 
identity) purely non-normative facts or relations.  
 Off the cuff, these commitments seem to imply a robust non-naturalist 
metaphysic. But one way to slim down the metaphysical commitments of this theory 
whilst staying non-reductionist about moral normativity in the rationality-involving 
sense on both the conceptual and the property level is to deny that the property of a 
reason exists in the world. This is Scanlon’s proposal. Moral reasons, albeit 
intrinsically normative, “constitute a distinct realm and [yet] need no metaphysical 
reality.”463  
 Why don’t moral reasons require a distinct metaphysical reality? Start with 
some very general reflections about ontology. With Quine, Scanlon argues that the 
way to understand the ontological commitments of a set of statements is to first 
translate these statements into the language of first-order logic, and then to 
determine what things there must be in the “universe of discourse” of a model in 
which all of these statements are true.
464
 These things are what we are ontologically 
committed to in accepting those statements. Importantly, the ‘universe of discourse’ 
isn’t itself anything ontological but “merely formal: a way of representing all those 
things that are presupposed by some set of statements, about the natural world or 
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about anything else.”465 So the universe of discourse is not the universe itself; that is, 
it is not the world around us as studied by the physical sciences. This distinction 
allows Scanlon to argue that the ontological commitments of a first-order discipline 
such as mathematics and morality only have implications for one’s ‘universe of 
discourse’ and not for ‘the universe’. First-order disciplines that do have 
implications for the universe are limited to the natural sciences and other disciplines, 
such as those studying witches and spirits, that can only be true, if they are, if they 
entail commitments about the universe. But this doesn’t hold for (moral) reasons. 
These can be true without entailing commitments about the inventory of the 
universe.  
 In making this argument Scanlon is committed to a permissive as opposed to 
a restrictive first-order view of ontological commitment. His permissive view says 
that we should decide what sentences to accept as true by applying the criteria 
appropriate to the relevant first-order disciplines (practical and moral thinking 
included) and then accept as existing whatever one is quantifying over in one’s 
‘universe of discourse’. According to such more restricted views “we should … 
avoid ontological commitment to anything other than physical objects”.466 And 
because it seems that normative truths don’t fit into the universe, such restricted 
views are incompatible with normative truths about what we have reason to do.  
 Clearly to get a success rather than an error theory we should accept the 
permissive view. But what justifies accepting the permissive view? Scanlon’s 
answer is that doing this allows us to countenance whole rafts of claims as true (viz., 
claims about mathematics, claims about normativity, et cetera) and because in doing 
so we have nothing to lose. In particular, we are not losing our allegiance to 
metaphysical naturalism. 
 I argue that this is all well and good, but that some questions remain. One 
question is; where, exactly, does the normativity of reasons come from on this 
picture? According to Scanlon, the “distinctive aspect of normative truths is … a 
matter of what Quine called “ideology” (the predicates we employ) rather than 
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ontology (the things we quantify over).”467 This suggests that the normativity of 
reasons comes from our predicates, not from the referents of these predicates. 
However, this is puzzling. For it obfuscates the need for an elaborate irrealist theory 
of the referents of reason predicates.  
 So perhaps this is not what Scanlon has in mind. Perhaps then we should say 
that what is normative are our reasons, not our predicates that we use to talk about 
our reasons. Nevertheless, this then invites the question: how do these reasons exert 
normative force over us? The problem is that we can imagine counter-reasons; 
‘reasons’ that exist in the ontologically light-weight sense of existence that Scanlon 
favours, and which we can imagine to be very similar to that of reasoning albeit 
resulting in different conclusions. After all, if we can justify the existence of reasons 
by reference to the internal practice of reasoning alone—and thus without taking 
considerations about what forms part of the universe into account—then we can 
justify the existence of counter-reasons by reference to the internal practice of 
counter-reasoning alone.
468
 So suppose that we end up with a reason not to kill and a 
counter-reason to kill. Given that both reasons and counter-reasons exist, we can 
ask: why should we heed to our reasons? How do reasons exert their normative 
force over us given that there are also counter-reasons that rogues like Jack the 
Ripper could appeal to? Scanlon has no principled answer to this, and indeed he 
can’t have such an answer as reasons and counter-reasons are equally respectable 
given that all it takes to have them is some practice of thinking about them.
469
 Now 
Scanlon could try to get the required difference between reasons and counter-
reasons by inflating his account of existence to a more “platonistically friendly” 
one.
470
 But that would entail a non-naturalist view inferior to error theory as I have 
already argued earlier on in this sub-section. Overall, then, Scanlon’s irrealism 
doesn’t work. I will now argue that Parfit’s version of this theory faces the same 
conclusion.  
 Parfit. Parfit holds a view similar to Scanlon’s by arguing for a view he calls 
Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalist Normative Cognitivism, according to which 
                                            
467 Scanlon (2009, Lecture 2, p13-4).  
468 Enoch (2011a : 125).  
469 Enoch (2011a : 126).  
470 Enoch (2011a : 124).  
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“there are some claims [about reasons] that are, in the strongest sense, true, but these 
truths have no positive ontological implications.”471 Like Scanlon, Parfit starts by 
looking at what kind of view about existence in general he can or should accept. He 
accepts Possibilism, according to which some things are not real but nevertheless 
exist. Parfit accepts Possibilism on independent grounds, but also because 
Possibilism can get combined with the Plural Senses View of Existence, according 
to which there are different senses in which things can exist. This package of claims 
allows Parfit to claim that although simple Metaphysical Cognitivism is true for 
some areas of discourse (discourse about rocks, which entails robust truths about 
rocks that require us to answer questions about what exists in the ontological sense 
of ‘exist’), there are other areas of discourse, such as those about reasons for action, 
which involve robust truths that do not require us to answer questions about what 
exists in the ontological sense of ‘exists’.472  
 Again the same issue of the existence of counter-reasons applies. For again 
we can consistently with Parfit’s story come with a story about the (non-ontological) 
existence of counter-reasons that problematizes his view. After all, which one has 
real authority—reasons or counter-reasons; i.e., the reasons that we accept not to kill 
or the counter-reasons that Jack accepts to steal? Parfit can’t argue that it is reasons 
that we ought to accept, unless, perhaps, he accepts that these exist in a more 
ontologically laden way. But that brings out the problems for non-naturalist theories.   
 Both theories suffer from the same objection, and in virtue of the same 
feature of their theories; viz., that they refuse to give their theories robust 
metaphysical import. It seems safe to assume that other quietist theories, such as for 
instance Dworkin’s, suffer from the same problem.473 Without going through all of 
these different theories though I conclude, provisionally, that quietist realism can’t 
work.   
 
Neither non-naturalist nor quietist realism can save the day for the moral 
success theorist in the present context in which Proceduralism+ and its rejection of 
                                            
471 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 479).  
472 Parfit (2012 Vol2: 487). Metaphysical Cognitivism is the view that there are 
claims that are, in the strongest sense, true and where these truths have positive 
ontological implications.  
473 Dworkin (1966).  
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rational requirements with categorical moral force is taken as accepted. At this point, 
therefore—and remembering our rejection of non-cognitivism in Chapter 1 and that 
of naturalism in Chapter 4—moral error theory has become the most plausible 
metaethical theory. No moral statements attributing moral properties are true.   
6.6 Conclusion and Preview 
This chapter has argued that the kind of categorical moral normativity that our 
ordinary moral discourse non-negotiably commits us to does not exist, at least not in 
the actual world. In conjunction with the result of the previous chapter that we can 
only have morality when this kind of normativity exists, a moral error theory has 
been established, at least for the actual world. Importantly, this moral error theory, I 
argued, has a convincing reply to the problem that I called the Formulation 
Dilemma. It has better arguments for the Non-Negotiable Commitment Claim and 
the Substantive Claim that existing error theories like that of Mackie and Joyce. The 
next chapter discusses objections to error theory that I haven’t engaged with so far. I 
argue that these objections don’t hurt my error theory. The final chapter of this 
dissertation discusses the issue of how we (prudentially) should respond to the truth 
of my version of error theory.  
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Chapter 7 
Further Objections to Moral Error Theory 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I argued that moral error theory is plausible. It is coherent 
and can deal with various objections. This chapter formulates and rejects objections 
to error theory that I haven’t discussed before. This amounts to further support for 
my error theory.  
One objection I haven’t dealt with yet is that since we can’t honestly believe 
error theory in our least philosophical and most commonsensical moments we 
should abandon error theory (§7.3). Another such objection is that my error theory 
of categorical moral normativity in the rationality-involving sense isn’t pervasive 
enough. Perhaps there are no moral right and wrongs, but if moral goodness, values 
and other aspects of morality are not affected by my arguments then we can doubt 
whether error theorists can rightly say that moral discourse ‘as such’ is in error 
(§7.4). A further objection is that we can infer from (i) the existence of a possible 
world identical to the actual world in all non-moral respects in which there are moral 
properties and (ii) a suitably formulated non-arbitrary constraint on moral 
properties’ instantiation conditions that (iii) the actual world also contains moral 
properties, and hence that error theory is false (§7.5). I close with a summary and 
preview (§7.6). But I start, in the next section, with two objections that require just a 
couple of paragraphs to deal with.  
7.2 Quick Objections, Quick Replies 
Consider the principle of epistemic conservatism:  
 
a person is to some degree justified in retaining a given belief just because that 
person has that belief
474
 
 
                                            
474 Daly and Liggins (2010: 223).  
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On the basis of this quote we can formulate the objection from epistemic 
conservatism. Consistent with the quote we can say that the degree of justification 
for a first-order moral claim such as Wrong (‘stealing is morally wrong’—see §3.2), 
which we possess just because we have the belief that Wrong is true, is greater than 
the degree of justification we have in the truth of error theory. From this it follows 
(at least on the assumption that we should believe what we have the greatest degree 
of justification to believe) that we shouldn’t believe error theory.  
Error theorists can either claim that the principle of epistemic conservatism 
carries no weight at all or that it carries some weight.475 The former, hard-line 
response is possible, but difficult to defend, and error theorist don’t need to defend 
it. For instead they can accept that the principle carries some weight but insist that 
the balance of evidence favours error theory nonetheless. This thesis as a whole aims 
to establish this. The reader must be the judge.  
 The second objection we can dismiss rather quickly starts from the 
observation that when we do philosophy we are trying to reach a reflective 
equilibrium between our pre-theoretical beliefs about various things on the one hand 
and the (philosophical) theories we construct to explain these things on the other 
hand. The objection is that error theory can never feature in such a reflective 
equilibrium because it denies that some pre-theoretical beliefs, such as the belief that 
stealing is wrong, are true.476  
This objection fails as well. It asserts on unwarranted a priori grounds that 
no reflective equilibrium that contains error theory is forthcoming. This remains to 
be seen and this dissertation aims to show that error theory merits the kind of 
epistemic warrant that justifies overthrowing beliefs like Wrong.  
In light of this advocates of this objection may shift ground and assert 
instead that although error theory might achieve reflective equilibrium, there is 
unlikely to be a unique reflective equilibrium. Moreover, they can say, if one of 
these equilibriums doesn’t contain the error theory then that licences embracing that 
particular equilibrium simply because in it error theory is false.  
This objection also fails. We need an additional argument for why the set of 
claims that doesn’t include error theory and yet reaches reflective equilibrium is to 
                                            
475 Huemer (2005: 99); Daly and Liggins (2010: 223). 
476 Daly and Liggins (2010: 216). 
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be embraced rather than another set of claims that also reaches reflective equilibrium 
but does include error theory. That argument needs to go beyond considerations of 
mere reflective equilibrium. Therefore, the objection from reflective equilibrium 
must collapse in one of the other arguments against error theory that are discussed in 
this chapter or elsewhere the dissertation. But these arguments are not successful, as 
I will now continue to argue.  
7.3 Honesty 
Consider the following maxim of honesty:  
 
never put forward a … theory … you cannot yourself believe in your least 
philosophical and most commonsensical moments477  
 
On the basis of this maxim we can formulate the Objection from Honesty. On the 
assumption that we cannot believe error theory in our least philosophical and most 
commonsensical moments we shouldn’t put forward (or we have sufficient reason to 
reject) error theory.  
Daly and Liggins argue that this objection doesn’t work.478 First (1) we 
should not underestimate what we can bring ourselves to believe. Indeed, unless 
there is countervailing evidence, we should take those philosophers who claim that 
they believe moral error theory and other ‘unbelievable’ claims (such as the 
compositional nihilist’s claim that there are no chairs) at their word.479 If (1) is true 
then we can believe error theory, in which case the maxim of honesty no longer 
threatens the error theorist’s position. Second (2) the maxim misses its target 
because in philosophy our aim is to determine what we ought to believe and it is  
 
unclear why our capacities for forming beliefs should constrain our thinking about 
what we ought to believe480 
  
So if (2) is true then the objection from honesty fails because it makes a claim about 
what we in fact cannot believe whereas what is relevant in the debate about error 
theory is a claim about what we should believe.   
                                            
477 Lewis (1986: 135). 
478 Daly and Liggins (2010: 216). 
479 See Merricks (2001) on compositional nihilism; see Pigden (2010: 17) on moral 
nihilism.  
480 Daly and Liggins (2010: 216).  
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As it stands, this two-fold reply fails to convince. First, reply (2) fails to 
appreciate that the maxim of honesty can also be interpreted as a normative claim, as 
follows: you ought to believe only what you can bring yourself to believe. This 
normative claim may be false, but it is a normative claim nonetheless, and it gets us 
a clash between two normative principles; viz., the maxim of honesty and the maxim 
according to which we should believe what we have most evidence to believe. But if 
that is so then the question becomes: which of these normative principles should we 
accept? And the worry for error theory is that if the first principle carries more 
normative weight than the second then it follows that we should reject error theory.  
Worse, as stated Daly and Liggins’ first reply fails to convince as well. For 
Daly and Liggins do nothing to make plausible the claim that when people believe 
error theory, they are at least some of the times in their least philosophical moments 
(circumstances C) and not always in circumstances C’ (their philosophical 
moments). The problem is that for all we know, the set of people that are error 
theorists in circumstances C’ and are able to hold on to the belief that error theory is 
true in circumstances C is empty. And this may be so even though it is true that (1) 
we should not underestimate what we can bring ourselves to believe and indeed that 
some people do in fact believe the error theory, whom we should take at their word 
unless we can cite, as Pigden puts it, “brain injury or massive self-deception.”481 So 
reply (1), because it fails to specify the conditions under which error theory is 
believed, cannot be used to resist the objection from the maxim of honesty.  
Fortunately Daly and Liggins’ response can be strengthened. To strengthen 
their first response, I can note that, unless I suffer from brain injuries or other 
delusions (for which there is no evidence), I am the best authority on what I believe 
and in what circumstances, and I can assure you that I believe my version of the 
error theory both in circumstances C’ and in circumstances C. So the 
abovementioned set of believers in error theory is non-empty. Having thus 
strengthened this response to Lewis’ honesty maxim I have at the same obviated the 
need to strengthen the other response. For even if it turns out that Lewis’ maxim 
carries more weight than the maxim of belief, if we can believe the error theory in 
both C and C’ then the maxim of honesty simply doesn’t apply to error theory.   
                                            
481 Pigden (2010: 17).  
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7.4 Pervasiveness 
The second larger objection I discuss is that my error theory fails because it 
debunks, at most, the deontic features of moral discourse. Perhaps moral statements 
that contain concepts like WRONG (equivalent to ‘ought not’) and RIGHT (equivalent 
to ‘ought’) are in error. But this leaves statements containing evaluative concepts 
like GOOD as well as thick concepts like RUDE error-free. And the same might hold 
for imperatives. After all, my argument in Chapter 5 only showed that moral 
statements such as Wrong metaphysically entail the moral reality thesis —nothing at 
all has been said about: 
 
Good   Giving to famine relief is morally good 
Rude   Scoffing at beggars is rude 
Imperative  Down with war! 
 
This gets us two questions. First, are these sorts of moral statements error-free? 
Second, if the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, does that endanger my conclusion 
that an error theory of moral discourse is warranted?  
One option for error theorists is to admit that the answer to the first question 
is ‘yes’ but that this doesn’t entail that we should also answer the second question in 
the affirmative. We can hold the opinion that “the core of morality [identifies] ... 
some actions to be obligatory”482 and claim that if the core of morality is error-
ridden then error theory of moral discourse is licensed even when moral statements 
like Good, Bad, Rude and Imperative are not in error. A second option also answers 
‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second, but it does so without committing 
itself to the thesis that morality has a deontic core. According to the second option, it 
is already an interesting enough result that a part of morality is error-ridden; namely, 
its deontic part. A third option is to answer ‘no’ to the first question. We can argue 
that judgments like Good, Imperative and Rude are entailed by judgments like 
Wrong and that this means that these statements are in error.  
I will argue that error theorists can embrace the third reply. This is good 
news. For the first reply opens up vexed issues about whether it makes sense to say 
                                            
482 Pauer-Studer (2009: 186).  
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that morality has a core and that its core is deontic.
483 
And the second reply would 
concede too much to the success theorist: if for instance virtue-talk (cf. Rude) 
survives unscratched then virtue ethicists, with their claims about the content or 
subject-matter of moral talk and thought, are still in the running.   
So how about the third option? Joyce writes that “talk of virtues … generally 
implicates the existence of obligations”.484 Virtues are often considered to be 
character traits that one is obligated to cultivate or that the virtuous agent is sensitive 
to when she acts in accordance with her moral obligations. But if that is so then 
virtue ethics requires deontological elements. And if accounts of the virtues leave 
out obligations-talk then they are too far removed from ordinary moral talk.485 So in 
fact virtue ethics also paves the way for error theory.   
How about Good, Rude and Imperative? Regarding Good, I borrow from 
Dreier and Joyce.
486
 Morality consists of rules, argues the moral error theorist, but 
this might beg the question against evaluative conceptions of morality. For such 
conceptions of morality tells us what things are of value, not what the actions are 
that we should perform. However, some (if not most) evaluative conceptions of 
morality also tell us what to do after they’ve told us what is of value: they tell us to 
maximize value, or satisfice value, or what have you. This means that evaluative 
conceptions of morality often entail deontological conceptions of morality.  
 In fact, even those purely evaluative conceptions of morality entail 
deontological notions. For even if it is not obligatory to bring about morally good 
states of affairs, it would presumably still be good to bring it about, in which case 
one seems to have a right to perform the act that brings about the morally good state 
of affairs. And from that it follows that everyone else has a moral obligation to allow 
each other to perform that action.487 The question, though, is whether there is 
anything that corresponds to that obligation, and if my error theory is right there 
isn’t.     
                                            
483 See, e.g., Scanlon (1982: 107); also see Schiffer (2003: 257-8); Lillehammer 
(2004: 762); Anscombe (1958); Bloomfield (2007); Joyce (2011b: 154); Macintyre 
(1981). 
484 Joyce (2001: 175).  
485 See Chapter 5 and Joyce (2001: 175).  
486 Dreier (1997: 81); Joyce (2001: 175-6). Also see Bond (1966).  
487 Hinckfuss (1987: 5).  
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 This leaves us with thick moral concepts and imperatives. Consider thick 
moral concepts first.488 Thick concepts somehow hold together descriptive and 
evaluative components, and everything we said thus far about purely thin evaluative 
and deontic concepts can be applied to the evaluative component of thick concepts. 
For instance, assume that the evaluative component of Rude is something like 
‘undesirable but morally permissible’. If that is so then error theory directly kicks in 
concerning ‘morally permissible’. Moreover, it kicks in regarding ‘undesirable’ 
when we can link this evaluative conception of morality with the deontic one in 
much the way that Dreier and Joyce explained we can. Hence, utterances like Good 
and Rude carry links to deontological thin concepts. This is further evidence that 
error theorists needn’t fear pervasiveness worries.  
Finally, let us look at imperatives. It can be argued that imperatives are 
merely used to express non-cognitive attitudes and that they are therefore not truth-
apt propositions of the kind that error theorists balk at.489 Consider ‘Down with 
war!’ Its grammatical form suggests that the person uttering it doesn’t believe that 
war is wrong and merely holds an unfavourable attitude toward war. The best reason 
for holding this view that I can think of is that if you believe that ‘war is morally 
wrong’ you will express that belief with a sentence in the indicative mood. For 
sentences in the indicative mood are standardly understood to express beliefs, and in 
virtue of that standardly understood to express willingness on the utterer’s part to 
take up certain commitments.
490
 These commitments include things like defending 
one’s belief in discussion, revising it in the face of countervailing evidence, and 
allowing that belief to feature in an explanation of one’s behaviour in something like 
the following form: ‘I’m not voting for the Republicans because they are more likely 
to wage wars, I believe that wars are morally wrong, and I believe that one shouldn’t 
do things that further wrong actions’. And because beliefs have all these further 
commitments that you don’t want to take up if you merely feel a certain way about 
war, you will use an imperative to signal that you don’t want to take up all these 
commitments.  
Error theorists should respond to this challenge by arguing that it is not a 
challenge. If imperatives express non-cognitive states and are therefore not truth-apt 
                                            
488 Joyce (2001: 176).  
489 Svoboda (2011: 43).  
490 Cf. Green (2009: §3) for an exception.  
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then they fall outside the scope of error theory and can be legitimately and 
felicitously uttered. And if imperative express beliefs with deontic, evaluative or 
thick moral content, then error theory kicks in. Overall, therefore, pervasiveness 
worries do not threaten error theory.   
7.5 The Non-Arbitrariness Constraint and Metaphysical Possibility 
I will now discuss:  
 
 Coons’ Argument 
P1  There is a metaphysically possible world that is non-morally identical to the 
actual world where error theory is false 
P2 If (P1) then there are moral facts in the actual world 
P3 There are moral facts in the actual world [From 1,2] 
P4 If (P3) then error theory is false 
C Therefore, error theory is false [From 3,4]
491
 
 
I explain the objection and why it fails.   
Start with P1. Since my error theory only argues that moral properties are 
metaphysically queer and not metaphysically impossible, there is a world like ours 
where error theory is false (i.e., where moral properties are instantiated). Coons 
argues that support for P1 comes from three common metaethical positions, 
accepted by error theorists like myself (and some other metaethicists as well): 
 
First Claim:  “no non-moral features of the actual world preclude the 
instantiation of moral properties”492  
Second Claim:  moral claims are truth-apt 
Third Claim:  moral claims are coherent (so we cannot determine on a 
priori grounds that they are false) 
  
First Claim rules out the possibility that there is something about this world that 
guarantees that it can’t instantiate moral properties even though moral properties are 
possible because they are instantiated in other possible worlds.
493
 Second Claim 
rules out non-cognitivist interpretations of moral language which, at least without 
                                            
491 Coons (2011: 87-92). In fact Coons’ argument is more complicated than this (it 
uses the wrongness of particular acts as well) but these complications don’t affect 
the argument.  
492 Coons (2011: 87).   
493 Coons writes “This sort of skepticism is rare, but it is not outlandish. For 
example, imagine someone who argues that there are no moral requirements because 
no actual being has the cognitive capacities for agency, and, there are no moral 
requirements if no agent is bound by them” (2010: 87n10).  
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the quasi-realist agenda, could be pressed into the service of an argument for 
morality’s impossibility.494 Third Claim rules out the possibility of an error theory 
according to which moral properties are impossible because the concepts we use to 
pick them out make incompatible claims about their instantiation conditions.495  
However, even if this is all true (hence, even if it is true that moral properties 
are instantiated in a world that is non-morally identical to ours), this doesn’t yet 
show that moral properties are instantiated in the actual world. This is what P2 is 
meant to guarantee. Coons argues that the non-arbitrariness constraint on moral 
properties’ instantiation conditions guarantees that moral properties would also be 
instantiated in the actual world once they are instantiated in a world that is non-
morally identical to ours. According to the non-arbitrariness constraint, it is 
“impossible” that the instantiation of moral properties is “random and unprincipled”, 
which is what it would be if “morality could require you to do one thing in a 
particular situation and something else in a qualitatively identical situation.”496 
Coons also argues that a suitably strong or at least a global supervenience relation 
between moral and non-moral properties allows for the same inference.497 In either 
case, the idea is that if moral properties are instantiated in a possible world non-
morally indiscernible from ours, it then follows that, given the truth of the non-
arbitrariness constraint or a suitable supervenience relation, moral properties are also 
instantiated in the actual world.  
P4 is obviously true, and so is P3 as long as P1 and P2 are true. Moreover, 
the argument is valid. Therefore, Coons’ Argument is a real challenge to my error 
theory, which was a claim about the actual world.  
What to make of this argument? It is not clear that P1 is true. That is, it is not 
clear whether there is a possible world non-morally indiscernible from ours where 
error theory is false. If, as we are assuming, the actual world is inhospitable to moral 
properties because of its constellation of non-moral properties on which the moral 
properties supervene, then this fact precisely rules out the possibility that there is 
another possible world, non-morally identical to ours, where moral properties are 
                                            
494 See Brown (2013: 628); Wedgwood (2001: 3). I argue against the idea that 
emotivism entails morality’s impossibility in Kalf (MS).  
495 For such error theories see Loeb (2008); Schiffer’s (1990, 2003).  
496 Coons (2011: 91).  
497 Coons (2011: 90-1).  
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instantiated. I argued for the antecedent of this conditional in Chapter 6. As we also 
saw, Coons explicitly assumes the opposite with his assumption First Claim. But this 
is an extremely gratuitous assumption in this context.498  Perhaps moral properties 
are possible, because instantiated, in other worlds not non-morally identical to ours. 
For perhaps in those worlds there are unicorns and irreducibly normative categorical 
moral reasons. But that doesn’t show that moral properties are possible in other 
worlds that are non-morally identical to ours—they aren’t, because in those worlds 
the same non-moral facts obtain, and these leave no room for moral properties, as I 
argued in Chapter 6. Coons’ Argument fails.499  
7.6 Conclusion and Preview 
In this chapter I have argued that the remaining objections to error theory that can be 
found in the literature are not convincing. Given my earlier argumentation in 
Chapters 1-6, we should therefore conclude that error theory is a plausible 
metaethical theory—indeed, that it is the most plausible metaethical theory within a 
cognitivist framework. The next chapter formulates and defends revolutionary 
cognitivism as a response to error theory.  
                                            
498 Also see Brown (2013).  
499 This also means that my error theory is sufficiently stable. We can’t seem to 
change something about the fact that our world is one in which metaphysical 
naturalism holds. So there doesn’t seem to be anything we can do to ‘introduce’ 
morality in the actual world. Had morality depended not on facts that can’t be 
reconciled with metaphysical naturalism but on facts that can be reconciled with 
metaphysical naturalism and that are just contingently not instantiated (e.g., identity 
of morally relevant desires across all agents—Burgess 1998) then we would have 
been able to introduce morality into the actual world. All that is needed for that is 
for us to adopt the same morally relevant desires. But, again, for my error theory this 
isn’t possible.  
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Chapter 8 
Revolutionary Cognitivism 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Thus far I have argued that error theory, or at least my formulation of it, merits more 
credit than it is often given. Indeed, my arguments suggest that we should be error 
theorists rather than success theorists if we are metaethical cognitivists. This raises 
the following question: what (prudentially) should we do with our error-ridden 
moral discourse? I argue that adopting a hitherto largely underexplored version of 
revolutionary cognitivism is the best answer to that question.500  
In the next section I explain what revolutionary cognitivism is. I discuss its 
psychological, semantic and epistemological commitments. I also explain its 
benefits (§8.2). After this I discuss problems for revolutionary cognitivism and 
suggest solutions to these problems (§8.3). The combined force of §8.2-3 is that 
revolutionary cognitivism is plausible. I then compare revolutionary cognitivism 
with other responses to error theory, arguing that revolutionary cognitivism enjoys 
important benefits over each of them in pair-wise comparisons (§8.4). The upshot of 
§8.2-4 is that we should become revolutionary cognitivists after error theory. A 
conclusion summarizes my main findings, both of this chapter and that of the thesis 
as a whole (§8.5).  
8.2 Psychology, Semantics, Epistemology, Benefits 
Psychology. Revolutionary cognitivists believe that after error theory we should stop 
believing moral propositions and should start believing schmoral propositions, 
where schmoral propositions are propositions like: 
                                            
500 ‘Hitherto largely unexplored’ because although revolutionary cognitivism is, as 
I argued in Chapter 1, Mackie’s response to the truth of error theory, his response to 
error theory has been largely misunderstood. Moreover, in more recent times 
revolutionary cognitivism is not even mentioned as an option for error theorists in 
for example Miller (2013: 115); Joyce (2001, 2005); Suikkanen (2013). Two 
exceptions are Schiffer (1990, 2003) and Lillehammer (1999).  
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 Schwrong Stealing is schmorally wrong 
  
The fact that revolutionary cognitivists continue to talk about beliefs sets them apart 
from certain types of fictionalist views that say that we should alter our mental 
attitudes towards moral propositions. Recall the attitude-fictionalist from §3.5. 
Schematically:  
 
Attitude of make-believe to:   Moral proposition (E.g., ‘stealing is 
morally wrong’) 
 
Other fictionalist views propose to keep our attitude towards moral propositions as it 
is now (i.e., one of believe) and suggest that we should alter the content of moral 
propositions by prefixing them with a fictionalist operator.
501
 These are content-
fictionalist views. Schematically:  
 
Attitude of believe to:  Fictionalist moral proposition (E.g., ‘in the moral 
fiction, stealing is wrong’) 
 
Revolutionary cognitivism is similar to content-fictionalism in that it keeps intact 
the attitude of believe we currently bear toward moral propositions and only alters 
the content of these moral propositions. But according to the revolutionary 
cognitivist, we shouldn’t prefix moral propositions with ‘in the fiction’-operators. 
Instead, we should change the content of what we say by starting to talk about 
schmoral rather than moral wrongs:  
 
Attitude of believe to: Schmoral proposition (E.g., ‘stealing is schmorally 
wrong’) 
 
Semantics. What does it mean for stealing to be schmorally wrong? It means 
that there are considerations that speak against stealing that fall short of being moral 
considerations. Recall that a consideration counts as a moral consideration if and 
only if it involves categorical normativity in the rationality-involving sense. If one 
utters a moral judgment like Wrong then one’s utterance is false if there isn’t any 
categorical normativity in the rational requirement-involving sense not to perform 
the action that one said was wrong. Contrastingly, if one utters a schmoral judgment 
like Schwrong then one’s utterance is false if there wasn’t any hypothetical 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense not to perform the action that one says 
                                            
501 Oddie and Demetriou (2010: 200).  
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is Schwrong. Hypothetical normativity in the rationality-involving sense is 
normativity that governs combinations of agents’ mental states and is grounded in 
agents’ desires. In Chapter 6 I argued that there is no categorical normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense that is recognisably moral. But that leaves it open that 
there is hypothetical normativity in the rationality-involving sense that is 
recognisably moral. Call considerations that have hypothetical normativity in the 
rationality-involving sense and that are recognisably moral schmoral rather than 
moral considerations. Revolutionary cognitivism proposes that we start uttering 
schmoral propositions that describe hypothetical normativity in the rationality-
involving sense.  
What is hypothetical schmoral normativity? Consider non-substantive, 
procedural rational requirements such as the Instrumental Principle (IP). IP can be 
used to argue that agents who already desire not to steal should not steal this 
particular bike. Here the reasoning is that (i) being in the mental state of knowing 
that stealing this bike would not further one’s more general, underived desire not to 
steal and that (ii) being in that general mental state of not desiring to steal generates, 
under normative pressure of IP, (iii) the further desire not to steal this particular 
bike. But again, although we do have normativity in the rationality-involving sense 
with recognizable moral content (‘do not steal this bike’), we don’t have moral 
normativity. For the normativity we have is desire-dependent or hypothetical—drop 
the general desire not to steal and the normative pressure you were under not to steal 
this bike evaporates. Of course IP itself is categorically normative in the rationality-
involving sense. But IP has no content—IP is a purely procedural rational 
requirement. Only in conjunction with (i) and (ii) does it generate normative 
pressure for the agent to form the instrumental desire not to steal the contextually 
salient bike. It is for this reason—i.e., that we can only get rationally authoritative 
normative pressure on agents to adopt desires with recognizable moral content if we 
combine a procedural rational requirement with a non-instrumental, recognisably 
moral and yet rationally optional desire that we can drop whenever we want to 
escape the rationally authoritative normative pressure—that I call the normativity 
that does exist and that is recognisably moral ‘hypothetical’ normativity. As 
explained in Chapter 5, the folk would not mistake their categorical moral 
normativity with this kind of hypothetical normativity. But since we are talking 
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about schmorality, this is fine—and, indeed, the best we can have given the sceptical 
arguments in Chapter 6.   
A final remark about the semantics of revolutionary cognitivism is this. What 
the revolutionary cognitivist proposes is a homophonic translation for moral terms 
in moral judgments to get schmoral terms that feature in schmoral judgments: 
 
what our utterances of [schmoral] sentences … reflect are our own subjective 
values. So … [we might] carry on as before [with moral discourse] but without 
imagining our evaluations to be [categorically normative in the rationality-involving 
sense]. If we would then be uttering sentences which are capable of being true, what 
would make them so … is fidelity to our subjective values502  
 
The translation is homophonic because although the content of what is being 
said is altered, what the resulting utterance sounds like is not different from the 
original utterance. The folk, argues the revolutionary cognitivist, can continue to say 
things like ‘stealing is wrong’ as long as what they mean (I’m talking about 
semantic rather than speaker meaning here) by that is ‘there is hypothetical 
normativity in the rationality-involving sense that governs my desires-forming 
processes’. Metaethicists discussing the pros and cons of revolutionary cognitivism 
are probably better advised to use the nomenclature of ‘morality’ and ‘schmorality’, 
however, in order to avoid confusion.  
Epistemology. How do we know what is schmorally right and wrong? We 
can know this by looking at our own subjective values. If I have an original desire to 
steal and no desire not to steal then, given the Instrumental Principle and as 
explained above, I should steal. Contrastingly, if I have a desire not to steal and no 
desire to steal then, again given the Instrumental Principle and as explained, I should 
not to steal.  
                                            
502 Burgess (1998: 545; emphasis in original). I borrow the term homophonic 
translation from Burgess. Also see Lillehammer (2000: 174) who suggests that error 
theorists could say that “normative reasons should be construed as response 
dependent regardless of the conceptual commitments embodied in common sense 
ethical discourse.” Similarly Balaguer explains that after error theory we “might 
decide that we would be better off if we altered our moral practices, i.e., if we 
started using our moral terms slightly differently, so that they expressed slightly 
different concepts, concepts that were … more natural or coherent, or some such 
thing” (2011: 374).  
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A major question is whether, and if so how, our desires should be corrected 
in light of full or ideal information or rationality constraints.503 My revolutionary 
cognitivism holds that some sort of correction of desires vis-à-vis other desires is 
mandatory. If I have the fundamental desire not to steal but also have the more 
specific desire to steal this bike, then one of these desires has to go. On the safe 
assumption that agents will more often relinquish their particular desires rather than 
their general desires, we can assume that in this situation the agent will relinquish 
her desire to steal the contextually salient bike. But since the Instrumental Principle, 
which is supplying the normativity in this case is content-neutral or a procedural 
rather than a substantive rational requirement, it would be equally fine for the agent 
to drop her fundamental desire for not stealing and to keep the desire to steal the 
bike (and then probably also to adopt the new fundamental desire to steal). So 
according to revolutionary cognitivism correction of desires vis-à-vis other desires is 
mandatory, but correction of desires per se is out. For that requires substantive 
rational requirements with recognisable moral content, and these don’t exist. Agents 
are not doing anything wrong when they have the fundamental, non-derivative 
desire to steal. They are certainly not doing anything morally wrong.
504
  
Benefits. Why schmoralize? The basic idea is that there is a subset of the 
roles that morality currently plays that could be played by something like morality 
even if it became widely accepted that morality is flawed.
505
 There are two aspects 
of moralizing that schmoralizing can mimic and that constitute schmorality’s 
benefits. One aspect of morality that schmorality can mimic is morality’s role in 
intra-personal practical deliberation. The second aspect of morality that schmorality 
can mimic is morality’s role in inter-personal moral communication. Let’s start with 
intra-personal benefits.  
                                            
503 The issue is a very thorny one as well (Enoch 2005).  
504 It would indeed be implausible if we were “[trimming moral] obligation to the 
size of individual motives” (Frankena 1958: 80; also see Brandt 1979) but we aren’t 
doing that. In the wake of error theory we are proposing that we are trimming 
schmoral obligations to the size of individual motives.  
505 West (2010: 196); Lillehammer (2004: 100); Parfit (2012: Vol. I, p273).  
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Intra-Personal Benefits. We moralize, and might have to continue to 
schmoralize, about things we deeply care about.506 Moralizing was, and 
schmoralizing will be, about torturing, killing, stealing, cheating, lying, giving to 
famine relief, helping someone at great costs to oneself, scoffing at the vulnerable, 
abortion, euthanasia, starting wars, sending more soldiers to the front, ending wars, 
giving kidneys to family members, et cetera, et cetera. The revolutionary cognitivist 
argues that there is normative pressure not to engage in some of these activities and 
to engage in some of the others. True, the normative force that it countenances stems 
from procedural rational requirements like the Instrumental Principle combined with 
our contingent desires rather than from an independently existing and irreducibly 
normative moral reality or substantive rational requirements that supply the required 
normative force. But that difference is often unimportant. It is a safe conjecture that 
many healthy, responsible adults desire not to steal and not to kill, and do desire to 
give to famine relief.507 One benefit of revolutionary cognitivism is that with it we 
can still make sense of the thought that we have to do these things. After all, we 
desire to give to famine relief and believe that we can do this by donating money to 
Oxfam. Then, by the Instrumental Principle, we are under genuine normative 
pressure to form a specific desire to donate to Oxfam. Indeed, not only can we, with 
schmorality, make sense of the thought that people with the right desires should give 
to famine relief, we can also make sense of the thought that such adults are making a 
rational mistake in their practical deliberation if they don’t settle on giving to Oxfam 
under these circumstances. For it is a rational mistake if one doesn’t desire to give to 
Oxfam and yet desires to give to famine relief and believes that giving to Oxfam is a 
good enough (or the best, or the most economic) way of giving to famine relief.  
So the first benefit of schmoralizing is this 
 
First Intra-Personal Benefit of Schmoralizing  
Schmoral considerations constrain agents’ practical deliberations almost as much as 
moral considerations do, thereby allowing us to hold on to the ideas that we should 
not desire to steal bikes (under certain circumstances, including the obtaining of the 
                                            
506 I write ‘might have to continue to schmoralize’ because at this point in the 
chapter I cannot yet rule out other options such as fictionalism and preservatism. I 
argue that revolutionary cognitivism outcompetes these and other theories in §8.4.  
507 This even holds for nihilists as their “past beliefs may have continuing effects 
on what they care about and do” (Parfit 2012 Vol2: 462). Also see Burgess (1998).  
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relevant desires) and that we are making a rational mistake when we do steal (again 
under certain circumstances, including the obtaining of the relevant desires).
508
  
 
‘Almost just as much’ because what schmorality can’t make sense of is the thought 
that all adults have to abide by particular rules and obligations with a particular 
content, such as the rule against stealing, whatever they desire. But that is precisely 
what necessitated the error theory—there are no rational requirements governing the 
formation of underived desires with recognizable moral content. Other than this 
there are a lot of other things that the moralist can say and that the revolutionary 
realist can say just as well; including, as indicated, that most agents are most of the 
time making rational mistakes if they don’t give to famine relief (if the right 
background desires and beliefs are in place). ‘Most agents’, because there are going 
to be some agents who simply desire to steal and that’s that. And ‘most of the time’ 
because even though for many agents it is true that they ought to drop their 
instrumental desire to steal a particular bike when they don’t want to drop their 
fundamental desire not to steal, it is perfectly legitimate for those agents to decide to 
drop their fundamental desire not to steal instead. But these exceptions 
notwithstanding, again, for the majority of cases revolutionary cognitivism gives the 
same verdict as ordinary morality—viz., that agents ought to refrain from stealing 
and that they therefore ought to drop their motivationally efficacious desire to steal. 
Does schmoralizing have to be as superficial as I have presented it so far? 
That is, can schmoralizing only consist in figuring out something as straightforward 
as whether an act of giving to Oxfam strokes with one’s beliefs and desire to give to 
famine relief?  
The answer is ‘no’, and this is nicely brought out by Lillehammer. He starts 
by saying much what I say about how to respond to error theory: 
 
the falsity of [moral] judgments does not entail the falsity of judgments which assert 
the existence of instrumental relationships between means and ends. Nor does the 
falsity of [moral] judgments entail the falsity of judgments which say whether or not 
different practical options are consistent with each other, given certain constraints or 
given certain circumstances
509
 
 
He adds to this picture that: 
 
                                            
508 Lillehammer (2004: 108); also see Railton (1986: 169); Hume (1751: Sect. IX, 
Pt. II).  
509 Lillehammer (1999: 211); also see Timmons (1999: 82). 
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There is an indefinite number of truths about how ends can be promoted and related 
to each other, necessarily or contingently. The [error theorist] can invoke these facts 
to explain why informative, insightful, deep and useful ethical thinking can be 
undertaken even if there are no [moral] normative reasons. If the ends involved are 
of the requisite kind and the problem situation sufficiently complex, the thinking 
required to make sense of the situation can easily amount to highly systematic and 
illuminating moral theorizing
510
 
 
One example of such ‘systematic and illuminating moral theorizing’ concerns the 
question of the improvement of the human condition. How is that to be attained? 
That is, how do factors such as world-politics, poverty, the power of multi-nationals 
and the current economic crisis affect this issue—and what overarching schmoral 
principle does it make sense to desire given one’s current set of both non-
instrumental and instrumental desires and beliefs? Schmoralizing is not always as 
simple and straightforward as my examples involving IP have so far suggested. 
Moreover,  
 
[schmoral] theorizing can also provide interesting impossibility and possibility 
proofs based on either the logical consistency or the practical compatibility of 
different conceptions of the good or the right. For example, one might try to prove 
that a system of human rights can be implemented consistently with a utilitarian 
moral theory … All the [error theorist] denies is that [a certain] approach [to the 
question of our ultimate ends] is intrinsically rationally privileged
511 
 
 
Again, schmoralizing will not, and cannot, be identical to moralizing. But it can be 
something that mimics moralizing to a fairly large degree and can it can be a very 
interesting and difficult activity all the same. It also follows from this that 
revolutionary cognitivism can make sense of moral disagreement, as there can be 
deep and interesting disagreement about what the (correct) means-end relations are 
as they pertain to a particular moral problem and its solution.   
But why not think directly in terms of desire-satisfaction rather than in terms 
of what is ‘schmorally’ right or wrong? This is where the second, intra-personal 
benefit of revolutionary cognitivism becomes relevant. It is generally true that the 
more cognitive steps are required in thinking about something, or in making a 
decision, the less likely it is that the agent reaches a particular conclusion or acts on 
a particular intention.512 The more cognitive steps one needs to make the more likely 
it is that where one wants to end up—in our case, the situation in which one has a 
                                            
510 Lillehammer (1999: 211).  
511 Lillehammer (1999: 213).  
512 Tresan (2010: 230); cf. Mackie (1977: 156); Joyce (2001: 184, 212).  
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psychology that maximally adheres to the rational requirements—isn’t where one 
will in fact end up. Once the agent knows that stealing is inconsistent with her 
underived desires and instrumental beliefs and so long as there aren’t any signs that 
anything has changed with her attitudes towards stealing, then the following holds. 
Thinking directly in terms of the schmoral wrongness of stealing allows the agent to 
skip some cognitive steps and to form a natural bulwark against stealing, adopting 
the desire for which allows the agent to attain a psychology that is fully in line with 
the rational requirements—or at least more in line with the rational requirements 
than a psychology in which she (wrongly) instrumentally desires to steal the bike. So 
the second benefit of schmoralizing is this: 
 
Second Intra-Personal Benefit of Schmoralizing  
Agents using schmoral considerations to govern their attitude-formation processes 
can better, because more reliably, approach a psychology that is maximally in line 
with the existing rational requirements   
 
To sum up the discussion so far, revolutionary cognitivism undertakes 
various psychological, semantic and epistemological commitments. These 
commitments come with benefits. Two of these are intra-personal benefits; benefits 
that concerns the agent insofar as she herself uses schmoral considerations in her 
practical deliberations. One such benefit is that with schmoral wrongs and 
obligations we can continue to make sense of the thought that we have to muster 
desires and intentions for performing or not performing morally relevant actions 
such as killing and stealing and indeed that we can make sense of the thought that 
we are making a rational mistake if we are not mustering those desires. The other 
benefit is that thinking in terms of schmoral wrongness rather than directly in terms 
of what is consistent with one’s other mental attitudes and the (procedural) rational 
requirements probably gives the agent a better chance of getting a psychology that 
maximally approaches the ideal of one that adheres to all the rational requirements. 
Let me now consider the inter-personal benefits of schmoralizing.  
Inter-Personal Benefits. There are also inter-personal benefits associated 
with revolutionary cognitivism. Two of these mimic the two intra-personal benefits 
just discussed. I discuss them first and then turn to a third interpersonal benefit.   
It is an intra-personal benefit of schmoralizing that the agent can make sense 
of her own obligation to refrain from stealing and indeed that she can make sense of 
her making a rational mistake when she does steal (so long as she has some relevant 
desires grounding the truth of these claims). Similarly, it is an inter-personal benefit 
- 229 - 
of schmoralizing that we can make sense of other people having to refrain from 
stealing and we can also make sense of them making a rational mistake when they 
steal (as long as they have some relevant desires grounding the truth of these 
claims). Let me elaborate on both conjuncts of the inter-personal claim.  
First, we can make good sense of other people having to refrain from stealing 
if we accept revolutionary cognitivism because according to that theory there are 
rational requirements governing individuals’ combinations of mental states such that 
when agents desire not to steal and know that taking away this bike amounts to 
stealing, they have to muster a desire for not-stealing that bike. On the assumption 
that agents should not drop true beliefs and on the further assumption that they will 
be reluctant to drop their original, non-derivative desire for not stealing, the attitude 
that is likely to be dropped and should be dropped if the assumption is true will be 
the one for stealing the bike.  
Second, if agents don’t make any of these changes then they are making a 
rational mistake, and revolutionary cognitivism therefore allows us to direct 
legitimate critique of their behaviour at other people from the point of practical 
rationality. The critique is ‘legitimate’ because it reflects the fact that these agents 
are ignoring normative force in the rationality-involving sense to perform certain 
actions.513 Of course, the kind of critique can be more interesting and difficult to put 
one’s finger on than this (recall my discussion of Lillehammer’s end-relative moral 
theorizing above), but these are the essentials of the first inter-personal benefit of 
schmoralizing. So we get:  
 
First Inter-Personal Benefit of Schmoralizing  
Schmoral considerations constrain agents’ practical deliberations almost as much as 
moral considerations do, thereby allowing us to hold on to the ideas that other 
agents should not desire to steal bikes (under certain circumstances, including the 
obtaining of the relevant desires) and are rightly rationally criticisable when they do 
steal (again under certain circumstances, including the obtaining of the relevant 
desires) 
 
                                            
513 Whether agents are culpable for not knowing that this force exists in addition to 
being culpable for knowing that the force exists and yet don’t act on it is not 
immediately relevant. After all, with the latter kind of culpability we can already 
provide a vindicatory explanation of our intuitions that other agents ought not to 
steal—at least when assuming that these agents are normal, healthy human beings 
and that they are also unlikely to relinquish their non-instrumental, underived desire 
for not-stealing.   
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A second inter-personal benefit of schmoralizing mimics the other intra-
personal benefit of schmoralizing. The second benefit of schmoralizing on the intra-
personal level was that by taking certain considerations as schmoral considerations 
and simply acting on them (rather than going through the underlying calculations of 
what accords with one’s fundamental desires in combination with the rational 
requirements, et cetera) will make it easier for the agent to attain the ideal of a 
psychology that is maximally adherent to the rational requirements. A similar 
benefit with schmoralizing materializes on the inter-personal level. The thought is 
that in order to get what you and I both want (this time a world that contains a little 
suffering as possible, on the assumption that that is what we both fundamentally 
desire) it will be useful to be able to skip some cognitive steps. We will have more 
success attaining the world that we both want when we can say to each other that 
stealing is schmorally wrong compared to when we communicate our ideas in the 
following, highly convoluted way: ‘stealing is inconsistent with our shared non-
derivative desire of living in a world in which there is as little human suffering as 
possible because and … etc., etc.’514 So we get: 
 
Second Inter-Personal Benefit of Schmoralizing  
Schmoral considerations allow agents to better communicate and thereby better 
attain the world that is most congruent with their shared desires compared to a 
situation in which those agents cannot communicate such considerations 
 
In addition to these two inter-personal benefits there is one further such 
benefit.515 Distinguish between the locutionary and perlocutionary act of schmoral 
                                            
514 Similarly Schiffer remarks that schmoralizing allows for “quick and easy” 
coordination of plans among “certain recognizable others about the kind of world we 
wished to inhabit” (2003: 261). Schiffer also writes that perhaps “we would 
introduce an indexical word ‘shmwrong’ such that when A said to B that it would be 
shmwrong for so-and-so to do such-and-such she was expressing a belief whose 
case-value was that A and B would want so-and-so not to do such-and-such if they 
were agreed about all relevant facts … My use [of moral language] is instrumental, 
but it gets across what I need to get across, and which I couldn’t begin to get across 
if I had to express the truth in what I was saying without use of those terms” (2003: 
261). I actually don’ think that it is true that we ‘couldn’t begin to get across’ these 
behaviour-cooperation plans without a moral or schmoral language, but other than 
that I am in broad agreement with Schiffer’s remarks.  
515 It could be thought that there is a fourth benefit—viz., that with schmoral 
discourse we can make sure that people continue to behave in ways that we used to 
think were morally obligatory or morally laudable. This was Mackie’s proposal—we 
should schmoralize in order to ensure that we can reap the benefits of social 
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utterances, which are both speech acts. The locutionary act one performs in uttering 
a (schmoral) judgment is the act of ““saying something” in the “full normal 
sense.”516 So when I say ‘stealing is schmorally wrong’ the locutionary act I perform 
is that of saying that stealing is schmorally wrong. But in uttering the same sentence 
I can also perform the perlocutionary act of scaring someone or bullying someone 
into believing that stealing is wrong. What perlocutionary act I perform in uttering 
‘stealing is wrong’ is—and this contrasts with locutionary acts—at least in part 
dependent on the hearer’s reaction. Whether I scare John by uttering ‘stealing is 
schmorally wrong’ depends in part on how he interprets my utterance (but probably 
also at least in part on how I utter that judgement). Likewise, whether I can bully 
John into believing that he shouldn’t steal depends on our past relation or his 
perception of my power, or something relevantly similar.517  
I use the word ‘bullying’ in reference to Williams’ thoughts on external 
reason claims.518 These are claims about what agents have reason to do for which it 
is not part of their truth-conditions that the addressee has a desire (or can reach that 
desire through certain procedurally rational modifications of her existing set of 
desires ‘S’). It was precisely Williams’ view that external reason claims aren’t 
anything other than attempts to bully agents into doing something. After all, there is 
nothing about the addressee that resonates with an external reason claim. The 
addresser simply tries to get the addressee to do something for which, according to 
Williams anyway, there is no justification. We have ‘bullying’, not ‘reasoning’ or 
something akin to reasoning.  
Why would it be a benefit of revolutionary cognitivism that agents can be 
‘bullied’ in this sense? The benefit is that schmoral talk enables agents to try to 
influence the behaviour of others with whom they have a fundamental moral 
disagreement (i.e., a disagreement about underived, basic desires such as desires for 
the world to contain or not to contain as much suffering as possible). Given that the 
stakes are high—the realization of one’s ideal world in which (it seems safe to hope) 
stealing is wrong—it is a good thing that we can use schmoral language for the 
                                                                                                                           
cooperation. But we also saw that this proposal won’t work (§2.2.4). Better than to 
drop the idea that schmorality is useful for the attaining of some social end or goal, 
and to rely on the benefits that it can generate.   
516 Austin (1975: 94).  
517 For similar ideas see Lillehammer (1999: 205).  
518 Williams (1979); also see his (1995a, 1995b, 2001).  
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purpose of bullying other agents into believing what we believe. Agents who believe 
that the world should contain as little suffering as possible perhaps won’t want to 
brutally force other agents to change their ways. But they might feel comfortable 
enough to ‘bully’ those agents to adopt their desires. Furthermore, bullying is not 
morally wrong because nothing is morally wrong. So the worry that this aspect of 
revolutionary cognitivism is morally wrong, I remind the reader, is a non-problem. 
Thus we also have: 
 
Third Inter-Personal Benefit of Schmoralizing  
Schmoral considerations can be used to get other agents to share one’s fundamental 
moral point of view 
 
Such are the benefits of revolutionary cognitivism. I will now turn to its 
(potential) drawbacks and my arguments that in fact these are not drawbacks.  
8.3  Objections and Replies 
My discussion of revolutionary cognitivism raises various questions: 
 
(1)  Does revolutionary cognitivism collapse into moral realism? 
(2)  Is implementing revolutionary cognitivism practically feasible?  
(3)  Is revolutionary cognitivism consistent with the most plausible account of 
the nature of belief?  
 
In what follows I aim to answer these questions. If I’m successful in this endeavour 
and combining this with the result of the previous section—viz., that revolutionary 
cognitivism has five benefits—we’ll have a strong, but defeasible case for 
revolutionary realism as our answer to the question ‘what (prudentially) should we 
do with moral discourse after error theory?’ That this case isn’t in fact defeated by 
the benefits (if indeed there really are any) of the other proposals, including 
fictionalism, will be argued in §8.4.   
8.3.1  A Collapse Into Realism?  
Jon Tresan asks, once we have made the change from uttering moral propositions to 
schmoral propositions, why  
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we haven’t thereby created new moral terms. After all, the substitutions [i.e., the 
schmoral predicates] would pick out the very properties naturalists say are the moral 
properties
519
  
 
Tresan’s problem is that error theory coupled with a revolutionary cognitivist 
procedure for assigning moral terms new referents—viz., action tokens and types 
that there is hypothetical normativity in the rationality-involving sense to perform or 
to refrain from performing—seems to collapse into a form of moral realism or a 
success theory. After all, the quote suggests, the properties we pick out with 
schmoral and moral terms—actions of stealing and the like—are the same and they 
are both normative in the rationality-involving sense. Their only difference is that 
moral normativity is categorical and that schmoral normativity is hypothetical. 
Tresan claims that this difference is enough to justify the claim that schmorality 
collapses into morality.  
Error theorists supporting revolutionary cognitivism can respond to this 
objection in two ways. First, they can insist that this difference between morality 
and schmorality is enough to keep the two apart. Indeed, that was part of the 
massage of Chapter 5. The folk simply wouldn’t mistake their categorical moral 
normativity for hypothetical schmoral normativity. Second, error theorists can argue 
that in fact the revolutionary cognitivist is not committed to the view that the 
‘substitution schmoral predicates would pick out the very properties naturalists say 
are the moral properties.’ After all, if I am under hypothetical schmoral normativity 
either to drop my instrumental desire not to steal this bike or my non-instrumental 
desire to steal then according to my version of revolutionary cognitivism, agents are 
acting fully rationally when they drop the instrumental desire not to steal and replace 
it with a different instrumental desire to steal the bike. But ordinary morality 
wouldn’t allow this. So that’s another, important difference between moralizing and 
schmoralizing. This objection doesn’t work.  
8.3.2  Feasibility   
For a proposal like revolutionary cognitivism it is important that it is practically 
feasible. We can accept as a general methodological maxim in practical philosophy 
that the unfeasibility of a thesis diminishes the credence we should have in it. For an 
example from normative moral philosophy, take a theory that imposes a duty to 
                                            
519 Tresan (2010: 236); also see Lillehammer (1999: 215); Joyce (2007b: 69); 
Lewis (1989: 93). 
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practice impartial benevolence among all people such that we can show no greater 
concern for the welfare of ourselves and loved ones than we do towards billions of 
others. That theory is probably unfeasible.
520
 The evolutionary history of human 
beings suggests that they won’t be able to refrain from favouring kin over non-kin in 
certain circumstances.
521
 Therefore, all else being equal, this theory is less likely to 
be a true theory in practical philosophy than a similar theory that imposes a more 
feasible duty. True, if a theory is difficult to implement than that need not imply that 
the theory is false. But if a theory is (virtually) impossible to implement, perhaps 
because it goes against the essentials of human nature, then that does seem to imply 
that the theory is false. After all, the whole point of doing practical philosophy is 
that one’s proposals are, precisely, practically relevant rather than interesting but 
unfeasible.  
The worry for my view is that something similar might be going on with 
revolutionary cognitivism. If revolutionary cognitivism is unfeasible then, all else 
being equal, we should diminish our credence in it compared to rival theories that 
are feasible. And revolutionary cognitivism might be thought to be unfeasible for 
two reasons. First, it seems difficult to convince the folk of error theory and 
revolutionary cognitivism. Understanding error theory requires a high level of 
conceptual sophistication that the folk cannot be assumed to have, argue my 
opponents.
522
 Second, even if we can teach the folk enough metaethics to understand 
error theory we still face the worry that we might not have the means to do this. As 
Cuneo and Christy put it:  
 
how would one go about communicating [the error-theoretic] message to the  
world (late night commercials?)
523
   
  
Both problems can be solved in one go. The solution is to allow the vast 
majority of people who, at least by hypothesis, cannot understand the error theory to 
remain realists. This solves the first problem because if we can allow a lot of people 
to remain realists then the difficulty of how we are going to convince those people of 
the truth of error theory (and revolutionary cognitivism) disappears. And this solves 
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522 Cuneo and Christy (2011: 94). Also see Oddie and Demetriou (2010).  
523 Cuneo and Christy (2011: 95).  
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the second problem because if we can allow a lot of people to remain realists then 
the difficulty of how we are going to reach everyone to preach the error-theoretic 
message will then also disappear.  
So we get a mixed-world of realists and revolutionary cognitivist. Why is a 
mixed world with moralizers and schmoralizers good enough—why shouldn’t we 
strive for a pure world that only contains schmoralizers?  
Part of the answer to that question is that there is at least nothing that speaks 
against having a mixed world. First, there is nothing morally wrong with a mixed 
world. We don’t have a moral obligation to tell people the truth because we don’t 
have any moral obligations at all. But Richard Joyce—who himself prefers an 
attitude-fictionalist treatment of our error-riddled moral discourse—argues that 
keeping the truth away from the folk results in an unstable society that it would be a 
prudentially bad society to live in.
524
 If the truth comes out then chaos ensues 
because people will not know what to do or what to believe. They will also feel that 
they’ve been misled and deceived, with all the (prudentially) bad consequences that 
come from the uproar that might ensue in response to these feelings. Apart from the 
fact that this last point is an unwarranted empirical speculation, my position isn’t 
subject to Joyce’s objection because I don’t argue that we should keep the truth 
away from the folk. We should be open and transparent about error theory and allow 
to folk to believe it if they can. We should not hide the truth from them. And if we 
don’t hide anything from the folk then the kind of chaos that Joyce predicts does not 
seem to be forthcoming. Moreover, in a mixed-world we can have all the advantages 
of revolutionary cognitivism as discussed in this chapter, albeit on a smaller scale. 
So neither version of the unfeasibility objection (we can’t convince the folk of error 
theory, and we can’t reach them to try to convince them anyway) is viable.   
Before closing however I want to point out that the claim that the folk won’t 
be able to understand error theory is probably a false empirical speculation. Cuneo 
and Christy surmise that the folk won’t be able to understand error theory due to the 
high level of conceptual sophistication that is required to understand such arguments 
as Blackburn’s objection from supervenience against moral realism and Horgan and 
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Timmons’ moral twin earth argument.525 But the error theory has a much simpler 
two-pronged form: here is a commitment of moral discourse that makes it what it is, 
and here is why it is false. So if we are speculating, it seems to me that the folk 
would be able to understand error theory.  
8.3.3  Doxastic Involuntarism    
The third and final objection to revolutionary cognitivism that I can think of is what 
I call the objection from Doxastic Involuntarism.
526
 Error theory is committed to: 
 
Evidence If error theory is true then there is sufficient evidence for the 
falsehood of our first-order atomic moral beliefs 
  
In fact, error theory is normally taken to be committed to something stronger than 
Evidence, viz.: 
 
Falsity If error theory is true then all first-order positive atomic moral 
beliefs are false 
 
I will get back to the relation between Evidence and Falsity shortly. First I remark 
that error theorists are also committed to: 
 
Continue It is possible to continue to have moral beliefs whilst believing 
error theory 
 
Most error theorists are committed to Continue because they argue that there are 
prudential normative reasons to abolish or make-believe (or what have you) moral 
thought. But it only makes sense to say that we should abolish or make-believe (or 
what have you) moral beliefs if it is possible to continue to hold on to them. Had it 
been impossible to continue to hold on to our error-riddled moral beliefs than 
arguing that we shouldn’t is futile. As revolutionary cognitivism gives prudential 
reasons for engaging in schmoral discourse it must commit itself to the possibility of 
continuing to have moral beliefs in the wake of error theory. 
The fact that error theorists both accept Falsity and Continue is 
problematic.
527
 Falsity and Continue are logically inconsistent. You can’t both 
accept Continue by believing a moral proposition like Wrong and accept Falsity at 
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the same time. For if you do that then you are both believing that stealing is wrong is 
true and that stealing is wrong is false.  
To avoid this predicament Suikkanen allows error theorists to run their 
theory with the weaker thesis Evidence.528 It is not logically inconsistent to believe 
Evidence and Continue at the same time. For it is not logically inconsistent to 
believe that stealing is wrong is true and that there is sufficient evidence that stealing 
is wrong is false at the same time. It may be epistemically ill-advisable to believe 
this, but it is not flatly logically inconsistent.  
However, now consider: 
 
Doxastic Involuntarism It is constitutive of belief that it is impossible to 
choose to continue to believe what one believes 
one has sufficient evidence to believe to be false 
 
According to Doxastic Involuntarism, if you have what you take to be sufficient 
evidence that grass is green, you can’t continue to believe that grass is red.  
The problem for any view about how to respond to error theory is that 
Doxastic Involuntarism renders the combination of Evidence and Continue worse 
than it already was. For Evidence and Continue together entail that moral beliefs are 
systematically truth-insensitive attitudes: attitudes that are not to be given up when 
one believes that there is sufficient evidence against them. That, after all, is what 
made it possible to accept both Evidence and Continue. But this is inconsistent with 
Doxastic Involuntarism, according to which beliefs are systematically truth-sensitive 
attitudes. Something has to go.  
Indeed, the inconsistent triad of Evidence, Continue and Doxastic 
Involuntarism generates a trilemma. Horn one: Either drop Evidence, but that is to 
drop (belief in) error theory. Horn two: drop Continue, but that necessitates dropping 
the quest for a normative theory for moral discourse after error theory and to engage 
in empirical speculations about what will in fact happen with moral discourse if we 
were to become error theorists. Examples of such descriptive theories are descriptive 
abolitionism and descriptive preservatism, according to which we will as a matter of 
fact abolish or preserve moral thought and talk in the wake of error theory. The 
problem with this is that such empirical speculation is very uninteresting. Horn 
three: drop Doxastic Involuntarism, but that incurs the obligation to adopt and 
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defend a non-standard account of the nature of belief. The objection to 
Revolutionary Cognitivism, since it offers prudential reasons for schmoralizing 
rather than continuing to moralize, is that it is committed to this inconsistent triad of 
claims.  
In response, error theorists should accept the second horn of the trilemma. 
For it is not true that denying Continue obliges one to recognize that our only 
options are to wait and see which of the descriptive theories turns out to be correct. 
Even if we can’t hold on to our old moral beliefs and as a matter of fact 
automatically abolish all moral thought and talk after error theory, it is still an 
interesting question whether we should do something else—and my own answer is 
that we should start to schmoralize.  
My solution to Suikkanen problem can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
other theories about what to do after error theory. Revolutionary cognitivism enjoys 
no special advantage over any of them insofar as the Problem of Doxastic 
Involuntarism is concerned. However I will now argue that revolutionary 
cognitivism is to be preferred over each and all of these.  
8.4 Comparing Revolutionary Cognitivism with Other Views  
In this section I compare revolutionary cognitivism with other views about what is 
the (prudentially) best response to the truth of the kind of error theory that I have 
been defending in this thesis.    
8.4.1 Abolitionism  
Abolitionists argue that we should abolish moral thought and talk, usually because 
this is prudentially better for our overall well-being.
529
 The best example I know to 
support this claim comes from the euthanasia and abortion debates. The abolitionist 
claims that in the absence of moral thought and talk we can focus in the relevant 
debates on the well-being of all parties involved. This is then argued to have hugely 
beneficial effects: by focussing directly on human well-being and by deliberately 
ignoring complicating and constraining moral factors we should be able to become 
much better at improving the human condition.  
 One problem for the abolitionist is that the revolutionary cognitivist can say 
all of this too, and more besides. The revolutionary cognitivist can say all of this 
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because she agrees that reasoning about the best means to ends is possible and that 
these ends may very well be that of improving the human condition in situations 
where questions of euthanasia and abortion are at stake. And the revolutionary 
cognitivist too isn’t constrained by the practice of moralizing one’s thoughts and 
action. Moreover, the revolutionary cognitivist has further benefits that the 
abolitionist doesn’t have. I have discussed these in the previous section. The 
abolitionist who simply proposes to do away with moral thought and talk and offers 
no replacing discourse at all cannot avail herself of these and other benefits. 
Revolutionary cognitivism is therefore better than abolitionism.   
8.4.2  Fictionalism 
I have already introduced the two main forms of fictionalism above; viz., attitude- 
and content-fictionalism. I argue that both suffer from the same flaw .  
Consider the attitude fictionalist, according to whom we should make-
believe that stealing is wrong (rather than believe that stealing is wrong or believe 
that ‘in the fiction, stealing is wrong’). To see the problem as it applies to her theory, 
consider the claim that the attitude of make-belief is a highly overridable attitude.
530
 
Lots of things can happen that can knock us out of the mode of pretence. A child 
pretends a chair is a boat, but if dinner is served she simply leaps into the ‘water’ 
and runs to the table. We pretend to know that our lover isn’t cheating on us even in 
the face of countervailing evidence; but there comes a point where we can no longer 
hold up the pretence.  
The problem with this aspect of fictionalism is that it sits ill with its official 
raison d’être—viz., ensuring in the best way we can that we’ll live in a society that 
doesn’t contain killers and stealers and is generally conducive to human cooperation 
and flourishing without violating the truth-norm (i.e., without deluding or deceiving 
ourselves). The fictionalist thinks that we can attain this state of affairs by 
pretending that stealing is morally wrong. When it actually matters we’ll have 
already managed to get ourselves in the mode of pretending that stealing is wrong 
and as a result refrain from stealing.
531
 But if the attitude of pretence is highly 
overridable—for instance by the thought that stealing will be fun or prudentially 
speaking the thing to do (because the agent stands a lot to gain without significant 
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losses)—then we can’t seem to be certain about our bulwark against stealing. Unless 
we are involved in self-delusion such as may happen when we drop the disposition 
to believe error theory in contexts of heightened epistemic standards. Presumably, if 
one never dismisses morality then one also won’t dismiss morality when it 
practically matters. However, by accepting that we can deceive ourselves in this 
way, revolutionary fictionalists abandon the truth-norm, which is not something that 
fictionalists accept. After all, if we can simply delude ourselves, whence the need to 
introduce complicating fictionalist elements into one’s replacement moral discourse? 
So attitude-fictionalism can’t work even on its own terms.  
According to the content-fictionalist we should believe that ‘in the fiction, 
stealing is wrong’. Would accepting content-fictionalism help? It wouldn’t. For such 
a view allows people to step out of the moral fiction all too easily whenever they 
need to if they can gain a lot and stand little to lose. After all, on content-fictionalist 
views agents know all too well that, really, stealing isn’t wrong (it is only wrong in 
the fiction). Again the problem is that these features of both kinds of fictionalist 
views sit ill with fictionalism’s purpose; viz., the securing of the alleged non-moral 
benefits of peaceful co-existence short of deluding oneself.  
Proponents of fictionalism can respond to my objections by bringing in the 
argument that we can compartmentalize, in our heads, first-order and second-order 
moral thinking such that our second-order nihilistic beliefs won’t interfere with our 
first-order (fictional) moral beliefs in practical deliberation.
532
 Compartmentalization 
is useful because if it works then the abovementioned tension between the purpose 
of fictionalism and its expected success will disappear. After all, if we can block 
metaethical considerations from arising when it practically matters then it will be 
possible that agents who make-believe moral propositions or believe fictionalist 
propositions will be set steadfastly on track to not stealing. This will allow such 
agents to reap the benefits of social cooperation without deluding themselves.  
Let’s be clear on what compartmentalization involves. Compartmentalization 
can be achieved through precommitment.
533
 To be precommitted to morality is to 
choose to develop a stable disposition to think in moral terms—for instance, in the 
shops, when one is tempted to steal—and yet to remain disposed to ‘step out’ of the 
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moral fiction in critical contexts such as the philosophy classroom. On this model, 
fictional thinking doesn’t feel any different from moral thinking. One isn’t supposed 
to—and if one has properly compartmentalized one thoughts, one won’t—actively 
rehearse the truth of the error theory and the conscious decision to enter the fiction. 
The temptation to steel will automatically feel abhorrent if one is precommitted to 
the moral fiction.   
Unfortunately for the friend of fictionalism and precommitment, it seems 
that the theory of precommitment only tells the fictionalist story as we already had it 
in a slightly different vocabulary. I surmise that it is reasonable to be sceptical about 
whether having precommitted oneself to the moral fiction—whether this happened 
via attitudes or fictional operators on sentences is a moot point in this context—will 
reliably enough yield the result that a stable social world will be attained. It would 
seem to be a safe empirical conjecture that for people with different ends, such as 
that of living in a world full of excitement and very few rules, precommitment to 
morality either wouldn’t work when it matters or even that these people won’t try to 
precommit themselves to begin with. Unless of course agents delude themselves into 
thinking that morality is in order and that error theory is false. But that is something 
that fictionalists can’t accept. It violates the truth-norm that they want to uphold, and 
if agents completely delude themselves into thinking that morality is real then this 
obfuscates the need for a fictionalist treatment of moral thought and talk. Therefore, 
again we have a position that fails by its own lights. As my own revolutionary 
cognitivism allows people to have whatever fundamental ends they want and only 
allows for critique of behaviour that is hypothetically normative, revolutionary 
cognitivism is not affected by the failing of the precommitment story.
534
 Since 
revolutionary cognitivism doesn’t fail and has some benefits, and since fictionalism 
can’t work, the former is to be preferred over the latter.  
8.4.3  Preservatism 
According to preservatism, we ought to preserve moral discourse. We ought to 
continue to moralize without changing anything about our moral practice or moral 
discourse. We do have the background knowledge that error theory is true, but we 
simply ignore this when it matters (or we compartmentalize our metaethical and 
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ethical thoughts).
 
The idea is that by preserving moral discourse we can continue to 
reap its benefits, which include having a discourse with which we can hope to enjoy 
the benefits of social cooperation, without putting forward a hopeless theory like 
fictionalism.  
Preservatism comes in two kinds. There is universal preservatism, according 
to which all of us should continue to moralize, regardless of whether we belong to 
the in-crowd of philosophers acquainted with metaethics (and the true metaethical 
theory, the moral error theory) or to the folk who have neither the time nor the 
resources to appreciate the reasons for believing error theory.
535
 And there is 
propagandism, according to which the error theorists should keep the truth of the 
error theory to themselves and pretend to be moralizing when they speak to the non-
cognoscenti (out of fear that when the folk will get to know the truth they will start 
misbehaving—i.e., that they will start killing and stealing).536 The propagandist 
herself, like the revolutionary cognitivist, can, when she talks to the folk, avail 
herself of the perlocutionary effects of presenting moral propositions, in the form of 
uttered statements, to an audience. In that way she can explain the use of uttering 
moral statements expressing moral propositions she doesn’t believe in.537 I object to 
each version of preservatism in turn.  
 Joyce complains about universal preservatism in the following way:  
 
The option of carrying on as if nothing has changed—of continuing to assert moral 
propositions and to hold moral beliefs even while maintaining moral error theoretic 
commitments—is surely a nonstarter, for the kind of doxastic schizophrenia 
involved in such a life not only violates epistemic norms but can also be expected to 
lead to various kinds of pragmatic handicap
538
 
 
I agree with Joyce that preservatists violate epistemic norms in the 
rationality-involving sense, such as the norm, defended in Chapter 6, only to believe 
what one has sufficient evidence to believe. Therefore, universal preservatism ought 
to be rejected. Revolutionary cognitivism doesn’t face this difficulty. It is committed 
to respecting norms in the rationality-involving sense, including epistemic ones, and 
has various benefits on offer.  
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Propagandist preservatism faces the same problem, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Rather than being committed to advising all agents to violate categorical epistemic 
norms in the rationality-involving sense, it only advises metaethicists to do this. 
Nonetheless, this is only a difference in degree; not in kind. And again revolutionary 
cognitivism doesn’t face this difficulty because it is committed to respecting norms 
in the rationality-involving sense, including epistemic ones and because it has 
various benefits on offer. 
Overall, I conclude that revolutionary cognitivism wins all of the pair-wise 
comparisons with the different views about what we should do with moral discourse 
after error theory. Therefore, after error theory we should accept it as our best theory 
about what we prudentially ought to do with our flawed moral discourse.    
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that my version of revolutionary cognitivism is 
plausible because it has various benefits (§8.2). I have also argued that it can 
respond to various problems (§8.3) and that it wins in every pair-wise comparison of 
it with the other proposals abolitionism, fictionalism, and preservatism (§8.4). 
Combining the results of §8.2-4 yields evidence that revolutionary cognitivism 
should be taken seriously as a response to the truth of the kind of error theory that I 
have defended in Chapters 1-7. Indeed, I have argued that error theorists have a 
working theory about what to do after error theory, so they can also solve the fourth 
of the four major problems for error theory that I mentioned in §1.4. This was the 
problem that although error theory may be true of our actual moral discourse, it is 
still a highly unsatisfactory theory because it can’t tell us how we should respond to 
its message and therefore that it can’t tell us what we ought to do with our error-
riddled moral discourse.  
Overall, then, the kind of error theory that I have defended in this 
dissertation is more plausible than it is often assumed to be. Not only is error theory 
independently credible, it can also be combined with a view about the future of 
moral discourse that has various benefits, including that we can continue to make 
sense of our belief that most people most of the time are under genuine, rationality-
involving normative force not to steal or kill.  
  
- 244 - 
Bibliography 
 
 
Altham, J.E.J., (1986), ‘The Legacy of Emotivism’, in: MacDonald, G., C. Wright (eds.), 
Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell 
 
Anscombe, G.E.M., (1958), ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in: Philosophy 33:1-19 
Anscombe, G.E.M,, (1959), An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press 
 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
 
Armstrong, D.M., (1978), Nominalism & Realism: Universals & Scientific Realism, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Armstrong, D.M., (1989), Universals, Boulder: Westview  
Armstrong, D.M., (2006), ‘The scope and limits of human knowledge’, in: Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 84: 159-166 
 
Austin, J.L., (1975), How to do things with words, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Ayer, J.A., (1936), Language, Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz 
 
Baillie, J., (2000), Hume on Morality, London : Routledge  
 
Balaguer, M., (2011), ‘Bare Bones Moral Realism and the Objections from Relativism’, in: 
Hales, S.D. (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
 
Barnes, R.E., (2012), ‘Book Review: Southwood, Nicholas, Contractualism and the 
Foundations of Morality’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90: 815-8 
 
Beaver, D.I., B. Geurts, (2011), ‘Presupposition’, in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/presupposition/ Visited on 12 April 2011 
 
Bedke, M.S., (2010), ‘Might All Normativity be Queer?’ in: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 88: 41-58 
Bedke, M.S., (2012), ‘Against Normative Naturalism’, in: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 90: 111-29 
 
Bentham, J., (1789), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1907) 
 
Biehl, J., (2008), ‘The Insignificance of Choice’, in: Chan, D., (ed.), (2008), Moral 
Psychology Today, Dordrecht, Springer Publishers 
 
Blackburn, S., (1971), ‘Moral Realism’, in: Casey, J., (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning, 
London: Methuen 
Blackburn, S., (1984), Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Blackburn, S., (1985), ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’, in: Honderich, T. (ed.), 
Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Blackburn, S., (1992), ‘Gibbard on Normative Logic’, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 52: 947-52 
Blackburn, S., (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
- 245 - 
Blackburn, S., (2005), ‘Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism’, in: Kalderon, M.E. (ed.), 
Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Bloomfield, P., (2001), Moral Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Bloomfield, P., (2007), ‘Book Review: The Evolution of Morality by Richard Joyce’, in: 
Mind 116: 176-80 
 
Boghossian, P., (1990), ‘The Status of Content’, in: The Philosophical Review 99: 157-84 
Boghossian, P., (2006), ‘What is Relativism?’ in: Greenough, P., M.P. Lynch (eds.), Truth 
and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Bond, E.J., (1966), ‘Moral Requirements and the Need for Deontic Language’, in: 
Philosophy 41: 233-57 
 
Boyd, R., (1988), ‘How to be a Moral Realist’, in: Sayre-McCord, G. (ed.), Essays on Moral 
Realism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
 
Brandt, R., (1979), A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford: Clarendon Press  
 
Bratman, M.E., (1986), Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press  
Bratman, M.E., (2009), ‘Intention, Belief and Instrumental Rationality’, in: Sobel, D., S. 
Wall, (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 
Brink, D.O., (1984), ‘Moral Realism and the Skeptical Arguments from Disagreement and 
Queerness’, in: Australian Journal of Philosophy 62: 111-25 
Brink, D.O., (1986), ‘Externalist Moral Realism’, in: Southern Journal of Philosophy 24: 
23-41 
Brink, D.O., (1989), Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Brink, D.O., (1992), ‘A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality’, in: Philosophical 
Perspectives 6:1-26 
Brink, D.O., (1997), ‘Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy’, in: 
Cullity, G., B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Broome, J., (1999), ‘Normative Requirements’, in: Ratio 12: 398-419 
Broome, J., (2007), ‘Is Rationality Normative?’ in: Disuptatio 23: 161-78 
Broome, J., (2008), ‘Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity’, in: Ethics 119: 96-
108 
 
Brown, P., (2013), ‘The impossibility of morality’, in: Philosophical Studies 163: 627-36 
 
Brunero, J., (2005) ‘Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency’, 
in: Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 1: 1-20 
Brunero, J., (2010), ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, in: The Philosophical Quarterly 
60: 28-49 
 
Burge, T., (1992), ‘Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-90’, in: Philosophical Review 
101: 3-51 
 
Burgess, J.A., (1998), ‘Error Theories and Values’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
76: 534-52 
Burgess, J.A., (2010), ‘Against Ethics’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without 
Values, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Caroll, L., (1895), ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’, in: Mind 4: 278-80 
- 246 - 
 
Casebeer, W., (2003), Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral 
Cognition, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
 
Clark, P., (2009), ‘Mackie’s Motivational Argument’, in: Sobel, D., S. Wall (eds.), Reasons 
for Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Coons, C., (2011), ‘How to prove that some acts are wrong (without using substantive moral 
premises)’, in: Philosophical Studies 155: 83-98 
 
Copp, D., (1995), Morality, Normativity and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Copp, D., (2007), Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Copp, D., (2009a), ‘Toward A Pluralist and Teleological Theory on Normativity’, in: 
Philosophical Issues 19: 21-37 
Copp, D., (2009b), ‘Realist-expressivism and Conventional Implicature’, in: Shafer-Landau, 
R., (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 167-202 
Copp, D., (2010), ‘Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin 
(eds.), A World Without Values: essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: 
Springer 
Copp, D., (2011), ‘Normativity’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 180-3 
Copp, D., (2012), ‘Normativity and reasons: five arguments from Parfit against normative 
naturalism’, in: Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Cuneo, T., (2007a), The Normative Web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Cuneo, T., (2007b), ‘Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism’, in: Philosophy Compass 2: 
850-79 
Cuneo, T., (2012), ‘Moral naturalism and categorical reasons’, in: Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay 
(eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Cuneo, T., S. Christy, (2011), ‘The Myth of Moral Fictionalism’, in: Brady, M. (ed.), New 
Waves in Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Daly, C., D. Liggins, (2010), ‘In defence of error theory’, in: Philosophical Studies 149: 
209-30 
 
Darwall, S., (1983), Impartial Reason, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 
Darwall, S., (2001), ‘Because I want it’, in: Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 129-53 
Darwall, S., (2002), Contractarianism/Contractualism, Oxford: Blackwell  
Darwall, S., (2006), ‘Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach’, in: Copp, D. 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Darwall, S., A. Gibbard, P. Railton, (1992), ‘Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends’, in: 
Philosophical Review 101: 115-89  
 
Davidson, D., (2004), Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Davis, W., (2010), ‘Implicature’, in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/implicature/  
 
Denham, A.E., (2000), Metaphor and Moral Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Doris, J., (2002), Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behaviour, New York: 
Cambridge University Press  
- 247 - 
 
Dreier, J. (1997), ‘Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality’, in: Cullity, 
G., B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Dreier, J. (2006), ‘Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism’, in: Copp, D. (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethical Theory, 240-64 
Dreier, J., (2010), ‘Mackie’s Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief’, in: Joyce, R., S. 
Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values, Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, 
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer 
 
Dunaway, B., A. Edmonds, D. Manley (forthcoming), ‘The Folk Probably Think What you 
Think They Think’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
 
Dworkin, R., (1996), ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, in: Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 25: 87-139 
 
Egan, A., (2007), ‘Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error’, in: Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 85: 205-19 
 
Ellis, J., (2006), ‘Color, Error and Explanatory Power’, in: Dialectica 60: 171-79 
 
Enoch, D., (2005), ‘Why Idealize?’ in: Ethics 115: 759-87 
Enoch, D., (2011a), Taking Morality Seriously: A Defence of Robust Realism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Enoch, D., (2011b), ‘Schmagency, Revisited’, in: Brady, M. (ed.), New Waves in 
Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Evans, M., Shah, N., (2012), ‘Mental Agency and Metaethics’, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7: 81-109 
 
Farber, P.L., (1998), The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics, Berkely CA: University of 
California Press 
 
Farrell, R., (1981), ‘Metaphysical Necessity is not Logical Necessity’, in: Philosophical 
Studies 39: 141-53 
 
Fehige, C., (2001), ‘Instrumentalism’, in: Millgram, E. (ed.), Variaties of Practical 
Reasoning, Massachusetts, MA: MIT Press 
 
Field, H., (1973), ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference’, in: Journal of 
Philosophy 70: 462-81 
Field, H., (1989), Realism, mathematics and modality, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Fine, K., (2002), ‘The Varieties of Necessity’, in: Gendler, T.S., Hawthorne, J., (eds.), 
Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Fine, K., (2005), ‘Necessity and Non-Existence’, in: Fine, K., (2005), Modality and Tense, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Finlay, S., (2005), ‘Value and Implicature’, in: Philosopher’s Imprint 5: 1-20 
Finlay, S., (2008a), ‘The Error in the Error Theory’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
86: 347 – 369 
Finlay, S., (2008b), ‘Too Much Morality’, in: Bloomfield, P. (ed.), Morality and Self-
Interest, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Finlay, S., (2009a), ‘Against All Reason? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm’, in: 
Pigden, C.R., (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue, London: Palgrave Macmillan 
Finlay, S., (2009b), ‘The Obscurity of Internal Reasons’, in: Philosophers’ Imprint 9: 1-22 
- 248 - 
Finlay, S., (2011), ‘Errors upon Errors: A Reply to Joyce’, in: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 89: 535-47 
 
Fischer, J., M. Ravizza, (1998), Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Fitzpatrick, W.J., (2008), ‘Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism and Normativity’, in: 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Foot, P., (1972), ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, in: Philosophical 
Review 81: 305-16 
 
Frankena, W., (1958), ‘Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy’, in: Melden, 
A.I. (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle: University of Washington Press 
 
Freeman, S., (2012), ‘Original Position’, in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/original-position/  
 
Gampel, E.H., (1996), ‘A Defense of the Autonomy of Ethics: Why Value Is Not Like 
Water’, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 191-209 
 
Garner, R., (1990), ‘On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts’, in: 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137-46 
Garner, R., (1994), Beyond Morality, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 
Garner, R., (2010), ‘Abolishing Morality’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without 
Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Gauthier, D., (1986), Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Gert, J., (2004), Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press  
 
Gibbard, A., (1990), Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press 
Gibbard, A., (2003), Thinking How to Live, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press  
 
Gill, M., (1996), ‘A philosopher in his closet: Reflexivity and justification in Hume’s moral 
theory’, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 231-56 
 
Gill, M.B., (2008), ‘Variability and moral phenomenology’, in: Phenomenology and 
Cognitive Science 7: 99-113 
 
Glassen, P., (1959), ‘The Cognitivity of Moral Judgments’, in: Mind 68: 57-72 
 
Greco, J., (2007), Putting Skeptics in their Place : the nature of skeptical arguments and 
their role in philosophical inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Green, M., (2009), ‘Speech Acts’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/speech-acts/.  
 
Grice, H.P., (1975), ‘Logic and Conversation’, in: Cole, P., J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and 
Semantics, 3: Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press 
Grice, H.P., (1989), Studies in the Ways of Words, Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press 
 
- 249 - 
Hägerström, A., (1953), Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals, Stockholm: Almqvist 
& Wiksell 
 
Haji, I., (1998), Moral Appraisability, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Haji, I., (2003), Deontic Morality and Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Hampton, J., (1998), The Authority of Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Hare, R.M., (1981), Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Point and Method, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Hare, R.M., (1999), Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Harman, G., (1975), ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, in: Philosophical Review 84: 3-22 
Harman, G., (1984), ‘Is There a Single True Morality?’ in: Copp, D., Zimmerman, D., 
(eds.), (1984), Morality, Reason and Truth – New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, 
Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld 
Harman, G., (1986), Change in View, Cambridge MA: MIT Press  
 
Harman, G., J.J. Thomson, (1994), Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Oxford: 
Blackwell 
 
Hartcourt, E., (2005), ‘Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances’, in: Mind 114: 249-75 
 
Heathwood, C., (2011), ‘Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare’, in: 
Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 
Heathwood, C., (2012), ‘Could Morality Have a Source?’ In: Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 6: 1-20 
 
Heumer, M., (2005), Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Hinckfuss, I., (1987), The moral society: Its structure and effects, Canberra: Australian 
National University 
 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (1992a), ‘Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open 
Question Argument’ Revived’, in: Philosophical Papers 21: 153-75 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (1992b), ‘Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness 
Revived’, in: Synthese 92: 221-60 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (2002), ‘Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism’, in: 
Philosophical Issues 12: 74-96 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (2005), ‘Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory’, in: 
Philosophical Issues 15: 56-77 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (2008a), ‘Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals’, in: 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7: 115-31 
Horgan, T., M. Timmons, (2008b), ‘What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About 
Moral Objectivity?’, in: Social Philosophy and Policy 25: 267-300 
 
Hubin, D., (1999), ‘What’s Special About Humeanism’, in: Nous 33: 30-45 
Hubin, D., (2001), ‘The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality’, in: The 
Journal of Philosophy 98:445–468 
 
Huemer, M., (2005), Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 
 
Hume, D., (1739-40) [1969], A Treatise of Human Nature, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Hume, D., (1751), Enquires Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, (ed. Selby-Bigge), Oxford: Clarendon Press  
 
- 250 - 
Hussain, N.J.Z., (2010), ‘Error Theory and Fictionalism’, in: Skorupski, J., (ed.), (2010), 
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Jackson, F., (1998), From Metaphysics to Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Jackson, F., (2012), ‘On ethical naturalism and the philosophy of language’, in: Nuccetelli, 
S., G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Jackson, F., P. Pettit, (1995), ‘Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation’, in: The 
Philosophical Quarterly 45: 20-40 
 
James, A., (2007), ‘Constructivism about Practical Reasons’, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 74: 302-25 
 
Johnston, M., (1987), ‘Human Beings’, in: The Journal of Philosophy 84: 59-83 
Johnston, M., (2010), Surviving Death, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press  
 
Joyce, R., (2000), ‘The Fugitive Thought’, in: Journal of Value Inquiry 34: 463-78 
Joyce, R., (2001), The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Joyce, R., (2005), ‘Moral Fictionalism’, in: Kalderon, M.E. (ed.), Fictionalism in 
Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Joyce, R., (2006), The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press 
Joyce, R., (2007a), ‘Moral Anti-Realism’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-anti-realism/. Visited 
on 31 March 2010 
Joyce, R., (2007b), ‘Morality, Schmorality’, in: Bloomfield, P., (ed.), (2007), Morality and 
Self-Interest, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Joyce, R., (2009), ‘Is Projectivism Empirically Tractable?’ in: Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 12: 53-75 
Joyce, R., (2010a), ‘Patterns of Objectification’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World 
Without Values: essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer 
Joyce, R., (2011a), ‘The Error in “The Error in the Error Theory”, in: Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 89: 519-34 
Joyce, R., (2011b), ‘The Accidental Error Theorist’, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics 6: 153-180 
Joyce, R., (2012), ‘Metaethical pluralism: How both moral naturalism and moral skepticism 
may be permissible positions’, in: Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: 
Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Joyce, R., (2013), ‘Review of David Enoch’s Taking Morality Seriously’, in: Ethics 123: 
365-9 
Joyce, R., (MS), ‘Enough with the errors! A final reply to Finlay’ (available at 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/staff/richard_joyce/onlinepapers.html)  
 
Juhl, C., E. Loomis, (2010), Analyticity, London: Routledge 
 
Kagan, S., (1989), The Limits of Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Kahane, G., (2013), ‘Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim?’ in: Journal of 
Moral Philosophy 10: 148-78 
 
Kalderon, M.E., (2005), Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kalderon, M.E., (2008), ‘Moral Fictionalism: Summary’, in: Philosophical Books 49: 1-3 
 
Kalf, W.F., (2013), ‘Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition’, in: Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 16: 923-37 
Kalf, W.F., (MS), ‘Is Morality Impossible?’ 
- 251 - 
 
Kane, R., (1996), The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Karttunen, L., (1973), ‘Presuppositions of Compound Sentences’, in: Linguistic Inquiry 4: 
167-93 
 
Kavka, G.S., (1984), ‘A Reconciliation Project’, in: Copp, D., D. Zimmerman (eds), 
Morality, Truth and Reason, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld 
 
Kiesewetter, B., (2012), ‘A dilemma for Parfit’s conception of normativity’, in: Analysis 72: 
466-74 
 
Kirchin, S., (2003), ‘Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics’, in: Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 6: 241-64 
Kirchin, S., (2010), ‘A Tension in the Moral Error Theory’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), 
A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Springer 
 
Kolodny, N., (2005), ‘Why be Rational?’ in: Mind 114: 509-64 
Kolodny, N., (2008), ‘Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?’, in: Ethics 118: 437-63 
 
Kornblith, H., (2012), On Reflection, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Korsgaard, C., (1986), ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, in: The Journal of Philosophy 
83: 5-25 
Korsgaard, C., (1996), The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Korsgaard, C., (1997), ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, in: Cullity, B., B. Gaut 
(eds.), (1997), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Kripke, S.A., (1972), Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
Lau, J., M. Deutsch (2002), ‘Externalism About Mental Content’, in: The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/content-externalism/  
 
Lewis, D.K., (1978), ‘Truth in Fiction’, in: American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37-46 
Lewis, D.K., (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
Lewis, D.K., (1989), ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-37 
Lewis, D.K., (1996), ‘Desire as Belief II’, in: Mind 105: 303–313 
 
Libet, B., (2004), Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Lillehammer, H., (1999), ‘Normative Antirealism’, in: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
37: 201-25 
Lillehammer, H., (2000), ‘Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason’, in: The 
Journal of Ethics 4: 173-90 
Lillehammer, H., (2004), ‘Moral Error Theory’, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
104: 95-111 
Lillehammer, H., (2007), Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity, New 
York: Palgrave 
 
Loeb, D., (2008), ‘Moral incoherentism: How to pull a metaphysical rabbit out of a 
semantic hat’, in: Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press 
- 252 - 
Loeb, D., (2010), ‘The Argument from Moral Experience’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A 
World Without Values: essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Lukes, S., (1985), ‘Taking Morality Seriously’, in: Honderich, T. (ed.), Morality and 
Objectivity, London: Routledge 
 
Lycan, W.G., (1999), Philosophy of Language: a contemporary introduction, London: 
Routhledge 
 
MacIntyre, A., (1981), After Virtue, London: Duckworth 
 
Mackie, J.L., (1946), ‘A Refutation of Morals’, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24: 
77– 90 
Mackie, J.L., (1976), Problems from Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press  
Mackie, J.L., (1977), Ethics: inventing right and wrong, London: Penguin Publishers 
Mackie, J.L., (1980), Hume’s moral theory, London: Routhledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Mandelbaum, M., (1955), The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, Glencoe IL.: Free 
Press 
 
Markovits, J., (2011), ‘Why be an Internalist about Reasons?’ in: Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 
 
Marks, J., (2013), Ethics without Morals: In Defense of Amorality, London: Routledge 
 
McDowell, J., (1985), ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in: Honderich, T. (ed.), Morality 
and Objectivity: Essays in Memory of J.L. Mackie, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
McGrath, M., (2004), ‘Moral Knowledge by Perception’, in: Philosophical Perspectives 18: 
219-28 
McGrath, M., (2012), ‘Propositions’, in: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/, visited on 12 September 
2012 
 
McLaughlin, B., K. Bennett, (2010), ‘Supervenience’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/supervenience/ Visited on May 25 2010 
 
McNaughton, D., (1988), Moral Vision, Basil Blackwell: London.  
 
Merricks, T., (2001), Objects and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Miller, A., (2002), ‘Wright’s Argument against Error Theories’, in: Analysis 62(2): 98-103 
Miller, A., (2003), An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Miller, A., (2013), An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (2
nd
 ed.), Cambridge: 
Polity Press  
 
Miller, C., (2009), ‘The Conditions of Moral Realism’, in: The Journal of Philosophical 
Research 34: 123-155 
 
Moore, G.E., (1903), Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Moore, G.E., (1942), ‘A Reply to My Critics’, in: Schilpp, P.A., (ed), The Philosophy of G. 
E. Moore: Evanston ILL: Northwestern University Press 
Moore, G.E., (1953), Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: George, Allen and 
Unwin 
 
- 253 - 
Nagel, T., (1970), The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press  
Nagel, T., (1986), The view from nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Nesbitt, W., (1977), ‘Categorical Imperatives – A Defense’, in: The Philosophical Review 
81: 305-16 
 
Newman, J., (1981), 'The Fictionalist Analysis of Some Moral Concepts', in: 
Metaphilosophy 12: 47-56 
 
Nichols, S., (2004), Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Nietzsche, F., (1883-88), The Will to Power, Trans. R. Hollingdale and W. Kaufmann; ed. 
W. Kaufmann [1986], New York: Vintage 
 
Nolan, D., G., Restall, C. West, (2005), ‘Moral fictionalism versus the rest’, in: Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 83: 307-30 
 
Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay (2012), ‘Does analytic moral naturalism rest on a mistake?’ in: 
Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Oddie, G., D. Demetriou, (2010), ‘The Fictionalist’s Attitude Problem’, in: Joyce, R., S. 
Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, 
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer 
 
Olson, J., (2009a), ‘Error Theory and Reasons for Belief’, in: Reisner, A., A. Steglich-
Petersen, (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer Publishers 
Olson, J., (2009b), ‘Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism’, in: Robertson, S. (ed.), Spheres 
of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Olson, J., (2011a), ‘In Defense of Moral Error Theory’, in: Brady, M. (ed.), New Waves in 
Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Olson, J., (2011b), ‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’: in: Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Olson, J., (2011c), ‘Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics’, in: Hume Studies 37: 19-42 
Olson, J., (2012), ‘Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics’, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 85: 192-200 
Olson, J., (forthcoming-a), ‘The Metaphysics of Reasons', in: Star, D., (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Olson, J., (forthcoming-b), ‘Mackie’s Motivational Queerness Argument Reconsidered’, in: 
The International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 
Olson, J., (MS), Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence 
 
O’Neill, O., (1988/9), ‘Constructivism in Ethics’, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
89: 1-18 
 
Papineau, D., (2007), ‘Naturalism’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ Visited on 29 July 2010 
 
Parfit, D., (1984), Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Parfit, D., (1997), ‘Reasons and Motivation’, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71, 
Suppl. Vol.: 99-130 
Parfit, D., (2012), On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2 Volumes) 
 
Pauer-Studer, H., (2009), ‘Humean Sources of Normativity’, in: Pigden, C.R. (ed.), Hume 
on Motivation and Virtue, London: Palgrave Macmillan 
- 254 - 
 
Pereboom, D., (2001), Living Without Free Will, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
 
Perry, R.B., (1926), ‘Value as Any Object of Interest’, in his General Theory of Value, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press  
 
Philips, D., (2010), ‘Mackie on Practical Reason’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World 
Without Values: essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer 
 
Pigden, C.R., (2010), ‘Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem’, in: Joyce, R., 
S. Kirchin (eds.), Morality in a Natural World: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error 
Theory, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer 
 
Plato, The Republic 
 
Platts, M., (1980), ‘Moral Reality and the End of Desire’, in: Platts (ed.), Reference, Truth 
and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Platts, M., (1991), Moral Realities, London: Routledge 
 
Potts, C., (2007), ‘Into the Conventional-Implicature Dimension’, in: Philosophy Compass 
2: 665-79 
 
Putnam, H., (1975), ‘The Meaning of “meaning”’, in: Putnam, H., Mind, Language and 
Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Putnam, H., (1988), Representation and Reality, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
Putnam, H., (1992), “Brains in a Vat”, in DeRose, K., T.A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a 
Contemporary Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 
Quine, W.V.O., (1948), ‘On What There Is’, in: Review of Metaphysics 2: 21-38 
 
Railton, P., (1986), ‘Moral Realism’, in: Philosophical Review 95: 163-207 
Railton, P., (1989), ‘Naturalism and Prescriptivity’, in: Social Philosophy and Policy 7: 51-
74 
Railton P (1997) On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and 
Action. In: Cullity, G., B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Railton, P., (2003), Facts, Values and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Railton, P., (2006), ‘Humean Theory of Practical Rationality’, in: Copp, D., The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Railton, P., (2010), ‘Realism and Its Alternatives’, in: Skorupski, J., (ed.), (2010), The 
Routledge Companion to Ethics, Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Ramsey, F., (1990), Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Rauscher, F., (2002), ‘Kant’s Moral Anti-Realism’, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 
44: 477-99 
 
Rawls, J., (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
 
Raz, J., (1999), ‘Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason’, 
in: Ratio 12: 354-79 
 
Ridge, M., S. Kohler, (forthcoming), ‘Revolutionary Expressivism’, in: Ratio 
 
- 255 - 
Rippon, S., (2011), ‘In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle’, In: Journal of 
Ethics & Social Philosophy 5: 1-20 
 
Robertson, S., (2008), ‘How to be an Error Theorist about Morality’, in: Polish Journal of 
Philosophy 2: 107-25 
Robertson, S., (2010), ‘Reasons, values, and morality’, in: Skorupski, J., (ed.), (2010), The 
Routledge Companion to Ethics, Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Robinson, D., (2009), ‘Moral Functionalism, Quasi-Relativism, and the Plan’, in: Braddon-
Mitchell, D., R. Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press 
 
Roskies, A., (2003), ‘Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from 
Acquired Psychopathy’, in: Philosophical Psychology 16: 51-66 
 
Rowland, R., (2013), ‘Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons’, In: 
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 7 
 
Russell, B., (1922), ‘Is there an absolute good?’ in: Pigden, C. (ed.), (1999), Russell on 
Ethics, London: Routledge 
 
Russell, L., (2011), ‘Two Kinds of Normativity: Korsgaard v. Hume’, in: Pigden, C.R. (ed.), 
Hume on Motivation and Virtue, London: Palgrave MacMillan 
 
Saeed, J.I., (2003), Semantics, Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers 
 
Sainsbury, R.M., (1998), ‘Projections and Relations’, in: The Monist 81: 130-60 
Sainsbury, R.M., (2010), Fiction and Fictionalism, London: Routledge 
 
Sayre-McCord, G., (1986), ‘The Many Moral Realisms’, in: The Spindel Conference: The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Suppl. Volume 24: 1-22 
 
Scanlon, T.M., (1982), ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in: Sen, A., B. Williams (eds.), 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Scanlon, T.M., (1998), What We Owe To Each Other: Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press 
Scanlon, T.M., (2007), ‘Structural Irrationality’, in: Brennan, G, R.E. Goodin, F. Jackson, 
M. Smith (eds.), Common Themes: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 
Scanlon, T.M., (2009), Being Realistic about Reasons: The John Locke Lectures, University 
of Oxford 
Scanlon, T.M., (2011), ‘The Unity of the Normative’, in: Philosophical Studies 154: 443-50 
 
Schiffer, S., (1990), ‘Meaning and Value’, in: The Journal of Philosophy 84: 602-14 
Schiffer, S., (2003), The Things We Mean, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Schroeder, M., (2007), Slaves of the Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Schroeder M (2009) Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons. 
Philosophical Studies 143: 223-48 
Schroeder, M., (2010), Noncognitivism in Ethics, London: Routhledge 
 
Setiya, K., (2007), ‘Cognitivism about instrumental reason’, in: Ethics 117: 649-73 
 
Shafer-Landau, R., (2003), Moral Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Shafer-Landau, R., (2005), ‘Error Theory and the Possibility of Normative Ethics’, in: 
Philosophical Issues 15: 107-20 
- 256 - 
 
Shafer-Landau, R., T. Cuneo, (2007), (eds.), Foundations of Ethics: an Anthology, London: 
Blackwell 
 
Shah, H., (2010), ‘The Limits of Normative Detachment’, In: Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 110: 347-71 
 
Sharp, F.C., (1928), Ethics, New York: The Century 
 
Shepski, L., (2008), ‘The Vanishing Argument from Queerness’, in: The Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 86: 371-87  
 
Silverstein, M., (2012), ‘Inescapability and Normativity’, in: Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 6: 1-26 
 
Simons, M., (2006), ‘Foundational Issues in Presupposition’, in: Philosophy Compass 1: 
357-72 
 
Simons, M., J. Tonhauser, D. Beaver, C. Roberts (2010), ‘What projects and why’, in: 
Proceedings of SALT 20: 309-27 
 
Singer, P., (1972), ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 
229-43 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006), Moral Skepticisms, New York: Oxford University Press 
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., (2008), ‘Is moral phenomenology unified?’, in: Phenomenology 
and Cognitive Science 7: 85-97 
 
Skorupski, J., (1999), ‘Irrealist Cognitivism’, in: Ratio 12: 436-59 
Skorupski, J., (2007), ‘Internal Reasons and the Scope of Blame’, in: Thomas, A. (ed.), 
Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Skorupski, J., (2010), The Domain of Reasons, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Smith, M., (1993), ‘Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the 
Phenomenology of Moral Experience’, in: Haldane, J., C. Wright (eds.), Reality, 
Representation and Projection, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Smith, M., (1994), The Moral Problem, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Smith, M., (1995), ‘Internal Reasons’, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55: 
109-31 
Smith, M., (2004) Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. In: Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Suppl. Volume 78: 93-109 
Smith, M., (2006), ‘Is that all there is?’ in: Journal of Ethics 10: 75-106 
Smith, M., (2007), ‘Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality?’ in: Tenenbaum, S. 
(ed.), Moral Psychology, Amsterdam: Rodopi 
Smith, M., (2009), ‘Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason’, in: 
Ratio 22: 98-125 
Smith, M., (2010), ‘Beyond the Error Theory’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World 
Without Values: essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht: Springer 
Smith, M., (2011), ‘Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative 
Values’, in: RATIO 24: 351-63 
Smith, M., (2012a), ‘Naturalism, absolutism, relativism’, in: Nuccetelli, S., G. Seay (eds.), 
Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Smith, M., (2012b), ‘A Puzzle about Internal Reasons’, in: Heuer, U., G. Lang (eds.), Luck, 
Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
- 257 - 
Smith M (MS) A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts. Available at: 
www.princeton.edu/~msmith/  
 
Soames, S., (2006), ‘Entailment, Presupposition, and Implicature’, in: Borcher, D.M., 
(2006), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Detroit MI, MacMillan 
 
Sobel, J.H., (MS), Good and Gold: A Judgmental History of Metaethics from Moore 
through Mackie 
 
Southwood, N., (2008), ‘Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality’, in: Ethics 119: 9-30 
Southwood, N., (2010), Contractualism & the Foundations of Morality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Stalnaker, R.C., (1999), Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and 
Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Stevenson, C.L., (1937), ‘The emotive meaning of ethical terms’, in: Mind 46: 14-31 
 
Strandberg, C., (2012), ‘A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language’, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 84: 87-122 
 
Stratton-Lake, P., (2002), ‘Introduction’, in: Ross, W.D., (2002) [1930], The Right and the 
Good, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
 
Strawson, P.F., (1956), ‘On Referring’, in: Flew, A, (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis, 
London: Macmillan & Co. 
Strawson, P.F., (1962), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in: Proceedings of the British Academy 
48: 1-25 
 
Street, S., (2009), ‘In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics 
and the Contingency of What Matters’, in: Philosophical Issues 19: 273-98 
Street, S., (2010), ‘What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?’ in: Philosophy 
Compass 5: 363-84 
 
Streumer, B., (2007), ‘Reasons and Entailment, in: Erkenntnis 66: 353-74 
Streumer, B., (2008), ‘Are there irreducibly normative properties?’ in: Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 86: 537-61 
Streumer, B., (2011), ‘Are normative properties descriptive properties?’ in: Philosophical 
Studies 154: 325-48 
Streumer, B., (forthcoming) ‘Can We Believe The Error Theory?’ in: The Journal of 
Philosophy  
 
Sturgeon, N.L., (1984), ‘Moral Explanations’, in: Copp, D., Zimmerman, D., (eds.), (1984), 
Morality, Reason and Truth – New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, Totowa: Rowman 
& Allanheld 
Sturgeon, N.L., (2006), ‘Ethical Naturalism’, in: Copp, D., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical 
Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Suikkanen, J., (2013), ‘Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem’, in: Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics 8 
 
Svavarsdóttir, S., (2001), ‘Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?’ in: 
Leiter, B., (ed) Objectivity in Law and Morals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Svoboda, T., (2011), ‘Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory’, in: 
Journal of Value Inquiry 45: 27-48 
- 258 - 
 
Thomson JJ (2008) Normativity. Open Court, Chicago ILL  
 
Timmons, M., (1999), Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Tresan, J., (2009), ‘Role-Based Interpretations of Moral Judgments: An Objectivist 
Account’, in: Social Theory and Practice 35: 369-91 
Tresan, J., (2010), ‘Question authority: in defense of moral naturalism without clout’, in: 
Philosophical Studies 150: 221-38 
 
Vaidya, A., (2010), ‘The Epistemology of Modality’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology 
Visited on September 1 2010 
 
Väyrynen, P., (2009), ‘Normative Appeals to the Natural’, in: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 79: 279-314 
 
Velleman, J.D., (1996), ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’, in: Ethics 106: 694-726 
Velleman, J.D., (2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
Velleman, J.,D., (2004), ‘Replies to Discussion on The Possibility of Practical Reason’, in: 
Philosophical Studies 121: 225-38 
 
Vogelstein, E., (forthcoming), ‘Moral normativity’, in: Philosophical Studies  
 
Wallace, R.J., (MS), ‘The Deontic Structure of Morality’, available online at  
http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/files/21.  
 
Way, J., (2012), ‘Explaining the Instrumental Principle’, in: Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 90: 487-506 
 
Wayne, D., (2008), ‘Implicature’, in: Zalta, E.N., (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/#2. Visited on April 6 2010 
 
Wedgwood, R., (2001), ‘Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms’, in: Philosophical 
Review 110: 1-30 
Wedgwood, R., (2007), The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Wedgwood, R., (2011), ‘Instrumental Rationality’, in: Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics 6: 280-309 
 
West, C., (2010), ‘Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of 
Morality’, in: Joyce, R., S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John 
Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer 
 
Williams, B., (1979), ‘Internal and external reasons’, in: Harrison, R. (ed.), Rational Action, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; reprinted in: Williams, B., (1981), Moral Luck, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Williams, B., (1985a), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press 
Williams, B., (1985b), ‘Ethics and the Fabric of the World’, in: Honderich, T. (ed.), 
Morality and Objectivity, London, Routledge  
Williams, B., (1995a), ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’, in: Making Sense of 
Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
- 259 - 
Williams, B., (1995b), ‘Replies’, in: Altham, J.E.J., R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and 
Ethics, Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Williams, B., (2001), ‘Postscript: Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons’, in: 
Millgram, E. (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
 
Williamson, T., (2007), The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
 
Wittgenstein, L., (1965), ‘Lecture on Ethics’, in: Philosophical Review 74: 3-12 
 
Wright, C., (1996), ‘Truth in Ethics’, in: Hooker, B. (ed.), Truth in Ethics, Oxford: 
Blackwell 
 
Zangwill, N., (2012), ‘Rationality and Moral Realism’, in: Ratio 23(3): 345-64 
 
 
